Thursday, December 3, 2009

FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT IN PORTUGAL FROM 11 TO 20 MAY 2009 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT IN PORTUGAL FROM 11 TO 20 MAY 2009 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) AND ORGANIC FERTILIZERS AND SOIL IMPROVERS

Executive Summary

This report describes the outcome of a Food and Veterinary Office (FVO)specific audit carried out from 11 to20 May 2009, as part of the general audit of Portugal carried out under the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council.

The objective of the mission was to evaluate the implementation of certain protective measures against Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as rules concerning organic fertilisers and soil improvers (OF/SI).

In terms of scope, the mission concentrated on BSE epidemio-surveillance in bovines, measures taken after suspicion/confirmation of BSE, removal and handling of specified risk material (SRM) from bovines, and the control measures in place to ensure the effectiveness of the total feed ban, in particular how the risks posed by the use of OF/SI are considered for the organisation of these controls. In addition and for OF/SI, it was assess the capability of the authorities to their correct production, flow and use. The evaluation included measures taken in response to the recommendations made in previous FVO missions regarding the afore-mentioned issues.

Overall, the report concludes that:

- BSE monitoring was largely satisfactory, with the exception of fallen animals, an important number of which are still not sampled and tested. However, in two cases there were significant delays in the implementation of movement restrictions following the detection of suspects. SRM controls were largely satisfactory.

- Progress has been made since the previous mission concerning feed ban controls and targets set by the control programme have been met; however, controls did not yet cover the entire country, and they were affected by deficiencies in the design and implementation of a risk based approach.

- Progress has been also made concerning OF/SI, although there were some weakness in their production. Nevertheless, official controls on the use of OF/SI have been satisfactorily reinforced, although they did not cover yet the use of non-bulk OF/SI.

The report makes a number of recommendations addressed to the Portuguese competent authorities, aimed at rectifying the shortcomings identified and further enhancing the implementing and control measures in place.

SNIP...

6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

BSE monitoring was largely satisfactory, with the exception of fallen animals, an important number of which are still not sampled and tested. However, in two cases there were significant delays in the implementation of movement restrictions following the detection of suspects. SRM controls were largely satisfactory.

Progress has been made since the previous mission concerning feed ban controls and targets set by the control programme have been met; however, controls did not yet cover the entire country, and they were affected by deficiencies in the design and implementation of a risk based approach. Progress has been also made concerning OF/SI, although there were some weakness in their production. Nevertheless, official controls on the use of OF/SI have been satisfactorily reinforced, although they did not cover yet the use of non-bulk OF/SI.

SNIP...END...SEE FULL TEXT ;


http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=7854



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ir_search_en.cfm?stype=insp_nbr&showResults=Y&REP_INSPECTION_REF=2009-8090



- To see the Competent Authority comments on the Draft Report, click here (89Kb) -

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=6158



To see the Competent Authority response to the report recommendations, click here


http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_pt_2009-8090.pdf




Opinion of the Scientific Panel on biological hazards (BIOHAZ) on the determination of the BSE risk status of Portugal Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-093


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620777374.htm




http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Opinion/summaryopinionportugalbse1,0.pdf?ssbinary=true




http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Opinion/finalopinionportugalbse1,3.pdf?ssbinary=true





Annex to The EFSA Journal (2004) 143 on the opinion on the determination of the
BSE risk status of Portugal.


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/cs/BlobServer/Scientific_Opinion/finalreportportugalbse1,3.pdf?ssbinary=true





Update of the GBR-opinion of the SSC of July 2000 11 January 2001 - 9 - ANNEX: OVERVIEW TABLE OF ALL COUNTRIES WITH A GBR CLASSIFICATION


40 Portugal (mainland) 3/3/99 IV 2000


http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out243_en.pdf




Wednesday, December 23, 2009


Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease: the first confirmed case from Portugal shows early onset, long duration and unusual pathology


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/12/variant-creutzfeldtjakob-disease-first.html




Table 3. Results of the GBR assessments through 2005

GBR I: Highly unlikely

Argentina (I), Australia (I), Iceland, New Caledonia, New Zealand (I), Panama (I), Paraguay (I), Singapore, Uruguay (I), Vanuatu

GBR II: Unlikely but not excluded

Botswana (I), Brazil (I), Colombia, Costa Rica (II), El Salvador (I), India, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia (I), Nicaragua (I), Nigeria, Norway (I), Pakistan, Sweden (II). Swaziland (I)

GBR III: Likely but not confirmed or confirmed at a lower level A

lbania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile (I), Croatia, Denmark, Canada (II), Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Poland, The Netherlands, Romania, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, USA (II)

GBR IV: Confirmed at a higher level

Portugal, United Kingdom


ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a1000e/a1000e00.pdf





Tuesday, December 1, 2009

IMPORTATION OF CANADIAN CATTLE, BISON, SHEEP, AND GOATS INTO THE UNITED STATES 12/1/09


http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/12/importation-of-canadian-cattle-bison.html



Monday, November 30, 2009

USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html



Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.


http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html



Wednesday, November 18, 2009

R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html



Monday, November 16, 2009

CANADA, USA, specified risk materials (SRMs), Environment, Fertilizer, AND Politics, just more BSe


http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/11/canada-usa-specified-risk-materials.html




O.I.E. = B.S.E./T.S.E. ... TSS



BSE/vCJD: The European On-going Story

Prof J Ralph Blanchfield, MBE

Past President

Institute of Food Science & Technology

President 2006-2008

International Academy of Food Science & Technology

IUFoST Governing Council Member 2003-2008

Food science, food technology and food law consultant

E-mail: jralphb@easynet.co.uk Web: www.jralphb.co.uk

(updated 25 Sepember 2009)



SNIP...


BSE/vCJD

Susceptibility to vCJD (cont)

Wadsworth et al have reported that in transgenic mice expressing human PrP, human PrP 129 valine appears not to be a compatible substrate for the type of prion (type 4) seen in vCJD. These animal models suggest that human infection with BSE-derived prions may not be restricted to a single disease phenotype, but may result in sporadic CJD-like or novel phenotypes in addition to vCJD, with the type of disease experienced depending on the genotype of the host source of the infection, and the genotype of the recipient.

(Wadsworth JD et al (2004). Science 2004 Nov 11 2004)

vCJD

Asante et al have shown that transgenic mice expressing human PrP methionine 129, inoculated with either BSE or vCJD prions, may develop the neuropathological and molecular phenotype of vCJD, consistent with these diseases being caused by the same prion strain. Surprisingly, however, BSE transmission to these transgenic mice, in addition to producing a vCJD-like phenotype, can also result in a distinct molecular phenotype that is indistinguishable from that of sporadic CJD with PrPSc type 2. These data suggest that more than one SE-derived prion strain might infect humans; it is therefore possible that some patients with a phenotype consistent with sporadic CJD may have a disease arising from BSE exposure.

Asante et al (2002). EMBO Journal, 21 ( 23), 6358-6366.

vCJD

First CJD case of valine homozygosity at codon 129

In a paper describing the histopathologic and molecular investigation in a young British woman with atypical sporadic CJD and valine homozygosity at PRNP codon 129. autopsy findings were atypical of sporadic CJD, with marked gray and white matter degeneration and widespread prion protein (PrP) deposition. Lymphoreticular tissue was not available for analysis. Molecular analysis of PrPSc from cerebellar tissue demonstrated a novel PrPSc type similar to that seen in vCJD (PrPSc type 4). Further studies will be required to characterize the prion strain seen in this patient and to investigate its etiologic relationship with BSE.

Mead s et al Arch Neurol. 2007;64(12):1780-1784.

vCJD

Aguzzi’s group in Zurich studied 114 brain samples from 70 patients with sporadic CJD and three patients with variant CJD. Every patient classified as CJD type 2, and all variant CJD patients, showed POM2/POM12 reactivity in the cerebellum and other PrPSc-rich brain areas, with a typical PrPSc type 1 migration pattern.

Interpretation

The regular coexistence of multiple PrPSc types in patients with CJD casts doubts on the validity of electrophoretic PrPSc mobilities as surrogates for prion strains, and questions the rational basis of current CJD classifications.

Polymenidou et al (2005), “Coexistence of multiple PrPSc types in individuals with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease”, Lancet Neurology, (4):805-814


SNIP...



http://www.jralphb.co.uk/BSE_vCJD_Web.ppt




http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:uonjAYkres0J:www.jralphb.co.uk/BSE_vCJD_Web.ppt+DETWILER+PORTUGAL+BSE&cd=15&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us





Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Co-existence of scrapie prion protein types 1 and 2 in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: its effect on the phenotype and prion-type characteristics.


http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/09/co-existence-of-scrapie-prion-protein.html



Thursday, November 05, 2009

Incidence and spectrum of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease variants with mixed phenotype and co-occurrence of PrPSc types: an updated classification


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/11/incidence-and-spectrum-of-sporadic.html



Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Characteristics of Established and Proposed Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Variants


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/08/characteristics-of-established-and.html



Saturday, June 13, 2009

Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009


http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html



Wednesday, February 11, 2009


Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html




Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html



Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html




Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html




TSS

Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

COMMISSION DECISION of 11 November 2009

amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC as regards the BSE status of Chile, Colombia and Japan
(notified under document C(2009) 8590)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2009/830/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies ( 1 ), and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 5(2) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 lays down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in animals. For that purpose, the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof (countries or regions) is to be determined by classification into one of three categories depending on the BSE risk involved, namely a negligible BSE risk, a controlled BSE risk and an undetermined BSE risk.

(2) The Annex to Commission Decision 2007/453/EC of 29 June 2007 establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions thereof according to their BSE risk ( 2 ) lists countries or regions according to their BSE risk status.

(3) The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) plays a leading role in the categorisation of countries or regions according to their BSE risk. The list in the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC takes account of Resolution No XXI — Recognition of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


Status of Members — adopted by the OIE in May 2008 regarding the BSE status of Member States and third countries.

(4) Decision 2007/453/EC currently lists Finland and Sweden as having a negligible BSE risk and all other Member States as having a controlled BSE risk. It also lists the BSE status of third countries. In May 2009, the OIE adopted Resolution No XXII — Recognition of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Risk Status of Members. That Resolution recognised Chile as having a negligible BSE risk and Colombia and Japan as having a controlled BSE risk. The list in Decision 2007/453/EC should therefore be amended to be brought into line with that Resolution as regards those three third countries. However, pending a final conclusion of the OIE on the BSE risk status of all Member States and taking into account the harmonised stringent BSE protective measures applied within the Community, no changes should at present be made as regards the recognised BSE status of the Member States.

(5) Decision 2007/453/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.

(5) Decision 2007/453/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.

(6) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,


HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC is replaced by the text in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 November 2009.

For the Commission
Androulla VASSILIOU
Member of the Commission


ANNEX

‘LIST OF COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

A. Countries or regions with a negligible BSE risk
Member States

— Finland,
— Sweden,

EFTA countries

— Iceland,
— Norway,

Third countries

— Argentina,
— Australia,
— Chile,
— New Zealand,
— Paraguay,
— Singapore,
— Uruguay,

B. Countries or regions with a controlled BSE risk
Member States

— Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, United Kingdom,

EFTA countries

— Liechtenstein,
— Switzerland,

Third countries

— Brazil,
— Canada,
— Colombia,
— Japan,
— Mexico,
— Taiwan,
— United States,

C. Countries or regions with an undetermined BSE risk





http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:295:0011:0013:EN:PDF




bought and paid for by your local cattle dealers. ...TSS


IN A NUT SHELL ;

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,



http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf




Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1





Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151





Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8




Wednesday, November 18, 2009

R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html




Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Surveillance On the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and rabies in Taiwan


http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/11/surveillance-on-bovine-spongiform.html




Monday, October 26, 2009


MAD COW DISEASE, AND U.S. BEEF TRADE


MAD COW DISEASE, CJD, TSE, SOUND SCIENCE, COMMERCE, AND SELLING YOUR SOUL TO THE DEVIL


http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/10/mad-cow-disease-and-us-beef-trade.html





Posted: Wed Dec 19, 2007 3:47 pm Post subject: OIE

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question wrote:

Quote:
Maybe familirise yourself with the OIE. The primary concern is animal health of the world they are the animal version of the WHO. It is a long way down from that ivory tower but here we go, until pressured by the USA repesentatives a country could not export animals for 6 years after finding a BSE/BASE positive animal so under the old rules the US would not be able to export anywhere in the world for another 4 1/2 years. Who got the risk levels system put in to allow some trade - your US representatives. You guys want to change rules - OK , but you do not get special rules that only apply to the US.

As i have told you before Sand h I market all my own slaughter animals and you know that, so don't do the whole holier than thow act.



With all due respect, it is obvious that you know little about the OIE and how it actually works. Having been to their offices in Paris and talked personally with the Head of the Animal Test Section, you would choke if you knew how many lobby groups attend that office daily. There is a steady stream of paid lobby groups that have one goal in life and that is to sway the Section Heads of each department within the OIE to suit the needs of different juristictions around the world, which curiously enough, also includes the USA and Canada. Anyone can go there and chat with them - providing they can privide valid cause to be let in. To say that the only goal of the OIE is animal health is actually only part of their function. They are more than that and my discussions with Dr. Diaz there has showed me that. But to blindly make a statement regarding what they do when you have no idea what they actually do is like eating the skin of the orange and not knowing what is actually under.

Interstingly you state that the US Government applied pressure (to the OIE) I assume and that is a great example of the lobby groups doing their job. So, at the end of the day, one can safely assume that it is the pressure applied by certain influential lobby groups that will determine a likely aoutcome to an apparent OIE directive. Man alive, isn't it great to live in a democracy wherein the people get to make the choices and not just some "other" interested party or group - say like........Cargyll or Tyson for example?

So, one last question, question?

Who wags the tail of that dog?? And for what reason other than one that is purely associated with trade and international agreements and greed?

And you think it is so simply explainable.



http://www.ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=22833&postdays=0&postorder=asc&highlight=ops&start=36




Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted date: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)

Document (0.2Mb)

Summary

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620779461.htm



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC), to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.

http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Canada%20jul%202004.pdf



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of MEXICO

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990's. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993. It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported 'at - risk' MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live 'at - risk' cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system. EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSEagent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.

http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Mexico%20jul%202004.pdf


MY comments/questions are as follows ; 1. SINCE the first Harvard BSE Risk Assessment was so flawed and fraught with error after the PEER REVIEW assessment assessed this fact, how do you plan on stopping this from happening again, will there be another peer review with top TSE Scientist, an impartial jury so-to-speak, to assess this new and updated Harvard BSE/TSE risk assessment and will this assessment include the Atypical TSE and SRM issues ?

*** Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002 ***

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf


***

http://www.scribd.com/doc/1490709/USDA-200600111


***

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


***

http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf


***

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


***

Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of ... RESPONSE TO COMMENTS FROM TERRY S. SINGELTARY SR. Comment #1: SINCE the first Harvard BSE Risk Assessment was so flawed and fraught ...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf




Heightened incidence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is associated with a shift in clinicopathological profiles

Thursday, November 13, 2008

Katharina Stoeck1, 6, Klaus Hess2, Lorenz Amsler3, 7, Tobias Eckert3, Dieter Zimmermann4, Adriano Aguzzi1, 8 and Markus Glatzel5, 8

(1) Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zürich, Schmelzbergstrasse 12, 8091 Zurich, Switzerland (2) Dept. of Neurology, University Hospital Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (3) Swiss Federal Office of Public Health, Bern, Switzerland (4) Institute of Surgical Pathology, University Hospital Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (5) Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany (6) Dept. of Neurology, University Hospital Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany (7) CSL Behring, Bern, Switzerland (8) Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital Hamburg-Eppendorf, Martinistrasse 52, 20246 Hamburg, Germany

Received: 23 February 2007 Revised: 8 February 2008 Accepted: 11 February 2008 Published online: 29 October 2008

Abstract Incidences of human transmissible spongiform encephalopathies are monitored by national registries in the majority of countries in Western Europe. During the past 13 years incidences for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in Switzerland fluctuated between 0.4 and 2.63 cases/106 inhabitants. We have compared clinicpathological patient profiles including geographic and gender distribution, age at disease onset, duration of disease, clinical symptoms, and recognized or hypothetical risk factors for CJD, genetic risk factors, biochemical and histopathological data for two cohorts of Swiss sporadic CJD patients from years of regular sporadic CJD incidence (1996–2000, mean incidence 1.3 cases/106 inhabitants, n = 47) to Swiss sporadic CJD patients from years of elevated sporadic CJD incidence (2001–2004, mean incidence 2.3 cases/106 inhabitants, n = 73). Sporadic CJD patients from the cohort with elevated sporadic CJD incidence presented with a higher frequency of rare sporadic CJD subtypes. Patients of these subtypes were significantly older and showed a skewed male/female ratio when compared to published patients of identical sporadic CJD-types or to patients from the 1996–2000 cohort and indicates that improved detection of rare sporadic CJD subtypes may have contributed to increased incidence.

snip...

In summary, this analysis confirms our initial finding of an increased incidence of sCJD in Switzerland. Although, the reason for this phenomenon remains unexplained to date, our analysis demonstrates that patients from the years 2001–2004 with increased sCJD incidence differ in several aspects from published sCJD cohorts. The fact that the MV2 subgroup of patients showed an increase in mean age at disease onset when compared to published cohorts, together with the fact that these patients demonstrate distinct features in sensitive imaging methods, may indicate that improved detection of these patients has contributed to the rise in sCJD incidence. Further studies investigating biochemical and genetic aspects will contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying sCJD.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this artiecle (DOI10.1007/s00415-008-0900-00) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Key words Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease - prions - dementia - epidemiology

M. Glatzel and A. Aguzzi coordinated the design and operation of the study. Katharina Stoeck and Klaus Hess were involved in clinical assessment of patients. M. Glatzel and Dieter Zimmermann were involved in assessment of specimen. All authors contributed to the manuscript and approved the final version. M. Glatzel and A. Aguzzi had full access to all data in the study and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. The study was performed according to established ethical guidelines This study was supported by grants of the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health and the Swiss National Science Foundation.

http://www.springerlink.com/content/w2w3027q63351q12/fulltext.pdf




A case-control study of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in Switzerland: analysis of potential risk factors with regard to an increased CJD incidence in the years 2001–2004


Jessica Ruegger* 1 , Katharina Stoeck* 2,3 , Lorenz Amsler4,5 , Thomas Blaettler2,6 , Marcel Zwahlen7 , Adriano Aguzzi2 , Markus Glatzel2,8 , Klaus Hess1 and Tobias Eckert4,9

1Department of Neurology, University Hospital Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

2Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

3Department of Neurology, University Hospital Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany

4Federal Office of Public Health, Bern, Switzerland

5CSL Behring, Bern, Switzerland

6Bristol-Myers Squibb, Wallingford, CT, USA

7Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland

8Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany

9Swiss Tropical Institute, Basel, Switzerland

author email corresponding author email* Contributed equally

BMC Public Health 2009, 9:18doi:10.1186/1471-2458-9-18

The electronic version of this article is the complete one and can be found online at:

http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/18


Received: 11 July 2008 Accepted: 14 January 2009 Published: 14 January 2009

© 2009 Ruegger et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

Background In 2001, the observed annual mortality from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in Switzerland increased from less than 1.5 to 2.6 per million inhabitants. An underlying cause could not be identified.

Methods To analyse potential risk factors for sCJD in Switzerland, close relatives of 69 sCJD-patients and 224 frequency age-matched controls were interviewed in a case-control study using a standardised questionnaire. 135 potential risk factors including socio-demographics, medical history, occupation and diet were analysed by logistic regression adjusting for age, sex and education.

Results sCJD patients were more likely to have travelled abroad, worked at an animal laboratory, undergone invasive dental treatment, orthopaedic surgery, ophthalmologic surgery after 1980, regular GP visits, taken medication regularly, and consumed kidney. No differences between patients and controls were found for residency, family history, and exposure to environmental and other dietary factors.

Conclusion Although some factors were significantly more frequent among sCJD-cases, this study did not reveal specific explanations for the increased incidence of deaths due to sporadic CJD observed in Switzerland since 2001. Results have to be interpreted with caution due to multiple testing and possible recall bias in association with a long incubation period. The most plausible reason for the increase in Swiss sCJD cases after 2000 is an improved case ascertainment. Therefore, underreporting of cases might well have occurred before the year 2001, and the "real" yearly incidence of sCJD might not be lower than, but rather above 2 per million inhabitants.


http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/18



http://www.eurocjd.ed.ac.uk/sporadic.htm



Biochemical typing of pathological prion protein in aging cattle with BSE

Seraina Tester1 , Valerie Juillerat1 , Marcus G Doherr1 , Bianca Haase2 , Miroslaw Polak3 , Felix Ehrensperger4 , Tosso Leeb2 , Andreas Zurbriggen1 and Torsten Seuberlich1

1NeuroCenter, Reference Laboratory for TSE in animals, Department of Clinical Research and Veterinary Public Health, Vetsuisse Faculty, University of Berne, Switzerland

2Institute of Genetics, Vetsuisse Faculty, University of Berne, Switzerland

3National Veterinary Research Institute, Pulawy, Poland

4Institute of Veterinary Pathology, Vetsuisse Faculty, University of Zürich, Switzerland

author email corresponding author email

Virology Journal 2009, 6:64doi:10.1186/1743-422X-6-64

The electronic version of this article is the complete one and can be found online at:

http://www.virologyj.com/content/6/1/64


Received: 23 March 2009 Accepted: 26 May 2009 Published: 26 May 2009

© 2009 Tester et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract Background The broad enforcement of active surveillance for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in 2000 led to the discovery of previously unnoticed, atypical BSE phenotypes in aged cattle that differed from classical BSE (C-type) in biochemical properties of the pathological prion protein. Depending on the molecular mass and the degree of glycosylation of its proteinase K resistant core fragment (PrPres), mainly determined in samples derived from the medulla oblongata, these atypical cases are currently classified into low (L)-type or high (H)-type BSE. In the present study we address the question to what extent such atypical BSE cases are part of the BSE epidemic in Switzerland.

Results To this end we analyzed the biochemical PrPres type by Western blot in a total of 33 BSE cases in cattle with a minimum age of eight years, targeting up to ten different brain regions. Our work confirmed H-type BSE in a zebu but classified all other cases as C-type BSE; indicating a very low incidence of H- and L-type BSE in Switzerland. It was documented for the first time that the biochemical PrPres type was consistent across different brain regions of aging animals with C-type and H-type BSE, i.e. independent of the neuroanatomical structure investigated.

Conclusion Taken together this study provides further characteristics of the BSE epidemic in Switzerland and generates new baseline data for the definition of C- and H-type BSE phenotypes, thereby underpinning the notion that they indeed represent distinct prion disease entities.

SNIP...

Conclusion Taken together these results indicate that the prevalence of H- and L-type BSE in Switzerland remains under the detection limit of the Swiss active surveillance program. However one H-type BSE case was identified by passive BSE surveillance and proves in principle the capacity to identify such cases in the population. Hence, the overall prevalence of atypical BSE in Switzerland appears very low and similar to what has been reported from other countries. It has been speculated and strengthened by experimental data [53,54] that atypical BSE once recycled in the cattle population was the origin of the worldwide BSE epidemic in the last 20 years. If this holds true and such cases occur spontaneously in the population, then BSE might never be completely eradicated. Furthermore, in these circumstances, it would be hazardous to relieve certain disease control measures, including the total prohibition of MBM in ruminant feed.


http://www.virologyj.com/content/6/1/64



Finally the authors consider the possibility that CJD in Switzerland is related to a prion epizootic, and pay considerable attention to this possibility since between 1995 and 1998, Switzerland reported a larger incidence of BSE than did all other continental European countries (415 cases between 1990 and 2002). Exposure to BSE-infected products might have taken place mainly before high-risk bovine food products were banned from the human food chain in 1990. However, BSE is thought to cause variant CJD [abbreviated as vCJD or CJD (new var.) in ProMED-mail] rather than sporadic CJD, yet all evidence indicates that none of the Swiss cases fulfill the diagnostic criteria of vCJD. Swiss CJD could be related to BSE only if the strain of Swiss BSE prion differs from the strain of BSE prevalent in the UK. Available data, though limited, suggest that this is not the case.

At present there is no evidence that the Swiss CJD cases might result from transmission of BSE to people after one or more serial passages through species other than cattle. Scrapie is exceedingly rare in Switzerland: only 7 cases have been reported in the past 10 years. Chronic wasting disease of deer has not been reported in Europe, although surveillance data on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in European game are incomplete.

All recognized clinical and molecular markers combine to indicate that none of the Swiss patients developed vCJD. The authors conclude that the elucidation of the underlying chain of events is a national research priority, and may uncover previously unrecognized modes of prion infection and transmission. It remains to be seen whether this increase in the incidence of CJD in Switzerland will be sustained, or whether it represent a statistical anomaly. According to Will RG, et al. (Ann Neurol 1998; 43: 763-767) there was a doubling in the annual death rates for sporadic CJD in the United Kingdom between the 1980s and the 1990s, and similar increases in the apparent death rates for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease had occurred in other European countries, attributable to improvement in diagnosis. - Mod.CP].................as/mpp/cp/mpp


http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f?p=2400:1202:307098::NO::F2400_P1202_CHECK_DISPLAY,F2400_P1202_PUB_MAIL_ID:X,18755



Prions: Protein Aggregation and Infectious Diseases

ADRIANO AGUZZI AND ANNA MARIA CALELLA

Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

snip...

3. Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Approximately 85% of all human prion diseases are sporadic forms of CJD. For sCJD, there is no association with a mutant PRNP allele, nor is there any epidemiological evidence for exposure to a TSE agent through contact with people or animals infected with TSEs. sCJD cases are currently subclassified according to the methionine/valine polymorphism at codon 129 of the PRNP gene and the size and glycoform ratio of proteaseresistant prion protein identified on western blot (type 1 or type 2) (174). Heterozygosity (Met/Val) at PrP codon 129 appears to be associated with a lower risk (378) and/or prolonged incubation time (119, 387). The lack of routine laboratory testing for preclinical diagnosis makes the search for agent sources and other risk factors extremely difficult. At present, the means of acquisition of a TSE agent in these patients remains a mystery. So far, there is no evidence for spontaneous PrPSc formation in any animal or human TSE. In humans, the peak age incidence of sporadic CJD is 55–60 years. However, if spontaneous misfolding were the primary event, one might expect a continuously increasing incidence with age because more time would allow more opportunity for rare misfolding events.

snip...

Physiol Rev • VOL 89 • OCTOBER 2009 • www.prv.org


http://physrev.physiology.org/cgi/content/abstract/89/4/1105



Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html



Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC EFFECT OF AGE ON THE PATHOGENESIS OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES SEAC 103/2

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-effect-of-age-on-pathogenesis-of.html



Thursday, November 05, 2009

Incidence and spectrum of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease variants with mixed phenotype and co-occurrence of PrPSc types: an updated classification

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/11/incidence-and-spectrum-of-sporadic.html





TSS

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Inspection 2009 Slovenia and Bulgaria

Country Slovenia Inspection number 2009-8114 Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Inspection period Jan 2009 Published 23/06/2009

6.1 OVERALL CONCLUSION

A satisfactory system is in place for the control and eradication of BSE. Epidemio-surveillance for BSE in bovines is largely in line with the requirements of Annex III to Regulations (EC) No 999/2001 and the officially reported incidence of BSE should be an accurate reflection of the true incidence of BSE. Controls on SRM are satisfactory. Total feed ban controls at feed mills and on farms in order to prevent feeding of ruminants with derogated PAO were satisfactory; however, the targeting criteria for the controls at farm level were not fully risk based in all regions.



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=7441



response ;



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=6036



Brussels, 16 May 2001

BSE: Scientists publish risk assessments for Costa Rica, Kenya, Slovenia and Romania

The Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) advising the European Commission on BSE related issues has today published its opinion on the Geographical Risk of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (GBR) in Costa Rica, Kenya, Slovenia and Romania. The evaluation of the geographical risk of presence of BSE focuses on the risk for animals to incubate the disease. The Committee concludes that is highly unlikely that cattle infected with the BSE agent are present in domestic herds of Costa Rica (GBR level I). They found that this is unlikely but not excluded in the herds of Kenya and Slovenia (GBR level II) and that it is likely that BSE is present in the cattle herds of Romania (GBR level III) although this is not yet confirmed. Slovenia is the first accession country that is classified as GBR level II. All other accession countries evaluated so far have been classified at level III of Geographical BSE Risk. Similarly, all EU Member States are classified at level III except for Sweden, Finland and Austria (level II) and United Kingdom and Portugal (level IV).

The Committee found that Slovenia has since 1992 imported 2.400 live cattle notably from Germany, and imported small amounts of MBM. The Slovenian authorities have been able to trace most of these cattle imports and to demonstrate that many of them are still alive. They also showed that reasonably effective controls on the rendering of MBM were in place at least as of 1996, and probably also before that date. In addition, a first feed ban to ruminants was introduced in 1996. It is therefore regarded unlikely but not excluded that the BSE agent could have been recycled, but not amplified, in Slovenia between 1992 and January 2001, when a complete feed ban was put in place. Romania has imported higher numbers of live cattle (about 22,000 tons) and meat-and-bone-meal (about 10,000 tons) from EU countries where the presence of BSE has since been confirmed. Although risk management measures were taken as of 1996, their effective enforcement has not been demonstrated. Therefore it is regarded likely that Romanian cattle herds were exposed to potentially BSE contaminated feed and subsequently infected.

Kenya has received meat and bone meal exports notably between 1987-1990 from the UK and since 1994 from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. The data made available to the SSC do not exclude that some of this MBM has reached domestic cattle. The conclusion of the assessment for Costa Rica is based on data demonstrating that BSE infectivity is highly unlikely to have reached the country and hence the domestic cattle population. Only minor quantities of potentially infected live cattle (35 from Spain) or potentially contaminated meat-and-bone meal (5 tonnes) were imported into the country.

The SSC recommends that BSE related aspects are included in the programme of future inspection missions of the Food and Veterinary Office, as far as feasible, to obtain confirmation of the information received from the national authorities in the countries concerned. For the time being, the scientists underline, their assessment has to be based on the information provided by the assessed countries. As far as possible all data have been evaluated and verified in close co-operation with the countries concerned, and checked against other sources in an open and transparent manner. Data on imports provided by the countries under evaluation have for example been compared with export data as recorded by EUROSTAT, the EU Statistical Office, and with export data provided by the UK authorities.

The evaluation of the GBR in these third countries was made on the basis of the same method and assessment process as described by the SSC in its July 2000 opinion on the GBR( 1 ). In the July-opinion the scientists already assessed the GBR risk in all EU Member States except Greece, and a first series of third countries( 2 ). An assessment for Uruguay was published in January; assessments for Botswana, Lithuania, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Swaziland in February, and for Albania, Brazil, Colombia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, India, Mauritius, Pakistan, Poland, Singapore and Slovakia in April this year.

The full text of the opinions is available at:



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/outcome_en.html



Released on 29/05/2001



http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press138_en.html



Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Slovenia

Impact Worksheet, November 23, 2001



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/taf/iw_2001_files/foreign/bse_slovenia1101.htm



Country Bulgaria Inspection number 2009-8110 Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Inspection period Feb 2009 Published 23/06/2009

6.6 OVERALL CONCLUSION

The report concludes that very little progress has been made since the previous mission concerning the monitoring of on-farm slaughtering, as a result of which requirements for epidemio-surveillance and SRM are not complied with at this level; moreover, testing of fallen animals is still limited and passive surveillance has not resulted in the declaration of any suspect so far. On the contrary, epidemio-surveillance and SRM controls at slaughterhouse level were largely satisfactory; the same applies to feed ban controls, although there were deficiencies in the organization of controls in accordance with risks. ...



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=7439



response ;



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_bulgaria_8110_2009.pdf



MIDDAY EXPRESS News from the Press and Communication Service's midday briefing Nouvelles du rendez-vous de midi du Service Presse et Communication 02 / 07 / 2002 EXTRAIT BSE: Scientists publish geographical risk assessments (GBR) for seven countries - Bulgaria, Croatia, Iceland, Latvia, San Marino, Turkey and Vanuatu GBR is a qualitative indicator of the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE. Where its presence is confirmed GBR gives an indication of the level of infection. The evaluation focuses on the risk for animals to incubate the disease. There are four categories: I Highly unlikely; II Unlikely but not excluded; III Likely but not confirmed or confirmed, at a lower level; IV Confirmed at a higher level. The Scientific Steering Committee which advises the European Commission on BSE related issues, has concluded that it is highly unlikely that cattle infected with the BSE agent are present in the domestic herds in Iceland and Vanuatu (GBR level I). They concluded that it is likely that BSE is present in the cattle herds of Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, San Marino and Turkey, although this is not yet confirmed (GBR level III). The full texts of the opinions are available

at:



http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/outcome_en.html#reports



http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press241_en.pdf



Scientific Steering Committee June 2002 - 1 - Opinion of the Scientific Steering Committee on the GEOGRAPHICAL RISK OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (GBR) in Bulgaria Adopted by the SSC on 27 June 2002



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out271b_en.pdf



Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

snip...

your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE methology of the OIE. most any coutnry that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE.

THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE.

AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...

snip...



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1



Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8



Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648027c28e



Monday, June 01, 2009

Biochemical typing of pathological prion protein in aging cattle with BSE



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/06/biochemical-typing-of-pathological.html



Sunday, June 07, 2009

L-TYPE-BSE, H-TYPE-BSE, C-TYPE-BSE, IBNC-TYPE-BSE, TME, CWD, SCRAPIE, CJD, NORTH AMERICA



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/06/l-type-bse-h-type-bse-c-type-bse-ibnc.html



Sunday, May 10, 2009

Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and NOT diagnosed in the United States



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html



Sunday, December 28, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html



Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html



Saturday, February 28, 2009 NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009 SEAC 102/2



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html



Saturday, June 13, 2009

BSE FEED VIOLATIONS USA UPDATE From 01/01/2009 To 06/10/2009



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/06/bse-feed-violations-usa-update-from.html



Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html



WHO WILL FOLLOW THE CHILDREN FOR CJD SYMPTOMS ???

Saturday, May 2, 2009

U.S. GOVERNMENT SUES WESTLAND/HALLMARK MEAT OVER USDA CERTIFIED DEADSTOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/us-government-sues-westlandhallmark.html



Sunday, April 12, 2009 BSE MAD COW TESTING USA 2009 FIGURES Month Number of Tests

Feb 2009 -- 1,891

Jan 2009 -- 4,620



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml



SEE FULL TEXT ;



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html



Monday, May 4, 2009

Back to the Past With New TSE Testing Agricultural Research/May-June 2009



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/05/back-to-past-with-new-tse-testing.html



Thursday, April 9, 2009

Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html#comments



Sunday, April 12, 2009 r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments



Sunday, May 10, 2009

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)



http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/05/meeting-of-transmissible-spongiform.html



Saturday, June 13, 2009

Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009



http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html



GREETINGS,


so, let us postulate shall we ;-) let us just postulate that for just this one time, that mad cow disease and all other Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies in all other species, that have been feeding on these species, and in the laboratory studies that proves oral transmission in many different species of these TSE, and in some the lateral and vertical transmission, let us all ignore this as well, just this one time. let's just for this one second play like the spontaneous mad cow disease is for real (which i don't believe for one second), and that mad cow disease just pops up from now and then, i believe it was guesstimated to be around to be like sporadic CJD i.e. 1-2 humans per million. but some studies suggested 3 to 8 cases of spontaneous BSE per million head of cattle, but lets just say for grins, 1-2 per million as with sporadic CJD. Therefore, if we have about 100 million cattle in the U.S., we should have 100-200 cases of BSE each year, if you consider 100 million head of cattle per year in the USA.

so, my question, WHERE ARE THESE MAD COWS AT, AND OR WHERE ARE THEY BURIED AT since that last case of mad cow disease in the USA was made public around March of 2006 ???

by what miracle and how has the USA bovine been protected from mad cow disease for so many years, decades $$$

ALL Human and Animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, of all phenotypes, of ALL ages, in EVERY State and INTERNATIONALLY, should be made MANDATORY reportable ASAP. ...



Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

OIE upgrades Japan's BSE status to "controlled risk"

Tue May 26, 2009 11:06am EDT

* OIE upgrades Japan's BSE status to "controlled risk"

* Decision to add pressure on Japan to accept U.S. imports

(Adds details)

By Sybille de La Hamaide

PARIS, May 26 (Reuters) - The world animal health body OIE said on Tuesday it had eased Japan's status on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease to "controlled risk", a move that should boost meat trade with the Asian country.

"This official categorisation of Japan and of other OIE listed countries contributes to the safety of international trade," OIE Director General Bernard Vallat told Reuters.

"It also provides guarantees to the consumers because it is the proof that these countries have applied the measures recommended by the OIE based on its adopted standards -- to prevent risks to public and animal health," he added.

The decision, taken at the OIE's general assembly in Paris, meets a request by the Asian country to obtain a status that other countries already have, hoping it will pave the way for major markets to relax import restrictions on Japanese cattle.

Under OIE regulations, there are three BSE risk categories -- negligible, controlled and undetermined risk.

Controlled risk status is granted to countries where adequate measures are taken, including the removal of certain risk materials such as brains, eyes and spinal cords, even though some cases of mad cow disease are still found.

More than 30 countries, including the United States, Britain and France, are in the controlled risk category while 10 countries are classified as negligible risk.

U.S. BEEF EXPORTS STAND TO BENEFIT

While Japan's exports have grown five times in two years to just over 500 tonnes last year thanks to heavy promotion, they are still tiny compared to imports that totalled about 470,000 tonnes, more than half the beef consumed in the country.

Analysts said the OIE decision would add pressure on Japan to let in more U.S. imports, as it could hardly ask countries to end restrictions on its meat due to its new OIE status without easing its own limits on U.S. imports.

One compromise may be extending the age limit of Japan's ban on any U.S. beef from cattle over 20 months old, a measure that has crimped shipments to what was once the United States' biggest beef buyer, taking more than a third of total U.S. exports, they said. [ID:nT216885]

The U.S. industry last week stressed the significance of the expected OIE ruling, which would put Japan's BSE status on the same level the United States has had since 2007. [ID:nN21289676]

For details of Japan's beef imports by source: here

For details of Japan's beef exports: here

To access a full list of countries' BSE risk status: here

(Additional reporting by Miho Yoshikawa in Tokyo; Editing by Anthony Barker)


http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLP716390



IN my opinion, the OIE lost all it's credibility when they went with the Bush administration on the BSE MRR policy. Science was not involved in that policy, only trade. IT did nothing but make legal, the trading of all strains of TSE globally, and set back the eradication of mad cow disease, to the beginning of the epidemic. with the atypical mad cow cases showing up, it will be interesting how this plays out in the years, and decades to come.

IN my opinion, the USA should be classified as undetermined risk, because these are the hard cold facts, they have absolutely no idea, and neither does anyone else. ...

TSS


Friday, March 6, 2009

Risk of Introduction of BSE into Japan by the Historical Importation of Live Cattle from the United Kingdom


http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2009/03/risk-of-introduction-of-bse-into-japan.html



Sunday, May 10, 2009

Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and not diagnosed in the United States


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted date: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)

Document (0.2Mb)

Summary

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178620779461.htm



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Document/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf?ssbinary=true



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC), to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.


http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Canada%20jul%202004.pdf



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of MEXICO Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004 Summary The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990's. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993. It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported 'at - risk' MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live 'at - risk' cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system. EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSEagent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.


http://www.mvo.nl/wetgeving-dierlijk-vet/onderzoek/download/EFSA%20on%20BSE%20risk%20Mexico%20jul%202004.pdf



Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf



-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT'S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, "The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA's Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law." Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the "USDA Agreement") to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the "Targeted Cattle Population"). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

Evidence uncovered during the government's investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA's ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;

(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA's testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #


http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf



Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38

FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK


http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html



FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf



10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II


___________________________________


PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html



Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html



Saturday, February 28, 2009

NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009 SEAC 102/2


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html



Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html



Saturday, February 21, 2009 Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule ??? WHAT, IT'S 2009 FOR PETE'S SAKE $$$ Two recent articles caught my eye ;

Renderers say industry not prepared for FDA feed ban rule

Food Chemical News

February 2, 2009

and

BSE, rendering relate to human safety

Emma Struve 02/17/2009


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/02/renderers-say-industry-not-prepared-for.html



Monday, May 4, 2009

Back to the Past With New TSE Testing Agricultural Research/May-June 2009


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/05/back-to-past-with-new-tse-testing.html



Sunday, May 10, 2009

Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and NOT diagnosed in the United States


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html



Friday, March 13, 2009

NAIS comments NCBA and R-Calf Wednesday, March 11, 2009 - 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry - Public Hearing


http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html



Monday, May 11, 2009

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html



Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment


snip...


MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8



IT'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have been at the helm of the


USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH et al for many many years, or the incompetence of these agencies are so inept, either through ignorance and or just too overweight with industry reps., they then should be all done away with and a single agency brought forth, and if not, how will you correct this ongoing problem ?


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf



Greetings,

>>>> “We want to have discussions based on the science and having a science-based OIE categorization of the U.S. bolsters significantly our position in having those discussions,“ DeHaven said. <<<


my God, how deep can this BSe get. Johanns, GW et al at USDA and the OIE's policy on the legal trading of all strains of TSE i.e. the BSE MRR policy has absolutely nothing to do with science and everything to do with commodities and futures. we cannot fire GW, but Johanns must go. they sold there soul (and ours) to the devil with this policy. it set back the eradication of BSE/TSE to the very beginning of when it was first documented in 1985. what it says is it's o.k. to feed other countries our strain of TSE and visa versa, but of course this had to wait until the USDA finally stumbled on there first documented case. there nothing more than a bunch of hypocrites. it's disgusting and sickening. the stench coming from Johanns et al at USDA is overwhelming.


ONE FINAL THOUGHT ;

OPINION


http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/biohaz/biohaz_opinions/1540/biohaz_op_ej359_qra_vertebral_column_en1.pdf



>>> New methodology, under the auspices of the OIE, is under construction within the EU and EFSA and the Panel recommended that once these classifications had been finalised they should harmonised with those used in the EFSA BSE QRA guidance document. The Panel anticipated that this harmonisation may have a knock-on impact on the QRA calculations, conclusions and recommendations and that, again, future Panel members should review this, and other, inputs of the QRA and address this impact using their “self-tasking mandate” option.<<<



GOD HELP US!

sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle, if i am not mistaken. MOST countries that went by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. ...TSS


http://www.oie.int/downld/SC/2005/bse_2005.pdf



THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE.

AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...


Page 95 of 98

8/3/2006

WHAT ABOUT RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS FROM ALL OTHER TSEs, WITH RELATIONS TO SRMs ???

a.. BSE OIE

see full text ;


http://p079.ezboard.com/fwolftracksproductionsfrm2.showMessage?topicID=470.topic



http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=20678



http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&I=-3&P=3381



TSS