Wednesday, January 28, 2009

OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions

COMMISSION DECISION

of 30 October 2008

amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk

(notified under document number C(2008) 6274)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2008/829/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (1), and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 5(2) and Article 5(3) thereof, Whereas:

(1) Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 lays down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in animals. It applies to the production and placing on the market of live animals and products of animal origin. For that purpose, the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof (‘countries or regions’) is to be determined by classification into one of three categories depending on the BSE risk involved, namely a negligible BSE risk, a controlled BSE risk and an undetermined BSE risk.

(2) The Annex to Commission Decision 2007/453/EC of 29 June 2007 establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk (2) lists countries or regions according to their BSE risk status.

(3) Pending the final conclusion on the BSE risk status of the Member States, all Member States were provisionally recognised as countries with a controlled BSE risk as laid down in Decision 2007/453/EC. During the OIE General Session in May 2008, a Resolution was adopted relating to the BSE status of different countries. The Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC should therefore be brought in line with the recommendations of the Resolution of the OIE. Pending a final conclusion on the BSE risk status of certain Member States and taking into account the harmonised stringent BSE protective measures applied within the Community, those Member States should remain provisionally recognised as countries with a controlled BSE risk.

(4) Decision 2007/453/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.

(5) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC is replaced by the text in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on 1 December 2008.

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 30 October 2008.

For the Commission

Androulla VASSILIOU

Member of the Commission

L 294/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 1.11.2008

(1) OJ L 147, 31.5.2001, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 172, 30.6.2007, p. 84.

ANNEX

LIST OF COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

A. Countries or regions with a negligible BSE risk

Member States

— Finland — Sweden EFTA countries — Iceland — Norway

Third countries

— Argentina — Australia — New Zealand — Paraguay — Singapore — Uruguay

B. Countries or regions with a controlled BSE risk Member States

— Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, the United Kingdom

EFTA countries

— Switzerland — Liechtenstein

Third countries

— Brazil — Canada — Chile — Taiwan — Mexico — United States

C. Countries or regions with an undetermined BSE risk

— Countries or regions not listed in points A or B of this Annex.



http://www.fsai.ie/legislation/legislation_update/2008/0810_euupdate/Dec2008_829.pdf





FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION Last update: November 6, 2008

Home A-Z Index Mission Staff FAS Offices in the EU Euro Exchange Rates

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Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopaties Introduction TSE Roadmap Impact on U.S. Trade Reports Links

Introduction In response to both animal and public health threats resulting from transmissible spongiform encephalopaties (TSEs), such as BSE (mad cow disease) which is linked to new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans, the European Commission has taken a series of measures to manage the risk of TSE's. Framework Regulation 999/2001 (consolidated version published in July 2008) was adopted in May 2001, with the intention to supersede all existing TSE legislation. It established rules for the monitoring of TSE in bovine, ovine and caprine animals, the removal of Specified Risk Material (SRM) and prohibitions concerning animal feeding. It introduced measures for the eradication of TSE, rules covering intra- and extra-Community trade and criteria to classify the BSE status of member states and third countries. Certain requirements, including removal of SRM's, would then be applied to a country depending on its classification. Regulation 1923/2006 amends Regulation 999/2001 in order to adopt the BSE classification of countries into 3 categories under OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) rules and to correct discrepancies with Regulation 1774/2002 on animal by-products.

More details on current EU TSE legislation can be found on the Commission's website.

Amendments to Framework Regulation 999/2001 & TSE Roadmap Since its adoption, Regulation 999/2001 has been amended several times to adjust it to new developments and scientific evidence. A comprehensive chronological list of BSE/TSE legislation in the EU is available on the European Commission's website. The EU's measures to fight TSE's have led to a significant reduction in cases. Based on this improved situation, the Commission has presented a "TSE Roadmap" on a short, medium-term and long-term strategy. This document suggests possible amendments to the EU's current TSE legislation for the next decade (see GAIN Report E35164). Because of the rapid decline on BSE cases, the EU updated its work plan in November of 2007 in a Commission Staff Working Document (see GAIN Report E48101).

Amendments in the short and medium term (2005-2009) are in the fields of:

Age requirements for removal of Specified Risk Material (SRM) to be raised from 12 to 24 months. This has been addressed in Commission Regulation 1974/2005 of December 2, 2005.

Feed Ban: the need to abandon the zero-tolerance and a relaxation of the fishmeal ban. This has been addressed in Commission Regulation 1292/2005 of August 5, 2005.

Monitoring Programs: reducing the number of BSE testing in line with epidemiological considerations. The finding of a BSE case in Sweden in March 2006 has actually led to the extension of the BSE monitoring to Sweden by Commission Regulation 688/2006.

Categorization of countries according to their BSE risk based on OIE categorization rules Commission Decision 2007/453/EC, amended by Commission Decision 2008/829/EC (new Annex).

Review of culling policy with regard to TSE’s in small ruminants. The finding in 2006 of BSE in sheep has led to increased monitoring of TSE's in small ruminants as required in Commission Regulation 1041/2006.

Cohort culling in bovine animals.

Restrictions on UK beef exports to be lifted. Commission Regulation 657/2006 removed the ban on exports of cattle and beef products from the U.K. as of May 2006.

Switch to revised system of categorization of countries according to their BSE risk status, based on OIE categorization rules. Regulation 1932/2006 amends Regulation 991/2001 to provide for this switch.

Amendments in the long-term (2009-2014) include:

A gradual decrease in the level of surveillance to a level in line with OIE recommendations. Criteria for the revision of EU Member State annual BSE monitoring programs have been set in Commission Regulation 571/2008 of June 18, 2008.

A complete revision of the need for the removal of SRM’s.

The introduction of a system of certification of herds.

Impact on U.S. Trade The United States is required to remove SRM's from animal products for export to the EU. Commission Decision 2007/453/EC of June 29, 2007, clasffied the U.S. under countries or regions with a controlled BSE risk, in line with the new OIE classification.

Regulation EC 1471/2004 of 18 August 2004, introduced requirements for the import of cervid products from Canada and the United States. This regulation imposes the removal of Specific Risk Materials (SRM) from all cervid meats exported to the EU and limits exports of wild game to areas free of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) as from January 1, 2005.

Reports EU-27 EU-15 increases age for mandatory BSE testing GAIN report E48117 (October 2008). On October 14, 2008, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain & Animal Health (SCoFCAH) decided to increase the mandatory testing age for mad cow disease (BSE) in the EU-15 to 48 months. Currently testing age is 30 months for healthy cattle at slaughter and 24 months for all at risk cattle. It is expected that this new measure can lead to a 25-35 percent decrease in testing of cattle at slaughter depending on the Member State. The decrease in testing of at risk cattle will be much lower.

EU-27 EFSA publishes two opinions on BSE testing levels in cattle GAIN report E48083 (July 2008). On July 17, 2008, the Biological Hazards Panel (BIOHAZ) of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has published two opinions on the monitoring of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle in the EU-15. Increasing the age for testing for BSE from the present 30 months to 36 or 48 months of age for slaughtered cattle would likely lead to less than one missed BSE case in cattle annually in the whole EU-15. A Belgian question to EFSA asked what number of cases would be missed if the EU-15 stopped testing cattle born after 31/12/2003, which is 3 years after the “total feed ban” was introduced. EFSA replied that amongst those animals born in a given year in the EU-15 fewer than 6 cases would be expected to be missed.

Update of the BSE situation in 2007 GAIN report E48101 (September 2008)

EU Directorate for Health and Consumer Protection presents its TSE Roadmap GAIN report E35164 (August, 2005): On July 15, 2005, DG SANCO presented a whole series of possible amendments to its TSE policy in its "TSE Roadmap. These possible amendments to EC Regulation 999/2001 result from recent years' improvement in the EU-25 BSE situation and also addresses recent problems that have come up with the current measures. These amendments could halve the cost of the present BSE/TSE measures in the EU or more. Some of these amendments could also lower the present burden on some U.S. exports of processed animal by-products.

Links "USDA releases BSE prevalence estimate for U.S." (USDA News Release - April 2006) BSE - U.S. Departments of Agriculture / FAS BSE/Scrapie - European Commission / DG Health and Consumer Protection

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Home




http://useu.usmission.gov/agri/srm.html





stupid is, as stupid does. ...forest gump


bought and paid for by your local cattle dealers, and their bought and paid for politician buddies
i.e. the industry. ...TSS



Wednesday, January 28, 2009
TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials (January, 2009) TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation(January 2009)TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/01/tafs1-position-paper-on-specified-risk.html



Saturday, January 24, 2009
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy h-BSE ATYPICAL USA 2008 Annual Report
Research Project: Study of Atypical BseLocation: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock2008 Annual Report



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-h-bse.html




Saturday, January 24, 2009 Research Project: Detection of TSE Agents in Livestock, Wildlife, Agricultural Products, and the Environment Location: 2008 Annual Repor



thttp://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/01/research-project-detection-of-tse.html



Sunday, December 28, 2008MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html




IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............



http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



full text ;



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/




bought and paid for by your local cattle dealer $$$


IN my opinion the WOAH/OIE is nothing more than a organized bunch of lobbyist for the members Countries in support of there INDUSTRY, bound together as one, with the only purpose of open trade for there precious commodities and futures. Speaking only of BSE, they failed at every corner, and then just said to hell with it, well just trade all strains of TSE globally.

snip...

NOW, ask yourself why not one single mad cow has been documented in the USA since the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG did the end around Johanns, Dehaven et al ??? found two atypical BSE or BASE cases and they flat shut it down i tell you. IF the OIE gives a favorable rating, IF the OIE gives any other rating but the lowest, poorest possible BSE/TSE rating, the OIE will have sealed there fate once and for all, because most of the world knows the truth about the USA and there mad cows. THE OIE will then be able to stand side by side with the USA, and proudly claim to have sold there soul to the devil, all for a buck, commodities and futures, to hell with human health. A 'CONTROLLED' RATING IS EXACTLY what the OIE will get if that is what they classify the USA as a 'CONTROLLED RATING'. IT will be controlled by Johanns, Dehaven, and GW. IT WILL BE RIGGED in other words. but that is nothing new, it's been rigged for years. ...

snip...

SEE FULL TEXT with facts and sources @ ;Wednesday, June 11, 2008

OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)

Attachment to Singeltary comment January 28, 2007 Greetings APHIS, I would kindly like to submit the following to ; BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 [Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST


snip...


MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518




http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412




http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8





January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

[[Page 1101]]




http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2008/06/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html





Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment




http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648027c28e





Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf




TSS

Monday, June 23, 2008

BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN BRITISH COLUMBIA OTTAWA Monday, June 23, 2008 2:20 PM

Sent: Monday, June 23, 2008 2:20 PM

Subject: BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN BRITISH COLUMBIA OTTAWA

BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN BRITISH COLUMBIA OTTAWA, June 23, 2008 - The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a cow in the Province of British Columbia. This case poses no risk to human or animal health since Canada’s stringent BSE safeguards prevented any part of the animal’s carcass from entering the human food chain or any potentially infective parts of the animal’s carcass from entering the animal feed chain.

The animal was detected through Canada’s national BSE surveillance program. The CFIA has launched a comprehensive investigation in an effort to determine the birth farm of the animal.

Canada’s enhanced feed ban, introduced last summer, virtually eliminates the potential spread of BSE through the animal feed chain and places Canada on an accelerated path to eliminate BSE. As the level of BSE continues to decline, the periodic detection of a small number of cases is fully expected in line with the experience of other countries. Concurrently, Canada’s food safety system maintains the highest levels of human health protection.

The national surveillance program, which targets the highest risk animals, has tested more than 220,000 cattle since 2003. The program continues to benefit from very strong producer participation.

The detection of this animal does not affect Canada’s status as a BSE controlled risk country as recognized by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).

As has been done with previous cases, the CFIA will update information as it becomes available through the ongoing investigation.

- 30 -

For information:

Canadian Food Inspection Agency Media relations: 613-228-6682



http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/bccb2008/13notavie.shtml




Wednesday, June 11, 2008

OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)

snip...SEE FULL TEXT with facts and sources @ ;



http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html




http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1566




Friday, April 25, 2008

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html




Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics

Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56]. It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA.

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

full text 18 pages ;



http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf




USA BSE ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE ???



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html




Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;

***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008



http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45




In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm




Tuesday, June 3, 2008

SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html




MAD COW TESTING USDA AND CANADA



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/04/mbm-greaves-meat-offal-live-cattle.html




http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/04/report-on-investigation-of-eleventh.html




http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/03/rapid-typing-of-transmissible.html




http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/docket-no-aphis-2006-0026-rin-0579-ac45.html




http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html




http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/12/bse-case-confirmed-in-alberta-december.html




http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html





Friday, January 11, 2008

CJD HUMAN TSE REPORT UK, USA, CANADA, and Mexico JANUARY 2008



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/01/cjd-human-tse-report-uk-usa-canada-and.html





A novel human disease with abnormal prion protein sensitive to protease
(prionopathy)



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/novel-human-disease-with-abnormal-prion.html





USA WRITTEN CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ???



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/




The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised
to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older.
Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known
cause at present.



http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html




Friday, June 20, 2008

USDA TO KOREA AND THE WORLD, EAT THAT AND LIKE IT



http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/usda-to-korea-and-world-eat-that-and.html





Saturday, June 7, 2008

Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR
U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS



http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/export-requirements-for-republic-of.html





http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html





Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities APHIS-2006-0041

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment Views

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152


January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

[[Page 1101]]

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Part III

Department of Agriculture

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Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

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9 CFR Parts 93, 94, 95, and 96

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines; Proposed Rule

[[Page 1102]]

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Parts 93, 94, 95, and 96

[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are proposing to amend the regulations regarding the importation of animals and animal products to establish conditions for the importation of the following commodities from regions that present a minimal risk of introducing bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) into the United States: Live bovines for any use born on or after a date determined by APHIS to be the date of effective enforcement of a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in the region of export; blood and blood products derived from bovines; and casings and part of the small intestine derived from bovines. We are proposing these amendments after conducting a risk assessment and comprehensive evaluation of the issues that concluded that such bovines and bovine products can be safely imported under the conditions described in this proposed rule.

DATES: We will consider all comments that we receive on or before March 12, 2007.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by either of the following methods: Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov , select ``Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service'' from the agency drop-down menu, then click ``Submit.'' In the Docket ID column, select APHIS-2006-0041 to submit or view public comments and to view supporting and related materials available electronically. Information on using Regulations.gov, including instructions for accessing documents, submitting comments, and viewing the docket after the close of the comment period, is available through the site's ``User Tips'' link. Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery: Please send four copies of your comment (an original and three copies) to Docket No. APHIS 2006-0041, Regulatory Analysis and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station 3A- 03.8, 4700 River Road Unit 118, Riverdale, MD 20737-1238. Please state that your comment refers to Docket No. APHIS 2006-0041. Reading Room: You may read any comments that we receive on this docket in our reading room. The reading room is located in room 1141 of the USDA South Building, 14th Street and Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC. Normal reading room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 690-2817 before coming. Other Information: Additional information about APHIS and its programs is available on the Internet at http://www.aphis.usda.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information regarding ruminant products, contact Dr. Karen James-Preston, Director, Technical Trade Services, Animal Products, National Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734- 4356. For information concerning live ruminants, contact Dr. Lee Ann Thomas, Director, Technical Trade Services, Animals, Organisms and Vectors, and Select Agents, National Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734- 4356. For other information concerning this proposed rule, contact Dr. Lisa Ferguson, Senior Staff Veterinarian, National Center for Animal Health Programs, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 43, Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734-6954.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background ............... snip .................... full text ;

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20071800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/07-17.htm


MY COMMENTS are as follows ;

WITH the new BASE mad cow in the USA bovine, on top of the regular BSE mad cow, I urgently stress that our borders be sealed and that no bovine or ovine, or cervids be traded. THE BSE MRR policy should be repealed, and the old BSE GBR risk assessments be adhered too, and strengthened to include all TSE. ...TSS

18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available.

snip...

ITEM 9 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS

snip...

64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE. Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. A study also demonstrated that in a mouse model it was possible to alleviate the pathological changes of prion disease by suppressing expression of the prion protein gene after infection.

http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf


Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed


EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.html

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.Par.0004.File.dat/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf


EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of Canada

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.

A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/564.html


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/564.Par.0001.File.dat/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_v2_en1.pdf


EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of Mexico

Summary of the Scientific Report The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993. It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported ‘at - risk’ MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live ‘at - risk’ cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system. EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/565.Par.0003.File.dat/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_summary_en1.pdf

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/565.Par.0004.File.dat/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_v2_en1.pdf


THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

O.I.E. .......... ??? GOD HELP US! most every country that went by the flawed OIE BSE guidelines, most all became BSE infected countries. ...TSS

sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle, if i am not mistaken. MOST countries that went

by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. ...TSS

http://www.oie.int/downld/SC/2005/bse_2005.pdf


THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE.

AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country

makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they

should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...

Page 95 of 98

8/3/2006

WHAT ABOUT RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS FROM ALL OTHER TSEs, WITH RELATIONS TO SRMs ???

a.. BSE OIE

see full text ;

http://p079.ezboard.com/fwolftracksproductionsfrm2.showMessage?topicID=470.topic


IT'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have been at the helm of the

USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH et al for many many years, or the incompetence of these agencies are so inept,

either through ignorance and or just too overweight with industry reps., they then should be all done away with and a

single agency brought forth, and if not, how will you correct this ongoing problem ?


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=20678


http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&I=-3&P=3381


Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL

BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2


BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1


[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf


[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf


PAUL BROWN M.D.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000490-vol40.pdf


9 December 2005 Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)

SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION James J. Kramer, Ph.D. Vice President, Corporate Operations

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf


Embassy of Japan

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02N-0273-EC240.htm


Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005 2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of Platelets by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ... http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm


03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf


03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf


Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF] ... 2005 6:17 PM To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ... http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf


03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF] ... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al [Docket No. 03- 025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and ... http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf


In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF] Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone: 732-741-2290 Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf


Volume 12, Number 12–December 2006

PERSPECTIVE

On the Question of Sporadic

or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Paul Brown,* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§

Strategies to investigate the possible existence of sporadic

bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) require

systematic testing programs to identify cases in countries

considered to have little or no risk for orally acquired disease,

or to detect a stable occurrence of atypical cases in

countries in which orally acquired disease is disappearing.

To achieve 95% statistical confidence that the prevalence

of sporadic BSE is no greater than 1 per million (i.e., the

annual incidence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

[CJD] in humans) would require negative tests in 3 million

randomly selected older cattle. A link between BSE and

sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory

studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.

Such a link might yet be established by the discovery

of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations

of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various

subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced

by a continuation of current public health measures that

exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and

human food chains.

SNIP...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm?s_cid=eid06_0965_e


3:00 Afternoon Refreshment Break, Poster and Exhibit Viewing in the Exhibit Hall

3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse

Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University

Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years. ***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.

6:30 Close of Day One

http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp


SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM 1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html


There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf


Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose


and i think, with time, and testing becomes more and more sensitive, we will all be surprised at just how much is too much, and just how young one might be to spread the agent, even as sub-clinical.

IF i remember correctly, the infamous PURINA FEED MILL incident in Gonzales TEXAS, where at one feeding, those cows could not have consumed more than......or no more than 5.5 grams...etc. so, how many feedings does a feeder and or dairy calf have in there lifespan ? wouldn't you multiply that by those figures by that ??? be a lot of potential mad cow protein IN COMMERCE, and still is in 2006......tss

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html


http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm


Subject: DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMs) AND OTHER REGULATIONS FSIS NOTICE 01-07 1/8/07 Date: January 8, 2007 at 9:28 am PST

FSIS NOTICE 01-07 1/8/07

DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMs) AND OTHER REGULATIONS

This notice clarifies how inspection program personnel are to document regulatory noncompliance related to 9 CFR 310.22 for controlling specified risk materials, as well as other regulations

Inspection program personnel are to cite 9 CFR 310.22 in the Relevant Regulation section of every noncompliance report (NR) for an establishment that does not meet the regulatory requirements for controlling SRMs. In addition to selecting 9 CFR 310.22, inspection program personnel are to select all other regulations with which there has been noncompliance.

For example, while performing the 03C02 procedure, the Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) sees spinal cord material on previously cut T-bone steaks that had passed the Critical Control Point (CCP). The IIC cites 9 CFR 417.2(c)(4) and 310.22(b) in the Relevant Regulations section on the Procedure Results NR screen. The IIC notifies the appropriate establishment official of the finding. The IIC also verifies that the corrective actions implemented by the establishment meet the requirements of 9 CFR 417.3(a) before issuing the NR.

Inspection program personnel are to describe the noncompliances in the Narrative Section, block 10, of the NR. The narrative should include a complete description of the SRM noncompliance, including the type of SRM and any other information relevant to the noncompliance. The narrative should also address each of the other regulations that inspection program personnel cite in the Relevant Regulations section on the NR screen. The statements in block 10 of the NR are to support completely and adequately the regulatory noncompliances cited.

For every NR that inspection program personnel issue, it is important that they cite all relevant regulations. These citations provide data that are the basis for critical, risk-based decisions that the FSIS must regularly make when working to ensure that meat and poultry products are safe. Thus, it is not appropriate for inspection program personnel to cite only one regulation if other regulations are also violated by the noncompliance that is the subject of the NR.

Inspection program personnel with technical questions related to the use of PBIS, or who experience technical problems, should contact the FAIM Help Desk at 1-800-473-9135. They should contact the Technical Service Center at 1-800-233-3935 for policy-related questions.

Philip S. Derfler /s/

Assistant Administrator Office of Policy, Program, and Employee Development

DISTRIBUTION: Inspection Offices; T/A Inspectors; Plant Mgt; TRA; ABB; TSC; Import Offices NOTICE EXPIRES: 2/1/08 OPI: OPPED

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Notice_01-07/index.asp


This notice clarifies how inspection program personnel are to document regulatory noncompliance

related to 9 CFR 310.22 for controlling specified risk materials, as well as other regulations

SO, it's Monday Jan. 8, 2007, in 2006 ALONE, the FDA allowed literally 100s of 1,000s of TONS of ruminant protein to be fed to not only USA cattle and livestock, but it also exported this poison to other parts of the globe as well, and the FSIS is just NOW clarifying how it's inspectors handle SRMs ??? and no SRMs are being fed to cattle in the USA ???

LIKE i said,

IT'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have been at the helm of the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH et al for many many years, or the incompetence of these agencies are so inept, either through ignorance and or just too overweight with industry reps., they then should be all done away with and a single agency brought forth, and if not, how will you correct this ongoing problem ?

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


http://www.prwatch.org/node/4624


====================================

2006 (partial list of) highly potential mad cow protein in commerce USA

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons DISTRIBUTION AL ______________________________ PRODUCT a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,484 tons DISTRIBUTION TN and WV

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II ______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE Approximately 2,223 tons DISTRIBUTION KY

______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,220 tons DISTRIBUTION KY

______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed. REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 40 tons DISTRIBUTION LA and MS

______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,150 tons DISTRIBUTION MS

______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 87 tons DISTRIBUTION MS

______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________ PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants". VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6 CODE All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products. RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs DISTRIBUTION MI

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete. REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants". VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? DISTRIBUTION KY END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html


CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II ______________________________ PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006 Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration

New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006

WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06

FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

Sincerely,

/S

Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District

http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm


look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa


Feb 06, 2004 Washington State Investigation—Final Epidemiology Report

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/WashingtonState_epi_final3-04.pdf


Secretary's Advisory Committee Recommendations

Feb 13, 2004 Secretary’s Advisory Committee Report

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/SAC-Report2-13-04.pdf


Feb 02, 2004 International Review Team (IRT) Report

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/US_BSE_Report2-2-04.pdf


http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/bse_disease_surv.shtml


Information on the Washington State Investigation of the BSE-positive Cow

This Office of Inspector General (OIG)

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/TestimonyBlurb2.pdf


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/Testimony7-2004.pdf


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-9-final.pdf


OIG REPORT ON IMPORTS FROM CANADA

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-01-HY.pdf


Final Case Summeries

May 02, 2006 Alabama BSE Investigation—Final Epidemiology Report

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf


http://www.scienceblog.com/cms/feds_confirm_mad_cow_in_alabama_10204.html


http://www.prwatch.org/node/4624


http://www.microbes.info/forums/index.php?showtopic=306


Aug 30, 2005 USDA Texas BSE Investigation—Final Epidemiology Report

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf


TSS REPORT ON 2ND TEJAS MAD COW Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 (the one that did NOT get away, thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong)


-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>

Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;

Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???terry

==============================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600 From: Carla Everett To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>

The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas. CarlaAt 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>

===================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]>

our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcementwhen we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:>why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:>November 22: Press Release title here >>star image More BSE information>>>>terry>>Carla Everett wrote:>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...>>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>

==========================

THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$

NO, it's not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em or leave em, however, you cannot change them.

with kindest regards,

I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf


http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=23557


Feb 06, 2004 Washington State Investigation—Final Epidemiology Report

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/WashingtonState_epi_final3-04.pdf


Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt


Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html


PART 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html


ALSO, now with the 4th documented transmission of vCJD via transfusion, from such a small donor pool, we must ban blood from feed for animal and human consumption ;

Fourth case of transfusion-associated vCJD infection in the United Kingdom

Editorial team (eurosurveillance.weekly@hpa.org.uk), Eurosurveillance editorial office

A suspected case of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) has recently been diagnosed in a patient in the United Kingdom (UK), who received a blood transfusion from a donor who later developed vCJD [1]. This is the fourth case of probable transfusion transmission of vCJD infection in the UK. Three of the four recipients developed symptoms of vCJD. The first symptomatic case of vCJD associated with blood transfusion was identified in December 2003. This individual developed vCJD six and a half years after transfusion of red cells donated by an individual who developed symptoms of vCJD three and a half years after donation.

A second case of vCJD 'infection' was identified a few months later in a person who had received red cells from a donor who developed symptoms of vCJD 18 months after donation. This patient (the second case) died from causes unrelated to vCJD five years after transfusion. Post-mortem investigations found abnormal prion protein in the spleen and a cervical lymph node., However, prion protein was not found in the brain, and no pathological features of vCJD were found.

A third case developed symptoms of vCJD six years after receiving a transfusion of red blood cells, and died two years and eight months later. The donor of the blood involved developed vCJD about 20 months after donating it.

These three cases have been published as case reports and in the findings of the ongoing collaborative study between the National Blood Services, the National CJD Surveillance Unit, and the Office for National Statistics. This study aims to collect evidence about transmission of CJD or vCJD via the blood supply [2,3,4,5].

The new, fourth case is in a patient who developed symptoms of vCJD eight and a half years after receiving a transfusion of red blood cells from a donor who developed vCJD about 17 months after this blood was donated [1]. The donor to this case also donated the vCJD-implicated blood transfused to the third case. As for all other reported clinical vCJD cases that have been tested for genotype, this patient is a methionine homozygote at codon 129 of the prion protein gene. The patient is currently alive.

All four cases had received transfusions of non-leucodepleted red blood cells between 1996 and 1999. Since October 1999, leucocytes have been removed from all blood used for transfusion in the UK. The effect of leucodepletion on the reduction of the risk of transmission of vCJD from an infective donation is uncertain.

This fourth case of vCJD infection associated with blood transfusion further increases the level of concern about the risk of vCJD transmission between humans by blood transfusion, although much remains unknown. This reinforces the importance of the existing precautions that have been introduced to reduce the risk of transmission of vCJD infection by blood and blood products [6]. No cases of vCJD have been associated with fractionated plasma products. The small group of living recipients of vCJD-implicated blood transfusion in the UK have been informed of their potential exposure to vCJD by blood transfusion, asked to take certain precautions to reduce the risk of onward person-to-person transmission of vCJD during health care, and offered specialist neurological evaluation and advice.

This article has been adapted from reference 1

References: Health Protection Agency. Fourth case of variant CJD associated with blood transfusion (press release). Press release, 18 January 2007. (http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2007/070118_vCJD.htm ) Llewelyn CA, Hewitt PE, Knight RSG, Amar K, Cousens S, Mackenzie J, et al. Possible transmission of variant CJD disease by blood transfusion. Lancet 2004; 363:417-21. Peden AH, Head MW, Ritchie DL, Bell JE, Ironside JW. Preclinical vCJD after blood transfusion in a PRNP codon 129 heterozygous patient. Lancet 2004 ; 364: 527-9. Wroe SJ, Pal S, Siddique D, Hyare H, Macfarlane R, et al Clinical presentation and pre-mortem diagnosis of blood transfusion-associated variant CJD. Lancet 2006;368:2061-67. Hewitt PE, Llewelyn CA, Mackenzie J, Will RG. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and blood transfusion: results of the UK Transfusion Medicine Epidemiology review study. Vox Sang. 2006;91(3):221-230. Department of Health [London]. Further precautions to protect blood supply. Press release 2004/0104, 16 March 2004. (http://www.dh.gov.uk/PublicationsAndStatistics/PressReleases/PressReleasesN otices/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=4076608&chk=MTwE%2Bl)

http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/2007/070118.asp#4


THE last time a country decided it was o.k. to poison the rest of the world, I thought we had learned something from it, I suppose we have not. that is all in the world the BSE MRR policy is, a legal tool to poison the globe, just for commodities and futures. THIS time however, we are dealing with a more virulent strain of mad cow disease i.e. BASE, and it's been here in the USA for some time if you go back and look at the studies of Mission, Texas from the Scrapie transmission studies there. So I failed to see the logic of this BSE MRR policy, there is nothing science based about it. ...

CONFIDENTIAL BSE POLICY

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/05/20002001.pdf


RESTRICTED

MINISTER'S MEETING ON BSE (EXPORTS AND TRIPE) AND ANTHRAX, 14, JULY 1989

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/07/14006001.pdf


England worried briefly about infecting other countries

27 Aug 00 confidential correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

BSE11/2 020;

SC1337p

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SWIA 2NS Telephone 01-210 3000 From the Chief Medical Officer Sir Donald Achson KBE DM DSc FRCP FFCM FFOM

Mr K C Meldrum Chief Veterinary Officer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Government Buildings Hook Rise South Tolworth Surbiton Surrey KT6 7NG 3 January 1990

Dear Mr Meldrum

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

You will recall that we have previously discussed the potential risks of BSE occurring in other countries as a result of the continuing export from the UK of meat and bone that may be contaminated by scrapie or possibly BSE.

I remain concerned that we are not being consistent in our attempts to contain the risks of BSE. Having banned the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminamts in 1988, we should take steps to prevent these UK products being fed to ruminants in other countries. This could be achieved either through a ban on the export of meat and bone meal, or at least by the proper labelling of these products to make it absolutely clear they should not be fed to ruminants [or zoo animals, including rare and endangered primates -- webmaster]. Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced with BSE may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal. Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.

I would be very interested to hear how you feel this gap in the present precautionary measures to eliminate BSE should be closed. We should be aiming at the global elimination of this new bovine disense. The export of our meat and bone meal is a continuing risk to other countries.

Yours Sincerely Donald Acheson

Copy: Dr Metters Dr Pickles

90/1.03/1.1 ============ BSE13/3 0083

Dr Pickles From: Dr J S Metters DCM0 International, Prevention and Community Services 7 June 1990 Copies to: Dr McInnes Miss Pease Mr Otley

BSE

1. I spoke to Mr Capstick yesterday. Among other things, he told me that MAFF are now considering the labelling of animal foodstuffs, and in particular what detail would be required if such labelling was made compulsory. Apparently our freedom of action is constrained by EC Directives [total garbage, MAFF wants to keep exporting -- webmaster], and there is also concern about the level of detail that should be included in any foodstuff labels.

2. Mr Capstick suggested that this was not an area that DH had a particular interest. I countered by saying that we supported the principle of labelling of animal foodstuffs, particularly when these were going for export.

3. I also thanked him for keeping us informed, in a way that I hope encourage further communication of MAFF's internal deliberations.

J S METTERS Room 509 Richmond House Ext. 5591 92/YdeS 90/6.7/5.1

http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/03001001.pdf


Transmission Studies

Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases

{the following was written but with a single line marked through it ''first passage (by this route)}...TSS

resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret.

snip...

Appendix 3

VISIT TO USA - DR A E WRATHALL - INFO OH BSE AND SCRAPIE

1. Dr Clark lately of the Scrapie Research Unit, Mission Texas has successfully transmitted ovine and caprine scrapie to cattle. The experimental results have not been published but there are plans to do this. This work was initiated in 1978. A summary of it is:-

Expt A 6 Her x Jer calves born in 1978 were inoculated as follows with a 2nd Suffolk scrapie passage:-

i/c 1ml; i/m, 5ml; s/c 5ml; oral 30ml. 1/6 went down after 48 months with a scrapie/BSE-like disease.

Expt B 6 Her or Jer or HxJ calves were inoculated with angora Goat virus 2/6 went down similarly after 36 months.

Expt C Mice inoculated from brains of calves/cattle in expts A • B were resistant, only 1/20 going down with scrapie and this was the reason given for not publishing.

Diagnosis in A, B, C was by histopath. No reports on SAT were given.

2. Dr Warren Foote indicated success so far in eliminating scrapie in offspring from experimentally- (and naturally) infected sheep by ET. He had found difficulty in obtaining embryos from naturally infected sheep (cf SPA).

3. Prof. A Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr A Thiermann showed the picture in the "Independent" with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. BSE was not reported in USA.

4. Scrapie incidents (ie affected flocks) have shown a dramatic increase since 1978. In 1953 when the National Control Scheme was started there were 10-14 incidents, in 1978 - 1 and in 1988 so far 60.

5. Scrapie agent was reported to have been isolated from a solitary fetus.

6. A western blotting diagnostic technique (? on PrP) shows some promise.

7. Results of a questionnaire sent to 33 states on the subject of the national sheep scrapie programme survey indicated

17/33 wished to drop it

6/33 wished to develop it

8/33 had few sheep and were neutral

Information obtained from Dr Wrathall's notes of a meeting of the U.S. Animal Health Association at Little Rock, Arkansas Nov. 1988.

33

end...TSS

Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.

snip...end

full text 33 PAGES ;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf


It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33 The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/


1: J Infect Dis. 1994 Apr;169(4):814-20.

Intracerebral transmission of scrapie to cattle.

Cutlip RC, Miller JM, Race RE, Jenny AL, Katz JB, Lehmkuhl HD, DeBey BM, Robinson MM.

USDA, Agriculture Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010.

To determine if sheep scrapie agent(s) in the United States would induce a disease in cattle resembling bovine spongiform encephalopathy, 18 newborn calves were inoculated intracerebrally with a pooled suspension of brain from 9 sheep with scrapie. Half of the calves were euthanatized 1 year after inoculation. All calves kept longer than 1 year became severely lethargic and demonstrated clinical signs of motor neuron dysfunction that were manifest as progressive stiffness, posterior paresis, general weakness, and permanent recumbency. The incubation period was 14-18 months, and the clinical course was 1-5 months. The brain from each calf was examined for lesions and for protease-resistant prion protein. Lesions were subtle, but a disease-specific isoform of the prion protein was present in the brain of all calves. Neither signs nor lesions were characteristic of those for bovine spongiform encephalopathy.

MeSH Terms: Animals Brain/microbiology* Brain/pathology Cattle Cattle Diseases/etiology* Cattle Diseases/pathology Encephalopathy, Bovine Spongiform/etiology* Encephalopathy, Bovine Spongiform/pathology Immunoblotting/veterinary Immunohistochemistry Male Motor Neurons/physiology Prions/analysis Scrapie/pathology Scrapie/transmission* Sheep Sleep Stages Time Factors

Substances: Prions

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8133096&dopt=Citation


Intracerebral transmission of scrapie to cattle FULL TEXT PDF;

SNIP...

Discussion

WE conclude that American sources of sheep scrapie are transmissible to cattle by direct intracerebral inoculation but the disease induced is NOT identical to BSE as seen in the United Kingdom. While there were similarities in clinical signs between this experimental disease and BSE, there was no evidence of aggressiveness, hyperexcitability, hyperesthesia (tactile or auditory), or hyperemetria of limbs as has been reported for BSE (9). Neither were there extensive neurologic lesions, which are primary for BSE, such as severe vacuolation of neurons and neuropil or neuronal necrosis and gliosis. Although some vacuolation of neuropil, chromotolysis in neurons, and gliosis were seen in the brains of some affected calves, these were industinguishable from those of controls. Vacuolated neurons in the red nucleus of both challenged and normal calves were considered normal for the bovines as previously described (50).

PrP-res was found in ALL CHALLENGED CALVES REGARDLESS OF CLINCIAL SIGNS, and the amount of PrP-res positively related to the length of the incubation. ...

snip...

WE also conclude from these studies that scrapie in cattle MIGHT NOT BE RECOGNIZED BY ROUTINE HISTOPATHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BRAIN AND SUGGEST THAT DETECTION OF PrP-res by immunohistochemistry or immunoblotting is necessary to make a definitive diagnosis. THUS, undiagnosed scrapie infection could contribute to the ''DOWNER-COW'' syndrome and could be responsible for some outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy proposed by Burger and Hartsough (8) and Marsh and harsough (52). ...

snip...

Multiple sources of sheep affected with scrapie and two breeds of cattle from several sources were used inthe current study in an effort to avoid a single strain of either agent or host. Preliminary results from mouse inoculations indicate multiple strains of the agent were present in the pooled inoculum (unpublished data). ...

Transmission of the sheep scrapie to cattle was attempted in 1979 by using intracerebral, intramuscular, subcutaneous, and oral routes of inoculation of 5, 8- to 11-month old cattlw with a homologous mixture of brain from 1 affected sheep (61, 62). ONE of the 5 cattle develped neurologic signs 48 months after inoculation. Signs were disorientation, incoordination, a stiff-legged stilted gait, progressive difficulty in rising, and finally in terminal recumbency. The clinical course was 2.5 months. TWO of the 5 cattle similarly inoculated with brain tissue from a goat with scrapie exhibited similar signs 27 and 36 months after incoluation. Clinical courses were 43 an 44 days. Brain lesions of mild gliosis and vacuolation and mouse inoculation data were insufficient to confirm a diagnosis of scrapie. This work remained controversial until recent examination of the brains detected PrP-res in all 3 cattle with neurologic disease but in none of the unaffected cattle (62). Results of these studies are similar to ours and underscore the necessity of methods other than histopathology to diagnose scrapie infection in cattle. We believe that immunologic techniques for detecting PrP-res currently provide the most sensitive and reliable way to make a definitive diagnosis...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac17/tab03.pdf


Visit to USA ... info on BSE and Scrapie

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf


snip...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf


http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0610&L=sanet-mg&D=0&T=0&P=19406


2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.

6:30 Close of Day One

http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp


18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available.

snip...

***$$$***

64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE. Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. A study also demonstrated that in a mouse model it was possible to alleviate the pathological changes of prion disease by suppressing expression of the prion protein gene after infection.

http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf


THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


UPDATE AUGUST 2008


Thursday, July 10, 2008

A Novel Human Disease with Abnormal Prion Protein Sensitive to Protease update July 10, 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/novel-human-disease-with-abnormal-prion.html

Thursday, July 10, 2008A New Prionopathy update July 10, 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/new-prionopathy-update-july-10-2008.html

Sunday, August 10, 2008

A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html


Friday, August 8, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/08/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html


Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf


MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE (the last two cases of mad cow disease in the USA were in Alabama, and Texas, both of which were atypical BSE).

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html


TSS