Friday, October 30, 2015

Brazil Agriculture minister to visit Saudi Arabia over BSE mad cow trade

BRAZIL

 

29/10/2015 - 20:00hs Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on gmail More Sharing Services Agriculture minister to visit Saudi Arabia Kátia Abreu will continue negotiations to unlock exports of Brazilian beef and will attend the Business Forum South America-Arab Countries.

 

Alexandre Rocha* alexandre.rocha@anba.com.br

 

São Paulo – Kátia Abreu, Brazil’s minister of Agriculture, will go to Saudi Arabia next week to continue negotiations for the reopening of the market to Brazilian beef exports and to attend the Business Forum South America- Arab Countries, on November 8th and 9th, an event leading up to the 4th Summit South American-Arab Countries (Aspa, in the Portuguese and Spanish acronym), scheduled for November 10th and 11th in Riyadh, the country’s capital.

 

The Arab nation suspended beef imports at the end of 2012, when the Brazilian government announced that an animal from the Paraná state herd, which died in 2010, was carrying the causing agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), aka mad cow disease, without, however, developing the disease.

 

Since then, government officials from both countries had several meetings to discuss the resumption of exports. In June, for instance, Saudi authorities were in Brazil to visit beef producing plants to get to know the Brazilian sanitary controls, with the goal to support a decision about the embargo. The expectation now is for negotiations to advance.

 

In the business forum, the minister will speak on investment opportunities in Brazilian agribusiness.

 

After Saudi Arabia, Abreu will go to the United Arab Emirates and has meetings scheduled with authorities and businesspersons in the capital Abu Dhabi. After, she will go to India and China.

 

Agribusiness exports from Brazil to Saudi Arabia fetched USD 1.52 billion from January to August, up 7.25% from a year ago, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. Sales to the UAE grossed USD 831 million, down 25.5%.

 

Diplomacy

 

Foreign Ministry sources said some of the main topics on the Aspa summit’s agenda will be the issue of refugees fleeing conflicts in Syria and other countries in the region, as well as the conflicts in themselves, i.e. international affairs.

 

The primary concern regarding refugees is the multitudes trying to reach Europe, whereas Brazil, despite its distance, issued over 8,000 visas to people fleeing the civil war in Syria, and granted refugee status to over 2,000.

 

Other important topics, according to the Ministry, will be energy, food security, the environment, desertification, water resource management, South-South cooperation in healthcare, and trade agreements. It is worth noting that the Mercosur is in talks for agreements of this sort with several Arab countries, and some such treaties have been signed, such as with Egypt.

 

*Translated by Sérgio Kakitani & Gabriel Pomerancblum

 


 

 Monday, May 5, 2014

 

Brazil 2nd BSE Mad Cow disease confirmed OIE 02/05/2014

 


 

Thursday, April 24, 2014

 

Brazil investigates possible BSE mad cow case

 


 

Thursday, September 26, 2013

 

Brazil evaluate the implementation of health rules on animal by-products and derived products SRM BST TSE PRION aka MAD COW DISEASE

 


 

Friday, December 07, 2012

 

ATYPICAL BSE BRAZIL 2010 FINALLY CONFIRMED OIE 2012

 


 

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

 

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Brazil

 


 

Monday, October 26, 2015

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE October 2015

 


 

Sunday, October 18, 2015

 

World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Institut Pasteur Cooperating on animal disease and zoonosis research

 


 

Sunday, October 25, 2015

 

USAHA Detailed Events Schedule – 119th USAHA Annual Meeting CAPTIVE LIVESTOCK CWD SCRAPIE TSE PRION

 


 

Wednesday, October 28, 2015

 

Interim Chronic Wasting Disease Response Rules Comment online through 07:00 a.m. November 5, 2015

 


 

Friday, October 23, 2015

 

CJD FOUNDATION CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE TSE PRION QUESTIONNAIRE UPDATE OCTOBER 2015

 


 

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

 

SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL (SRM) CONTROL VERIFICATION TASK FSIS NOTICE 70-13 10/30/13

 


 

*** U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 


 


 

*** USA sporadic CJD MAD COW DISEASE HAS HUGE PROBLEM Video

 

*** you can see video here and interview with Jeff's Mom, and scientist telling you to test everything and potential risk factors for humans ***

 


 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease

 

*** Kuru Video

 

Kuru: The Science and The Sorcery

 


 

*** Scrapie Video

 


 

*** Human Mad Cow Video

 


 

I asked someone recently, what sort of hunting legacy do you want to leave your children, did you want to have where all you have are blind, slobbering, drooling, stumbling, or maybe even healthy looking subclinical cwd infected cervid, to go on and expose who knows what (cause cwd is spreading, it has mutated, and nobody can seem to stop it so far), but is this what we want to leave our children? the only answer I ever seem to get from anyone in the industry, is just let cwd take care of itself. how is that working out for us so far? my opinion, until we have a 100% validated live test for cwd tse prion (and we don’t yet)

 


 

in my opinion, the scorched earth policy is the only policy available. and then what do you do with the land? ($$$)

 

this cwd tse prion must be stopped. the vertical and lateral transmission of this cwd tse prion agent amongst cervids, if cwd jumps species (if it has not already), and transmits the same ways vertical and lateral in other species, and the other species are as susceptible from so many different routes and sources, simply put, we’re screwed, if we are not screwed already, I mean the mad cow bse tse prion been out of the barn here in North America for Decades, just saying.

 

I am not trying to scare anyone, I am simply presenting the facts, you must make your own decision or not. we have ignored these tse prion disease way too long. right now seems policy is just to change the name of them, and call it a day, (that would take to long to explain i.e. ibnc bse tse or the infamous sporadic ffi or sporadic gss that is not tied to any family link...GET OUT OF HERE...iatrogenic maybe from ffi or gss, maybe) but to let lobbyist and their legislators make up the science and the policy making for cwd tse pron there from, and continue to ignore sound science, is a terrible mistake in my opinion.

 

like I said, if and when, a tse mutates into humans like cwd in cervid, we are screwed. we have been extremely lucky so for, with the _documented_ body bag count, with the science to date i.e. the UKBSEnvCJD only theory (I have highly disputed this from day one, and since then have been proven correct by science, but on paper, it’s the same old shit still i.e. UKBSEnvCJD only theory).

 

how many have we missed ???

 

Wednesday, September 2, 2015

 

Clinically Unsuspected Prion Disease Among Patients With Dementia Diagnoses in an Alzheimer’s Disease Database

 


 

 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net on the bottom, Galveston Bay

Tuesday, October 20, 2015

FBI: Agroterrorism not likely, but very possible, Dr. Stephen Gold­smith FBI Laboratory Division, here's your sign

CC-Dr. Steve Goldsmith, FBI Laboratory Division

 

please note, I tried to forward this to the FBI, spoke with several folks at FBI headquarters, and they were not interested...just saying...terry

 

FBI: Agroterrorism not likely, but very possible

 

Posted: Monday, October 19, 2015 10:00 am

 

FBI: Agroterrorism not likely, but very possible By Sara Bredesen, Regional Editor | stbrede@gmail.com The Country Today | 0 comments

 

Acts of ter­ror­ism against U.S. agri­cul­ture are highly pos­si­ble, but not highly likely, ac­cord­ing to Stephen Gold­smith, a vet­eri­nar­ian with the Bi­o­log­i­cal Coun­ter­mea­sures Unit of the Fed­eral Bureau of In­ves­ti­ga­tion.

 

“The prob­lem is, a lot of con­flict ar­eas in the world that are un­sta­ble — there are ter­ror­ist groups in con­trol — these are also en­demic ar­eas for a lot of dis­eases. They have foot-and-mouth dis­ease, they have PPR (goat plague), they have lumpy skin dis­ease, sheep and goat pox, and a lot of these other dis­eases,” Gold­smith told his au­di­ence dur­ing an agroter­ror­ism sem­i­nar at World Dairy Expo ear­lier this month. “It doesn’t take a rocket sci­en­tist to see what the threat is. We have to re­al­ize that agri­cul­ture is a tar­get. I hate to say it, (but) peo­ple don’t like us.”

 

Gold­smith de­fined agroter­ror­ism as the use of bi­o­log­i­cal, chem­i­cal, ra­di­o­log­i­cal, nu­clear or ex­plo­sive weapons against some com­po­nent of the agri­cul­ture in­dus­try. While any of these weapons of mass de­struc­tion could be de­ployed, the in­ten­tional re­lease of bi­o­log­ics is the most wor­ri­some be­cause of its po­ten­tial to dam­age the econ­omy of the coun­try and food se­cu­rity.

 

Gold­smith used foot-and-mouth dis­ease as an ex­am­ple. It is highly con­ta­gious and spreads rapidly.

 

“If we had one pos­i­tive or even pre­sump­tive di­ag­no­sis in the United States, it would im­me­di­ately shut down the ex­port of ev­ery prod­uct live or pro­cessed, food or other prod­ucts, in­clud­ing se­men (and) fe­tal calf serum for di­ag­nos­tic tests. Any­thing from a sus­cep­ti­ble species would be shut down im­me­di­ately,” he said.

 

Another is­sue with con­ta­gious dis­eases is that most of them are zoonotic, mean­ing they can spread among dif­fer­ent do­mes­tic and wild species and to hu­mans. Seventy-five per­cent of emerg­ing dis­eases are zoonotic, and 60 per­cent of all dis­eases that af­fect hu­mans af­fect mul­ti­ple species, Gold­smith said.

 

It would be rel­a­tively easy for a ter­ror­ist to col­lect in­fected ma­te­rial from an en­demic area and in­tro­duce it into Amer­i­can agri­cul­ture, which Gold­smith de­scribed as a soft tar­get. An­i­mals are of­ten kept close to roads, and crop fields can run for miles with­out a fence.

 

“In Is­lam, it is against the Ko­ran to at­tack food, but it is al­lowed in the face of an over­whelm­ing force against the ji­had,” Gold­smith said. “Thank heav­ens they tend to want to blow things up, and it’s harder to do that in the United States than in other parts of the world, and they haven’t seen bioter­ror­ism as a cred­i­ble thing.”

 

He added that in the U.S., an­i­mal rights and en­vi­ron­men­tal ac­tivist groups have com­mit­ted more acts of ter­ror­ism than al-Qaeda has.

 

While there have been ac­ci­den­tal in­tro­duc­tions of dis­eases, chem­i­cals and in­va­sive pests into agri­cul­ture and forestry, the FBI is keep­ing tabs on sus­pi­cious cir­cum­stances that might sug­gest an in­ten­tional at­tack. The con­cen­tra­tion is on an­i­mal dis­eases, but crop dis­eases are also a con­cern.

 

“The thing with these dis­eases, even if you get some of these dis­eases and they are con­trol­lable, it in­creases the cost of pro­duc­tion tremen­dously, es­pe­cially with some of the fun­gal (dis­eases),” he said.

 

Gold­smith said the only way to pre­vent agroter­ror­ism is through biose­cu­rity, and the only peo­ple that can do that are the pro­duc­ers them­selves.

 

He rec­om­mended beef­ing up phys­i­cal se­cu­rity like gate and door locks, be­ing ob­ser­vant of clin­i­cal symp­toms that are highly un­usual in the live­stock herd, do­ing a thor­ough screen­ing of new em­ploy­ees and train­ing them to re­port con­cerns, and watch­ing for un­usual ac­tiv­ity or un­fa­mil­iar peo­ple in the area,

 

“You hate to be sus­pi­cious of nice peo­ple, but there’s a lot of peo­ple that are not nice that you need to be sus­pi­cious of,” Gold­smith said.

 

If a very un­usual out­break of symp­toms shows up among live­stock, no­tify lo­cal or state health au­thor­i­ties im­me­di­ately. It may not be an in­ten­tional threat, but the FBI is able to track re­ports and iden­tify pat­terns if they ex­ist.

 

“We don’t want you to lay awake at night, get ner­vous and have ul­cers, but think about things,” Gold­smith said.

 


 

Friday, October 2, 1 p.m.

 

“Agroterrorism Threat Briefing and Roles of Law Enforcement” Stephen Goldsmith DVM, WMD Directorate-Biological Countermeasures Unit, HQ, FBI Sponsored By: Quality Liquid Feeds, Inc. Continuing Education Credits: ARPAS (1), RACE (1)

 

Agricultural terrorism is a primarily economic attack against the U.S. that targets livestock and food crops. This seminar will describe the use of animal and crop diseases as asymmetrical warfare tools and what the indicators and triggers of these attacks are. As a longtime employee of the FBI and Army National Guard and Reserve veteran, Stephan Goldsmith DVM will present the role of law enforcement and agriculture agencies in the joint investigation of intentional criminal or terrorist attacks against agriculture. Goldsmith currently serves in the WMD Directorate-Biological Countermeasures Unit for the FBI as an agricultural terrorism subject matter expert. Previously, he served six years in the Hazardous Material Science Response Unit of the FBI Laboratory Division, and was a Field Veterinary Medical Officer and FAD Diagnostician with USDA-APHIS-Veterinary Services in Georgia, Bolivia and North Carolina. He also worked as the Assistant Bureau Chief at the Bureau of Contagious and Infectious Diseases with the Florida Department of Agriculture State Veterinarian’s Office as was in private large animal practice in South Georgia for 10 years.

 


 

 >>> Acts of ter­ror­ism against U.S. agri­cul­ture are highly pos­si­ble, but not highly likely, ac­cord­ing to Stephen Gold­smith, a vet­eri­nar­ian with the Bi­o­log­i­cal Coun­ter­mea­sures Unit of the Fed­eral Bureau of In­ves­ti­ga­tion. <<<

 

 now that is an oxymoron of a statement if I ever heard one.

 

 That kind of mentality is what brought the twin towers down. you sit back on one’s laurels, and people can die. see ;

 

 USDA, APHIS, FSIS, HHS, ET AL, on animal disease preparedness grade score = F+.

 

With Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE prion disease aka mad cow disease, one mad cow caused total chaos, and to this day, the USA is not, and has never been prepared.

 

all one has to do is look at mad cow disease, something these agencies can’t even say now, but look at that blunder, Larry, Curly, and Moe could have done a better job.

 

but that’s what happens when you let the wolf guard the henhouse. industry governing and regulating itself will never work, especially when all they do is ignore sound science, for the sake of the industry.

 

I know that there are a lot of very dedicated folks working for these federal agencies, and I do applaud them, and I probably have not said that enough. but, when you have the industry and their lobbyist infiltrated in policy and decision making for human and animal health, over riding any sound decisions based on sound science, there lay the problem, and nothing will get fixed as long as this continues to happen.

 

ANOTHER CONCERN OF MINE HAS BEEN BIOTERRORISM. please see why ;

 

Air Traffic passengers, hidden meat products, and mad cow type disease BSE TSE Prion ;

 

Docket No: 02-088-1 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins

 

Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;

 

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 –0600

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

To: regulations@aphis.usda.gov Docket No: 02-088-1

 

Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins

 


 

Greetings,

 

i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA. please be warned;

 

Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 –0800

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system)

 

MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth [Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]

 

snip...

 

Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine, including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.

 

snip...

 

From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been in Greece is prohibited.

 

snip...

 


 

========================

 

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the country?

 

Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product. Sources: World Trade Atlas

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country? Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE;

 

most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

Greetings list members, i just cannot accept this;

 

> 23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)

 

> The data do not provide a species of origin code for these

 

> products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

 

what kind of statement is this?

 

how stupid do they think we are?

 

it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?

 

There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000. APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

 

A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights. As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria? Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species. Source: World Trade Atlas

 

snip...

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?

 

A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US. Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ

 


 

Greetings FDA and public,

 

if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.

 

[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001.

 

Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]

 

if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.

 

[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]

 

more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?

 

snip...

 

A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001.

 

Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.

 


 

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?

 

Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

 

A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest.

 

Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;

 


 

more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';

 

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again

 

References: <3dc198e3 .8090704="" wt.net=""> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean

 

Greetings again List Members, let me kick a madcow around here a bit.

 

on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system. the USDA/APHIS states;

 

> During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from

 

> Poland included non-species specific animal products

 

> used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal

 

> products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product

 

> imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant

 

> material.

 

NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;

 

ANNEX 1 Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001

 

EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY

 

The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards. This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time. The continuing very high external challenge supported this development. Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance. Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed. BSE surveillance: Not sufficient before 2001. Cross-contamination: Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.

 

see full text and ANNEX 1 at;

 


 


 

Sunday, January 11, 2015

 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 


 


 

Owens, Julie

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

 

To: FSIS RegulationsComments

 

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98

 


 

FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY

 


 

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net]

 

Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM

 

To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov

 

Cc: ggraber@cvm.fda.gov; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L

 

Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

 

Greetings FDA,

 

my name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr., i lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease).

 

i would kindly like to comment on the proposed HACCP method of detecting and or preventing TSEs in the human/animal feed supply.

 

it seems to me by implementing something that was designed for Astronauts instead of cattle, something that the GAO has already stated is terribly flawed (HACCP), i find it very disturbing to continue to insist on refusing to use rapid TSE TESTING in sufficient numbers to find TSEs, as with other Countries that they too once thought they were BSE free. for example, it took Italy 1 MILLION rapid TSE tests since 2001 to find 102 cases of BSE. THE USA has only tested 48,000 cattle in the 14 years of surveillance. there is documented proof that indeed the USA cattle have been infected with a TSE for decades, but the FDA/USDA and other USA Gov. agencies continue to conveniently ignore these findings. YOU must not ignore what Richard Marsh found. Plus, you must not ignore Asante/Collinge new findings that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD. The USA has been feeding ruminant by-products back to cattle, deer, elk and sheep for decades, and TSEs in these species have been recycled for feed for decades in the USA. The rendering process here in the USA will not kill this agent. to implement any HACCP over massive rapid TSE testing is only prolonging the inevitable, and will only allow the agent to spread further. it is simply a band-aid approach to something that needs a tourniquet...

 

3. Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety

 

Rules Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses. GAO-02-902, August 30.

 

FSIS Is Not Ensuring that Plants' HACCP Plans Meet Regulatory Requirements

 

snip...

 

According to FSIS's food safety systems correlation reviews, inspectors are not consistently identifying and documenting failures of plants' HACCP plans to meet regulatory requirements. Furthermore, FSIS does not expect its inspectors to determine whether HACCP plans are based on sound science--the cornerstone of an effective plan. While in-depth verification reviews examine the scientific aspects of HACCP plans, they have been conducted in very few plants, and consumer safety officers hired to review the scientific soundness of HACCP plans may take several years to assess the plans at all plants. Moreover, inspectors in 55 percent of the 5,000 plants nationwide did not document any HACCP violations during fiscal year 2001. When we brought this information to the attention of FSIS officials, they were surprised that so many plants had no HACCP violations for an entire year.

 

snip...

 

2. USDA believes that the title of the report is misleading. We disagree. We believe the title accurately reflects the concerns detailed throughout the body of the report.

 

snip...

 


 


 

FDA acknowledges that it has not yet identified and inspected all firms subject to the ban” pg. 3 ;

 


 

The report concludes that “federal actions do not sufficiently ensure that all BSE-infected animals or products are kept out or that if BSE were found it would be detected promptly and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or enter the human food chain” italics added pg. 3 ;

 


 

***********2015*********

 

THE last documented mad cow in the USA was in California, was an Atypical BSE BASE TSE prion aka mad cow type disease, the most lethal strain documented to date, and of which has now been linked to sporadic CJD. we have not heard much about BSE aka mad cow disease, due to the Governments covering up mad cow disease. all one as to do is look at the BSE MRR, which is a doctrine for the legal trading of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease around the globe. you can thank the OIE, USDA, WTO, just to name a few off the top of my head. it's all about trade folks, nothing else matters, when it comes to the TSE prion disease, due to the long incubation period, and no trace back efforts, even though that once clinical, all of the tse prion disease are fatal. then the federal governments continue to ignore more updated and ongoing sound science, peer review science, that indeed sporadic cjd is linked to not only atypical BSE mad cow disease, but also to atypical scrapie i.e the Nor-98 and typical scrapie as well. or the fact that the 1997 ruminant feed ban aka mad cow feed ban was and still is a terrible failure. but they don’t print that. ...just saying. now, you think I am crazy for saying this....now think back to asbestos and tobacco, and how those two man made killers were covered up for 100 years as cancer causing and killers, by our fine federal friends. for your fileS, use as you wish, but it’s the truth as I have come to know it from daily research of all said science, since my mothers demise to the heidenhain variant of creutzfeldt jakob disease i.e. hvcjd. ...just made a promise to mom, never forget, and never let them forget. ...kind regards, terry

 

Thursday, May 28, 2015

 

OIE cuts six European countries' mad cow risk level, while increasing risk factors for humans to the BSE TSE PRION DISEASE around the globe

 


 

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation

 


 

spontaneous atypical BSE ???

 

don’t let anyone fool you. spontaneous TSE prion disease is a hoax in natural cases, never proven.

 

all one has to do is look at France. France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$ same as the USA, that’s why they stopped testing for BSE mad cow disease in numbers they could find any with, after those atypical BSE cases started showing up. shut down the testing to numbers set up by OIE that are so low, you could only by accident find a case of BSE aka mad cow disease. and this brilliant idea by the WHO et al, to change the name of mad cow disease, thinking that might change things is preposterous. it’s all about money now folks, when the OIE, USDA and everyone else went along and made the TSE prion disease aka mad cow type disease a legal trading commodity by the BSE MRR policy, I would say everyone bit off more then they can chew, and they will just have to digest those TSE Prions coming from North America, and like it, and just prey you don’t get a mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease in the decades to come, and or pass it to some other poor soul via the iatrogenic medical surgical tissue friendly fire mode of transmission i.e. second hand transmission. it’s real folks, just not documented much, due to lack of trace back efforts. all iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, until the iatrogenic event is tracked down and documented, and put into the academic and public domain, which very seldom happens. ...

 

As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.

 


 

FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$

 

so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

 

Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT

 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

snip...see link ;

 

Saturday, May 09, 2015

 

Expression of genes involved in the T cell signalling pathway in circulating immune cells of cattle 24 months following oral challenge with Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE)

 


 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC -254 Accepted - Volume 11

 


 


 


 


 


 

*** PRION 2015 ORAL AND POSTER CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS ***

 

THANK YOU PRION 2015 TAYLOR & FRANCIS, Professor Chernoff, and Professor Aguzzi et al, for making these PRION 2015 Congressional Poster and Oral Abstracts available freely to the public. ...Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations

 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France

 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. ***We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE. ***Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), ***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.

 

===============

 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...

 

===============

 


 

 ***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. ***

 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. ***

 

P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification

 

Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan

 

To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA).

 

Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.

 

Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, ***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.

 

================

 


 


 

==========================================

 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.

 

==========================================

 

P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE

 

Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada

 

Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to disease as adults. Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with 100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to neurological disease. At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only. Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. We are further examining explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged animal.

 


 

10 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

 

CODE

 

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

42,090 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

WI

 

___________________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

 

CODE

 

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

2013

 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

Sunday, June 14, 2015

 

Larry’s Custom Meats Inc. Recalls Beef Tongue Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials BSE TSE Prion

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

 

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

 

IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure

 

Posted by flounder on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

 


 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

 

Singeltary et al

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan.

 

*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

Saturday, September 19, 2015

 

*** An interview with Professor John Collinge: VIDEO Director of the MRC Prion Unit Part of the Hayward Gallery's History Is Now ***

 


 

Thursday, July 30, 2015

 

Professor Lacey believes sporadic CJD itself originates from a cattle infection number of cattle farmers falling victim to Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease is much too high to be mere chance

 


 

Saturday, September 12, 2015

 

The Canadian Management of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Historical and Scientific Perspective, 1990-2014

 

>>>We propose that Canadian policies largely ignored the implicit medical nature of BSE, treating it as a purely agricultural and veterinary issue. In this way, policies to protect Canadians were often delayed and incomplete, in a manner disturbingly reminiscent of Britain’s failed management of BSE. Despite assurances to the contrary, it is premature to conclude that BSE (and with it the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) is a thing of Canada’s past: BSE remains very much an issue in Canada’s present. <<<

 


 

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

 

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

 

snip...

 

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

 


 

In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

 

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...

 


 

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

 

NIH Availability for Licensing AGENCY: [FR Doc. 2015–24117 Filed 9–22–15; 8:45 am] Detection and Discrimination of Classical and Atypical L-Type BSE Strains by RT-QuIC

 


 

Thursday, October 1, 2015

 

H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation

 

Master Obi-Wan Kenobi, Kemosabe...THIS IS NOT GOOD GOOSE!...grasshopper...tonto...tss

 


 

Wednesday, September 16, 2015

 

Ljubljana Slovenia First Mad Cow Disease Case in Eight Years Confirmed

 


 

Saturday, October 3, 2015

 

Wales Welsh Government Written Statement - Isolated case of Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy detected in deceased bovine

 


 

Sunday, October 18, 2015

 

World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Institut Pasteur Cooperating on animal disease and zoonosis research

 


 

Friday, May 29, 2015

 

GAO FEDERAL VETERINARIANS US Federal Government Is Unprepared for a Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak

 


 

Thursday, September 10, 2015

 

25th Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Food and Drug Administration Silver Spring, Maryland June 1, 2015

 


 

PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FT. COLLINS CWD RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS

 

*** LATE-BREAKING ABSTRACTS PRION 2015 CONFERENCE ***

 

O18

 

Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions

 

Liuting Qing1, Ignazio Cali1,2, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang3, Diane Kofskey1, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Wenquan Zou1, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 2Second University of Naples, Naples, Italy, 3Encore Health Resources, Houston, Texas, USA

 

*** These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.

 

==================

 

***These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.***

 

==================

 

P.105: RT-QuIC models trans-species prion transmission

 

Kristen Davenport, Davin Henderson, Candace Mathiason, and Edward Hoover Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA

 

Conversely, FSE maintained sufficient BSE characteristics to more efficiently convert bovine rPrP than feline rPrP. Additionally, human rPrP was competent for conversion by CWD and fCWD.

 

***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously estimated.

 

================

 

***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously estimated.***

 

================

 


 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 9:29 PM

 

To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Subject: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE R. G. WILL 1984

 

THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE

 

R. G. WILL

 

1984

 

*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). (SEE LINK IN REPORT HERE...TSS) PLUS, THE CDC DID NOT PUT THIS WARNING OUT FOR THE WELL BEING OF THE DEER AND ELK ;

 

snip...

 


 

July's Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article did prod state officials to ask CDC to investigate the cases of the three men who shared wild game feasts. The two men the CDC is still investigating were 55 and 66 years old. But there's also Kevin Boss, a Minnesota hunter who ate Barron County venison and died of CJD at 41. And there's Jeff Schwan, whose Michigan Tech fraternity brothers used to bring venison sausage back to the frat house. His mother, Terry, says that in May 2001, Jeff, 26, began complaining about his vision. A friend noticed misspellings in his e-mail, which was totally unlike him. Jeff began losing weight. He became irritable and withdrawn. By the end of June, he couldn't remember the four-digit code to open the garage door or when and how to feed his parents' cats. At a family gathering in July, he stuck to his parents and girlfriend, barely talking. "On the night we took him to the hospital, he was speaking like he was drunk or high and I noticed his pupils were so dilated I couldn't see the irises," his mother says. By then, Jeff was no longer able to do even simple things on his computer at work, and "in the hospital, he couldn't drink enough water." When he died on September 27, 2001, an autopsy confirmed he had sporadic CJD.

 

In 2000, Belay looked into three CJD cases reported by The Denver Post, two hunters who ate meat from animals killed in Wyoming and the daughter of a hunter who ate venison from a plant that processed Colorado elk. All three died of CJD before they were 30 years old. The CDC asked the USDA to kill 1,000 deer and elk in the area where the men hunted. Belay and others reported their findings in the Archives of Neurology, writing that although "circumstances suggested a link between the three cases and chronic wasting disease, they could find no 'causal' link." Which means, says Belay, "not a single one of those 1,000 deer tested positive for CWD. For all we know, these cases may be CWD. What we have now doesn't indicate a connection. That's reassuring, but it would be wrong to say it will never happen."

 

So far, says NIH researcher Race, the two Wisconsin cases pinpointed by the newspaper look like spontaneous CJD. "But we don't know how CWD would look in human brains. It probably would look like some garden-variety sporadic CJD." What the CDC will do with these cases and four others (three from Colorado and Schwan from Upper Michigan), Race says, is "sequence the prion protein from these people, inject it into mice and wait to see what the disease looks like in their brains. That will take two years."

 

CJD is so rare in people under age 30, one case in a billion (leaving out medical mishaps), that four cases under 30 is "very high," says Colorado neurologist Bosque. "Then, if you add these other two from Wisconsin [cases in the newspaper], six cases of CJD in people associated with venison is very, very high." Only now, with Mary Riley, there are at least seven, and possibly eight, with Steve, her dining companion. "It's not critical mass that matters," however, Belay says. "One case would do it for me." The chance that two people who know each other would both contact CJD, like the two Wisconsin sportsmen, is so unlikely, experts say, it would happen only once in 140 years.

 

Given the incubation period for TSEs in humans, it may require another generation to write the final chapter on CWD in Wisconsin. "Does chronic wasting disease pass into humans? We'll be able to answer that in 2022," says Race. Meanwhile, the state has become part of an immense experiment.

 


 

I urge everyone to watch this video closely...terry

 

*** you can see video here and interview with Jeff's Mom, and scientist telling you to test everything and potential risk factors for humans ***

 


 

*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***

 


 

*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies. ***

 


 

Wednesday, October 07, 2015

 

Deer Prion Proteins Modulate the Emergence and Adaptation of Chronic Wasting Disease Strains

 


 

Saturday, October 03, 2015

 

TEXAS CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION GOD MUST NOT BE A TEXAN 2002 TO 2015

 


 


 

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

 

*** Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings ***

 

Last updated 15 May 2015

 


 

Monday, August 17, 2015

 

FDA Says Endoscope Makers Failed to Report Superbug Problems OLYMPUS

 

I told Olympus 15 years ago about these risk factors from endoscopy equipment, disinfection, even spoke with the Doctor at Olympus, this was back in 1999. I tried to tell them that they were exposing patients to dangerous pathogens such as the CJD TSE prion, because they could not properly clean them. even presented my concern to a peer review journal GUT, that was going to publish, but then it was pulled by Professor Michael Farthing et al... see ;

 


 

*** now, from all the consumption and exposure above, now think iatrogenic cjd tse prion at a hospital near you, what if?

 

Thursday, August 13, 2015

 

Iatrogenic CJD due to pituitary-derived growth hormone with genetically determined incubation times of up to 40 years

 


 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

 

*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***

 


 

THE BAXTER STUDY...SEE MORE HERE ;

 


 

Tuesday, April 21, 2015

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee TSEAC MEETING SCHEDULED FOR June 1, 2015

 


 

Tuesday, August 4, 2015

 

*** FDA U.S. Measures to Protect Against BSE ***

 


 

Saturday, September 19, 2015

 

*** An interview with Professor John Collinge: VIDEO Director of the MRC Prion Unit Part of the Hayward Gallery's History Is Now ***

 


 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease

 

*** Kuru Video

 

Kuru: The Science and The Sorcery

 


 

*** Scrapie Video

 


 

*** Human Mad Cow Video

 


 

*** USA sporadic CJD MAD COW DISEASE HAS HUGE PROBLEM Video

 


 

Saturday, March 21, 2015

 

***Canada and United States Creutzfeldt Jakob TSE Prion Disease Incidence Rates Increasing ***

 


 

CANADA SEE STEADY INCREASE OF THE SPORADIC CJD’S AND THE VPSPR’S (sporadic CJD’s). ...tss

 

PLEASE NOTE, type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD) in Canada is also on a steady increase.

 

please see ;

 

> 3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is pending.

 

CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122

 

As of May 31, 2012

 

Deaths of Definite and Probable CJD

 

Year Sporadic Iatrogenic Familial GSS FFI vCJD Total

 

1994 2 0 0 1 0 0 3

 

1995 3 0 0 0 0 0 3

 

1996 13 0 0 0 0 0 13

 

1997 16 0 1 1 0 0 18

 

1998 22 1 0 1 0 0 24

 

1999 26 2 2 1 0 0 31

 

2000 32 0 0 3 0 0 35

 

2001 27 0 2 1 0 0 30

 

2002 31 0 2 2 0 1 36

 

2003 27 1 1 0 0 0 29

 

2004 42 0 1 0 0 0 43

 

2005 42 0 0 2 0 0 44

 

2006 39 0 1 3 1 0 44

 

2007 35 0 0 4 0 0 39

 

2008 48 0 1 0 0 0 49

 

2009 48 0 3 2 0 0 53

 

2010 34 0 3 0 0 0 37

 

2011 37 0 2 1 0 1 41

 

2012 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

 

Total 525 4 19 22 1 2 573

 

1. CJDSS began in 1998

 

2. Data before 1998 are retrospective and partial, data from 1998 to 2008 are complete, and data for 2009 - 2012 are provisional

 

3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is pending.

 

CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122

 

As of May 31, 2012

 


 

SEE DECEMBER 2012 CANADA

 


 

Saturday, June 15, 2013

 

Canada Fraser Health Statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease outbreak

 


 


 

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Sunday, December 14, 2014

 

ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report

 


 

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Friday, October 09, 2015

 

An alarming presentation level II trauma center of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease following a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head

 


 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

 

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323.

 


 


 

Thursday, October 1, 2015

 

Alzheimergate, re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy, Singeltary Submission to Nature

 


 

Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease

 

Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3, 2014

 

*** IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ***

 

Singeltary comment ;

 


 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

please note, I tried to forward this to the FBI, spoke with several folks at FBI headquarters, and they were not interested...just saying...terry

 

TSS