Report on the Investigation of the Nineteenth Case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada

November 2015

Report on the Investigation of the Nineteenth Case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada

November 2015

List of Tables

Table 1. Commercially Prepared Feed Sources to Which the Case Animal had Potentially been Exposed
Table 2. Rendered Animal By-Products Sources to Which the Case Animal had Potentially been Exposed
Table 3. Disposition of Animal Traces for BSE #19 Birth Cohort (n=746)

List of Figures

Figure 1. Sources, Processing, Transportation and Disposal of SRMs
Figure 2. Timeline (birth and death) of BSE Cases #17 and #19 Born on the Same Farm

Acronyms

BAB: Born After the Ban
BARB: Born After the Reinforced Ban
BSE: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
CFIA: Canadian Food Inspection Agency
EFB: Enhanced Feed Ban
ISO: International Organization for Standardization
MBM: Meat and Bone Meal
OIE: World Organisation for Animal Health
PM: Prohibited Material
QA: Quality Assurance
SRM: Specified Risk Material
TSE: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Details of the BSE Case

A sample taken from a cow in Alberta, Canada was identified as positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). The case animal was reported by the owner to have been non-ambulatory (downer) in the days preceding its death. After consultation between the producer and the local veterinary practitioner it was determined that the animal met the inclusion criteria of Canada's National BSE Surveillance Program. The animal was euthanized on February 4, 2015 and arrangements were made to collect and submit appropriate tissue samples for evaluation.

On February 7, 2015, the Alberta Agriculture Edmonton Laboratory (now Alberta Agriculture and Forestry TSE Laboratory) informed the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) of a BSE surveillance sample (collected through the Canada-Alberta BSE Surveillance Program) with an initial reaction on the BIO-RAD TeSeE ELISA rapid test that remained positive on repeat testing.

As per Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) ISO quality assurance (QA) guidelines, homogenates and samples were forwarded to the CFIA and OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) BSE Reference Laboratory in Lethbridge, Alberta. The sample was confirmed as BSE positive using the OIE Immunoblot (SAF and mAB 6H4) test on February 11, 2015. In addition to the OIE Immunoblot, the National BSE Reference Laboratory evaluated the sample using the Prionics-Check Western® rapid test, Hybrid Western Blot, the Prionics Check PrioSTRIP® rapid test, and the BioRad TeSeE ELISA. All test results were determined to be positive. Hybrid Western Blot results characterized the case as C-type (classical) BSE.

The carcass was secured at the sampling site, obtained by and transferred to CFIA's laboratory in Lethbridge for incineration. No part of the carcass entered the human food supply or animal feed chain.

The positive animal (Case #19) was confirmed to be a pure bred Black Angus beef cow born on March 25, 2009, therefore being 70 months of age at the time of death. It had been sold from its birth farm, via an auction mart, to the farm where it was sampled, just over a year prior to detection (Jan 22, 2014). This was the second BSE case born on the birth farm (the previous was case #17, born in March 2004).

The birth farm of the case animal was a cow-calf operation with both purebred Black Angus and commercial beef cattle. At the time of detection of this case, there were 290 breeding cows on the birth farm.

1.2 Case Investigation Overview

1.2.1 CFIA Investigation as Specified by the OIE

The CFIA immediately initiated an epidemiological investigation based on the recommended BSE guidelines (Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2014) of the OIE and the CFIA's BSE Manual of Procedures. Specifically, the CFIA followed the recommended BSE guidelines for a country with controlled risk status and investigated:

Feed: all sources of feed to which the infected animal was or may have been exposed during its first year of life;
Feed cohort: all cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE case during its first year of life, and which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period; and/or
Birth cohort: all other cattle that were born on the same farm and within 12 months of the infected animal's birth.

1.2.2 Identifying Potential Risk Pathways for Exposure to the BSE agent

BSE case #19 had two unique characteristics when compared with previous cases Canada has experienced to date:

This was the second BSE case to be born on the same birth farm (as was case #17, born in March 2004). Canada has not previously identified more than one BSE case born on the same farm.
The affected animal was born after the enhanced feed ban (EFB): The EFB, implemented on July 12, 2007, ensures that specified risk material (SRM) is excluded from animal feed, pet food and fertilizers. Case #19 was born in March 2009, which is 20 months after the EFB was implemented.

To complete this investigation, on-farm and off-farm risks pathways potentially associated with the unique characteristics of this case were examined. The following sections provide an overview of Canada's feed ban and the potential risk pathways that were considered in the course of the investigation.

1.3 Overview of Canada's Feed Ban and Regulations

In 1997, Canada implemented an initial feed ban as a precautionary measure to limit the potential spread of BSE through the domestic cattle population, should there have been a previously undetected presence of BSE in the country. This ban prohibited the feeding of mammalian-derived proteins (“prohibited material” or PM) to ruminant animals (cattle, sheep, goats, deer, elk and other species), with the exception of proteins derived from a porcine or equine; gelatin or gelatin products derived exclusively from hides or skins of any species; blood or blood products and rendered fats from any species^Footnote 1. Canada's ban also prohibited incorporation of poultry litter and restaurant waste into feed for ruminants.

The detection of Canada's first native-born case of BSE in 2003, followed by a small number of BSE cases between 2003 and 2005 were a manifestation of a low level of exposure to the BSE-agent in the cattle population prior to and around the time the feed ban was implemented. In 2006, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) undertook a comprehensive review of the feed ban in order to look at the control measures put in place and examine the CFIA's inspection program to assess compliance with the Health of Animals Regulations. Canadian, U.S. and other international scientific and technical analyses, including a review of the UK experience, confirmed that the ban would have arrested any further amplification and significantly reduced the opportunities for recycling of the BSE-agent in the cattle population. While the impact of the feed ban may not have been absolute, ongoing surveillance confirms the low and declining incidence of BSE. Multiple scientific analyses have concluded that Canada's feed ban would eventually lead to the eradication of BSE in the country^Footnote 2^Footnote 3. However, Canada decided to take the additional step necessary to accelerate this process by requiring that SRM be excluded from the entire terrestrial and aquatic animal feed chains, as well as fertilizers from July 2007. It is important to note that prior to 2007, SRM were prohibited from being fed to ruminants as they fell under the scope of the original feed ban as prohibited materials. SRM are now segregated at source and redirected to disposal or destruction to ensure that the remaining PM no longer contains SRM.

SRM includes the skull, brain, trigeminal ganglia, eyes, tonsils, spinal cord and dorsal root ganglia of cattle aged 30 months or older, and the distal ileum of cattle of all ages. Collectively these tissues contain more than 99.9% of the BSE infectivity in an infected animal. Considering that any remaining potential infectivity in non-SRM tissues would be at extremely low levels, the likelihood of an animal becoming infected would be negligible even if it consumed feed contaminated with PM.

Preventing SRM from entering the animal feed and pet food production chain enhanced the 1997 feed ban by minimizing the risk of BSE transmission posed by the cross-contamination of ruminant feed by PM, as well as any inappropriate on-farm use. The provision to prohibit the use of SRM in fertilizers was intended to prevent the potential accidental or intentional misuse of fertilizers as feed.

SRM is collected, segregated, stained, and directed to a dedicated line/container. Collection, treatment, transport and disposal of SRM are done under a permitting system^Footnote 4. The SRM program is implemented, administered, monitored and enforced by the CFIA through inspection activities at dead stock collection sites, salvaging and rendering facilities, landfills, and other processing and disposal sites.

SRM collected for processing and disposal is predominantly sourced from slaughterhouses and on-farm bovine dead stock (Figure 1). Compliance verification programs of the measures in place to ensure the SRM ban is effective are detailed in Appendix 1.

Sources, Processing, Transportation and Disposal of SRMs. Description follows. — Figure 1. Sources, Processing, Transportation and Disposal of SRMs

1.4 Pathways for On-farm Exposure to the BSE Agent Associated with BSE Case #19

1.4.1 Residual Feed Contamination on Farm

The extensive UK experience with BSE led to the conclusion that the ingestion of contaminated feed remains the most likely source of BSE in infected animals born after the implementation of a feed ban^Footnote 5.

With two BSE cases diagnosed on the same birth farm the investigation of possible residual feed contamination on farm was conducted. The first case (BSE case #17) was born when the 1997 feed ban was in place, prior to enhancements to exclude SRM (Figure 2). While the second case (BSE case #19) was born 20 months after the enhanced feed ban was implemented, it is possible that small amounts of residual contaminated feed associated with the previous case could have remained on the farm ^Footnote 6. It is important to note that while the previous case (#17) most likely became infected in 2004, it did not arise as a BSE case until February 2010, almost a year after the birth of the case under consideration.

1.4.2 Maternal transmission

The report of the meeting of the OIE ad hoc group to review the BSE chapter in the OIE Terrestrial animal health code (2006) concluded that there was no evidence that vertical transmission of the BSE agent occurs. In this particular case, it has been determined that case #17 (commercial cow) is not the dam of case #19 (pure bred cow). The producer reported that the dam of case #19 was euthanized after an injury in February 2014, nearly five years after case #19 was born.

In this investigation, we noted that in 2009, case #17 calved on March 30, a few days after the birth of case #19 on March 25 (Figure 2). On this farm, as in most cow-calf herd practices, calving frequency was concentrated in time. The current literature5 considers horizontal transmission as a highly unlikely means of transmission of BSE and it was not further considered.

Figure 2. Timeline (birth and death) of BSE Cases #17 and #19 Born on the Same Farm. Description follows. — Figure 2. Timeline (birth and death) of BSE Cases #17 and #19 Born on the Same Farm

1.4.3 Environmental Contamination on Farm (carcass disposal)

Carcass disposal could be hypothesised to contribute to environmental contamination by the BSE agent. Western Canadian cow-calf farms are typically housed on large farmlands. Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development (now Alberta Agriculture and Forestry) legislation allows natural disposal of livestock mortalities under specific conditions (the animal is disposed of on the property owned by owner of the animal; the animal was not suspected of an infectious or reportable disease, nor was it euthanized with drugs or other chemical substances; the total weight of animals disposed of in one site does not exceed 1000kg; compliance with specific distances between sites, wells, livestock facilities, residences, roads and natural parks or areas; and natural disposal does not create a nuisance)^Footnote 7.

On the birth farm, dead cattle were disposed of on farm. They were transported to the disposal location, situated on the fence line of a field that is not used for grazing. BSE case #17 was, as reported, incinerated at the Lethbridge CFIA laboratory.

Cows were normally on pasture from June to December. Any animals that died during that period were left on pasture. In the Canadian cow-calf industry, the annual death loss of cows is estimated to approximately 1%^Footnote 8. In a farm this size, this could represent one or two cows dead on pasture annually. If one of these were infected, for successful transmission to occur, a susceptible young animal would need to ingest the BSE agent through scavenging the carcass or ingesting contaminated soil or plants. Considering that, unlike Chronic Wasting Disease and Scrapie, there is no evidence in the scientific literature concerning potential environmental pathways for the transmission of BSE, this potential route of infection was not considered further.

1.5 Pathways for Off-farm Exposure to the BSE Agent Associated with BSE Case #19

Considering that contaminated feed was the most likely source of infectivity in this investigation, pathways of infective material entering the feed system were examined. Given the fact that the enhanced feed ban was in place over a year prior to the birth of BSE case #19, the potential pathways for feed to become contaminated with infective material are limited, given the extremely low prevalence rate of BSE and the controls surrounding SRM (see Section 1.3; Figure 1; Appendix 1). However unlikely, if the BSE agent were to enter the feed chain, the potential source of contamination could involve two pathways: (1) incomplete removal of SRM from PM, or (2) cross contamination of feed (PM or non-PM) with SRM. Investigating potential cross-contamination with PM would be of interest in mills that use both PM and non-PM material. Investigating cross-contamination of feed with SRM involves examining the sources and movement of SRM from a live infected ruminant that:

1. Dies or is killed on farm:

Carcass (which contains SRM) may be disposed of on farm (see Section 1.4.3), or may be picked up by deadstock for salvaging and rendering.

2. Dies off farm:

in transport,
prior to slaughter, or
at an assembly area

Carcass (which contains SRM) is sent for salvage and rendering.

3. Is condemned at slaughter:

Carcass (which contains SRM) is sent for salvage and rendering.

4. Is slaughtered:

The SRM is removed, treated under a dedicated process and destroyed (or sent for destruction or disposal under license, at a remote facility). Raw inedible material from the slaughter plant is forwarded to the rendering plant.

Through any of these routes, at slaughter, salvage, rendering, or delivery of animal by-products to the mill, should controls fail, cross-contamination could occur. Therefore, the additional risks of feed being contaminated with SRM lie upstream from the feed mill, either at the rendering plant or the slaughterhouse. Many mechanisms are in place to ensure the SRM ban is effective and any potential cross contamination in the complex network of rendering, feed production, transport, storage and use are effectively eliminated (see Section 1.3; Figure 1; Appendix 1).

1.6 Pathways Investigated for BSE case #19

Epidemiological evidence across several countries suggest that a feed-borne source of BSE is the only substantiated route of infection for BSE, even after a feed ban is implemented to mitigate against the risk of feed being contaminated with the BSE agent. Many BSE affected countries that have implemented effective feed bans have detected limited numbers of cases Born After Reinforced (or enhanced or SRM) Ban. Such animals are referred to as BABs or BARBs^Footnote 9. The majority are born within the first few years after the ban is introduced^Footnote 10. In the UK, for example, two-thirds of BSE cases in cattle born after the original 1998 feed ban were born in the first few years after it was introduced^Footnote 11.

Given the abovementioned on-farm and off-farm exposure pathways, two lines of enquiry were pursued to investigate possible sources of BSE infectivity in this case:

(1) On farm through residual or carryover of contaminated feed acquired prior to the enhanced feed ban; and

(2) Off farm through the acquisition of contaminated feed.

2. Feed Investigation

The feed investigation focused on feeds to which the case animal may have had access during its first year of life and on the manufacturing practices used to produce these feeds (March 2008 to March 2010).

2.1 Feeding Practice

A thorough and detailed feed investigation was conducted at the birth farm to identify all of the feed materials used, the suppliers and sources of these products. In addition, the feeding practices and storage and management practices were reviewed. The on-farm investigation focused on potential cross contamination incidents or incidental exposure to feeds that could have contained prohibited ruminant feed ingredients (primarily ruminant meat and bone meal) manufactured prior to July 2007.

On this farm, the calving season extended from February to June, with most calving occurring in March and April. During the first four months of life, the case animal would have nursed from its dam and had access to creep feed. In June, cow-calf pairs were moved to pastures where they were rotated through until December. All pastures were located in the same County as the birth farm, and there was no pasture sharing or mixing of animals with other farms. During this period, the case animal could have had access to hay, grain, pelleted cow ration, pelleted bull ration, free choice minerals and salt. The case animal would not have had access to milk replacer, because the only reported purchase of milk replacer was in February 2010, when the case animal was 11 months of age.

All feed products to which the BSE case was known to have had access were intended for feeding ruminants. Forages fed on the farm were grown and harvested on the farm or occasionally purchased from neighbors and transported with farm owned equipment. The producer did not mix feed on farm. Feed was purchased from the same suppliers over the years. During the period of interest, pelleted feed was delivered to the farm on a regular basis (every 3 to 9 months). The services of a feed consultant have been used since 2003. Ingredient processing of barley occurred with a portable roller; this equipment was shared with a neighboring farm. It was confirmed that this neighboring farm only used this equipment for rolling barley.

On-farm storage and usage practices of feed were such that all cattle on farm could have had access to any of the different feed types used on farm (creep, calf, cow or bull rations), all intended for feeding ruminants. Pet foods were stored in the dwelling house on site and livestock did not have access to these. Bin management and storage practices on farm could not eliminate the possibility that feed products produced prior to the enhanced feed ban may have remained (to some extent) on the farm post enhanced feed ban. However, there was no indication that feedstuff was stored for extended periods as part of the feeding practices on farm. The on-farm practices consisted of shoveling out a bin when it became empty prior to filling it again. The farmer reported this occurred approximately once a year.

Management practices on farm were similar to that of other cow-calf farms in Canada Given the nature of the feed used on farm (home grown forages, commercial feed/supplements manufactured specifically for cattle, no on farm mixing) there would have been no reason to consider the potential that feed might be contaminated. As discussed earlier, it is important to note that while the previous case (#17) born on this farm most likely became infected in 2004, it was not detected as a BSE case until February 2010, almost a year after case #19 was born and likely became infected. Considering the management practices and timelines of the two cases, it was not possible to rule out the potential for the carry-over of a small amount of residual contaminated feed on the farm.

2.2 Feed Sources

Investigations were conducted at all feed manufacturers to determine if they handled prohibited material and whether or not potential cross contamination of ruminant feed may have occurred. Specific attention was directed to ingredient sourcing, transportation, handling, manufacturing, storage and delivery/receiving practices.

Results of the investigation on the farm revealed that the case animal had potentially been exposed to various commercially prepared feeds during the period of interest (March 2008 to March 2010) (Table 1). None of the product formulations contained prohibited material.

Table 1. Commercially Prepared Feed Sources to Which the Case Animal had Potentially been Exposed
Commercial Feed Facilities (number of different feeds of interest)	Facility Profile Production Practices	Feed Type	Rendering Facilities supplying ingredients (Number and type of products)^{Table Note 1}	Comments
A (4)	Facility handled Prohibited Material (PM) for feed preparations destined to non-ruminant species. Facility also handled non-PM rendered animal by-products.	Pelleted rations	J (1 PM and 1 non-PM) K (2, non-PM) L (1, non-PM) M (1 PM and 1 non-PM) N (1, non-PM)	Review of available compliance inspection records during period of interest did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM sources with PM.
B (1)	Facility did not handle PM, but handled other rendered animal by-products.	Mineral supplement	J (1, non-PM) L (1, non-PM) N (1, non-PM) USA (1, imported, non-PM)	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of mineral feeds with PM.
C (2)	Facility did not handle PM, but handled other rendered animal by-products.	Mineral supplement	O (3, non-PM) USA (1, imported, non-PM)	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of mineral feeds with PM.
D (1)	Facility did not handle PM, but handled other rendered animal by-products.	Mineral supplement	L (1, non-PM) USA (1, imported, non-PM)	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of mineral feeds with PM.
E (2)	Feed manufactured and exported to Canada from a facility in USA	Lick tubs	Not investigated	Letter of guarantee provided by manufacturer stating that all products were free from non-prohibited ingredients in the manufacture of its products (to address BSE/restricted use of animal proteins as per US Regulations).
F (1)	Feed manufactured and exported to Canada from a facility in USA	Lick tubs	Not investigated	Letter of guarantee provided by manufacturer stating that all products were free from rendered mammalian protein (except gelatin coating on vitamins) provided by manufacturer, as well as, ingredient lists.
G (1)	Facilities did not handle PM or other rendered animal by-products.	Salt product	Not applicable	No animal by-products used in manufacture and only bulk product received is salt. Conveyances delivering salt to facility do not transport rendered products.
H (1)	Facility did not handle PM or other rendered animal by-products.	Salt product	Not applicable
I (1)	Facility did not handle PM, but did handle other rendered animal by-products.	Milk replacer	P (1, non-PM) Q (1, non-PM) R (1, non-PM) S (1, non-PM) T (1, non-PM) USA (1 imported, non-PM)	Feed was received when case animal was 11 months old, so exposure to this feed ruled out as it would not have been provided in feeding practices of case animal.

Table Note

Table note 1: See Table 2 for description of rendering facilities

Return to table note 1 referrer

For each feed involved, information was gathered from facility management with regards to ingredients, the use of prohibited material in the facility, interviews with CFIA Inspectors and a review of inspection documents, as well as the compliance history of the facilities. Interviews and record reviews were also conducted to characterize transportation of incoming and finished products and to identify if these were transported by company owned or third party owned conveyances.

Based on the presence of PM and non-PM material, Facility A was considered to pose the most likely potential risk for an off-farm source of exposure to the BSE agent, if such an event had occurred. The suppliers of the mineral supplements (Facilities B, C & D) did not handle PM. The facilities did handle non-PM animal by-products, although none were included as ingredients in the mineral supplements. The potential for cross contamination with the BSE agent at Facilities B, C and D was considered negligible. Suppliers of lick tubs (Facilities E & F), located in the USA, were not investigated further. A letter from these suppliers indicated their products were free from rendered mammalian protein. Suppliers of salt products (Facilities G & H) were not considered further at risk because they do not handle PM or non-PM material. The facility supplying milk replacer (Facility I) was eliminated from further investigation with regards to the timing of purchased product and the potential for exposure of the animal. It was noted that facilities A and B were also identified as feed suppliers to the birth farm in the investigation of BSE case #17.

The supplier of the pelleted feeds (Facility A) to the birth farm produced feeds for ruminants and non-ruminant species. The non-ruminant feeds may include PM as an ingredient. Facilities that handle PM and manufacture ruminant rations are considered to be at a greater risk for potential cross contamination of feed. Facility A had documented procedures in place to prevent contamination of ruminant feeds with prohibited material in accordance with the requirements of the Feed Ban and legislative authorities. The commercial mill inspection completion rate for the area was 100% for the years 2008-2010. During the period of interest, Facility A had only one non-compliance recorded related to the feed ban (Health of Animals regulations). The non-compliance was a missing lot number on an invoice for feed containing PM and resulted in a corrective action.

A detailed review of individually manufactured feeds of interests at Facility A was conducted. It targeted 10 deliveries of the 4 different rations (creep, calf, cow or bull pellets), to which the case animal was known to be or was potentially exposed. Due to a flood at the facility, production records for 3 of these 10 feeds delivered to the farm, as well as any delivery records were not available. In reviewing the available mill records for all of the feeds delivered to the farm, there was no documentary evidence of potential cross contamination.

2.3 Rendered Animal By-product Sources

For BSE cases born prior to the implementation of the enhanced feed ban (EFB) (July 2007), the focus of the investigations was on commercial feed mills and subsequent transportation of feed to farms, and on farm feeding practices. At that time, SRM were rendered together with other prohibited materials (PM) to produce meat and bone meal (MBM) for feeding to non-ruminant species. Consequently, the feed investigation focussed on identifying possible opportunities for cross-contamination of feeds with PM that the case animal may have been exposed to. Now that SRMs are excluded from the entire animal feed chain, for cases born after the EFB, contamination of ruminant feed with PM is no longer the most likely potential pathway of exposure to the BSE agent.

To this end, as part of the feed investigation in this case, a more detailed investigation of sources of rendered animal by-products on the premises of the commercial feed facilities during the period of interest was also undertaken. As outlined in Appendix 1, the CFIA conducts regular compliance inspections at rendering plants at frequencies based on risks of transmitting BSE down the animal feed production and supply chain. Compliance inspection records for inspections conducted at the various suppliers of rendered animal by-products identified in Table 1 were reviewed. Instances of non-compliance at these facilities were assessed in relation to the likelihood of potential transmission of the BSE agent down the supply chain to a commercial feed facility and ultimately to the birth farm. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 2. In summary, the review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have likely resulted in the contamination of PM rendered products with SRM or non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.

Table 2. Rendered Animal By-Products Sources to Which the Case Animal had Potentially been Exposed
Rendering Facilities	Products manufactured	Comments
J	MBM (PM), blood meal, animal fat (tallow), animal/vegetable fat blend, SRM cracklings, feather meal	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
K	Porcine MBM, poultry meal, feather meal, blood meal, animal fat, yellow grease, poultry fat, porcine fat	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
L	Spray dried blood plasma	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
M	MBM (PM), animal fat	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
N	Fish meal, poultry meal	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
O	Porcine MBM, animal/vegetable fat blend	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
P	Blood plasma	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
Q	Animal/vegetable fat blend	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
R	Blood meal, porcine MBM	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
S	Fish meal	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.
T	Fish meal	Review of available compliance inspection records did not identify any situations that would have resulted in the contamination of non-PM rendered products with PM or SRM.

3. Identifying and Tracing Cohort Animals

Cattle identified as birth cohorts to the case animal are being traced and destroyed in accordance with OIE requirements. This aims to eliminate animals potentially exposed to the same contaminated feed as the BSE case, although it is unlikely to provide any additional protection against the backdrop of the measures already in place, which include the ongoing feed ban and the exclusion of SRM at the time of slaughter from the human food supply.

The feed and birth cohorts were, in this case, indistinguishable because all animals from the birth cohort had access to the same feed as the case animal during the first year of life. The birth cohort was determined to be animals born after March 25, 2008 and before March 25, 2010. It consisted of 746 animals, based on an exact count of births recorded during the period of interest.

The trace-out investigation targeted the 746 animals of the birth cohort. The trace out investigation located 132 live animals, 99 of which were on the birth premises. All live animals, located on 14 different premises (including the birth farm), have been placed under quarantine. Of these, 22 live cohorts have been humanely destroyed. Disposal was in accordance with OIE recommendations and the CFIA's BSE Manual of Procedures. The remaining live cohorts have been permanently identified, their movements controlled and will be destroyed, or upon their death, their carcasses disposed of in accordance with the CFIA's BSE Manual of Procedures.

Disposition of the remaining 614 cohort animals are reported by category in Table 3. To date^Footnote 12, trace out activities have been finalised for 716 animals of the 746 in the cohort. Tracing of the remaining 30 animals is expected to be completed by the end of 2015.

The OIE no longer classifies the progeny of a BSE-positive cow as equivalent risk animals. However, tracing of the calves born to the infected dam within 24 months preceding the diagnosis of BSE (2013 and 2014 calves) was undertaken to satisfy specific country export requirements. Records indicated the 2013 calf died of scours soon after birth. The 2014 calf was born at the sampling site and is currently under quarantine.

Table 3. Disposition of Animal Traces for BSE #19 Birth Cohort (n=746)
Trace Category	Description	Number of animals
Located	The animal of interest has been located and quarantined (destroyed).	132 (22)
Confirmed dead	The animal has been traced to a location where it is known to have died.	20
Confirmed slaughtered	The animal has been traced to a slaughter plant, or a location known to assemble animals for slaughter only, including a terminal feedlot.	303
Exported	The animal has been traced to a location where it has been reported as exported.	0
Exported and slaughtered	The animal has been traced to a location where it has been reported as exported for immediate slaughter. The importing country has been notified.	118
Presumed dead	The animal has been traced to a location where it is believed to have died. The animal is not on the premises and there is no record or knowledge of it leaving the premises. There are no further avenues of investigation to pursue. Information on the purported disposition of the carcass is recorded if available.	3
Presumed slaughtered	The animal has been traced to a location where it is believed that the animal left only to slaughter or a terminal feedlot. There are no further avenues of investigation.	130
Untraceable	All avenues of tracing have been exhausted. The animal has not been located, or if located, has not been identified amongst non-trace animals, nor determined or believed to have died or been slaughtered. No further action is required.	10
Total closed traces^{Table Note 2}		716

Table Note

Table Note 2: Tracing of remaining 30 animals is pending

Return to table note 2 referrer

4. Investigation Summary

Case #19 was a case of classical BSE in a Black Angus beef cow, 5 years and 10 months of age at time of diagnosis. It was born in March 2009, 20 months after the enhanced feed ban was implemented. A previous case of BSE was diagnosed on the same birth farm from an animal born in 2004.

As for other cases of classical BSE in Canada and in other countries, feed-borne infection is the most likely source of BSE in this case. BSE case #19 was born shortly after the enhanced feed ban was implemented, which may suggest residual feed contamination on-farm or off-farm as the source of infection. No significant events could be linked with this case but the potential for the carry-over of a small amount of residual contaminated feed could not be discounted. Considering the stringent safeguards implemented from 2007 to ensure that SRMs are excluded from the entire terrestrial and aquatic animal feed chains as well as fertilizer, together with the rigorous inspection oversight by the CFIA the contamination of both prohibited and non-prohibited materials with SRM at either a slaughter establishment or a rendering facility, would in all likelihood, be highly improbable. As a result, the carry-over of a small amount of residual contaminated feed associated with the earlier case (#17) on the same birth farm is the most plausible explanation for BSE case #19.

Trace-out of birth cohort animals is ongoing and expected to be completed for the end of 2015. Live cohorts traced are permanently identified, their movements controlled and upon death or destruction are disposed of in accordance with OIE requirements and the CFIA's BSE Manual of Procedures.

5. Impact of Current Findings

The results of Canada's ongoing surveillance program continue to confirm that BSE remains under effective control. Since it is widely recognised that cattle are most susceptible to becoming infected in their first year of life, an analysis of surveillance test results stratified by the year of birth (a birth cohort analysis) provides a surrogate measure of exposure to the BSE-agent in the cattle population in any given year. Even though Canada has recently had a BSE case born almost two years after enhancements were made to the feed ban in 2007 to exclude SRM from the entire terrestrial and aquatic animal feed chains, the updated results from a birth cohort analysis incorporating this case confirm that the overall risk profile has not changed^Footnote 13. The impact of this case on the prevalence estimates for the 2009 and subsequent birth cohorts is inconsequential. They remain extremely low.

Appendix 1. Enhanced Feed Ban Compliance Inspection Programs

Abattoir:

In federally registered abattoirs inspections are undertaken on a daily basis by an on-site CFIA inspector. This includes segregation in the inedible area, staining, the dedication and labelling of containers and the verification that transporters picking up the SRM have a valid and current CFIA permit authorizing this activity. For non-federally registered abattoirs, inspections are carried out by on-site provincial inspectors, or quarterly by CFIA or provincial inspectors.

Transporters of SRM:

Transportation of SRM, including bovine deadstock from which SRM has not been removed, and SRM that has been subjected to intermediate processing (such as rendering or composting), is controlled through the issuance of permits from the CFIA. Permits are issued annually for commercial operations and permitted site is subject to quarterly inspections.

Rendering facilities:

During the period of interest (2008-2010), the inspection frequency of inedible rendering plants in Canada by CFIA was as follows:

Table 1.1 – Inspection Frequency for Inedible Rendering Plants
Facility Risk Profile	2008-09	2009-10
Process SRM, PM and/or non-PM	Full time (24 hour daily presence)	Full time^{Table Note 3} (24 hour daily presence)
Process SRM only (stand-alone facility)	4 inspections/ year	4 inspections/ year
Process PM and non-PM	4 inspections/ year	4 inspections/ year
Process PM only	2 inspections/ year	2 inspections/ year
Process non-PM only	2 inspections/ year	1 inspection/ year

Table Note

Table Note 3: During 2009-10. Inspection frequency at these facilities, based on an excellent level of ongoing compliance, transitioned to 4 inspections/ year

Return to table note 3 referrer

All inedible rendering plants operating in Canada require a permit to operate, which is issued on an annual basis by the CFIA. Prior to the issuance of a permit to operate, each rendering plant must be fully inspected to confirm that they are operating in accordance with the conditions of their permit, including compliance with the Health of Animals Regulations and Feeds Regulations. Inspections verify that written procedures and records of the facility meet the regulatory requirements related to preventing cross-contamination of non-prohibited materials with PM or SRM during the transportation and handling (e.g. delivery vehicles, containers, tools and other equipment used to collect, remove and transport) of raw material or finished rendered product. If non-compliance is identified, mechanisms are in place to control and mitigate risks in terms of product control and systemic corrections by the facility.

Confinement and Destruction of SRM:

A CFIA permit is required for the confinement and destruction of deadstock cattle containing SRM; meat and bone meal (MBM) made from deadstock cattle or SRM; and compost made from deadstock cattle or SRM and permitted site is subject to quarterly inspections.

Commercial Feed Mills:

Commercial Feed Mill inspections are conducted at commercial feed manufacturing establishments to:

confirm that feeds are being manufactured and used in compliance with the Feeds Regulations and Health of Animal Regulations, for the purpose of reducing the potential for feed-related problems affecting animal and/or human health or the environment; and
confirm that feeds are being imported and sold in compliance with the Feeds Act and Regulations and the Health of Animal Act and Regulations.

The purpose of this program is to verify that commercial feed mills:

manufacture safe, compliant, correctly labelled feed; and
follow procedures relating to feed manufacturing, labelling and record keeping, to ensure that the integrity of the feed is maintained and the complete distribution of any feed is identified.

The risk categorization for commercial feed mills considers the food safety and animal health risks associated with the spread of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) via feeds and the use of medications in feeds.

The following risk categories have been identified for commercial feed mills:

High Risk –TSE
- Facilities that manufacture feeds containing prohibited material and manufacture ruminant feeds
Low Risk-TSE
- Facilities that do not have both risk factors for TSE
High Risk – Medications
Low Risk - Medications

These risk factors are used to determine inspection task frequencies for feed manufacturing facilities. The table below identifies the risk factors and the corresponding number of inspection tasks to be assessed at commercial feed mills based on the risk categories.

During the period of interest (2008-2010), the inspection frequency of commercial feed mills was as follows:

Table 1.2 – Inspection Frequency for Commercial Feed Mills
Risk Category	Risk Factors	2008-09	2009-10
1	High Risk TSE and High Risk Medications	4 inspections/ year	3 inspections/ year
2	High Risk TSE and Low Risk Medications	2 inspections/ year	2 inspections/ year
3	Low Risk TSE and High Risk Medications	2 inspections/ year	2 inspections/ year
4	Low Risk TSE and Low Risk Medications	1 inspection/ year	1 inspection/ year

Footnotes

Footnote 1: Health of Animals Regulations (C.R.C., c. 296) part XIV, food for ruminants, livestock and poultry, rendering plants, fertilizers and fertilizers supplements

Return to footnote 1 referrer
Footnote 2: Enhanced Feed Ban Options – Risk Reduction Model and Analysis. Canadian Food Inspection Agency. November 18, 2004.

Return to footnote 2 referrer
Footnote 3: New Regulations Proposed for BSE-Related Feed Controls. Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement. Canadian Food Inspection Agency. December 2004.

Return to footnote 3 referrer
Footnote 4: Enhanced Animal Health Protection from BSE - Specified Risk Material (SRM), Canadian Food Inspection Agency

Return to footnote 4 referrer
Footnote 5: Review of the Evidence for the Occurrence of ‘BARB' BSE Cases in Cattle. William G. Hill, DEFRA (2005) PDF (177 kb).

Return to footnote 5 referrer
Footnote 6: Final report on BSE confirmed in an animal born on 3 October 2001 & 2 cohort animals born on 28 September 2001 & 1 May 2002 in a Pembrokeshire herd. DEFRA (2005) PDF (55.7 kb).

Return to footnote 6 referrer
Footnote 7: Livestock mortality management (disposal), Government of Alberta, 2011 PDF (1.5 mb)

Return to footnote 7 referrer
Footnote 8: Managing livestock mortalities, Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2010

Return to footnote 8 referrer
Footnote 9: Ducrot, et al. Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics., Vet Res. 2008 39:15.

Return to footnote 9 referrer
Footnote 10: Review of the Evidence for the Occurrence of 'BARB' BSE Cases in Cattle. William G. Hill, Defra, 2005 PDF (177 kb)

Return to footnote 10 referrer
Footnote 11: Cattle: TSE surveillance statistics

Return to footnote 11 referrer
Footnote 12: Trace out investigation is ongoing, results presented are those of October 30, 2015

Return to footnote 12 referrer
Footnote 13: An update on the BSE situation in Canada. Canadian Food Inspection Agency. April 2015

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/terrestrial-animals/diseases/reportable/bse/investigations/report-case-19/eng/1448461331857/1448461332731

***********OCTOBER 2015*************

*** PRION 2015 ORAL AND POSTER CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS ***

THANK YOU PRION 2015 TAYLOR & FRANCIS, Professor Chernoff, and Professor Aguzzi et al, for making these PRION 2015 Congressional Poster and Oral Abstracts available freely to the public. ...Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE

Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada

Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to disease as adults. Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with 100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to neurological disease. At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only. Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. We are further examining explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged animal.

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.

***We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE.

***Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.

===============

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...

===============

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/programguide1.pdf

***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. ***

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. ***

P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification

Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan

To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA).

Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.

Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, ***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.

================

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/programguide1.pdf

==========================================

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.

==========================================

Saturday, September 12, 2015

The Canadian Management of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Historical and Scientific Perspective, 1990-2014

>>>We propose that Canadian policies largely ignored the implicit medical nature of BSE, treating it as a purely agricultural and veterinary issue. In this way, policies to protect Canadians were often delayed and incomplete, in a manner disturbingly reminiscent of Britain’s failed management of BSE. Despite assurances to the contrary, it is premature to conclude that BSE (and with it the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) is a thing of Canada’s past: BSE remains very much an issue in Canada’s present. <<<

http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2015/09/the-canadian-management-of-bovine.html

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

snip...

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...

http://web.archive.org/web/20060307063531/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

NIH Availability for Licensing AGENCY: [FR Doc. 2015–24117 Filed 9–22–15; 8:45 am] Detection and Discrimination of Classical and Atypical L-Type BSE Strains by RT-QuIC

http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2015/09/nih-availability-for-licensing-agency.html

10 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

2013

Sunday, December 15, 2013

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/12/fda-part-589-substances-prohibited-from.html

17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2014/12/fda-part-589-substances-prohibited-from.html

Monday, October 26, 2015

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE October 2015

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2015/10/fda-part-589-substances-prohibited-from.html

Sunday, June 14, 2015

Larry’s Custom Meats Inc. Recalls Beef Tongue Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials BSE TSE Prion

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2015/06/larrys-custom-meats-inc-recalls-beef.html

Thursday, July 24, 2014

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2014/07/protocol-for-further-laboratory.html

***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure

Posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=86610

Saturday, January 31, 2015

European red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) are susceptible to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE by Oral Alimentary route

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/01/european-red-deer-cervus-elaphus.html

I strenuously once again urge the FDA and its industry constituents, to make it MANDATORY that all ruminant feed be banned to all ruminants, and this should include all cervids as soon as possible for the following reasons...

======

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administrations BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system.

***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

======

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=85351

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action;jsessionid=635CE9094E0EA15D5362B7D7B809448C?root=7143

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan.

*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2009/prion2009_bookofabstracts.pdf

Monday, November 23, 2015

Dynamics of the natural transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy within an intensively managed sheep flock Vet Res. 2015; 46: 126.

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/11/dynamics-of-natural-transmission-of.html

*** Docket No. APHIS-2007-0127 Scrapie in Sheep and Goats Terry Singeltary Sr. Submission ***

Docket No. APHIS-2007-0127 Scrapie in Sheep and Goats

SUMMARY: We are reopening the comment period for our proposed rule that would revise completely the scrapie regulations, which concern the risk groups and categories established for individual animals and for flocks, the use of genetic testing as a means of assigning risk levels to animals, movement restrictions for animals found to be genetically less susceptible or resistant to scrapie, and recordkeeping requirements. This action will allow interested persons additional time to prepare and submit comments.DATES: The comment period for the proposed rule published on September 10, 2015 (80 FR 54660-54692) is reopened. We will consider all comments that we receive on or before December 9, 2015. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2007-0127-0001

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-11-16/html/2015-29179.htm

http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2007-0127

Saturday, September 12, 2015

The Canadian Management of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Historical and Scientific Perspective, 1990-2014

Historical Article

The Canadian Management of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Historical and Scientific Perspective, 1990-2014

Alexandra E. Quimbya1 and Michel C.F. Shamya2 c1

a1 Faculty of Medicine, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

a2 Department of Medicine (Neurology), University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

Abstract

On February 11, 2015, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency announced that a cow born and raised in Alberta had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as mad cow disease. BSE is a prion disease of cattle that, when transmitted to humans, produces a fatal neurodegenerative disease known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. We believe that this latest case of BSE in Canadian cattle suggests the timeliness of a review of the management of BSE in Canada from a historically and scientifically informed perspective. In this article, we ask: how did the Canadian management of BSE between 1990 and 2014 engage with the contemporary understanding of BSE’s human health implications? We propose that Canadian policies largely ignored the implicit medical nature of BSE, treating it as a purely agricultural and veterinary issue. In this way, policies to protect Canadians were often delayed and incomplete, in a manner disturbingly reminiscent of Britain’s failed management of BSE. Despite assurances to the contrary, it is premature to conclude that BSE (and with it the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) is a thing of Canada’s past: BSE remains very much an issue in Canada’s present.

RÉSUMÉ

Perspective historique et scientifique sur la gestion de l’encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine au Canada de 1990 à 2014. Le 11 février 2015 l’Agence canadienne d’inspection des aliments a annoncé que le test de dépistage de l’encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine (ESB), communément appelée maladie de la vache folle, s’était avéré positif chez une vache née et élevée en Alberta. L’ESB est une maladie à prion chez les bovins qui, quand elle est transmise aux humains, cause une maladie neurodégénérative fatale connue sous le nom de variante de la maladie de Creutzfeldt-Jakob. Nous croyons que ce cas récent d’ESB chez une vache canadienne indique qu’il est temps de revoir la gestion de l’ESB au Canada sous un éclairage historique et scientifique. Dans cet article, nous posons la question suivante : comment la gestion de l’ESB au Canada de 1990 à 2014 s’est-elle adaptée aux connaissances actuelles des répercussions de l’ESB sur la santé humaine? Nous suggérons que les politiques canadiennes ont ignoré dans une large mesure la nature médicale inhérente à l’ESB en la traitant comme un problème purement du domaine de l’agriculture et du domaine vétérinaire. Souvent les politiques destinées à protéger les Canadiens ont donc été tardives et incomplètes, rappelant de façon préoccupante l’échec de la Grande-Bretagne à gérer l’ESB. En dépit d’affirmations contraires, il est prématuré de conclure que l’ESB (et ainsi le risque de contracter la variante de la maladie de Creutzfeldt-Jakob) est chose du passé au Canada : l’ESB y demeure un problème actuel.

(Received December 12 2014)

(Accepted June 19 2015)

Keywords Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease; Healther Services Research; History; Neurosciences; Prion

Correspondence

c1 Correspondence to: Michel Shamy, 1053 Carling Avenue, Room C2182a, Ottawa, ON K1Y 4E9, Canada. Email: mshamy@toh.on.ca.

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9950565&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0317167115002863

Friday, July 10, 2015

CANADA TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION UPDATE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/07/canada-transmissible-spongiform.html

Monday, February 23, 2015

20th BSE Case Raises New Concerns about Canada's Feeding Practices and Voluntary Testing Program; Highlights Importance of COOL

http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2015/02/20th-bse-case-raises-new-concerns-about.html

Friday, February 20, 2015

A BSE CANADIAN COW MAD COW UPDATE Transcript - Briefing (February 18, 2015)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/02/a-bse-canadian-cow-mad-cow-update.html

EDMONTON - Some of former Alberta premier Ralph Klein's most colourful quotes — and the reactions they elicited:

SNIP...

"This all came about through the discovery of a single, isolated case of mad cow disease in one Alberta cow on May 20th. The farmer — I think he was a Louisiana fish farmer who knew nothing about cattle ranching. I guess any self-respecting rancher would have shot, shovelled and shut up, but he didn't do that." — Klein recalls how the mad cow crisis started and rancher Marwyn Peaster's role. The premier was speaking at the Western Governors Association meeting in Big Sky, Mont. September 2004.

"The premier meant that in an ironic or almost a sarcastic way." — Klein spokesman Gordon Turtle.

---

"You would have to eat 10 billion meals of brains, spinal cords, ganglia, eyeballs and tonsils." — Klein speaking in Montreal in January 2005 on the risk of humans contracting mad cow disease.

---

"I would offer $5 billion to have a Japanese person to come over here and eat nothing but Alberta beef for a year. And if he gets mad cow disease, I would be glad to give him $5 billion — make it $10 billion — Canadian." — Klein speaking after Japan closed its borders to Canadian beef.

---

http://www.edmontonjournal.com/news/Kleinisms+former+Alberta+premier+Ralph+Klein+sound+bite/8171110/story.html

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Canada, USA, Bad feed, mad cows: Why we know three BSE cases had a common origin and why the SSS policy is in full force $$$

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/05/canada-usa-bad-feed-mad-cows-why-we.html

Thursday, March 29, 2012

atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012

NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2012/03/atypical-nor-98-scrapie-has-spread-from.html

Increased Atypical Scrapie Detections

Press reports indicate that increased surveillance is catching what otherwise would have been unreported findings of atypical scrapie in sheep. In 2009, five new cases have been reported in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. With the exception of Quebec, all cases have been diagnosed as being the atypical form found in older animals. Canada encourages producers to join its voluntary surveillance program in order to gain scrapie-free status. The World Animal Health will not classify Canada as scrapie-free until no new cases are reported for seven years. The Canadian Sheep Federation is calling on the government to fund a wider surveillance program in order to establish the level of prevalence prior to setting an eradication date. Besides long-term testing, industry is calling for a compensation program for farmers who report unusual deaths in their flocks.

http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/This%20Week%20in%20Canadian%20Agriculture%20%20%20%20%20Issue%2028_Ottawa_Canada_11-6-2009.pdf

Current as of: 2015-01-31

Sheep flocks and/or goat herds confirmed to be infected with classical scrapie in Canada in 2015 Date confirmed Location Animal type infected January 5 Ontario Goat

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/terrestrial-animals/diseases/reportable/2015/scrapie-2015-/eng/1423162035296/1423162036030

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/terrestrial-animals/diseases/reportable/scrapie/eng/1329723409732/1329723572482

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Alberta Canada First case of chronic wasting disease found in farm elk since 2002

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2015/02/alberta-canada-first-case-of-chronic.html

Saturday, March 21, 2015

***Canada and United States Creutzfeldt Jakob TSE Prion Disease Incidence Rates Increasing ***

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2015/03/canada-and-united-states-creutzfeldt.html

CANADA SEE STEADY INCREASE OF THE SPORADIC CJD’S AND THE VPSPR’S (sporadic CJD’s). ...tss

PLEASE NOTE, type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD) in Canada is also on a steady increase.

please see ;

> 3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is pending.

CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122

As of May 31, 2012

Deaths of Definite and Probable CJD

Year Sporadic Iatrogenic Familial GSS FFI vCJD Total

1994 2 0 0 1 0 0 3

1995 3 0 0 0 0 0 3

1996 13 0 0 0 0 0 13

1997 16 0 1 1 0 0 18

1998 22 1 0 1 0 0 24

1999 26 2 2 1 0 0 31

2000 32 0 0 3 0 0 35

2001 27 0 2 1 0 0 30

2002 31 0 2 2 0 1 36

2003 27 1 1 0 0 0 29

2004 42 0 1 0 0 0 43

2005 42 0 0 2 0 0 44

2006 39 0 1 3 1 0 44

2007 35 0 0 4 0 0 39

2008 48 0 1 0 0 0 49

2009 48 0 3 2 0 0 53

2010 34 0 3 0 0 0 37

2011 37 0 2 1 0 1 41

2012 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

Total 525 4 19 22 1 2 573

1. CJDSS began in 1998

2. Data before 1998 are retrospective and partial, data from 1998 to 2008 are complete, and data for 2009 - 2012 are provisional

3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is pending.

CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122

As of May 31, 2012

http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/pdf/stats_0512-eng.pdf

SEE DECEMBER 2012 CANADA

http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/stats-eng.php#canada

Saturday, June 15, 2013

Canada Fraser Health Statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease outbreak

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/06/canada-fraser-health-statement-on.html

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/08/cjd-case-in-saint-john-prompts-letter.html

Saturday, September 12, 2015

The Canadian Management of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Historical and Scientific Perspective, 1990-2014

http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2015/09/the-canadian-management-of-bovine.html

Saturday, September 19, 2015

*** An interview with Professor John Collinge: VIDEO Director of the MRC Prion Unit Part of the Hayward Gallery's History Is Now ***

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/09/an-interview-with-professor-john.html

spontaneous atypical BSE ???

don’t let anyone fool you. spontaneous TSE prion disease is a hoax in natural cases, never proven.

all one has to do is look at France. France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$ same as the USA, that’s why they stopped testing for BSE mad cow disease in numbers they could find any with, after those atypical BSE cases started showing up. shut down the testing to numbers set up by OIE that are so low, you could only by accident find a case of BSE aka mad cow disease. and this brilliant idea by the WHO et al, to change the name of mad cow disease, thinking that might change things is preposterous. it’s all about money now folks, when the OIE, USDA and everyone else went along and made the TSE prion disease aka mad cow type disease a legal trading commodity by the BSE MRR policy, I would say everyone bit off more then they can chew, and they will just have to digest those TSE Prions coming from North America, and like it, and just prey you don’t get a mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease in the decades to come, and or pass it to some other poor soul via the iatrogenic medical surgical tissue friendly fire mode of transmission i.e. second hand transmission. it’s real folks, just not documented much, due to lack of trace back efforts. all iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, until the iatrogenic event is tracked down and documented, and put into the academic and public domain, which very seldom happens. ...

As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.

http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/8/74

FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$

so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

Sunday, October 5, 2014

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2014/10/france-stops-bse-testing-for-mad-cow.html

Saturday, June 14, 2014

Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) Calls for Briefing on Beef Recalled for Mad Cow Potential Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT)

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2014/06/rep-rosa-delauro-d-ct-calls-for.html

Friday, May 29, 2015

GAO FEDERAL VETERINARIANS US Federal Government Is Unprepared for a Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2015/05/us-federal-government-is-unprepared-for.html

Thursday, September 10, 2015

25th Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Food and Drug Administration Silver Spring, Maryland June 1, 2015

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2015/09/25th-meeting-of-transmissible.html

Sunday, October 25, 2015

USAHA Detailed Events Schedule – 119th USAHA Annual Meeting CAPTIVE LIVESTOCK CWD SCRAPIE TSE PRION

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2015/10/usaha-detailed-events-schedule-119th.html

Thursday, October 22, 2015

Former Ag Secretary Ann Veneman talks women in agriculture and we talk mad cow disease USDA and what really happened

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2015/10/former-ag-secretary-ann-veneman-talks.html

Sunday, October 18, 2015

World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Institut Pasteur Cooperating on animal disease and zoonosis research

http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2015/10/world-organisation-for-animal-health.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE

Monday, November 30, 2015