Thursday, December 30, 2021

FSIS Issues Public Health Alert for Ineligible Imported Meat and Poultry Products from China, what about BSE?

FSIS Issues Public Health Alert for Ineligible Imported Meat and Poultry Products from China, what about BSE?

NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE BSE TSE PrP?

FSIS Issues Public Health Alert for Ineligible Imported Meat and Poultry Products from China 

FSIS Announcement

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29, 2021 - The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is issuing a public health alert for an undetermined amount of imported meat and poultry products from China. A recall was not requested because FSIS has been unable to identify and contact the importers. The total amount of ineligible product is undetermined because the investigation is ongoing.

The products subject to the public health alert and labels are listed here. 

The meat and poultry products do not identify an eligible establishment number on their packaging and were not presented to FSIS for import reinspection. These products are ineligible to import into the U.S., making them unfit for human consumption.

The problem was identified through an investigation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). FSIS will continue working with CBP and APHIS on the ongoing investigation.

Retailers who have purchased the products are urged not to sell them. Consumers who purchased the products should not consume them and need to dispose of them properly. Consumers are asked to dispose of the products by double bagging them to reduce the possibility of animals accessing the products. USDA cannot confirm whether the products were properly heated to control pathogens that affect domestic livestock.

There have been no confirmed reports of adverse reactions due to consumption of these products. Anyone concerned about an illness should contact a health care provider.

Consumers with food safety questions can call the toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline at 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) or live chat via Ask USDA from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. 

Consumers can also browse food safety messages at Ask USDA or send a question via email to MPHotline@usda.gov. For consumers that need to report a problem with a meat, poultry, or egg product, the online Electronic Consumer Complaint Monitoring System can be accessed 24 hours a day at https://foodcomplaint.fsis.usda.gov/eCCF/.



***> It is evident from Table 1 that China reacted to the outbreak of BSE by placing various bans such as feed ban, MBM ban and making BSE a notifiable disease in 1990. <***

(3) (PDF) Bovine spongiform encephalopathy and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease risk management strategies in the People's Republic of China. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/.../264815349_Bovine...[accessed Dec 29 2021].

The Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of European Union established a qualitative indicator − the geographical BSE risk (GBR) − of the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, at a given point in time, in a country (Scientific Steering Committee, 2002b). This system was further expanded by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to include countries participating in the import and export of cattle and cattle by-products. The previous GBR classifications have been phased out and as of 2007 WOFAH took the responsibility of classifying countries for their BSE risk under a new categorization system. The categories under the new system are negligible BSE risk, controlled BSE risk and undetermined BSE risk (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). However, a GBR risk assessment was not conducted for China by any of the above mentioned agencies.

As of 2008, the World Organization for Animal Health recognizes Chinese Taipei as a ‘controlled BSE risk region’ (Office of International des Epizooties, 2008). 

An internal risk analysis was performed by the Chinese Government in 2000 entitled, Risk Analysis and Assessment of BSE in China. Some key highlights from this analysis for China have been reported by Ozawa (2003) (Table 1) as well as for Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei (Table 2). It is evident from Table 1 that China reacted to the outbreak of BSE by placing various bans such as feed ban, MBM ban and making BSE a notifiable disease in 1990. China has been carrying out passive surveillance since 1997 and made it more comprehensive by including an active surveillance stream in the year 2000. 

But what is notable about China and Hong Kong is the absence of SRM ban whereas data on a similar ban was not available for Chinese Taipei. Ozawa (2003) also noted some disparities in the instituted prevention policies between China, Chinese Taipei, and Hong Kong (Table 1 and Table 2) namely a MBM ban and rendering conditions. Hong Kong relies on voluntary ban on feeding cattle ruminant derived meat and bone meal. Information on national rendering conditions could not be gathered for China. 3.1 

Import of cattle and beef from BSE-affected countries China imports live cattle for breeding purposes. Importation of breeding cattle from EU countries (France and Germany), North America (the USA and Canada), and Japan continued until the first case of BSE was reported in these countries. As shown in Figure 1, a total of 6,720 live cattle were imported during the period 1990 to 2003 from countries that later reported BSE (United States Department of Agriculture, 2004a, 2005, 2007; Smith, 2001). Another source reported the country had imported 2,863 breeding cattle from Japan, Canada, the USA and Australia between 1992 to 1999 (China Daily, 2001). Regardless of the number, the fact remains that China did import a large number of live cattle during the 1990s from countries that later reported BSE.

BSE and vCJD risk management strategies in the People’s Republic of China 309 Table 2 Data on BSE preventive measures in Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei Cattle import Feed ban MBM ban SRM ban Surveillance and monitoring Rendering Public awareness programs Hong Kong None No official ban No official ban (rely on voluntary bans since 2001) No official ban BSE was not a notifiable disease until 2003 Ruminant material not rendered; sent to landfills None 1997 – Ban on use of ruminant derived MBM in feed Chinese Taipei None 2001 – ban on use of animal protein 1990 – Ban on import of MBM from BSE affected countries No data 1990 – BSE made notifiable Rendering at 133°C/3bar/ 20 minute 1990 – Programs in place Source: Data summarised from Ozawa (2003)

(3) (PDF) Bovine spongiform encephalopathy and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease risk management strategies in the People's Republic of China. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/.../264815349_Bovine...[accessed Dec 29 2021].



***> However, a GBR risk assessment was not conducted for China by any of the above mentioned agencies.

Animal Health Status of Regions

Last Modified: Sep 22, 2021

Regions classified by APHIS as having either negligible risk or controlled risk for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 9 CFR 92.5

NO LISTING OF BSE RISK FACTOR FOR CHINA; SEE;


Spongiform encephalopathies in mainland China

Chang-Kai Sun Xiao-Qin Chong Yuan-Gui Huang

Published:August 24, 1996DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)64699-5

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and a new variant of human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in the UK have had international medical, economic, and political repercussions. 1 , 2 Not a single case of BSE or scrapie has been reported in the People's Republic of China. Yet more than 30 confirmed and probably naturally occurring, sporadic or family, cases of spongiform encephalopathy including more than 20 cases of CJD and five of the slower progressing Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome, have been described since 1980. None of the patients had a history of ever having received any probable contaminated medical treatment. Nor were they medical workers who had ever contacted any person with spongiform encephalopathy. The onset of progressive neuropsychiatric dysfunction at an early or late age is rare in these cases. However, there were six cases of spongy degeneration of the brain in infancy reported 12 years ago. 3


Published: 18 October 2008 

Surveillance for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in China from 2006 to 2007 

Qi Shi, Chen Gao, Wei Zhou, Bao-Yun Zhang, Jian-Ming Chen, Chan Tian, Hui-Ying Jiang, Jun Han, Ni-Juan Xiang, Xiao-Fang Wang, Yong-Jun Gao & Xiao-Ping Dong BMC Public Health volume 8, Article number: 360 (2008) Cite this article

Abstract Background Human transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (HTSE), or Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), is a group of rare and fatal diseases in central nervous system. Since outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and variant CJD, a worldwide CJD surveillance network has been established under the proposition of WHO. In China, a national CJD surveillance system has started since 2002. The data of CJD surveillance from 2006 to 2007 was analyzed.

Methods Total 12 provinces are included in CJD surveillance system. The surveillance unit in each province consists of one or two sentinel hospitals and the provincial CDC. All suspected CJD cases reported from CJD surveillance were diagnosed and subtyped based on the diagnostic criteria for CJD issued by WHO.

Results Total 192 suspected CJD cases were reported and 5 genetic CJD, 51 probable and 30 possible sporadic CJD (sCJD) cases were diagnosed. The collected sCJD cases distribute sporadically without geographical clustering and seasonal relativity and the highest incidences in both probable and possible sCJD cases appeared in the group of 60–69 year. The most common three foremost symptoms were progressive dementia, cerebellum and mental-related symptoms. The probable sCJD patients owning both typical EEG alteration and CSF protein 14-3-3 positive have more characteristic clinical syndromes than the ones having only one positive. The polymorphisms of codon 129 of all tested reported cases shows typical patterns of Han Chinese as previous reports, that M129M are predominant whereas M129V are seldom.

Conclusion Chinese CJD patients possessed similar epidemiological and clinical characteristics as worldwide.

SNIP...

Discussion Since German neurologists Creutzfeldt and Jakob firstly reported the cases with progressive cerebral dysfunction, the 'Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease' has been known for almost one century. Since the occurrence of vCJD in Europe was addressed, WHO consultation had recommended the establishment of worldwide CJD surveillance[14]. In 2002, China started to set up the national CJD surveillance and join into the worldwide surveillance system. It consists of twelve provinces now with about 440 millions inhabitants. In this paper, we propose the surveillance results from 2006 to 2007. Except five genetic CJD cases, all CJD cases are diagnosed as sCJD. No iCJD and vCJD has been identified. The collected sCJD cases distribute sporadically without geographical clustering. The mean onset ages of the probable sCJD and possible sCJD cases are almost the same, showing the highest incidence in the group of 60–69 years. There are more male cases than female ones in the past two years, probably reflecting only short-term surveillance.

Many symptoms have been described as the foremost clinical manifestations in sCJD patients. The first three common symptoms are progressive dementia, cerebellum and mental-related symptoms. Along with the progression of the disease, more neurological symptoms have been identified, among them progressive dementia has been observed sooner or later in all sCJD patients. No differences in the appearances and frequencies of other four main clinical manifestations have been notified in the groups of probable sCJD and possible sCJD.

EEG examination and CSF protein 14-3-3 test are the indexes for probable sCJD according to the diagnostic criteria recommended by WHO[9]. We find that the probable sCJD patients owning both typical EEG alteration and CSF protein 14-3-3 positive have more characteristic clinical syndromes than the ones having only one positive. Meanwhile, all cases with 14-3-3 positive and EEG altheration show myoclonus during their clinical courses. CSF 14-3-3 positive is believed as the marker of brain damage[15]. EEG abnormality represents early recognition of worsening brain function[16]. It might reflect that the patients owning two positive results have more pathological changes in brains.

In our surveillance system, the PRNP genes of all reported cases have been screened if available. The polymorphisms of codon 129 of all tested reported cases show typical patterns of Han Chinese as previous reports[13], that M129M are predominant whereas M129V are seldom. Additionally, analyses of a few biopsy and postmortem brain samples of sCJD cases collected previously show all type 1 PrPSc patterns in Western blots (unpublished data). All these patients have been confirmed to be M129M homozygous. Furthermore, five genetic CJD cases have been identified through CJD surveillance. Two cases, T188K and E200K, do not have detectable family histories, which are reported and primarily diagnosed as probable and possible sCJD, respectively. It emphasizes that PRNP gene sequencing is essential and unique for detection of gCJD without detectable family history.

Although CJD cases have been identified through our CJD surveillance, the reported and diagnosed cases is far from the expected one based on the numbers of inhabitants. Therefore, it is hard to line out the morbidity of CJD in China. Lack of knowledge of this rare disease in local clinicians in small town encumbers the sensitivity of surveillance system. Carefully designed training programs will help to improve this situation. Compared with the developed countries, the rate of postmortem is extremely lower in China, due to the traditional customs. Therefore, apart from the future legislation for brain autopsy of suspected CJD patient, enhancing follow-up will improve the quality of our CJD surveillance system.

Conclusion The results of the present study revealed the general epidemiology status of CJD in China from 2006 to 2007. Foremost clinical manifestations were different among the CJD patients, but along with the progression of the disease, progressive dementia was observed sooner or later in all cases. EEG examination, CSF protein 14-3-3 test and PRNP gene analyses were the main laboratory tools for the suspected patients without postmortem. M129M were the predominant genotype in Han Chinese. The morbidity of CJD in China still remained unsettled for the short-term surveillance. Due to the lower rate of postmortem, enhancing follow-up will improve the quality of the CJD surveillance system.


***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.

https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). 

Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 

=============== 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 

=============== 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 

============== 

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf 

***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

Taylor & Francis

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20

Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160

Officials and Industry can continue to post/quote that old BS junk science, but it's not true. for one thing, not a single case of the so called old age spontaneous atypical BSE cases have ever been proven to be spontaneous, and see what the OIE themselves state;

OIE Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle

Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided. 


Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 2019

34 Scientific Commission/September 2019

3. Atypical BSE

The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.

The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.

4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greaves

snip...

REFERENCES

SNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;


Atypical L-type BSE

Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb; 23(2): 284–287. doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161416 PMCID: PMC5324790 PMID: 28098532

Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle 


Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.


 In most cases of naturally occurring atypical BSE identified so far, the animals were >8 years of age, except for 3 cases: 1 H-BSE and 1 L-BSE in Spain (1) and 1 H-BSE in Germany (12). Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that L-BSE developed sporadically/spontaneously.

Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.


Atypical H-type BSE

Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion

Research Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 

This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.


Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies

Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge

Author item Greenlee, Justin item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University

Submitted to: Prion

Publication Type: Abstract Only

Publication Acceptance Date: 5/14/2018

Publication Date: 5/22/2018

Citation: Greenlee, J.J., Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H. 2018. The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge. Prion 2018, May 22-25, 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Paper No. P98, page 116. Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure. Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with either H-type BSE from the 2004 US H-type BSE case (n=3) or from the 2006 US H-type case associated with the E211K polymorphism (n=4) using 10% w/v brain homogenates. Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. At approximately 50 months post-inoculation, one steer (EK211 inoculated with E211K associated H-BSE) developed clinical signs including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and was euthanized. Enzyme immunoassay confirmed that abundant misfolded protein was present in the brainstem, and immunohistochemistry demonstrated PrPSc throughout the brain. Western blot analysis of brain tissue from the clinically affected steer was consistent with the E211K H-type BSE inoculum. With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.


P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 

Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States. 

With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains. 

PRION CONFERENCE 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT

Published: 23 June 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSE-infected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission. In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.

References...END


2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

PLEASE NOTE;

2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author:

‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).

In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE. 


3.2.1.2 Non‐cervid domestic species

The remarkably high rate of natural CWD transmission in the ongoing NA epidemics raises the question of the risk to livestock grazing on CWD‐contaminated shared rangeland and subsequently developing a novel CWD‐related prion disease. This issue has been investigated by transmitting CWD via experimental challenge to cattle, sheep and pigs and to tg mouse lines expressing the relevant species PrP.

For cattle challenged with CWD, PrPSc was detected in approximately 40% of intracerebrally inoculated animals (Hamir et al., 2005, 2006a, 2007). Tg mice expressing bovine PrP have also been challenged with CWD and while published studies have negative outcomes (Tamguney et al., 2009b), unpublished data provided for the purposes of this Opinion indicate that some transmission of individual isolates to bovinised mice is possible (Table 1).

In small ruminant recipients, a low rate of transmission was reported between 35 and 72 months post‐infection (mpi) in ARQ/ARQ and ARQ/VRQ sheep intracerebrally challenged with mule deer CWD (Hamir et al., 2006b), while two out of two ARQ/ARQ sheep intracerebrally inoculated with elk CWD developed clinical disease after 28 mpi (Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). However, tg mice expressing ARQ sheep PrP were resistant (Tamguney et al., 2006) and tg mice expressing the VRQ PrP allele were poorly susceptible to clinical disease (Beringue et al., 2012; Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). In contrast, tg mice expressing VRQ sheep PrP challenged with CWD have resulted in highly efficient, life‐long asymptomatic replication of these prions in the spleen tissue (Beringue et al., 2012).

A recent study investigated the potential for swine to serve as hosts of the CWD agent(s) by intracerebral or oral challenge of crossbred piglets (Moore et al., 2016b, 2017). Pigs sacrificed at 6 mpi, approximately the age at which pigs reach market weight, were clinically healthy and negative by diagnostic tests, although low‐level CWD agent replication could be detected in the CNS by bioassay in tg cervinised mice. Among pigs that were incubated for up to 73 mpi, some gave diagnostic evidence of CWD replication in the brain between 42 and 72 mpi. Importantly, this was observed also in one orally challenged pig at 64 mpi and the presence of low‐level CWD replication was confirmed by mouse bioassay. The authors of this study argued that pigs can support low‐level amplification of CWD prions, although the species barrier to CWD infection is relatively high and that the detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs with a mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity.


kind regards, terry

Saturday, December 18, 2021

CFIA Canada Alberta Laboratory detection of atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy

CFIA Canada Alberta Laboratory detection of atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy

Laboratory detection of atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy

On December 17, 2021, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) notified the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) of a case of atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a 8 and a half year old beef cow on a farm in Alberta.

The detection and reporting of an atypical BSE case will not affect the OIE negligible risk status of Canada and market access for Canadian animals and beef products should be unaffected.

The Government of Canada will work with the cattle and beef industries to maintain the confidence of international trading partners to maintain market access for Canadian animals and products.

Cases of atypical BSE are generally observed in animals aged 8 years or older. Atypical BSE has worldwide distribution, even in countries where no classical BSE has been reported. These two factors support the assumption that this extremely rare disease develops spontaneously. Atypical strains occurs naturally and sporadically in all cattle populations at a very low rate and which have only been identified in older cattle.

Canada continues to maintain its safeguards in order to prevent the introduction of certain cattle tissues capable of transmitting BSE, known as specified risk material (SRM). The detection of atypical BSE in Canada underscores the ongoing effectiveness of Canada's robust targeted BSE surveillance program.

As this case has been confirmed as an atypical case, no further actions on the index farm are required. There is no quarantine or other restrictions in place for the farm.






I remember another famous quote;

Alberta Premier Ralph Klein has taken aim at the owner of the province's infamous mad cow, saying a "self-respecting" rancher would not have taken the animal to slaughter but instead would have simply "shot, shovelled and shut up."

OIE Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle

Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided. 



Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 2019

34 Scientific Commission/September 2019

3. Atypical BSE

The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.

The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.

4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greaves

snip...

REFERENCES

SNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;


TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 07, 2021
Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE OIE, FDA 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, and Ingestion Therefrom


Atypical L-type BSE
Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb; 23(2): 284–287. doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161416 PMCID: PMC5324790 PMID: 28098532
Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle 
Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.
Atypical H-type BSE
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States. 
With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains. 
PRION CONFERENCE 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
Published: 23 June 2011
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits
The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSE-infected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission. In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.
References...END
2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains
PLEASE NOTE;
2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strainsNo
Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author: ‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).
In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE. 

CDFA September 2018
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
North America

SNIP...

BSE Cases in North America by Year and Location Year Province/State Type Age (Years) Strain Canada

1993 Alberta1 Beef cow 6 Classical

2003 Alberta Angus cow 6-8 Classical

2004 Alberta Holstein cow 8 Classical

2005 Alberta Charolais cow 6 Classical

2006 Alberta Holstein Hereford cow 6 Classical

2006 British Columbia Holstein cow 6 Classical

2006 Manitoba Beef cow 15

2006 Alberta Dairy cow 4 Classical

2006 Alberta Beef cow 8-10

2007 Alberta Bull 6 Classical

2007 British Columbia Dairy cow 5 Classical

2007 Alberta Beef cow 13 Atypical

2008 Alberta Dairy cow 6 Classical

2008 British Columbia Holstein cow 5 Classical

2008 Alberta Beef cow 6 Classical

2008 British Columbia Dairy cow 7 Classical

2009 Alberta Dairy cow 7 Classical

2010 Alberta Angus cow 6 Classical

2011 Alberta Dairy cow 6 Classical

2015 Alberta Beef cow 6 Classical

U.S.

2003 Washington2 Dairy cow 6 Classical

2005 Texas Beef cow 12 Atypical

2006 Alabama Beef cow 10 Atypical

2012 California Dairy cow 10 Atypical

2017 Alabama Beef cow 11 Atypical

2018 Florida Beef cow Mature Atypical

1 Animal was imported from the United Kingdom

2 Animal was born in Alberta, Canada

https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/ahfss/animal_health/pdfs/BSE_NorthAmerica.pdf

Subject: Change in Disease Status of Canada Because of BSE
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
Reply To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 08:31:15 -0500
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (286 lines)
########  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>  #########

[Federal Register: May 29, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 103)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 31939-31940]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr29my03-1]


 =======================================================================
Rules and Regulations
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each
week.

 =======================================================================

[[Page 31939]]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Parts 93 and 94

[Docket No. 03-058-1]

Change in Disease Status of Canada Because of BSE

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Interim rule and request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are amending the regulations by adding Canada to the list
of regions where bovine spongiform encephalopathy exists because the
disease has been detected in an animal in that region. This action
prohibits or restricts the importation of ruminants that have been in
Canada and meat, meat products, and certain other products and
byproducts of ruminants that have been in Canada. This action is
necessary to help prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy into the United States.

DATES: This rule is effective retroactively to May 20, 2003. We will
consider all comments that we receive on or before July 28, 2003.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by postal mail/commercial delivery
or by e-mail. If you use postal mail/commercial delivery, please send
four copies of your comment (an original and three copies) to: Docket
No. 03-058-1, Regulatory Analysis and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station
3C71, 4700 River Road Unit 118, Riverdale, MD 20737-1238. Please state
that your comment refers to Docket No. 03-058-1. If you use e-mail,
address your comment to regulations@aphis.usda.gov <mailto:regulations@aphis.usda.gov>. Your comment must
be contained in the body of your message; do not send attached files.
Please include your name and address in your message and ``Docket No.
03-058-1'' on the subject line.
    You may read any comments that we receive on this docket in our
reading room. The reading room is located in room 1141 of the USDA
South Building, 14th Street and Independence Avenue, SW., Washington,
DC. Normal reading room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you,
please call (202) 690-2817 before coming.
    APHIS documents published in the Federal Register, and related
information, including the names of organizations and individuals who
have commented on APHIS dockets, are available on the Internet at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppd/rad/webrepor.html <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppd/rad/webrepor.html>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Gary Colgrove, Director, Sanitary
Trade Issues Team, National Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS,
4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734-4356.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to
below as the regulations) govern the importation of certain animals,
birds, poultry, meat, other animal products and byproducts, hay, and
straw into the United States in order to prevent the introduction of
various animal diseases, including bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE).

    BSE is a neurological disease of cattle and is not known to exist
in the United States. It appears that BSE is primarily spread through
the use of ruminant feed containing protein and other products from
ruminants infected with BSE. Therefore, BSE could become established in
the United States if materials carrying the BSE agent, such as certain
meat, animal products, and animal byproducts from ruminants, are
imported into the United States and are fed to ruminants in the United
States. BSE could also become established in the United States if
ruminants with BSE are imported into the United States.

    Sections 94.18, 95.4, and 96.2 of the regulations prohibit or
restrict the importation of certain meat and other animal products and
byproducts from ruminants that have been in regions in which BSE exists
or in which there is an undue risk of introducing BSE into the United
States. Paragraph (a)(1) of Sec.  94.18 lists the regions in which BSE
exists. Paragraph (a)(2) lists the regions that present an undue risk
of introducing BSE into the United States because their import
requirements are less restrictive than those that would be acceptable
for import into the United States and/or because the regions have
inadequate surveillance. Paragraph (b) of Sec.  94.18 prohibits the
importation of fresh, frozen, and chilled meat, meat products, and most
other edible products of ruminants that have been in any region listed
in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2). Paragraph (c) of Sec.  94.18 restricts
the importation of gelatin derived from ruminants that have been in any
of these regions. Section 95.4 prohibits or restricts the importation
of certain byproducts from ruminants that have been in any of those
regions, and Sec.  96.2 prohibits the importation of casings, except
stomach casings, from ruminants that have been in any of these regions.

Additionally, the regulations in part 93 pertaining to the importation
of live animals provide that the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) may deny an application for a permit for the
importation of ruminants from regions where a communicable disease such
as BSE exists and from regions that present risks of introducing
communicable diseases into the United States (see Sec.  93.404(a)(3)).

    On May 20, 2003, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency reported a
case of BSE in a beef cow in northern Alberta. Therefore, in order to
prevent the introduction of BSE into the United States, we are amending
Sec.  94.18(a)(1) by adding Canada to the list of regions where BSE is
known to exist. This action prohibits or restricts the importation of
ruminants that have been in Canada and the importation of meat, meat
products, and certain other products and byproducts of ruminants that
have been in Canada. We are making this amendment effective
retroactively to May 20, 2003, which is the date that Canada reported
the BSE case.

    As noted previously, the regulations in Sec.  93.404(a)(3) provide
the basis for APHIS to deny an application for a permit for the
importation of ruminants from regions listed in Sec.  94.18(a)(1) or
(a)(2). Because, with certain exceptions, ruminants may not be imported
into the

[[Page 31940]]

United States unless their importation is authorized by a permit, the
provisions of Sec.  93.404(a)(3) have been sufficient to prevent the
entry of live ruminants from regions affected with BSE. However, the
regulations in part 93 provide exemptions from the permit requirement
for ruminants from several regions, including Canada, under certain
circumstances. Given that the denial of a permit application may not
serve in all cases to provide a regulatory basis for preventing the
importation of ruminants from regions affected with BSE, we have
amended the regulations in Sec.  93.401, ``General prohibitions;
exceptions,'' to include an explicit prohibition on the importation of
ruminants that have been in any region listed in Sec.  94.18(a)(1) or
(a)(2).

Emergency Action

    This rulemaking is necessary on an emergency basis to prevent the
introduction of BSE into the United States. Under these circumstances,
the Administrator has determined that prior notice and opportunity for
public comment are contrary to the public interest and that there is
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553 for making this rule effective less than
30 days after publication in the Federal Register.

    We will consider comments we receive during the comment period for
this interim rule (see DATES above). After the comment period closes,
we will publish another document in the Federal Register. The document
will include a discussion of any comments we receive and any amendments
we are making to the rule.

Executive Order 12866 and Regulatory Flexibility Act

    For this action, the Office of Management and Budget has waived its
review under Executive Order 12866.

    This emergency situation makes timely compliance with section 604
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) impracticable.
We are currently assessing the potential economic effects of this
action on small entities. Based on that assessment, we will either
certify that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities or publish a final regulatory
flexibility analysis.

Executive Order 12988

    This rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988, Civil
Justice Reform. This rule: (1) Preempts all State and local laws and
regulations that are inconsistent with this rule; (2) has retroactive
effective to May 20, 2003; and (3) does not require administrative
proceedings before parties may file suit in court challenging this
rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This interim rule contains no information collection or
recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

List of Subjects

9 CFR Part 93

    Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Poultry and poultry products,
Quarantine, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

9 CFR Part 94

    Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Meat and meat products, Milk,
Poultry and poultry products, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Accordingly, we are amending 9 CFR parts 93 and 94 as follows:

PART 93--IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN ANIMALS, BIRDS, AND POULTRY, AND
CERTAIN ANIMAL, BIRD, AND POULTRY PRODUCTS; REQUIREMENTS FOR MEANS
OF CONVEYANCE AND SHIPPING CONTAINERS

1. The authority citation for part 93 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1622 and 8301-8317; 21 U.S.C. 136 and 136a;
31 U.S.C. 9701; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.


2. In Sec.  93.401, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  93.401  General prohibitions; exceptions.

    (a) No ruminant or product subject to the provisions of this part
shall be brought into the United States except in accordance with the
regulations in this part and part 94 of this subchapter;\3\ nor shall
any such ruminant or product be handled or moved after physical entry
into the United States before final release from quarantine or any
other form of governmental detention except in compliance with such
regulations. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subpart, the
importation of any ruminant that has been in a region listed in Sec.
94.18(a)(1) or (a)(2) of this subchapter is prohibited. Provided,
however, the Administrator may upon request in specific cases permit
ruminants or products to be brought into or through the United States
under such conditions as he or she may prescribe, when he or she
determines in the specific case that such action will not endanger the
livestock or poultry of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Importations of certain animals from various regions are
absolutely prohibited under part 94 because of specified diseases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

PART 94--RINDERPEST, FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE, FOWL PEST (FOWL
PLAGUE), EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE, AFRICAN SWINE FEVER, CLASSICAL
SWINE FEVER, AND BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED AND
RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS

3. The authority citation for part 94 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7701-7772, and 8301-8317; 21 U.S.C. 136
and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 4331 and 4332; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80,
and 371.4.

Sec.  94.18  [Amended]

4. In Sec.  94.18, paragraph (a)(1) is amended by adding, in
alphabetical order, the word ``Canada,''.

    Done in Washington, DC, this 23rd day of May, 2003 .
Bobby R. Acord,
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.
[FR Doc. 03-13440 Filed 5-28-03; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-34-P

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/03-13440.htm

TSS

###########  http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html  ############

Subject: BSE CANADA & EXPORTS TO USA AND CANADA FROM UK
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
Reply To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2003 14:31:59 -0500
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (146 lines)
########  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>  #########

Greetings BSE-L,

i believe i sent this through before, but thought under the circumstances,
i would pass through again. i did not read over all of it, maybe be more?

TSS

1994 UK EXPORTS BEEF VEAL  USA , MEXICO $ CANADA ONLY
other Countries list in PDF file)

USA -------- TOTALS  ''8'' TONS
CANADA -- TOTALS ''29'' TONS

1995 UK EXPORT BEEF AND VEAL TO USA AND CANADA

USA ------- TOTALS ''358'' TONS

CANADA --TOTALS  ''24'' TONS

BONE-IN BEEF AND VEAL

USA-------- TOTALS ''10'' TONS (i think this is part of the  358 tons
above?)

 UK EXPORT OF LIKE CATTLE TO USA AND CANADA

1986 TO 1996 USA TOTAL = 1297

1986 TO 1996 CAN TOTAL =  299

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab10.pdf

UK EXPORT MEAT OR OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS DEC 1987

CANADA -- 64,526 KG

UK EXPORT OFFALS OF BOVINE ANIMALS FRESH CHILLED
OR FROZEN OTHER THAN LIVER  DEC 1987 YTD

USA -- 45,943 KG

UK EXPORT MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMAL WITH BONE IN 1988

CANADA -- 4,163 KG

PREP OR PRES MEAT OR OFFAL OF  BOVINE ANIMALS CUMULATIVE
TO DEC 1988

USA -------- 28,609 KG
CANADA -- 22,044  KG

MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS WITH BONE IN CUMULATIVE TO ANUAL 1989

USA -------- 17,880 KG
MEXICO---- 33,444 KG

BONELESS  MEAT OF BOVINE 1989

USA --------111,953 KG
CANADA---1,800 KG
MEXICO --- 1,143,387 KG

EDIBLE OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS 1989

USA -------- 19,980 KG
MEXICO--- 31,244 KG

MORE........

MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS BONELESS 1990

USA 146,443

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf

http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075218/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab05.pdf

      Other US BSE risks: the imported products picture

http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh

Terry

Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade
purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as "flours and meals of meat
or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves". UK
exports of this to the US are listed below:

Country Tonnes
1980
1981    12
1982
1983
1984    10
1985      2
1986
1987
1988
1989    20
1990

Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These
can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM
Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).

Best wishes
Simon Pearsall
Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

Simon
as discussed
thanks
Julie
-----

now if you consider the obvious, the picture even gets worse;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

hey, but it's not here..........''NOT''

TSS

###########  http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html  ############

Subject: BSE in North America CANADIAN UPDATE Latest Information (as of January 25, 2005 - 16:00 EST)
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
Reply To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2005 16:52:00 -0600
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (27 lines)
#####################  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy  #####################

Canadian Food Inspection Agency BSE in North America

  Latest Information

    Latest Information (as of January 25, 2005 - 16:00 EST)

    * Case 3 (Confirmed January 11, 2005
          o The remaining eight identified animals from the birth cohort
            will be sampled for testing today. Results are expected in a
            few days. To date, 33 of 41 birth cohort animals have been
            tested, with all results negative for BSE.
          o The feed component of the investigation is ongoing.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/situatione.shtml
 
 
TSS

#########  https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html  ##########

Subject: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY IN CANADA OIE Report date: 17 January 2005.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
Reply To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2005 13:38:55 -0600
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (108 lines)

#####################  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy  #####################

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY IN CANADA

See also: 14 January 2005 

<http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/AIS_10.HTM#Sec3>, 7 January 2005 
<http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/AIS_11.HTM#Sec7>, 15 August 2003 
<http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/AIS_06.HTM#Sec2>

Immediate notification report

Information received on 17 January 2005 from Dr Brian Evans, Executive 
Director, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Ottawa:

Report date: 17 January 2005.

Date of first confirmation of the event: 11 January 2005.

Date of start of the event: 4 January 2005.

Clinical disease: yes.

Nature of diagnosis: laboratory.

Details of outbreak:

First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of 
epidemio-logical unit Name of the location Latitude Longitude
Alberta Red Deer district farm Innisfail 52º 07' 48" N 114º 32' 23" W

MAP <http://www.oie.int/cartes/CAN050121.jpg>

Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreak
susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered
4 Jan. 2005 bov 110 1 ... 1 0

Description of affected population: the infected animal has been 
determined to be a Charolais cow 81 months of age, born on 21 March 1998 
on the same premises. There are 110 cows on the premises, 25 of which 
are from the birth cohort. Additional birth cohorts have been traced to 
seven other premises.

Diagnosis:

Laboratories where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results
Provincial TSE(1) Laboratory, Edmonton, Alberta ELISA(2) rapid test 6 
Jan. 2005 positive
National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (NCFAD), Winnipeg, Manitoba 
western blot rapid test 9 Jan 2005 positive
National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (NCFAD), Winnipeg, Manitoba 
immunohistochemical test 11 Jan. 2005 positive

Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.

Control measures:

A. Undertaken: quarantine.

B. To be undertaken: stamping out.

Treatment of affected animal: no.

Other details/comments:

Plans are under way for evaluation, depopulation, sampling and testing 
during the week of 17-21 January 2005.

The infected animal was born on 21 March 1998. It is suspected that the 
animal most likely became infected through the consumption of 
contaminated feed at an early age.

No part of the animal entered the human or animal food systems. The 
affected carcass was placed under quarantine before being transported to 
a federal laboratory for incineration. A comprehensive epidemiological 
investigation is under way.

In accordance with Article 2.3.13.5. of the Terrestrial Animal Health 
Code <http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_2.3.13.htm>, the 
progeny born to the infected animal within the previous two years and 
the birth cohort of the positive animal (animals born between 1 January 
1997 and 31 December 1999 and which may have been exposed to the same 
feed sources) are being traced. All such animals remaining alive will be 
detained, their movements controlled and, when slaughtered, they will be 
sampled for testing and completely destroyed.

Of the 349 animals from the birth cohort of the positive animal, 28 died 
at birth, 162 were sold as calves, 43 were sold as yearling bulls, 91 
are currently being traced and 25 are alive on the premises. These 25 
animals remain under quarantine on the farm.

In parallel a thorough investigation of feed sources on the farm is 
under way.

(1) TSE: transmissible spongiform encephalopathy

(2) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

* * *

http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/AIS_09.HTM#Sec0

NICE to see at least Canada is still using the WB...

TSS

#########  https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html  ##########

Subject: MAD COW BSE NORTH AMERICA 'CANADIAN UPDATE' (as of January 18, 2005 - 16:00 EST)
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
Reply To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2005 17:13:16 -0600
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (393 lines)
#####################  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy  #####################

Canadian Food Inspection AgencyBSE in North America

  Latest Information

    Latest Information (as of January 18, 2005 - 16:00 EST)

    * Case 3 (Confirmed January 11, 2005)
          o The guidelines of the World Organization for Animal Health
            recommend that BSE investigations include an infected
            animal's most recently born offspring, based on the
            theoretical possibility of maternal transmission.
          o The CFIA has determined that the infected animal's most
            recently born offspring are no longer alive. The two animals
            died of causes unrelated to BSE. This finding concludes the
            offspring component of the investigation.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of January 17, 2005 - 14:00 EST)

    * Case 2 (Confirmed January 2, 2005)
          o

            Further investigation of the birth cohort has determined
            that an additional two animals were exported to the United
            States. This brings the total number of exported birth
            cohort animals to six. American authorities have been notified.

    * Case 3 (Confirmed January 11, 2005)
          o

            The CFIA is pursuing multiple lines of inquiry to
            investigate the use, sale and production of feeds. Given the
            timeframe of interest, it may not be possible to draw any
            definitive links between a particular feed and the origin of
            infection.

    *

      CFIA officials are finalizing the details of Canada's feed ban
      review. The review is tentatively scheduled to begin later this
      week. Officials from the United States will arrive in Canada on
      January 24, 2005, to begin their examination of the feed ban.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of January 14, 2005 - 12:00 EST)

    * Case 2 (Confirmed January 2, 2005)
          o Based on records of feed purchases and use, the CFIA has
            confirmed that the infected animal, born in 1996, was
            exposed to feed rations containing meat and bone meal.
          o

            This feed was produced before the 1997 feed ban, when the
            inclusion of meat and bone meal in ruminant feeds was
            allowed. This finding concludes the feed component of the
            investigation.

    * Case 3 (Confirmed January 11, 2005)
          o An additional 15 cattle from the infected animal's birth
            cohort have been identified and placed under individual
            animal quarantines. All live animals from the birth cohort,
            currently 37 cattle, will be tested.
          o

            Investigators are collecting information pertaining to feed
            used on the farm of origin. The CFIA is tracing records from
            the farm of origin and investigating feed retailers and
            manufacturers.

    *

      CFIA officials expect to release the details of a review of
      Canada's feed ban next week. International animal health and feed
      experts are expected to participate in the review.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of January 12, 2005 - 15:00 EST)

    * Case 2 (Confirmed January 2, 2005)
          o Nine animals from Case 2's birth cohort have been euthanized
            and tested negative for BSE.
          o

            Ongoing traceouts have confirmed that an additional three
            birth cohort animals were exported to the United States.
            American authorities have been notified.

    * Case 3 (Confirmed January 11, 2005)
          o

            Based on current information, we have identified 22 cattle
            from Case 3's birth cohort. Additional traceouts are underway

    *

      CFIA officials are preparing to undertake a review of Canada's
      feed ban. This process will examine the effectiveness of
      industry's compliance with the ban in limiting the spread of BSE.
      The review will include participation from international animal
      health and feed experts.

    * An extensive international outreach campaign is underway to
      reinforce awareness and understanding of the science-based
      measures Canada has in place to protect human and animal health
      from BSE.
          o Canadian officials have been dispatched to China and will be
            travelling to Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan over the coming week.
          o Canada's Chief Veterinary Officer is currently in Washington
            for technical discussions with USDA and FDA officials.
          o Minister Mitchell will travel to Mexico next week and the
            United States soon after to meet with his counterparts.
          o Heads of Missions will be fully briefed this week so they
            can serve as effective advocates of Canada's BSE safeguards.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of January 11, 2005 - 14:00 EST)

    *

      The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) today announced that
      Canada's national surveillance program has detected bovine
      spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in an Alberta beef cow
      <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2005/20050111e.shtml>
      just under seven years of age. As part of its surveillance
      program, the CFIA has control of the carcass. No part of the
      animal has entered the human food or animal feed systems.

    *

      The CFIA is investigating what the animal may have been fed early
      in its life and the source of the feed. The infected animal was
      born in March 1998, and the farm of origin has been confirmed.
      Based on preliminary information, feed produced prior to the
      introduction of the 1997 feed ban in Canada remains the most
      likely source of infection in this animal.

    *

      This current investigation is independent of the BSE investigation
      on the case which was confirmed on January 2, 2005.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of January 7, 2005 - 15:00 EST)

    *

      The Canadian Food Inspection Agency's (CFIA) investigation has
      gathered a significant amount of information about other animals
      of potential interest. The investigation is ongoing and the
      numbers mentioned are based on currently available information.

    *

      The infected animal last gave birth in 2003 and 2004. Both calves
      have died of causes unrelated to BSE. This finding concludes the
      offspring component of our investigation.

    *

      The investigation has also determined that the birth cohort -
      animals born on the farm of origin within 12 months before and
      after the infected animal - includes 38 cattle of primary
      interest. It is possible that these animals could have been
      exposed to the same feed as the infected animal. Finding multiple
      cases of BSE in a single birth cohort is rare, based on
      international experiences. No additional cases were uncovered
      during Canada's two previous investigations.

    *

      Of the 38 animals, 1 previously tested negative through the
      national surveillance program after being reported as a downer. We
      have located 9 more animals from this group. These animals have
      been placed under individual animal quarantines.

    *

      We are continuing to investigate the locations and status of the
      remaining animals. Given the age of the infected animal, it is
      likely that some of the animals from the birth cohort are no
      longer alive. We expect to begin euthanizing animals from the
      birth cohort during the week of January 10.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of January 3, 2005 - 10:00 EST)

    *

      The United States continues to consider Canada as a minimal risk
      region. As stated in the United States Department of Agriculture
      press release of January 3, 2005
      <http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/%21ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/01/0001.xml>,
      the United States would not alter the implementation of its rule
      to resume trade with Canada.

          o

            Statement by Ron DeHaven, Administrator, Animal and Plant
            Health Inspection Service
            <http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/%21ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/01/0001.xml>
            (English Only)

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of January 2, 2005 - 19:00 EST)

    *

      The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) today confirmed
      <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2005/20050102e.shtml>
      that an older dairy cow from Alberta has tested positive for
      bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). No part of the animal
      entered the human food or animal feed systems.

    *

      The CFIA is continuing its investigation and has determined the
      infected animal's farm of origin. Efforts are now underway to
      identify any other animals of similar risk. Specifically, the
      Agency is focusing on two categories of animals: recently born
      offspring of the infected animal and cattle born on the same farm
      within a year of the infected animal

    *

      The Agency has also launched a feed investigation to examine what
      the infected animal was fed early in its life, when infection was
      most likely to have occurred prior to the 1997 feed ban.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of December 31, 2004 - 14:00 EST)

    *

      Consistent with our testing protocol, we are now conducting
      confirmatory testing using the OIE "gold standard" test for BSE .
      Confirmatory testing was initiated on December 30 and results are
      expected in two to four days.

    *

      The suspect animal's farm of origin has been determined through
      the CFIA's investigation. While earlier information suggested the
      suspect animal might be ten years old, it has now been confirmed
      that the cow was eight years old.

    *

      Similar to the two North American BSE -infected animals detected
      in 2003, this animal was born before the Canadian and American
      feed bans were introduced in 1997.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of December 30, 2004 - 02:00 EST)

    *

      Preliminary BSE testing results completed late on December 29,
      2004 have identified a suspect 10-year-old dairy cow. Although the
      finding is not definitive, multiple screening tests have yielded
      positive results.

    *

      No part of the animal entered the human food or animal feed
      systems. Samples are currently being analyzed at the Canadian
      Science Centre for Human and Animal Health in Winnipeg.
      Confirmatory results are expected in three to five days.

    *

      The Government of Canada's normal policy is to report only
      confirmed results. However, given the unique situation created by
      the United States' border announcement on December 29 it was
      decided that the most prudent action would be to publicly announce
      <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2004/20041230e.shtml>
      the available information and provide stakeholders with a full
      understanding of the current situation.

    *

      The United States Office of the Management and Budget (OMB ) has
      completed its review of the proposed rule on Bovine Spongiform
      Encephalopathy (BSE ) and returned it to the United States
      Department of Agriculture (USDA) for publication in the Federal
      Register.

    *

      The USDA said Wednesday that the final rule will be published in
      the January 4 Federal Register
      <http://www.agr.gc.ca/cb/index_e.php?s1=n&s2=2004&page=n41230a>
      and will take effect March 7, 2005.

    *

      When implemented, the rule will provide access to the U.S. for a
      range of live animals and beef and ruminant products. In
      particular, the rule will once again allow for the importation
      into the U.S. of live cattle under 30 months for immediate
      slaughter or for feeding, provided they are slaughtered before
      reaching the age of 30 months. The rule also allows for the
      importation of meat from animals older than 30 months and removes
      segregation requirements at Canadian slaughter facilities.

          o

            Rule to Establish Minimal-Risk Regions for Bovine Spongiform
            Encephalopathy
            <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse.html>
            United States Department of Agriculture (English Only)

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of December 14, 2004 - 14:00 EST)

    *

      The Government of Canada today announced that Cuba has agreed to
      re-open its border
      <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2004/20041214e.shtml>
      to a broad range of Canadian beef products.

    *

      Effective immediately, Cuba will accept Canadian beef and beef
      products from cattle of any age with minor exceptions, such as
      mechanically separated meat, vertebral column, trimmings, and
      tissues derived from the head.

    *

      Cuba has also agreed to accept Canadian pet food that does not
      contain meat and bone meal of ruminant origin. Building on this
      agreement, Canadian and Cuban officials hope to agree shortly on
      certification requirements that would permit the importation of
      live Canadian cattle.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Latest Information (as of December 10, 2004 - 14:00 EST)

    *

      The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has proposed amendments
      <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2004/20041210e.shtml>
      to federal regulations that will strengthen existing animal feed
      controls.

    *

      The proposed amendments prohibit the use of specified risk
      material (SRM) in animal feeds, including pet food.

    *

      The proposed regulations have been placed in the Canada Gazette
      Part 1. A 75-day comment period ending February 24, 2005 is being
      provided to give regulated industries, trading partners and other
      interested parties the opportunity to review the proposed
      amendments and provide the CFIA with written comments.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

snip...

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/situatione.shtml

TSS

#########  https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html  ##########

Subject: Potential Case of BSE MAD COW Identified in B.C.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
Reply To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG>
Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 11:23:22 -0500
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (67 lines)
#####################  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy  #####################
 
Subject: Potential Case of BSE MAD COW Identified in B.C. 

Date: April 13, 2006 at 8:55 am PST

Latest Information (as of April 13, 2006 - 12:00 EST)

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is currently conducting confirmatory testing of samples from a cow from British Columbia suspected of having bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

No part of the animal-an approximately six-year-old dairy cow-entered the human food or animal feed systems, and the entire carcass has been placed under control.

This case, if positive, has no bearing on the safety of Canadian beef. Canada has a suite of internationally recognized safeguards that work together to provide high levels of human and animal health protection.

Final testing is now underway and will be completed over the holiday weekend.

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/situatione.shtml

Subject: FINAL TESTING CONFIRMS BSE CASE IN B.C.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
Reply To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG>
Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2006 15:54:54 -0500
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (753 lines)
#####################  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy  #####################

 
Subject: FINAL TESTING CONFIRMS BSE CASE IN B.C.
Date: April 16, 2006 at 1:24 pm PST

Latest Information

Latest Information (as of April 16, 2006 - 15:00 EST)

Testing at the National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease in Winnipeg has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy in a cow from British Columbia. No part of this animal entered the human food or animal feed systems. 
The CFIA is also conducting a thorough examination of potential sources of infection. Investigators will pay particular attention to the feed to which the animal may have been exposed early in its life, when cattle are most susceptible to BSE. 

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/situatione.shtml

FINAL TESTING CONFIRMS BSE CASE IN B.C.

OTTAWA, April 16, 2006 - Testing at the National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease in Winnipeg has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy in a cow from British Columbia. As reported on April 13, 2006, samples from this animal were sent to Winnipeg for additional testing after screening tests produced inconclusive results.

This finding does not affect the safety of Canadian beef. Tissues in which BSE is known to concentrate in infected animals are removed from all cattle slaughtered in Canada for domestic and international human consumption. No part of this animal entered the human food or animal feed systems.

Preliminary investigations conducted prior to receiving final results identified the animal’s exact date of birth and birth farm — two critical elements required to trace other animals of interest, as defined by the World Organization for Animal Health. With the confirmed positive results and this information already in hand, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has immediately undertaken the animal component of its investigation on a priority basis.

The CFIA is also conducting a thorough examination of potential sources of infection. Investigators will pay particular attention to the feed to which the animal may have been exposed early in its life, when cattle are most susceptible to BSE. The CFIA is collecting records of feed purchased by and used on the animal’s birth farm. As in previous investigations, the CFIA will also fully consider all other scientific pathways in an attempt to definitively determine how the animal became infected.

This animal, a six-year-old dairy cow, developed BSE after the implementation of Canada’s feed ban. Similar situations are common to almost all BSE-affected countries that have introduced feed controls. Although the design, implementation and compliance of Canada’s feed ban have been rigorously assessed by a number of countries over the past several years, and have been described as robust and effectively enforced, the Government is committed to continuously making improvements where possible. An enhanced feed ban would accelerate the eradication of BSE in Canada. Accordingly, the CFIA has published proposed regulatory amendments, and following extensive consultations, is now in the process of finalizing their content. 

The feed ban and national surveillance program which identified this animal, contribute to Canada's interlocking BSE controls. While the feed ban continues to limit the spread of BSE, Canada's national surveillance program effectively monitors the health of the Canadian cattle herd. The national surveillance program, which targets cattle most at risk of having BSE, has tested more than 100,000 such animals since 2003. The detection of only five animals within this high-risk population over the past three years and the age of the animals detected supports the conclusion that the level of BSE in Canada is very low and declining.

The strong participation of producers to facilitate the detection of any suspect cases at the farm level, as demonstrated once again by this most recent finding, and the close collaboration between the Provinces and Federal Government in the surveillance effort demonstrates the shared commitment which exists to protect animal and human health in Canada.

In keeping with its ongoing practice, the CFIA will post to its website updated information as it becomes available.

- 30 -

For information:

Canadian Food Inspection Agency

Media Relations: (613) 228-6682

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2006/20060416e.shtml

BSE Cases Identified in Canadian-born Cattle

Update: February 12, 2015 a New Case of BSE Detected in Canada

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) external icon announced the confirmation of another bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a beef cow from Alberta born in March 2009. See the CFIAexternal icon notice.

Based on the known or most likely year of birth, an average of 1.4 cases of BSE occurred among the group of animals born each year in Canada from 1991 through 2004. The highest reported number of cases by birth year in a single year, 3 BSE cases, occurred in 2000, 2001 and 2002. The most recently reported case extends the period of BSE transmission in Canada through at least the early half of 2009.


MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2015 

Report on the Investigation of the Nineteenth Case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada November 2015


FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2015 

A BSE CANADIAN COW MAD COW UPDATE Transcript - Briefing (February 18, 2015)
 

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2015 

Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta 

Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a beef cow from Alberta. No part of the animal's carcass entered the human food or animal feed systems.

The Government of Canada is committed to protecting human and animal health and takes the management of BSE very seriously. Immediately upon confirmation of this case, the CFIA launched an investigation and is working closely with provincial and industry partners.

BSE is a progressive, fatal neurological disease in cattle. Canada's last confirmed BSE case was reported in 2011. This latest case was detected through the national BSE surveillance program, which continues to play an important role in Canada's strategy to manage BSE.

As part of the investigation, the CFIA is seeking to confirm the age of the animal, its history and how it became infected. The investigation will focus in on the feed supplied to this animal during the first year of its life. The Agency will also trace out all animals of equivalent risk. Equivalent risk animals will be ordered destroyed and tested for BSE.

Canada remains a "controlled BSE risk" country, as recognized by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Accordingly, this case should not affect current exports of Canadian cattle or beef.

The case will be reported to the OIE, in line with Canada's international obligations and our commitment to transparency. It will be reported on the CFIA website, as part of the Agency's monthly reportable diseases update.


Transcript - Briefing (February 13, 2015) Date/Date: February 13, 2015 4:00 p.m.

Location/Endroit: Teleconference, Ottawa, Ontario

Principal(s)/Principaux:

Denis Schryburt, Media Relations Officer, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Paul Mayers, Vice-President, Policy and Programs, CFIA Dr. Martine Dubuc, Vice-President, Science, CFIA, and Delegate for Canada for the World Organization for Animal Health Nathalie Durand, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Subject/Sujet: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency Holds a Technical Briefing to Provide More Information on a BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) Find in Alberta.

Operator: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Bonjour, mesdames et messieurs. Welcome to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency's technical briefing on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alberta. Bienvenue à la séance d'information technique sur le cas d'Encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine en Alberta. I would like to turn the meeting over to the technical briefing operator, Mr. Denis Schryburt. J'aimerais maintenant céder la parole au modérateur de cette séance, M. Denis Schryburt. À vous la parole, M. Schryburt. Please go ahead, sir.

Denis Schryburt: Thank you very much. Good afternoon and thank you for joining us today. My name is Denis Schryburt, Media Relations Officer at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and I'll be moderating today's technical briefing. I will begin by introducing our speakers who will make a short statement in both official languages and then open it up to the media for questions.

Our first speaker is Paul Mayers, Vice-President, Policy and Programs, followed by Dr. Martine Dubuc, Vice-President, Science, and Delegate for Canada for the World Organization for Animal Health.

Bonjour et merci de vous joindre à nous aujourd'hui. Mon nom est Denis Schryburt, agent des Relations avec les médias à l'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments, et j'animerais la séance d'information technique aujourd'hui. Je vais débuter par présenter nos porte-parole qui feront une brève déclaration dans les deux langues officielles et ensuite répondre à vos questions.

Notre premier porte-parole est Paul Mayers, vice-président, Politique et Programmes, suivi par Martine Dubuc, vice-présidente, science, et la délégué pour Canada pour l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale.

I will now invite Paul Mayers to make a brief statement in English. Mr. Mayers.

Paul Mayers: Thank you, Denis. Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for calling in today. We'd like to provide some information today on a developing animal health situation. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has confirmed Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, also known as BSE, in a beef cow from Alberta.

First of all, no part of the animal's carcass entered the human food or animal feed system. Canada's suite of internationally recognized safeguards effectively protects the safety of food and animal feed. There is no risk to food safety.

The Government of Canada is committed to protecting human and animal health and takes the management of BSE very seriously. Immediately upon confirmation of this case, the CFIA launched an investigation and is working closely with provincial and industry partners. This investigation will follow the well-developed procedures we've employed in response to previous BSE cases.

Canada's last confirmed BSE case was reported in 2011. This latest case in Alberta was detected through the National BSE Surveillance Program, which is a program that continues to play an important part in Canada's strategy to manage BSE. The fact that we continue to see very high levels of producer participation in the surveillance program underscores the commitment present throughout the cattle and beef sectors to responsibly manage BSE.

The detection of a small number of additional BSE cases is not unexpected in the context of the 30,000 samples we take annually, as Canada continues our ongoing management of this disease.

As has been our practice for CFIA investigations of BSE cases, the Agency is seeking to confirm the age of the animal, its history and how it may have become infected. We're also working to trace out all animals of equivalent risk such as the animals that may have been exposed to the same feed as the infected animal in the first year of its life. Equivalent risk animals will be ordered destroyed, and they will be tested for BSE.

The CFIA will notify the World Organization for Animal Health, also known as the OIE, in line with Canada's international obligations and our commitment to transparency.

This finding should not affect Canada's status as a controlled BSE risk country as recognized by the OIE. Canada continues to effectively manage BSE through a series of integrated safeguards designed to protect both human and animal health. These include prohibiting risk materials from entering the human food and animal feed chains and testing cattle for BSE.

Again, the CFIA is strongly committed to protecting animal health. Our investigation is underway, and we are mobilizing all necessary resources to address this situation.

Thank you.

Denis Schryburt: Thank you, Mr. Mayers. Et maintenant j'invite Martine Dubuc à faire une déclaration en français. Mme Dubuc, s'il-vous-plaît.

Dr Martine Dubuc: Merci. Bonjour à tous, et merci de vous être joints à la téléconférence aujourd'hui. Nous aimerions vous donner aujourd'hui des renseignements sur une situation de santé animale en évolution.

L'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments a confirmé un cas d'Encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine, aussi connu sous le nom d'ESB, chez une vache de boucherie provenant de l'Alberta.

 
snip... 

-30-


Timeline of Events: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy – Alberta – February 2015

February 13

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) holds a technical briefing related to the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) positive case found in Alberta.

February 12

The CFIA notifies key trading partners of the new finding and posts the information on its website.

February 11

The CFIA confirms BSE in one beef cow in Alberta.

The CFIA continue to gather information on the animal's herd of origin and to trace the suspect animal's offspring.

February 10

The CFIA gather preliminary information on the suspect animal's herd of origin.

February 9

The CFIA receives a tissue sample from the affected animal and begins confirmatory testing at its laboratory in Lethbridge.

CFIA inspectors follow up at the farm, obtain additional samples, discuss next steps with producer and begin the investigation.

February 7

The province of Alberta reports a non-negative test for BSE to the CFIA.


Friday, February 20, 2015

A BSE CANADIAN COW MAD COW UPDATE Transcript - Briefing (February 18, 2015)



Saturday, February 14, 2015

Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta


Current as of: 2015-01-31

Sheep flocks and/or goat herds confirmed to be infected with classical scrapie in Canada in 2015 Date confirmed Location Animal type infected January 5 Ontario Goat

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/terrestrial-animals/diseases/reportable/2015/scrapie-2015-/eng/1423162035296/1423162036030

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/terrestrial-animals/diseases/reportable/scrapie/eng/1329723409732/1329723572482

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Alberta Canada First case of chronic wasting disease found in farm elk since 2002


Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Canada, USA, Bad feed, mad cows: Why we know three BSE cases had a common origin and why the SSS policy is in full force $$$


Thursday, January 17, 2013

Canada, U.S. agree on animal-disease measures to protect trade, while reducing human and animal health protection


Sunday, December 2, 2012

CANADA 19 cases of mad cow disease SCENARIO 4: ‘WE HAD OUR CHANCE AND WE BLEW IT’


Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Canadian veterinarian fined after approving banned BSE high risk cattle for export to U.S.A.


Monday, April 23, 2012

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE CJD TSE PRION DISEASE UPDATE CANADA 2012


Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31



Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA


Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA


Published Date: 2010-03-11 19:00:03 

Subject: PRO/AH/EDR> BSE, bovine - Canada: (AB) Archive Number: 20100311.0792

BSE, BOVINE - CANADA: (ALBERTA) 

******************************* 

A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org>

[1] Date: 25 Feb 2010 Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency [edited] <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rep/2010bseesbe.shtml

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases have been confirmed in Canada in 2010. BSE is a reportable disease under the "Health of Animals Regulations." This means that all suspected cases must be reported to the CFIA. The following table lists individual animals confirmed to be infected with BSE in Canada in 2010, updated 28 Feb 2010:

Date confirmed: 25 Feb 2010 Location: Alberta Animal type infected: Beef cow Age of animal: 72 months

-- Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <flounder9@verizon.net>

****** [2] Date: 11 Mar 2010 Source: Meat Trade News [edited] <http://www.meattradenewsdaily.co.uk/news/100310/canada___case_of_bse_mad_cow_disease_in__year_old_cow.aspx> 

The Badger has learned a new case of BSE was discovered 2 weeks ago, but the public was not informed as part of the government's new communication strategy. The decision not to announce new cases of BSE was made in August 2009, and the public was informed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) online.

"The CFIA is committed to providing all stakeholders, including the general public, media and trading partners, with timely information about disease detections in farmed animals. As such, we have revised how we report online for disease detections in farmed animals to provide a more comprehensive view of Canada's animal health status. All confirmed cases of federally reportable diseases in farmed animals will be centrally located on our website. This information will be updated monthly," explained CFIA spokesperson Jenn Gearey.

The new communication strategy means journalists will not be notified when any new cases of BSE are discovered.

The latest finding of BSE -- Canada's 17th domestic case -- was announced to industry stakeholders, such as processors, on 25 Feb 2010, but not to the media or general public. And while the CFIA claims its reportable diseases page will be updated monthly, no new information has been posted since 31 Jan 2010.

The infection was detected through the national surveillance program in a 6-year-old black angus cow in the same general area of Alberta, home to most of Canada's BSE activity.

The last case discovered in Canada was in May 2009, the only occurrence that year. In 2008, there were 4 incidents; in 2007, there were 3, and in 2006, there were 5 cases of BSE.

Canada's international risk status has not been affected by the latest case.

-- Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <flounder9@verizon.net>

****** [3] Date: 10 Mar 2010 Source: Reuters Canada [edited] <http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCATRE6295A420100310> 

Canada has confirmed its 17th case of mad cow disease, a finding that will delay any upgrade to its international risk status by one year, a top industry official said on Wednesday [10 Mar 2010].

The animal was born in February 2004, making it Canada's latest-born case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The new case pushes back the earliest date for an upgrade to Canada's controlled risk status from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) to 2016, said Ted Haney, president of the Canada Beef Export Federation.

A country cannot apply to upgrade to negligible status sooner than 11 years after the latest-born case of BSE. The process then takes about one year.

Canada, along with many other countries with controlled risk status from the OIE, can ship beef as long as it meets conditions such as disease surveillance.

The infected animal, which has been slaughtered, has not affected trade, Haney said.

The 2003 discovery of the 1st case of mad cow disease on a Canadian farm caused many countries to halt imports of Canadian beef. Most markets have since reopened, but the cattle industry remains in a slump due to other factors such as a strong Canadian dollar.

Mad cow disease is believed to be spread when cattle eat protein rendered from the brains and spines of infected cattle or sheep. Canada banned that practice in 1997.

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency tightened feed rules further in 2007 and said the moves should help eliminate the disease nationally within a decade, although the agency cautioned it still expected to discover the occasional new case.

CFIA spokeswoman Julie LePage confirmed the 17th case but could not provide details of the new case.

The CFIA notified cattle industry officials of the new case late last month [February 2010] but did not issue a news release, Haney said.

[Byline: Rod Nickel]

-- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>

[While it may be CFIA's decision on how to notify the public, it may not be in the best interest as far as public relations are concerned. Also, the Reuters article does not make much sense. How can the OIE status change be delayed to 2016 if it is 11 years from the last case? From the CFIA website [article [1] in this posting], it appears the animal was confirmed positive on 25 Feb 2010. Thus, 11 years would be 2021. - Mod.TG] See Also 2009 ---- BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) 20090517.1841 BSE, bovine, 2008 - Canada: (AB, BC) CFIA reports 20090417.1459 2008 ---- BSE, bovine - Canada (04): (BC) 20081119.3648 BSE, bovine - Canada (03): (AB) 20080819.2580 BSE, bovine - Canada (02): (BC) 20080623.1941 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) 20080226.0786 2007 ---- BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) (03) 20071218.4076 BSE, bovine - Canada (BC) 20070502.1430 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) (02) 20070308.0813 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) 20070208.0499 2006 ---- BSE, bovine - Canada (AB)(06) 20061227.3621 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB)(05) 20060825.2413 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB)(04) 20060823.2384 ...................................................tg/msp/lm

*##########################################################* 


Increased Atypical Scrapie Detections

Press reports indicate that increased surveillance is catching what otherwise would have been unreported findings of atypical scrapie in sheep. In 2009, five new cases have been reported in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. With the exception of Quebec, all cases have been diagnosed as being the atypical form found in older animals. Canada encourages producers to join its voluntary surveillance program in order to gain scrapie-free status. The World Animal Health will not classify Canada as scrapie-free until no new cases are reported for seven years. The Canadian Sheep Federation is calling on the government to fund a wider surveillance program in order to establish the level of prevalence prior to setting an eradication date. Besides long-term testing, industry is calling for a compensation program for farmers who report unusual deaths in their flocks.


Published Date: 2008-08-19 11:00:29 Subject: PRO/AH/EDR> BSE, bovine - Canada (03): (AB) Archive Number: 20080819.2580

BSE, BOVINE - CANADA (03): (ALBERTA) 

************************************ 

A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org>

[1] Date: Fri 15 Aug 2008 Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) [edited] <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/ab2008/14notavie.shtml> 

BSE [bovine spongiform encephalopathy] case confirmed in Alberta

----------------------------------------------------------------

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has confirmed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a 6-year-old beef cow from Alberta. No part of the animal's carcass entered the human food or animal feed systems.

The animal's birth farm has been identified, and an investigation is underway. The CFIA is tracing the animal's herdmates at the time of birth and examining possible sources of infection. The age and location of the infected animal are consistent with previous cases detected in Canada.

This case was detected through the national BSE surveillance program, which has been highly successful in demonstrating the low level of BSE in Canada. The program continues to play an important role in Canada's strategy to manage BSE.

Canada remains a Controlled Risk country for BSE, as recognized by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Accordingly, this case should not affect exports of Canadian cattle or beef.

For information: Canadian Food Inspection Agency Media relations: 613-228-6682

-- Communicated by: Terry S Singeltary Sr <flounder9@verizon.net>

****** [2] Date: Sat 16 Aug 2008 Source: Montana News Station, Associated Press (AP) report [edited] <http://www.montanasnewsstation.com/Global/story.asp?S=8851685> 

New mad cow case found in Canada 

--------------------------------

A new case of mad cow disease was confirmed in Canada, its 14th case since 2003.

Government inspectors say no part of the animal entered the human food system. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) says the disease was found in a 6-year-old beef cow. The agency did not say where the cow was born. The agency says it is tracing other cattle in the herd and is trying to determine how the cow became infected with the disease. They say the new case should not affect exports of Canadian cattle or beef.

Mad cow disease causes spongy holes in the brain. In people, a rare but fatal form of the disease has been linked to eating infected tissue from cows.

The inspection agency has said a ban on using animal materials in feed products has virtually eliminated the spread of BSE in Canada, but it said a small number of mad cow cases are still expected to surface.

-- Communicated by: ProMED-mail Rapporteur Brent Barrett

****** [3] Date: Sat 16 Aug 2008 Source: The Edmonton Journal [edited] <http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=e1dd935b-43dc-417a-a76e-6376990ba413>

Another mad cow case confirmed 

------------------------------

A 6-year-old beef cow was confirmed Friday [15 Aug 2008] as the 13th case of mad cow disease in Alberta, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency said.

It is the 14th confirmed case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, in Canada.

"At this point, it is too early to say how it could have been infected," said Natalie Bragg, a veterinary program specialist with the food inspection agency.

The cow was born, raised, and died on the same farm in northern Alberta, Bragg said. The agency does not release specific locations of infected animals. The animal was euthanized after it became sick. A sample from the animal was tested twice and confirmed as carrying BSE on Friday [15 Aug 2008].

The agency said no traces of BSE made it into either human or animal food supplies. Bragg said the investigation is now focused on the feed on the farm, including how it was transported and stored. The animal was born after a 1997 ban on feed containing cattle or other ruminant parts was introduced.

The agency is also tracking all other animals that were born within a year, and on the same farm, as the dead cow.

Last month [July 2008], it was revealed that Alberta plans to test 50 per cent fewer cattle for BSE by stopping targeted tests of elderly bovines or those without proper documentation. The step was taken because animals that are 9 years old or older are far less likely to contract the diseases, the Alberta government said. Between 2004 and mid-2006, 54 per cent of cattle tested in the province were 9 years or older. 2 of those cows tested positive.

Alberta tests up to 30 000 cattle a year, roughly half of the national BSE monitoring.

Cattle industry officials downplayed the latest BSE discovery, saying it should have little impact on their business, including international beef exports. "So far there has been no major reaction and no markets have closed, and that's because we have kept our international clients educated," said Cam Daniels of Canada Beef Export Federation.

Daniels regularly travels to Japan, China, Mexico, Macau, the Middle East, and other places to talk to importers and distributors. "They understand clearly the control measures we have in place, and they know we're expecting more cases because we are working diligently to find them," he said.

While everyone looks forward to the time when mad cow is eradicated in Canada, some overseas clients view the climbing number of cases as positive right now because it means our surveillance programs are working, said Alberta Beef Producers spokeswoman Lori Creech. "They prefer we find them, rather than in the words of Ralph Klein, 'Shoot, shovel and shut up,' " she said.

"We are very transparent and open as a country. This latest case doesn't affect our status in the world at all because it's not unexpected that they would find another animal with BSE."

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists Canada as a controlled risk country for BSE.

[Byline: Ryan Cormier and Keith Gerein]

-- Communicated by: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>

[Although Canada is proposing a decrease of its surveillance their system is clearly working. The system may be expensive, but it appears to be a model for others. - Mod.TG

Alberta can be located on the HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Canada at <http://healthmap.org/promed?v=55.4,-101.9,4>. - CopyEd.MJ] See Also BSE, bovine - Canada (02): (BC) 20080623.1941 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) 20080226.0786 2007 ---- BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) (03) 20071218.4076 BSE, bovine - Canada (BC) 20070502.1430 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) (02) 20070308.0813 BSE, bovine - Canada (AB) 20070208.0499 ...................................tg/mj/dk

*##########################################################*



Subject: Re: REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE NINTH CASE OF BSE IN CANADA
UPDATE MARCH 26, 2007

Date: March 26, 2007 at 1:29 pm PST

Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada

snip...

Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the
standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on
the expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult
herd size (Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the
standing Canadian adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the
expected value obtained under BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which
corresponds to an estimated 23.2 BSE-infected animals in the standing
Canadian adult cattle population.

snip...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/BSE_Prevalence.pdf

greetings,

23.2 BSE-infected mad cows in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.
very disturbing...

tss

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM
BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0701&L=sanet-mg&D=0&P=3854

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=4652

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&D=0&P=2583

Importation of Certain Commodities From BSE Minimal-risk Regions (Canada)

Environmental Assessment, October 27, 2006

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EnvironmentalAssessment10-27-2006.pdf

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA


TSS

----- Original Message -----

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>

To: <BSE-L@aegee.org>

Sent: Monday, March 26, 2007 1:42 PM

Subject: Re: BSE CANADA UPDATE CASE 9

> Subject: REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE NINTH CASE OF BSE IN CANADA
> UPDATE MARCH 26, 2007
> Date: March 26, 2007 at 11:23 am PST
>
> REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE NINTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
> ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
> Background
> Between January 20 and 22, 2007, a bull on a commercial beef farm in
> northern Alberta died after having experienced a loss of body condition over
> the course of the winter. A private practitioner sampled the animal under
> Canada's National BSE Surveillance Program on January 24, 2007. Brain
> samples were received by the Alberta Agriculture and Food (AAF) Laboratory
> on January 29, where they were screened for BSE using a Bio-Rad rapid test.
> The preliminary test results received on January 30, 2007, did not rule out
> BSE. In accordance with the prescribed testing protocol, the test was
> repeated on January 31 and produced a second reaction. Brain samples were
> then sent to the National BSE Reference Laboratory in Lethbridge, Alberta,
> where rapid screening tests validating these results were performed. BSE was
> confirmed by the Scrapie Associated Fibril (SAF) immunoblot procedure with
> monoclonal antibody 6H4 on February 7, 2007. This method had been chosen as
> the main confirmatory test because of poor tissue quality (autolysis and
> freezing artefact). Immunohistochemistry was also performed for additional
> confirmation and was positive on February 7, 2007. The carcass was secured
> from the farm, transferred to the AAF laboratory and incinerated. No part of
> the carcass entered the human food supply or animal feed chain.
>
> The CFIA immediately initiated an epidemiological investigation based on the
> most recent World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) recommended BSE
> guidelines. Specifically, the CFIA investigated:
>
> the birth cohort (all cattle born in the same herd as, and within 12 months
> of, the birth of the BSE-positive animal);
> the feed cohort (all cattle which, during their first year of life, were
> reared with the BSE-positive animal during its first year of life, and which
> investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during
> the period); and
> feed to which the animal may have been exposed early in its life.
> Animal Investigation
> The producer identified the positive animal as an unregistered Angus bull 79
> months of age at the time of death. The animal was born on the farm and
> remained there throughout its life. The bull had been losing condition over
> the course of the winter and died from undetermined causes. A private
> veterinary practitioner attended the premises to determine if the animal met
> the inclusion criteria of Canada's National BSE Surveillance Program. A
> post-mortem examination could not be performed because the carcass was
> frozen, but the animal was assessed as having a body condition score of one
> (emaciated) and arrangements were made to forward appropriate samples for
> laboratory evaluation.
>
> In an effort to corroborate the producer's recollection of the animal's
> origin and age, samples for DNA analysis were obtained from animals on the
> premises that were identified by the owner to be the sire and dam of the
> affected bull. The DNA results confirmed the parentage of the case animal
> and, therefore, that it was a home-bred animal as described. This
> demonstrated that the farm of origin was also the birth farm of the positive
> animal.
>
> The dam of the positive animal, located on the birth farm, was demonstrated
> to have been born in 1998 according to the producer's tagging system. This
> indicated that her first calf - the positive bull - was born as part of the
> spring 2000 calf crop, which corroborated the producer's recollection.
>
> The birth and feed cohort comprised 593 animals that, along with the
> positive animal, were born or raised on the farm. This includes animals born
> in the entire 1999, 2000 and 2001 calving seasons. It also includes
> additional animals sold from the farm that cannot be distinguished from the
> cohort based on their description at the point of sale. The trace-out
> investigation of the cohort identified 57 live animals retained by the
> producer. These animals are currently quarantined on the producer's premises
> pending a final decision on the timing of their disposition. In the event
> that any of the animals are not destroyed immediately, but retained under
> official control until after calving or to the end of their productive
> lives, their carcasses will be excluded from the food and feed chains on
> their death or destruction in accordance with the norms prescribed in the
> OIE International Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2006). The following is
> the disposition of the remaining 536 animals in the cohort:
>
> 411 animals were traced and confirmed to have died or been slaughtered.
> 49 animals were traced and presumed to have died or been slaughtered.
> One animal was traced and confirmed to have been exported and the importing
> country has been notified.
> Tracing of the remaining 75 animals is expected to be completed by the end
> of March (the outcomes of the remaining traces will not change the
> epidemiological profile of the investigation, but will achieve the objective
> of eliminating any living cohort animals from the food and feed systems as
> per OIE guidelines). A final summary of cohort dispositions will be posted
> when the remaining traces have been completed.
> Feed Investigation
> The feed investigation focussed on feeds to which the animal may have been
> exposed during its first year of life. Review of the manufacture,
> transportation and handling of these feeds did not demonstrate a link
> between production practices for a specific product and potential
> cross-contamination with prohibited material.
>
> Other species present on the farm included horses, dogs, and cats. On-farm
> mixing and delivery equipment consisted of a portable mix mill used to
> combine ground grain with commercial products and a mixer wagon used to
> combine forages with grain. Feed products available to the horses were the
> same as the commercial farm operation - no special products were purchased
> for them. Cat and dog food products were purchased and presumed to have
> contained prohibited material. These products were stored and fed in the
> house since 1999 and were not available to be accessed by the index case.
>
> All identified feed products to which the BSE-positive animal had access
> were products intended for feeding to ruminants and consisted of farm-grown
> or purchased grains and forages, as well as commercially prepared feed
> products. Commercial products included frequent purchase of trace
> mineralized salt and intermittent purchase of other mineral, limestone,
> protein supplement, molasses, vitamin premix and a complete feed.
>
> The case animal was moved from a pen to pasture shortly after birth and
> remained on pasture until weaned at approximately six months of age. While
> on pasture, the animal also had access to mineral and trace mineralized
> salt. The animal was weaned into a pen where it remained until approximately
> 10 months of age, prior to returning to pasture. Feeds available during this
> time included forages and barley mixed on-farm with limestone, trace
> mineralized salt, and vitamin premix. Other products that the animal may
> have accessed included a 32% protein supplement and a complete feed.
>
> Commercially prepared products were either purchased directly from a
> manufacturer or from a retail supplier that purchased from various
> manufacturers concurrently. The mineral and trace mineralized salt products
> that were purchased directly from the manufacturer were produced in a
> facility that had discontinued using prohibited material prior to May, 1999.
> These products were therefore ruled out as a possible source of
> contamination.
>
> Investigation at the retailer identified two possible manufacturers of the
> trace mineralized salt, one manufacturer of the protein supplement, one
> manufacturer of the vitamin premix, one supplier of the limestone and one
> manufacturer of the complete feed. Of these, only the protein supplement,
> vitamin premix and one of the sources of trace mineralized salt were
> manufactured in facilities also handling prohibited material. The
> manufacture of the other products was therefore also ruled out as a possible
> source of contamination.
>
> The facility manufacturing the protein supplement employed sequencing and
> flushing procedures to ensure products for ruminants were free of
> contamination with prohibited material. Investigation of specific products
> potentially received by the farm confirmed these sequencing and flushing
> procedures were followed and documented. The protein supplement was ruled
> out as a potential source of contamination.
>
> The facility manufacturing the vitamin premix was also the second
> manufacturer of the trace mineralized salt. Manufacturing records for
> products from this facility for the time frame of interest are no longer
> available so production practices to prevent cross-contamination of ruminant
> feeds by prohibited material as required by the regulations could not be
> verified. Ingredient receiving records do not document that appropriate
> procedures were always followed after receipt of prohibited material so
> opportunities for cross-contamination may have existed at this point in the
> manufacturing process. However, there are no records to associate specific
> production lots through the manufacturer and retailer to the producer.
>
> Transportation records for the complete feed and grain were not available so
> confirmation of compliance with regulatory requirements at the time could
> not be verified. The possibility of cross-contamination during
> transportation cannot be ruled out for these products. The other commercial
> products were packaged in such a manner (bags or totes) to eliminate
> contamination during subsequent transportation and storage.
>
> No direct link between specific products and production practices associated
> with potential cross-contamination can be made in this case. Facilities that
> handle prohibited material and manufacture ruminant rations are considered
> higher risk and did manufacture products to which the positive animal had
> access. The facilities identified in the investigation and which handled
> prohibited material, were each supplied exclusively by the same rendering
> facility common to previous investigations.
>
> Investigation Overview
> The detection of this case does not change any of Canada's BSE risk
> parameters. The location and age of the animal are consistent with previous
> cases, and the BSE surveillance results to date, including this new case,
> still reflect an extremely low level of BSE in Canada. In essence, the case
> confirms what was already known about an extremely low level of BSE
> infectivity having existed in Canada's feed system during the late 1990's
> and early 2000's within a previously determined geographic area and time
> interval.
>
> Since the confirmation of BSE in a native-born animal in May 2003, Canada
> has significantly increased its targeted testing of cattle in high-risk
> categories advocated by the OIE (including animals which die on-farm). This
> effort is directed at determining the level of BSE in Canada, while
> monitoring the effectiveness of the suite of risk-mitigating measures in
> place. Canada's National BSE Surveillance Program continues to demonstrate
> an extremely low level of BSE in Canada, with nine positive animals detected
> among over 150,000 targeted tests conducted since 2003. Such detections
> demonstrate the effectiveness and integrity of Canada's surveillance system;
> the level of awareness existing at all levels of the animal and meat
> production systems; the value of financial reimbursement provided for
> sampling and carcass disposal; and the commitment of Canadian producers and
> veterinarians to eliminating this disease. Canada's surveillance program
> adheres to OIE guidelines.
>
> The safety of beef produced in Canada is assured by public health measures
> enacted in 2003, following the first detection of BSE in a native-born
> animal in Canada. The removal of Specified Risk Materials (SRM), those
> tissues which have been demonstrated to have the potential to harbour BSE
> infectivity, from all animals slaughtered for human consumption is the most
> effective single measure to protect consumers in Canada and importing
> countries from exposure to BSE infectivity in meat products.
>
> As demonstrated by the surveillance system, the feed ban implemented in 1997
> is effectively preventing the amplification of BSE in Canada's feed system.
> The detection of BSE in a few animals born after the 1997 feed ban is not
> unexpected and does not indicate a failure of those measures. Additional
> regulations to enhance Canada's feed ban were announced on June 26, 2006.
> The most important change will require the removal of specified risk
> material from all animal feeds, pet food and fertilizer. The enhancement
> will significantly accelerate progress toward eradicating BSE from the
> national cattle herd by preventing more than 99% of potential BSE
> infectivity from entering the Canadian feed system and eliminating
> opportunities for cross-contamination within the complex system of
> production, transportation and storage of animal feeds. For further
> information, please see the fact sheet, Canada's Enhanced Feed Ban, at
> http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/feebet/rumin/enhrene.shtml.
>
>
>
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/ab2007/9investe.shtml
>
>
> TSS
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
> To: <BSE-L@aegee.org>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 8:04 PM
> Subject: BSE CANADA UPDATE CASE 9
>
>
> Subject: BSE CANADA UPDATE CASE 9
> Date: March 6, 2007 at 5:46 pm PST
> Latest Information (as of March 6, 2007 - 16:30 EST)
> The Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s (CFIA) comprehensive investigation of
> Canada's latest case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is nearing
> completion.
> CFIA investigators have confirmed the animal was born in 2000 and was at
> least six and a half years old at the time of its death, based on dental
> analysis, DNA testing and information provided by the producer.
> Information collected through the investigation also indicates the animal
> was born and raised on the farm where it was found.
> The CFIA has directed all necessary resources toward the tracing of cattle
> that may have been exposed to the same feed as the affected animal during
> the early part of their lives.
> The investigation also includes a thorough examination of the formulation,
> production, transportation and storage of a number of feed sources used on
> the birth farm at the time.
> This case is consistent with our understanding of BSE in North America. The
> CFIA has maintained that more cases could be found, especially considering
> that we are testing cattle most at risk of having BSE More than 150,000
> cattle have been tested since BSE was first detected in 2003.
> All of Canada’s cases have been detected through the surveillance program.
> These findings provide undisputable proof that our targeted testing regime
> is effective and working as intended to closely monitor the health of Canada
> ’s cattle herd.
> Under Canada's enhanced feed ban, which comes into effect on July 12, 2007,
> BSE should be eliminated from the national cattle herd within approximately
> 10 years. The CFIA expects the periodic detection of a limited number of
> cases to continue as the level of BSE continues to decline.
>
>
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/situatione.shtml
>
>
> TSS

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: BSE CANADA AND NORTH AMERICA Latest Information (as of January 12, 2005 -15:00 EST)
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 08:44:55 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net>
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
To: BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Canadian Food Inspection Agency - BSE in North America - Latest Information Page 1 of 26

Canadian Food Inspection Agency

BSE in North America

Latest Information

Latest Information (as of January 12, 2005 -15:00 EST)

" Case 2 (Confirmed January 2, 2005)

o Nine animals from Case 2's birth cohort have been euthanized and tested negative

for BSE.

o Ongoing traceouts have confirmed that an additional three birth cohort animals
were exported to the United States. American authorities have been notified.

. Case 3 (Confirmed January 11, 2005)

o Based on current information, we have identified 22 cattle from Case 3's birth
cohort. Additional traceouts are underway

. CFIA officials are preparing to undertake a review of Canada's feed ban. This process will
examine the effectiveness of industry's compliance with the ban in limiting the spread of
BSE. The review will include participation from international animal health and feed
experts.

" An extensive international outreach campaign is underway to reinforce awareness and
understanding of the science-based measures Canada has in place to protect human and
animal health from BSE.

o Canadian officials have been dispatched to China and will be travelling to Hong
Kong, Japan and Taiwan over the coming week.

o Canada's Chief Veterinary Officer is currently in Washington for technical
discussions with USDA and FDA officials.

o Minister Mitchell will travel to Mexico next week and the United States soon after to
meet with his counterparts.

o Heads of Missions will be fully briefed this week so they can serve as effective
advocates of Canada's BSE safeguards.

Latest Information (as of January 11, 2005 -14:00 EST)

" The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) today announced that Canada's national
surveillance program has detected bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in an Alberta
beef cow just under seven years of age. As part of its surveillance program, the CFIA has
control of the carcass. No part of the animal has entered the human food or animal feed
systems.

" The CFIA is investigating what the animal may have been fed early in its life and the

source of the feed. The infected animal was born in March 1998, and the farm of origin has
been confirmed. Based on preliminary information, feed produced prior to the introduction
of the 1997 feed ban in Canada remains the most likely source of infection in this animal.

. This current investigation is independent of the BSE investigation on the case which was
confirmed on January 2, 2005.

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/situatione.shtml 1/13/2005 TSS

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########

Latest Information (as of January 11, 2005 - 14:00 EST)

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) today announced that
Canada's national surveillance program has detected bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in an Alberta beef cow
<http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2005/20050111e.shtml>
just under seven years of age. As part of its surveillance
program, the CFIA has control of the carcass. No part of the
animal has entered the human food or animal feed systems.

The CFIA is investigating what the animal may have been fed early
in its life and the source of the feed. The infected animal was
born in March 1998, and the farm of origin has been confirmed.
Based on preliminary information, feed produced prior to the
introduction of the 1997 feed ban in Canada remains the most
likely source of infection in this animal.

This current investigation is independent of the BSE investigation
on the case which was confirmed on January 2, 2005.

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/situatione.shtml

NEW CASE OF BSE DETECTED

OTTAWA, January 11, 2005 - The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) today announced that Canada's national surveillance program has detected bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in an Alberta beef cow just under seven years of age. As part of its surveillance program, the CFIA has control of the carcass. No part of the animal has entered the human food or animal feed systems.

Public health remains protected through the removal of specified risk material (SRM) from all animals slaughtered for human food. SRM are tissues that, in infected animals, contain the BSE agent. This measure is internationally recognized as the most effective public health measure against BSE.

The CFIA is investigating what the animal may have been fed early in its life and the source of the feed. The infected animal was born in March 1998, and the farm of origin has been confirmed. Based on preliminary information, feed produced prior to the introduction of the 1997 feed ban in Canada remains the most likely source of infection in this animal.

The infected animal was detected through the recently enhanced national surveillance program. Additional cases may be found as testing of high-risk cattle continues. In 2004, the Government of Canada tested over 22,000 animals.

Canada's science-based BSE safeguards to protect public and animal health have been designed with the understanding that BSE is potentially present in a small and declining number of animals. This includes animals born before and shortly after the 1997 feed ban. The Government of Canada continues to believe that the ruminant to ruminant feed ban introduced in 1997 has limited the spread of BSE and remains effective

Initial testing on the animal was conducted by Alberta authorities. Results were inconclusive and samples were then sent to the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health in Winnipeg. The definitive diagnosis was made today using the internationally recognized "gold standard" test for BSE.

Since the surveillance program was enhanced in January 2004, Canada has tested more than 24,000 high-risk cattle. This targeted approach has detected an additional two BSE positive cattle. These findings demonstrate the shared commitment of cattle producers, industry and governments to responsibly search for any remaining cases of BSE.

This current investigation is independent of the BSE investigation on the case which was confirmed on January 2, 2005.

The CFIA will hold a news conference today, January 11, 2005, at 2:00 EST. A media advisory has been issued.

-30-

For information:

Canadian Food Inspection Agency
Media Relations
(613) 228-6682

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2005/20050111e.shtml

Release No. 0011.05

Statement by Dr. Ron DeHaven,Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

January 11, 2005

"Today, Canada announced that a six year, nine month old cow has tested positive for BSE. We remain confident that the animal and public health measures that Canada has in place to prevent BSE, combined with existing U.S. domestic safeguards, provide the utmost protections to U.S. consumers and livestock.

"However, since this animal was born shortly after the implementation of Canadas feed ban and to determine if there are any potential links among the positive animals, we will expedite sending a technical team to Canada to evaluate the circumstances surrounding these recent finds. We appreciate Canadas willingness to cooperate and assist us in these efforts. We will continue our ongoing work with Canadian officials in their epidemiological investigations to determine the facts of these cases.

"As always, protection of public and animal health is our top priority. The result of our investigation and analysis will be used to evaluate appropriate next steps in regard to the minimal risk rule published last week."

#

USDA News
oc.news@usda.gov
202 720-4623

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.retrievecontent/.c/6_2_1UH/.ce/7_2_5JM/.p/5_2_4TQ/.d/1/_th/J_2_9D/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?PC_7_2_5JM_contentid=2005%2F01%2F0011.xml&PC_7_2_5JM_navtype=RT&PC_7_2_5JM_parentnav=LATEST_RELEASES&PC_7_2_5JM_navid=NEWS_RELEASE#7_2_5JM

Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html

PART 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html

PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ..

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf

Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine

genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable

from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

Statement by Ron DeHaven, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

January 3, 2005

"Yesterday, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) confirmed that an older dairy cow from Alberta, Canada, has tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The infected animal was born in 1996, prior to the implementation of Canada's 1997 feed ban. No part of the animal entered the human food or animal feed systems.

"USDA remains confident that the animal and public health measures that Canada has in place, including the removal of specified risk material (SRMs) from the human food chain, a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban, a national surveillance program and import restrictions, combined with existing U.S. domestic safeguards and the additional safeguards announced as part of USDA's BSE minimal-risk rule announced Dec. 29 provide the utmost protections to U.S. consumers and livestock.

'The extensive risk assessment conducted as part of USDA's rulemaking process took into careful consideration the possibility that Canada could experience additional cases of BSE.

"According to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines, a country may be considered a BSE minimal-risk country if it has less than 2 cases per million cattle over 24 months of age during each of the previous 4 consecutive years. Considering Canada has roughly 5.5 million cattle over 24 months of age, under OIE guidelines, they could detect up to 11 cases of BSE in this population and still be considered a minimal-risk country, as long as their risk mitigation measures and other preventative measures were effective.

"USDA will continue to work closely with CFIA officials as their investigation into this situation progresses."

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.retrievecontent/.c/6_2_1UH/.ce/7_2_5JM/.p/5_2_4TQ/.d/1/_th/J_2_9D/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?PC_7_2_5JM_contentid=2005%2F01%2F0001.xml&PC_7_2_5JM_navtype=RT&PC_7_2_5JM_parentnav=LATEST_RELEASES&PC_7_2_5JM_navid=NEWS_RELEASE#7_2_5JM

Transcript of U. S. Farm Report, Town and Country Living Year-end interview with Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman As Aired January 1, 2005 on RFD-TV

snip...

"Obviously my time has been spent in large part on continuing on the BSE crisis that we encountered."

MR. SAMUELSON: "That happened just before Christmas a year ago."

SEC. VENEMAN: "Exactly. And after our interview, there we were, the cow who stole Christmas, December 23rd. And we've spent a lot of time working through all of the issues-- increased strength of our regulations, implementing animal ID, implementing an enhanced testing program. There's been a whole host of issues we've had to deal with. And that's taken a lot of time.

snip...

"MR. SAMUELSON: "Finally, back to BSE for a moment. You mentioned animal identification. Are we making progress on that program?"

SEC. VENEMAN: "Absolutely. We are working closely with states and organizations to implement premise ID, individual animal ID, and to put it into a national database. Obviously this is a voluntary program as we get it up and running, but we expect over time that it will become a mandatory program that will allow us to trace back animals in the event of a disease outbreak, particularly of disease like foot and mouth disease where it spreads very, very quickly, and it's important to quickly be able to see where the animals have gone so that we can see where the disease might spread."

snip...

"The other day is December 23, 2003, the day that we discovered we had our first case of BSE. And we then of course had to deal with the cow who stole Christmas. And that took up a lot of what we did all of this year in terms of implementing the programs in the aftermath of that."

MR. SAMUELSON: "But I give you high marks -- the cattle industry and you as Secretary and your staff -- because we didn't go through the difficult times that the Canadian growers went through."

SEC. VENEMAN: "Well, that's absolutely true. We kept demand high, prices have stayed high. The cattle industry is in good shape, and that's because consumer confidence remained strong."

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/01/0003.xml

Statement By Dr. Ron DeHaven Administrator, Animal & Plant Health
Inspection Service

January 7, 2005

"The U.S. Department of Agriculture is working closely with the Canadian
Food Inspection Agency in their investigation of the Canadian dairy cow
that recently tested positive for BSE. This investigation is focused on
identifying birth cohorts - animals born in the same herd within one
year of the affected animal. The preliminary investigation has shown
that one of these birth cohorts was imported into the United States in
February 2002 for immediate slaughter. USDA, in collaboration with FDA,
is currently tracing the disposition of this animal and will provide
further details as the investigation evolves.

"Even at the height of BSE infection in Europe and the United Kingdom,
it was extremely rare to have more than one animal in the same herd
affected with BSE, therefore USDA believes it is extremely unlikely that
this imported cow would have been infected. Nevertheless, as was the
case in May 2003, when Canada had its first case of BSE and a small
number of birth cohorts were traced to the United States, USDA will make
every reasonable effort to obtain and provide information about the
disposition of this animal as well as any other birth cohorts that are
traced to the United States through Canada's epidemiological investigation.

"USDA and FDA have had a strong program in place for years to protect
the U.S. livestock population from BSE. Import controls on live cattle
and certain ruminant products from countries at high risk of BSE were
put in place more than 15 years ago. In 1997, both the United States and
Canada finalized animal feed bans, which are the single most important
safeguard to prevent the spread of the disease through the cattle
population. Public and animal health in the United States and Canada
have also been protected through ongoing surveillance efforts and
inspection of animals at slaughter for neurological signs, and now by
the removal of specified risk materials from the human food supply.

"USDA also continues the enhanced BSE surveillance program that began in
June 2003. To date, more than 170,000 targeted animals have been tested
for BSE. All samples have been negative."


http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/01/0007.xml

TSS


######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: Dr. Ron DeHaven DOING THE MAD COW TEXAS TWO-STEP AGAIN
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 10:41:56 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@WT.NET>
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
To: BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
References: <41D44A6C.2020304@wt.net> <41D48915.9040301@wt.net>


##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

> * Dec. 30: CFIA begins definitive laboratory immunohistochemistry test
> on sample in Winnipeg lab with results expects as early as Saturday
> but more likely on Monday...

are they this stupid or do they just not know about the
atypical cases and the fact that immunohistochemistry
misses some of them ???

WHY no OIE WB done $$$

> Diagnosis:

> - The brain sample from the bullock tested positive to the ELISA-based
> bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) screening test, and was sent to
> the National Institute of Infectious Disease for confirmation and was
> subjected to Western blot analysis, histopathological examination and
> immunohistochemical examination. Based on these results, this case was
> concluded as an atypical BSE on 6 October 2003.
> - Result of Western blot analysis: PrPsc (scrapie-associated prion
> protein) was detected, the pattern of glycoform and relative protease
> resistance of PrPsc were different from what is known for BSE. Results
> of histopathological examination and immunohistochemical examination
> were negative.

IF we look at # 8 and # 9 cows, they seem to be very similar to the USA
positives that turn out to be negative all the time;

>8. 6/10/2003 Holstein Steer 13/10/2001 23 mths
> No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP-
>

>9. 4/11/2003 Holstein Steer 13/1/2002
>21 mths No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP-
>

NOW, what does the USDA say about negative IHC ;

> John Clifford of the USDA said in a statement that the negative IHC
> results "makes us confident that the animal in question is indeed
> negative."


SURE it does, i suppose this is why they refused to do a WB$

snip...

> A U.S. veterinarian knowledgeable about mad cow tests told UPI that
> experts she has spoken with are "very, very skeptical about" the
> USDA's negative test result.
>
> The veterinarian, who requested anonymity because she feared
> repercussions for speaking out against the USDA, said the skepticism
> arose because the agency did not run another kind of mad cow test
> called a Western blot. The test sometimes can pick up positive cases
> that IHC misses and the agency has used it in the past to rule out
> suspect cases.

>> Subject: Re: USDA/APHIS JUNE 2004 'ENHANCED' BSE/TSE COVER UP UPDATE
>> DECEMBER 19, 2004 USA
>> Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 12:27:06 -0600
>> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
>>
>>
>> BSE-L
>>
>> snip...
>>
>>>
>>> OH, i did ask Bio-Rad about this with NO reply to date;
>>>
>>>
>>> -------- Original Message --------
>>> Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
>>> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
>>> To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,
>>>
>>> Happy Holidays!
>>>
>>> I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing
>>> and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that
>>> complicated,
>>> or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?
>>>
>>> HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with
>>> No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- ,
>>> BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?
>>>
>>> IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?
>>>
>>> What am I missing?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -------- Original Message --------
>>> Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
>>> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
>>> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
>>> snip...end
>>>
>>>
>>> Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> snip...END
>>
>> WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this,
>> however it was not Susan Berg.
>> but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal
>> there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention
>> this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted
>> any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;
>>
>> Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04
>>
>> Finally spoke with ;
>>
>>
>> Bio-Rad Laboratories
>> 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
>> Hercules, CA 94547
>> Ph: 510-741-6720
>> Fax: 510-741-5630
>> Email: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
>>
>> at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant
>> phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA
>> and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem
>> to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak
>> directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB.
>> X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation
>> of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries
>> do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X
>> I understood that it was a very loaded question and X
>> agreed several times over and even said a political one.
>>
>> my question;
>>
>> Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive,
>> without WB, and considering the new
>> atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???
>>
>> ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch
>> and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not
>> want any of this recorded or repeated.
>>
>> again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of
>> retaliation, but again said X tell
>> me what other countries are doing and finding, and that
>> i should take it from there.
>> "very difficult to answer"
>>
>> "very political"
>>
>> "very loaded question"
>>
>> outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in
>> house WB, SAF, along with
>> IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several
>> talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT
>> IS NEGATIVE. again, look what
>> the rest of the world is doing.
>> said something about Dr. Houston stating;
>> any screening assay, always a chance for human
>> error. but with so many errors (i am assuming
>> X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false
>> positives?
>> said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but
>> were positive''. ...
>>
>>
>> TSS
>>
>> -------- Original Message --------
>> Subject: Your questions
>> Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800
>> From: To: flounder@wt.net
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Terry:
>>
>> ............................................snip Let me know your
>> phone number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test.
>> Thank you
>>
>> Regards
>>
>>
>>
>> Bio-Rad Laboratories
>> 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
>> Hercules, CA 94547
>> Ph: 510-741-6720
>> Fax: 510-741-5630
>> Email: =================================
>>
>>
>> END...TSS
>>
>>
>> ######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
>> ##########
>>


EDMONTON - Some of former Alberta premier Ralph Klein's most colourful quotes — and the reactions they elicited:

SNIP...

"This all came about through the discovery of a single, isolated case of mad cow disease in one Alberta cow on May 20th. The farmer — I think he was a Louisiana fish farmer who knew nothing about cattle ranching. I guess any self-respecting rancher would have shot, shovelled and shut up, but he didn't do that." — Klein recalls how the mad cow crisis started and rancher Marwyn Peaster's role. The premier was speaking at the Western Governors Association meeting in Big Sky, Mont. September 2004.

"The premier meant that in an ironic or almost a sarcastic way." — Klein spokesman Gordon Turtle.

---

"You would have to eat 10 billion meals of brains, spinal cords, ganglia, eyeballs and tonsils." — Klein speaking in Montreal in January 2005 on the risk of humans contracting mad cow disease.

---

"I would offer $5 billion to have a Japanese person to come over here and eat nothing but Alberta beef for a year. And if he gets mad cow disease, I would be glad to give him $5 billion — make it $10 billion — Canadian." — Klein speaking after Japan closed its borders to Canadian beef.

---


Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. 

*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

 see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
 
http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2009/prion2009_bookofabstracts.pdf
 
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
 
 
ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ?
 
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
 

*** CANADA MBM LIVE CATTLE BSE TSE PRION TO USA

Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2003 02:23:12 +0200


sporadic/spontaneous CJD can be caused by atypical and typical BSE and Scrapie and CWD...it's just science!

''In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.''

2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

PLEASE NOTE;

2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strainsNo

Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author: ‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).

In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE. 


''In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.'' 

***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.

https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). 

Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 

=============== 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 

=============== 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 

============== 

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf 

***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

Taylor & Francis

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20

Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

snip...

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

PMID: 6997404


Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6


Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).

Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).



Wednesday, February 16, 2011

IN CONFIDENCE

SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

IN CONFIDENCE


TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2021 

Classical BSE prions emerge from asymptomatic pigs challenged with atypical/Nor98 scrapie


TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2021 

Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Very Young Person Singeltary Reply 2021


WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2021 

Continuing Enhanced National Surveillance for Prion Diseases in the U.S.


Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Subject: BSE Canada USA From: Karin.Irgens@DYREHELSETILSYNET.NO

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2003 02:23:12 +0200

Parts/Attachments: text/plain (261 lines)

Reply ######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### Hello all

Terry Singletary has provided the official US import and export statistics for the USA in 2002 and the first 3 months of 2003, for live cattle and MBM (meat and bone meal)

I have tried to figure out how many 'risk units' (external challenge) the USA has imported from Canada during 2002-2003. 


TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2021

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion end of year report December 14, 2021


FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2021 

EFSA Annual Report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE 2021


CANADA CJD VPSPR TSE PRION ?

i have a question, i have been trying to figure out, maybe you can help. 

why is there no documented vpspr variably protease-sensitive prionopathy in Canada?

are the vpspr cases being lumped in with all of sporadic cjd cases, and just no mention of different types?

i cannot find anything on it.

Canada vpspr 0 cases ???



USA vpspr;

6 Includes 39 case in which the diagnosis is pending (1 from 2018, 1 from 2019, 1 from 2020 and 19 from 2021), and 19 inconclusive cases; 
7 Includes 33 (33 from 2021) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded. 
8 The sporadic cases include 4158 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), 76 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr) and 35 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI). 

i just find it odd that Canada has NO cases of vpspr...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.