JAPAN BANS DEER AND ELK MEAT AND ALLOWS SOME BEEF PRODUCTS ? really USDA okays some beef imports from Japan
August 27, 2012 By Julie Harker Leave a Comment
The USDA has cleared the way for whole cuts of boneless beef imports from Japan to resume, having determined that Japan is now free of foot-and-mouth disease. The U.S. halted beef exports from Japan to the United States in April 2010 while Japan managed its food-and-mouth outbreak.
A report on Farm.Com says the USDA also reviewed Japan’s food safety measures in light of concerns about radioactive contamination as a result of their nuclear crisis last year. The U.S. reviewed and approved of those measures. Wagyu beef, which is highly marbled, makes up the bulk of Japanese beef imported by the U.S.
Export Requirements for Japan
JA-224 (Aug 15, 2012)
Asterisks (*) indicate the most recent revision to these requirements. To search, click on your browser's "Edit" menu, then click on "Find (on this page)". Enter "*" in the "Find What" field, then click "Find" or "Find Next" until all asterisks have been identified.
Red Meat Export Requirements for Japan
B. Ineligible Meat Products
- Beef heads (hygienically removed tongues and cheek meat are eligible), processed beef products and veal products, ground beef and ground veal, and advanced meat recovery products containing beef or veal.
- Meat and meat products derived from sheep and goats.
- Coloring agents are not permitted in raw meat products.
- Bison, deer and elk meat.*
Alternative BSE Risk Assessment Methodology for Beef and Beef Offal Imported into Japan
Yasuhiro YOSHIKAWA1)*, Motohiro HORIUCHI2), Naotaka ISHIGURO3), Mutsuyo KADOHIRA4), Satoshi KAI5), Hidehiro MIZUSAWA6), Chisato NAGATA7), Takashi ONODERA8), Tetsutaro SATA9), Toshiyuki TSUTSUI10), Masahito YAMADA11) and Shigeki YAMAMOTO12)
1)School of Veterinary Medicine, Kitasato University, 23–35–1 Higashi, Towada, Aomori 034–8628, Japan
2)Laboratory of Veterinary Hygiene, Department of Applied Veterinary Sciences, Graduate School of Veterinary Medicine, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido 060–0818, Japan
3)Laboratory of Food and Environmental Hygiene, Department of Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Applied Biological Sciences, Gifu University, Gifu 501–1193, Japan
4)Department of Life Science and Agriculture, Obihiro University of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine, Obihiro, Hokkaido 080–8555, Japan
5)Faculty of Business, Marketing and Distribution, Nakamura Gakuen University, Fukuoka, Fukuoka 814–0198, Japan
6)Department of Neurology and Neurological Science, Tokyo Medical and Dental University, Yushima, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113–8619, Japan
7)Department of Epidemiology & Preventive Medicine, Graduate School of Medicine, Gifu University, Gifu 501–1193, Japan
8)Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 1–1–1 Yayoi, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113–8657, Japan
9)Department of Pathology, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Toyama, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162–8640, Japan
10)Epidemiological Research Team, National Institute of Animal Health, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305–0856, Japan
11)Department of Neurology and Neurobiology of Aging, Graduate School of Medical Science, Kanazawa University, Kanazawa 920–8640, Japan
12)Division of Biomedical Food Research, National Institute of Health, Yoga, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 158–8501, Japan
(Received 11 September 2010/Accepted 31 October 2011/Published online in J-STAGE 14 November 2011)
The Food Safety Commission (FSC) of Japan, established in July 2003, has its own initiative to conduct risk assessments on food stuffs known as “self-tasking assessment”. Within this framework, the FSC decided to conduct a risk assessment of beef and beef offal imported into Japan from countries with no previous BSE reports; thus, a methodology was formed to suit to this purpose. This methodology was partly based on the previous assessments of Japanese domestic beef and beef imported from U.S.A./Canada, but some modifications were made. Other organizations’ assessment methods, such as those used for BSE status assessment in live cattle by the OIE and EFSA’s GBR, were also consulted. In this review, the authors introduce this alternative methodology, which reflects (1) the risk of live cattle in the assessed country including temporal risks of BSE invasion and domestic propagation, with the assessment results verified by surveillance data, and (2) the risk of beef and beef offal consisting of cumulative BSE risk by types of slaughtering and meat production processes implemented and the status of mechanically recovered meat production. Other possible influencing factors such as atypical BSE cases were also reviewed. The key characteristic of the current assessment is a combination of the time-sequential risk level of live cattle and qualitative risk level of meat production at present in an assessed country.
KEY WORDS: beef, BSE, importation, prion diseases, risk assessment.
*Correspondence to: Yoshikawa, Y., School of Veterinary Medicine, Kitasato University, 23–35–1 Higashi, Towada, Aomori 034–8628, Japan. e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org or email@example.com Authors’ notes: The authors, except for the first author, are listed alphabetically. This article is based on the discussion at a Prion Expert Committee meeting. ©2012 The Japanese Society of Veterinary Science
doi: 10.1292/jvms.10-0393; J. Vet. Med. Sci. 74(8): 959–968, 2012
More than 20 years have passed since BSE was officially recognized in the U.K. Now, there is prominent evidence showing the efficacy of a real feed ban and the abolishment of using meat and bone meal (MBM) derived from mammals in feeds for mammals. The total number of BSEpositive cases in the world last year was less than that of one day when the BSE outbreak was at its peak in the U.K. from 1992 through 1993. However, the U.K. continued to spread the sources of BSE pathogens, such as live cattle and animal feeds, to two dozen countries, resulting in a cumulative number of more than 220 variant CJD patients in the world .
Currently, Japan imports beef and beef offal from the U.S.A. and Canada, two countries that have previously experienced BSE cases and for which the Food Safety Commission (FSC) in Japan has already assessed the BSE risks of their beef and beef offal. Besides these two countries, Japan also imports beef and beef offal from other countries where no BSE cases have been reported so far. However, some of these countries were categorized as Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) category III by the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA). According to EFSA’s definition, countries are designated as GBR category III either because they are estimated to have a reasonably high possibility of having BSE cases that have not been detected or because they have had a few confirmed cases of BSE. Among exporters to Japan, there are also countries that have simply not been assessed by EFSA’s GBR.
Japanese risk managers presently request importers of beef and beef offal from the above countries to submit official health certificates confirming that the cattle are of healthy origin and also ask that they refrain from importing specified risk materials (SRM). Although the health certificates are confirmed at quarantine stations, there are currently no measures to clarify the exclusion of SRM among beef products imported. There is also uncertainty over potential risks of imported beef and beef offal due to insufficient availability of data related to BSE prevalence and anti-BSE countermeasures in the above-mentioned countries.
The FSC in Japan conducts risk assessments at the request of risk managers, or alternatively, it can also conduct assessments on its own initiative, termed “self-tasking assessment”. The process of hazard selection for self-tasking assessment is as follows. The Expert Committee for Planning collects information and screens the possible assessment subjects based on the degree of public concern in Japan, based on demands for information collection either due to increasing necessity for developing hazards or based on items that are heavily requested for assessment. Selected subjects are then discussed for potential assessment at the Commission’s opinion exchange meetings, and finally, the FSC officially adopts the hazards of choice to be the next subject of selftasking assessment.
Risk assessment of beef and beef offal imported into Japan was among the most requested items during public meetings and other occasions hosted by the FSC. Behind these requests, there seemed to be public concern over uncertainty about BSE risks in beef and beef products imported from countries other than the U.S.A. and Canada. With this situation, the FSC decided to conduct “risk assessment of beef and beef offal imported into Japan” as its self-tasking assessment.
The current assessment conducted by the Prion Expert Committee (PEC) of the FSC in Japan is based on the following concepts: (1) presently, the worldwide BSE prevalence is in the trend of decline; (2) this risk assessment is essentially different from the rest of the BSE-related risk assessments previously conducted by the FSC, in that the assessed countries are only those that have not previously reported BSE cases; (3) previous risk assessments of beef and beef products from the U.S.A. and Canada were conducted by comparing their risks with that of Japanese beef and beef products so that the assessment was based on the relativity; and (4) it was foreseen to be based on the data submitted by each assessed country on a voluntary basis. Subsequently, assuming that there may be certain limitations concerning data availability and submission, the PEC decided to largely conduct this assessment on a qualitative basis but to strive to make it as quantitative as possible.
It was with this background that the PEC firstly developed an alternative assessment method suited to the current situation and then carried out BSE risk assessment for imported beef and beef offal according to this method. In this review, the authors describe the structure and logic of this assessment method. A sample assessment result is provided at the end of this article to enhance readers’ understanding.
PRINCIPLES OF THE CURRENT RISK ASSESSMENT
The methodology for the current risk assessment was developed based on the previously used models for risk assessments of Japanese domestic beef and for US/Canadian beef imported into Japan [5, 6]. OIE’s risk assessment criteria for BSE status and the EFSA GBR method were also referred to [8, 11]. The PEC for the current assessment aimed to deliver the overall conclusion as a science-based comprehensive assessment defined by time periods and based on a combination of the following risk aspects: ...
Recently, there have been a few cases of irregular forms of BSE (atypical BSE) reported apart from classical BSE in Europe, Japan and the U.S.A. These reports of atypical BSE indicated variation in molecular sizes of abnormal prion proteins (PrPSc) among cases, and eventually two major sizes of proteins were designated as the H and L types. Most of the atypical BSE cases were found in aged cattle over 8 years old, but a remarkable exception exists in Japan, where a steer only 23 months old was reported to have been infected with atypical BSE (the 8th BSE case in Japan). When this exception was excluded, the detection ages of atypical BSE cases ranged from 6.3 to 18 years old. The average detection ages for the H and L types were 11.8 and 11.6 years old, respectively .
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there have been about 40 cases of atypical BSE reported worldwide, yet the OIE does not require distinction between classical and atypical BSE cases in member countries for their reports, while the EFSA only recently referred to case reporting by classical/atypical recognition in its 2009 scientific opinion. These situations seem to further obscure the clear number of atypical BSE cases occurring in the world.
The origin of atypical BSE has not yet been determined. According to EFSA’s scientific opinion published in 2008, all the cases of atypical BSE were reported with birth dates before the real feed ban in January 2001 in Europe. Therefore, the possibility of these atypical cases being attributed to contaminated feeds, just as in classical BSE, cannot be completely denied. On the other hand, data of atypical BSE cases (both the H and L types) in France did not show any reasonable correlation between birth year and frequency of occurrence, as was indicated in classical BSE cases, thus raising the possible interpretation of atypical BSE being sporadic isolated cases of prion disease .
Based on the data accumulated in France, the frequencies of atypical BSE cases per 1 million tested adult cattle were estimated to be 0.41 and 0.35 cases for the H and L types, respectively (1.9 and 1.7 cases for the H and L-types, respectively, when limiting the sampling to tested cattle over 8 years old). In Japan, a total of 10 million cattle including fallen stock and slaughtered cattle were tested for BSE, and the results showed no positive cases of the H type and 2 positive cases (case 8, a 23-month-old steer; case 24, a 169-month-old Japanese black cow) of the L type of atypical BSE. These data indicate that Japan has prevalence frequencies of 0 and 0.2 cases of the H and L types of atypical BSE per 1 million cattle including tested fallen stock and slaughtered cattle (zero and approximately 1.5 cases of the H and L types respectively, when limiting the sampling to tested slaughtered cattle over 8 years old).
Atypical BSE of both the H and L types was confirmed to be transmissible by intracerebral inoculation in transgenic mice expressing alleles of bovine or ovine PrP genes and of inbred mice. However, for transgenic mice expressing human prion protein, the L type but not the H type could be transmitted according to the previously published reports (recently, it was reported that H type also transmissible to the humanized transgenic mice). There have also been reports of glycosylation pattern transformation from L-type BASE3 PrPSc-like type to more of the classical BSE PrPSc type. This phenomenon was observed during passage using inbred and transgenic TgVR2 mice. As for the atypical cases of BSE confirmed in Japan, the 24th case of BSE was determined to have had the atypical L type at the detection age of 169 months old, and its sample was successfully transmitted to transgenic mice expressing bovine prion protein. However, transmission of a sample from the other case of atypical L-type BSE confirmed in Japan (the 8th case; detected at the age of 23-month-old) was reported to be unsuccessful in transgenic mice expressing bovine prion protein. The reason for this inconsistency is not clear at this time, although the possible presence of a limitation in the amount of prion protein accumulated in the subject’s brain sample or that the inoculated volume was too low to reach the detection limit cannot be excluded.
A recent report has shown that the atypical L type of BSE has a higher degree of potential for pathogenicity than that its classical counterpart because incubation periods are shorter in atypical BSE transmitted to transgenic mice expressing human prion protein, suggesting that atypical BSE possibly has a higher degree of pathogenicity when compared to its classical counterpart .
In contrast to classical BSE, the systemic distribution of abnormal prion protein in atypical BSE cases is barely known. Therefore, it is unclear whether the brainstem is truly the optimal part for sampling and testing in H/L type detection. Likewise, information regarding the infectivity distribution of atypical BSE is scarce in bovine peripheral tissues and body fluid. All together, the lack of essential data hinders, to a certain extent, evaluation of the relative risk-reducing effects of various SRM removal measures for cattle.
Based on the currently available data concerning the potential risks for humans of atypical BSE and prevalence of atypical BSE, it may be too extreme to deny the risk of MRM, especially in MRM derived from aged cattle. However, the degree of influence of the presence of atypical BSE on our concept of the MRM risk will be limited to a low level under the circumstances with presently available knowledge and our discussion. In the meantime, one must also be reminded of the fact that only a limited amount of data is currently available concerning atypical BSE. A proper amount of dis cretion should be used when interpreting these data to avoid unnecessary confusion. Further research and accumulation of data will bring additional insight into the mechanism, pathogenicity and transmission potential of atypical BSE, for which further assessment may become necessary in the future.
To gain the final result of this assessment, the periodic BSE risk status of a country (the sum of invasive BSE risk and domestic stability) and efficacy of present BSE riskreducing measures at meat processing lines were combined and used as an indicator of comprehensive likelihood of BSE prion contamination in beef and beef offal imported into Japan. Surveillance data were used to verify reliability of the assessment. Finally, a summary of each country was expressed in schematic figures (an example is shown in Fig. 4). In Fig. 4, a model country’s invasive risk was ranked as high (from 1986–2005) but was reduced to the middle level from 2006 onwards. The efficacy of feed ban (domestic stability) was unstable during 1986–1989 but improved to the middle level (1990–1996), to the stable level (1997–2000) and then to the very stable level (2001-until now). Current risk reduction efficacy at meat processing lines, determined by factors such as the definition of SRM, compulsory removal of SRM by law, and HACCP/SSOP procedures were good and verified and were therefore rated as ◎. BSE testing at slaughterhouse (>30 months), proper slaughtering procedures such as avoidance of air stunning and pithing were verified as ◎. All together, the overall risk reduction was extremely effective.
The final assessment for this model country was as follows: the domestic BSE exposure/propagation risk was low, and risk reduction at meat processing lines was extremely effective; therefore, the risk of BSE contamination of beef and beef offal imported from this assessed country was considered to be negligible.
RISK ASSESSMENT OF BEEF AND BEEF OFFAL IMPORTED INTO JAPAN
Tuesday, July 17, 2012
O.I.E. BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE PRION DISEASE Final Report of the 80th General Session, 20 - 25 May 2012
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Cc: firstname.lastname@example.org ; email@example.com ; firstname.lastname@example.org ; B.Vallat@oie.int
Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2007 2:31 PM
Subject: TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES in the USA and OIE reporting of it ???
Greetings again OIE,
I am deeply concerned that the OIE has completely given up on the surveillance and eradication of TSE around the Globe. I am disappointed, and IF the OIE gives favorable ratings for the USA TSE rating with the new BSE/BASE MRR policy, I will then have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
1st and foremost question,
IF THE OIE gives favorable ratings for USA BSE/BASE/TSE, by what means will it be justified (scientific, not political) ??? ;
Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 9:12 PM
Subject: BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 COMMENT SUBMISSION
January 28, 2007
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Comment Submitted Comment Receipt
Thank you. Your comment on Document ID: APHIS-2006-0041-0001 has been sent. Comment Tracking Number: APHIS-2006-0041-DRAFT-0028
Attachments: C:\My Music\My Documents\APHIS-2006-0041_January 28.doc
If you wish to retain a copy of the receipt, use the following link to print a copy for your files.
IN SHORT, AND IN A NUT SHELL ;
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,
Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST August 24, 2005
Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Greetings APHIS ET AL,
My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;
Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:
Whole cuts of boneless beef from- Japan...
snip... see full text ;
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;
When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?
What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”
“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi State.
In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said
The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.
Saturday, August 4, 2012
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE INVESTIGATION JULY 2012
Summary Report BSE 2012
Saturday, August 4, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE Epidemiological Investigation
WHO WILL FOLLOW THE CHILDREN FOR CJD SYMPTOMS (aka mad cow disease) FOR THE NEXT 50 YEARS ???
Saturday, May 2, 2009
U.S. GOVERNMENT SUES WESTLAND/HALLMARK MEAT OVER USDA CERTIFIED DEADSTOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
OUR SCHOOL CHILDREN ALL ACROSS THE USA WERE FED THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE FOR 4 YEARS I.E. DEAD STOCK DOWNER CATTLE VIA THE USDA AND THE NSLP.
WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5+ DECADES ???
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???
you can check and see here ;
the article in question was an opinion article _written_ by Dr. Richard Raymond former Undersecretary for Food Safety, U.S. Department of Agriculture (2005-2008), and published on Bill Marlers Food Safety News feed.
Sunday, August 26, 2012
Detection of PrPSc in peripheral tissues of clinically affected cattle after oral challenge with BSE
in the url that follows, I have posted
SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.
MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until 2007, when they ceased posting them.
MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.
Friday, May 18, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012
2011 Monday, September 26, 2011
L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD
Tuesday, June 26, 2012
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada, Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012
type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the rise in Canada and the USA
Monday, July 23, 2012
The National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center July 2012
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...
***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) . Oral transmission studies with H-type BSEinfected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission.
In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.
Sunday, August 26, 2012
Detection of PrPSc in peripheral tissues of clinically affected cattle after oral challenge with BSE
Monday, September 3, 2012
Sale of misbranded and/or non-inspected meat and meat products to Omaha Public Schools indicted
Response to Public Comments
Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005
The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Risk_Assessments/index.asp). Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:
Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.
October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [email@example.com]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006
Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;
Terry S. Singeltary
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [firstname.lastname@example.org]
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 6:17 PM
Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
I would kindly like to submit the following to [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001