Tuesday, August 9, 2016

Concurrence with OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2015-0055]

BILLING CODE: 3410-34-P DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

 

[Docket No. APHIS-2015-0055]

 

Concurrence with OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

 

ACTION: Notice.

 

SUMMARY: We are advising the public of our decision to concur with the World Organization for Animal Health’s (OIE) bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk designations for 14 regions. The OIE recognizes these regions as being of negligible risk for BSE. We are taking this action based on our review of information supporting the OIE’s risk designations for these regions.

 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Roberta Morales, Senior Staff Veterinarian, Regionalization Evaluation Services, National Import Export Services, VS, APHIS, 920 Main Campus Drive, Suite 200, Raleigh, NC 27606; (919) 855-7735.

 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

 

The regulations in 9 CFR part 92 subpart B, “Importation of Animals and Animal Products; Procedures for Requesting BSE Risk Status Classification With Regard to Bovines” (referred to below as the regulations), set forth the process by which the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) classifies regions for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk. Section 92.5 of the regulations provides that all countries of the world are considered by APHIS to be in one of three BSE risk categories: Negligible risk, controlled risk, or undetermined risk. These risk categories are defined in § 92.1. Any region that is not classified by APHIS as 2 presenting either negligible risk or controlled risk for BSE is considered to present an undetermined risk. The list of those regions classified by APHIS as having either negligible risk or controlled risk can be accessed on the APHIS Web site at

 


 

The list can also be obtained by writing to APHIS at National Import Export Services, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737. Under the regulations, APHIS may classify a region for BSE in one of two ways. One way is for countries that have not received a risk classification from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) to request classification by APHIS. The other way is for APHIS to concur with the classification given to a country by the OIE.

 

If the OIE has recognized a country as either BSE negligible risk or BSE controlled risk, APHIS will seek information to support our concurrence with the OIE classification. This information may be publicly available information, or APHIS may request that countries supply the same information given to the OIE. APHIS will announce in the Federal Register, subject to public comment, its intent to concur with an OIE classification.

 

In accordance with that process, we published a notice1 in the Federal Register on December 4, 2015 (80 FR 75849, Docket No. APHIS-2015-0055), in which we announced our intent to concur with the OIE risk designations for 16 regions. The OIE recognizes these regions as being of negligible risk for BSE. We solicited comments on the notice for 60 days ending on February 2, 2016. We received two comments by that date, from a private citizen and a representative of a foreign government.

 

1 To view the notice and the comments we received, go to

 


 

3 One commenter stated that if a product is being imported only for use in pet food, then the BSE risk status of the exporting region should not be an issue.

 

We disagree that bovine products imported for use in pet food do not pose a risk for introducing or spreading BSE in the United States. It is possible that pet foods could be used for cattle feed, either by accidental misfeeding of pet foods to cattle or by misusing salvage pet food for cattle. Farms that raise multiple species (e.g. dogs, swine, and cattle) present a particular risk for misfeeding.

 

The other commenter stated that the United States does not recognize all the OIE’s risk designations for BSE, noting that the United States still considers several countries as controlled risk regions though the OIE has classified them as negligible risk.

 

As we explained above, § 92.5 of the regulations provides two ways that APHIS may classify a region for BSE. One way is for countries that have not received a risk classification from the OIE to request classification by APHIS. The other way is for APHIS to concur with the classification given to a country by the OIE. If the OIE has recognized a country as either BSE negligible risk or BSE controlled risk, APHIS will seek information to support our concurrence with the OIE classification. This information may be publicly available information, or APHIS may request that countries supply the same information given to the OIE.

 

The length of APHIS’s review of information in support of concurrence depends on a number of factors, including whether the information is publicly available, and, if it is not publicly available, how quickly a country responds to our request for information. This notice updates APHIS’ list of regions recognized as negligible risk for BSE to include all the regions for which we have been able to review information. We intend to announce concurrence with additional countries recognized by the OIE in a future notice.

 

4

 

One commenter noted that while the OIE guidelines call for removal of specified risk materials (SRMs) from animals older than 30 months of age, our regulations require the removal of SRMs from animals 30 months of age or older. The commenter stated that while this is not a significant difference from an epidemiological perspective, it creates a major problem for certification through the veterinary services of exporting countries and presents a barrier to trade. APHIS notes that the wording “30 months of age or older” is consistent with Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations as well as with Canadian regulations. We also note that anyone wishing to import bovine products into the United States must also meet FSIS or FDA requirements as well as APHIS requirements. We do not anticipate that this difference will have a significant impact on trade.

 

In the December 2015 notice, we mistakenly announced our intent to recognize Romania as a region of negligible risk for BSE. In December 2014, the OIE suspended Romania’s status as a negligible risk region because Romania reported a case of atypical BSE. Since then, the OIE has announced its intent to reinstate Romania’s status as a region of negligible risk for BSE. We will be seeking information to verify Romania’s status and will announce our intent to concur with the OIE’s designation in a future notice.

 

Also in the December 2015 notice, we announced our intent to recognize France as a region of negligible risk for BSE in concurrence with the OIE. Since then, France has confirmed a case of classical BSE in a 5-year-old cow. Accordingly, the OIE has suspended France’s status as a region of negligible risk for BSE and reinstated its status as a region of controlled risk effective March 25, 2016. For this reason we have removed France from the list of regions of negligible risk for BSE in this document. We will continue to recognize France as a region of controlled risk for BSE.

 

5

 

Therefore, in accordance with the regulations in § 92.5, we are announcing our decision to concur with the OIE risk classifications of the following countries:

 

 Regions of negligible risk for BSE: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, India, Korea (Republic of), Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, and Switzerland.

 

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1622 and 8301-8317; 21 U.S.C. 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.

 

Done in Washington, DC, this 4th day of August 2016.

 

Kevin Shea,

 

Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

 

[FR Doc. 2016-18985 Filed: 8/9/2016 8:45 am; Publication Date: 8/10/2016]

 


 

> Concurrence with OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2015-0055]

 

LAUGH OUT LOUD LOL !

 

THE OIE and USDA BSE MRR policy is the biggest piece of junk science propaganda I have every seen, which will be sure to continue to spread the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE PRION disease (all strains), around the globe, just for trade and the almighty dollar...terry

 

Saturday, July 23, 2016

 

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, AND SRM REMOVAL UNITED STATE OF AMERICA UPDATE JULY 2016

 


 

Tuesday, July 26, 2016

 

Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion UPDATE JULY 2016

 


 

Saturday, July 16, 2016

 

Importation of Sheep, Goats, and Certain Other Ruminants [Docket No. APHIS-2009-0095]RIN 0579-AD10

 

WITH great disgust and concern, I report to you that the OIE, USDA, APHIS, are working to further legalize the trading of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Pion disease around the globe.

 

THIS is absolutely insane. it’s USDA INC.

 


 

Thursday, August 4, 2016

 

Secretary's Advisory Committee on Animal Health [Docket No. APHIS-2016-0046] TSE PRION DISEASE

 


 

Friday, June 3, 2016

 

The epidemiological evolution of prion infection on bovine in Romania, in the period of 2010 – 2015

 


 

PRION 2016 TOKYO JAPAN

 

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

 

USDA APHIS National Scrapie TSE Prion Eradication Program April 2016 Monthly Report Prion 2016 Tokyo Update

 


 

Monday, May 02, 2016

 

*** Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions: An Update Prion 2016 Tokyo ***

 


 

*** NIH awards $11 million to UTHealth researchers to study deadly CWD prion diseases Claudio Soto, Ph.D. ***

 

Public Release: 29-Jun-2016

 


 

I urge everyone to watch this video closely...terry

 

*** you can see video here and interview with Jeff's Mom, and scientist telling you to test everything and potential risk factors for humans ***

 


 

Saturday, April 23, 2016

 

*** SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential TOKYO CONFERENCE 2016

 

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X

 


 

Friday, January 30, 2015

 

*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***

 


 

Thursday, August 04, 2016

 

*** MEETING ON THE FEASIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES ON CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE 1978 THE SCRAPIE FILES IN CONFIDENCE CONFIDENTIAL SCJD ***

 


 

LEFTOVERS FOR LIVESTOCK: A Legal Guide for Using Food Scraps as Animal Feed and a recipe for Another TSE Prion Disaster

 

While using food scraps as animal feed was once a common practice in the U.S., it has declined since the 1980s because of disease outbreaks linked to animal products like food-and-mouth and bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known as mad cow disease. Stricter state laws and federal regulations were enacted to prevent outbreaks; 15 states currently ban any animal-derived scraps from being used in swine feed, and nine of those 15 also ban feeding vegetable waste to pigs. But the practice can be done responsibly, the report says, and there is a renewed enthusiasm among farmers, food entrepreneurs and consumers looking to address the environmental and economic problems related to food waste. Read it here...

 


 

LEFTOVERS FOR LIVESTOCK: A Legal Guide for Using Food Scraps as Animal Feed

 

snip...

 

The use of food scraps as animal feed has been a common practice worldwide for centuries.5 The vision of a classic agrarian homestead often features the farmer’s children bringing dinner scraps out to “slop the pigs” and feed the chickens. Yet the practice of feeding food scraps to animals has declined precipitously since the 1980s, when several disease outbreaks were linked to animal feed (specifically, animal products in livestock feed), including foot-and-mouth disease in swine and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly referred to as mad cow disease, in cattle. In an attempt to prevent the spread of such diseases, federal and state laws and regulations that restricted what is often pejoratively referred to as “garbage feeding” were enacted. Some of these policies were overly restrictive, and many of them impose conflicting requirements among neighboring states. Thus, they contributed to a decline in the amount of leftover food being used in animal feed. Indeed, by 2007, just three percent of U.S. hog farms fed food scraps to their livestock.6

 

snip...

 

b. Ruminant Feed Ban Rule The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)/Ruminant Feed Ban Rule36 prohibits the use of mammalian protein (i.e., animal tissue) in feeds for ruminant animals. This ban covers all “ruminants,” meaning animals that have a stomach with four chambers through which feed passes during digestion, such as cattle, sheep, goats, deer, elk, and antelopes, among others (Swine and fowl are not ruminants.).37 The regulations apply to any “protein derived from mammalian tissue.”38 The ban specifically lays out the types of products that can and cannot be fed to particular types of ruminants.39 Producers of waste-based ruminant feed must certify compliance and keep detailed records of inputs and processes; they are also subject to inspection by FDA.40 The regulations require any company or individual that processes animal products unfit for human consumption or meat scraps to

 

1) follow specified labeling guidelines indicating that the products are not to be fed to other ruminants and

 

2) maintain records tracking the receipt, processing, and distribution of the products.41 Alternatively, processors can use manufacturing and testing methods approved by FDA to prevent transmissible spongiform encephalopathy

 

August 2016 Leftovers for Livestock: A Legal Guide for Using Excess Food as Animal Feed |4 (BSE)/Ruminant Feed Ban Rule prohibits the use of almost all mammalian protein (i.e., animal tissue) in feeds for ruminant animals.

 

diseases, including BSE.42 Those who intend to separate qualifying protein products from other food scraps are subject to additional processing and inspection guidelines.43 Finally, ruminant-feeding operations must maintain copies of purchase invoices and labeling for all feeds containing animal protein products, which may be subject to FDA inspection.44

 

snip...

 

FDA has described such byproducts as portions of processed food that may not be nutritious, suitable, or desirable for human consumption, but that still may be a source of energy and nutrition for certain species of animals.47 Examples include culls, peels, trimmings, and pulp from vegetable manufacturing/processing; chaff, bran, and middlings from grain milling; wet brewer’s grains from beverage brewing operations; and liquid whey from dairy facilities.48 This definition embraces food unfit for human consumption, which might include animal meat, but recall that the SHPA and the BSE/Ruminant Feed Ban Rule respectively prohibit the feeding of meat containing active disease organisms to swine49 and the feeding of mammalian protein to ruminant animals such as cows, sheep, and goats.50 A facility that wishes to use human food byproducts as animal feed must ensure it complies with these regulations—as well as any relevant state laws and regulations—in addition to the Preventive Controls rule for animal food.

 


 

seriously ?

 

you do know that the infamous August 1997 bse mad cow feed ban was a colossal failure?

 

you do know that the surveillance and testing for bse was a colossal failure?

 

you do know that the bse srm ban was also a colossal failure?

 

you do know that ***CWD-Detection of infectivity in orally challenged pigs.

 

you do know that these plants and grains that mix with feed, could be a potential source of the cwd tse prion.

 

please use this as you wish. be careful though, it’s sound science, something not used anymore...

 

kind regards, terry

 

Priority Interim Position Paper PROTECTING THE FOOD CHAIN FROM PRIONS Perspectives 2016

 

snip...

 

5. Proposed Recommendations

 

a. The question of re-introduction of ruminant protein into the food-chain

 

The opinion of the members of PRIORITY is that the sustainment of an absolute feed ban for ruminant protein to ruminants is the essential requirement, especially since the impact of non-classical forms of scrapie in sheep and goats is not fully understood or cannot be fully estimated. Therefore, the consortium strongly recommends prohibiting re-introduction of processed ruminant protein into the feed-chain. Arguments in support of this opinion are:

 

the large (and still uncharacterized) diversity of prion agents that circulate in animal populations;

 

the uncertainties related to prion epidemiology in animal populations;

 

the unknown efficacy of industrial processes applied to reduce microbiological risk during processed animal protein (PAP) production on most prion agents;

 

the intrinsic capacity of prions to cross interspecies transmission barriers;

 

the lack of sensitive methodology for identifying cross contamination in food.

 

The consortium is also hesitant to introduce processed ruminant proteins into fish food considering the paucity of data on prion infections in fishes and sea animals, and the risk of establishing an environmental contamination of the oceans that cannot be controlled.

 

b. Atypical prion agents

 

Atypical prion agents will probably in the next future represent the dominant form of prion diseases. Type L atypical BSE has clear zoonotic potential. Similarly, there are now some data that seem to indicate that atypical scrapie agent can cross various species barriers. Moreover, the current EU policy for eradicating scrapie (genetic selection in affected flocks) is inefficient to prevent atypical scrapie. In that context it would appear valuable

 

to develop knowledge related to pathogenesis and inter-individual transmission of atypical prion agents in ruminants (both intraspecies and interspecies)

 

to investigate for potential PrP resistance allele to the infection by atypical prion agents

 

to improve the sensitivity of detection assay that are applied in the field towards this type of agent

 

to maintain a robust surveillance of both animal and human populations

 

c. Species transmission barriers

 

Intensified search for a molecular signature of the species barrier is recommended, since this barrier is a key for many important policy areas - risk assessment, proportional policies, the need for screening of human products and food.

 

d. Prion structure

 

Prion strain structural language will remain an important issue for public health for the foreseeable future. Understanding the structural basis for strains and the basis for adaptation of a strain to a new host will require continued fundamental research.

 

e. Detection and therapy

 

Early detection of prion infection, ideally at preclinical stage, will remain crucial for development of effective treatment strategies in humans affected by the disease.

 


 


 

Tuesday, May 31, 2016

 

Priority Interim Position Paper PROTECTING THE FOOD CHAIN FROM PRIONS Perspectives

 


 

PRION 2016 CONFERENCE TOKYO

 

***CWD-Detection of infectivity in orally challenged pigs

 

P-154 Prion infectivity detected in swine challenged with chronic wasting disease via the intracerebral or oral route

 

S Jo Moore, Robert A Kunkle, Jodi D Smith, M Heather West-Greenlee, Justin J Greenlee Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center; ARS, USDA, United States

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally-occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of North American cervids. The potential for swine to serve as a host for the agent of chronic wasting disease is unknown. In the US, feeding of ruminant by-products to ruminants is prohibited, but feeding of ruminant materials to swine, mink, and poultry still occurs. In addition, scavenging of CWD-affected cervid carcasses by feral pigs presents a potential risk for CWD exposure. The purpose of this study was to investigate the susceptibility of swine to the CWD agent following oral or intracranial experimental challenge.

 

At 8 weeks of age, crossbred pigs were challenged by the intracranial route (n=20), oral route (n= 19), or were left unchallenged (n=9). At approximately 6 months of age, the time at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled (<6 challenge="" groups="" month="" pigs="" remaining="" the="">6 month challenge groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post challenge (mpc). At death a complete necropsy examination was performed, including testing of tissues for misfolded prion protein (PrPcwd) by western blotting (WB), enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), and immunohistochemistry (IHC).

 

None of the pigs developed clinical signs consistent with prion disease. Four >6 month intracranially challenged pigs (survival times 45-73 mpc) were positive by ELISA, two were also positive by WB, and one was positive by IHC. One >6 month orally challenged pig (64 mpc) was positive by ELISA.

 

To further investigate the potential for infectivity, brain tissue from selected pigs was bioassayed in mice expressing porcine PRNP. Tissue from the two WB-positive >6 month intracranially challenged pigs produced positive bioassay results, albeit with low attack rates and variable incubation periods. Interestingly, bioassay of material from the longest surviving >6 month orally challenged pig (72 mpc), which was negative for PrPcwd by all other tests, produced a positive bioassay result. Bioassay of material from additional animals is currently underway.

 

This study demonstrates that pigs can serve as potential hosts for CWD, although with low attack rates and scant PrPcwd accumulation. Detection of infectivity in orally challenged pigs using mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity, even though affected pigs do not develop overt clinical signs or readily detectable PrPcwd.

 


 

WS-02

 

Scrapie in swine: A diagnostic challenge

 

Justin J Greenlee1, Robert A Kunkle1, Jodi D Smith1, Heather W. Greenlee2

 

1National Animal Disease Center, US Dept. of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, United States; 2Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine

 

A naturally occurring prion disease has not been recognized in swine, but the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy does transmit to swine by experimental routes. Swine are thought to have a robust species barrier when exposed to the naturally occurring prion diseases of other species, but the susceptibility of swine to the agent of sheep scrapie has not been thoroughly tested.

 

Since swine can be fed rations containing ruminant derived components in the United States and many other countries, we conducted this experiment to test the susceptibility of swine to U.S. scrapie isolates by intracranial and oral inoculation. Scrapie inoculum was a pooled 10% (w/v) homogenate derived from the brains of clinically ill sheep from the 4th passage of a serial passage study of the U.S scrapie agent (No. 13-7) through susceptible sheep that were homozygous ARQ at prion protein residues 136, 154, and 171, respectively. Pigs were inoculated intracranially (n=19) with a single 0.75 ml dose or orally (n=24) with 15 ml repeated on 4 consecutive days. Necropsies were done on a subset of animals at approximately six months post inoculation (PI), at the time the pigs were expected to reach market weight. Remaining pigs were maintained and monitored for clinical signs of TSE until study termination at 80 months PI or when removed due to intercurrent disease (primarily lameness). Brain samples were examined by immunohistochemistry (IHC), western blot (WB), and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Brain tissue from a subset of pigs in each inoculation group was used for bioassay in mice expressing porcine PRNP.

 

At six-months PI, no evidence of scrapie infection was noted by any diagnostic method. However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more methods: IHC (n=4), WB (n=3), or ELISA (n=5). Interestingly, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study).

 

Swine inoculated with the agent of scrapie by the intracranial and oral routes do not accumulate abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) to a level detectable by IHC or WB by the time they reach typical market age and weight. However, strong support for the fact that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie comes from positive bioassay from both intracranially and orally inoculated pigs and multiple diagnostic methods demonstrating abnormal prion protein in intracranially inoculated pigs with long incubation times.

 

Curriculum Vitae

 

Dr. Greenlee is Research Veterinary Medical Officer in the Virus and Prion Research Unit at the National Animal Disease Center, US Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service. He applies his specialty in veterinary anatomic pathology to focused research on the intra- and interspecies transmission of prion diseases in livestock and the development of antemortem diagnostic assays for prion diseases. In addition, knockout and transgenic mouse models are used to complement ongoing experiments in livestock species. Dr. Greenlee has publications in a number of topic areas including prion agent decontamination, effects of PRNP genotype on susceptibility to the agent of sheep scrapie, characterization of US scrapie strains, transmission of chronic wasting disease to cervids and cattle, features of H-BSE associated with the E211 K polymorphism, and the development of retinal assessment for antemortem screening for prion diseases in sheep and cattle. Dr. Greenlee obtained his DVM degree and completed the PhD/residency program in Veterinary Pathology at Iowa State University. He is a Diplomate of the American College of Veterinary Pathologists.

 


 


 

Wednesday, July 06, 2011

 

Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation

 

snip...

 

In the US, feeding of ruminant by-products to ruminants is prohibited, but feeding of ruminant materials to swine, mink and poultry still occurs. Although unlikely, the potential for swine to have access to TSE-contaminated feedstuffs exists.

 

snip...

 


 

Wednesday, July 06, 2011

 

Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation (see tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce USA...tss)

 


 

In an experimental study of the transmissibility of BSE to the pig, seven of 10 pigs, infected at 1-2 weeks of age by multiple-route parenteral inoculation with a homogenate of bovine brain from natural BSE cases developed lesions typical of spongiform encephalopathy.

 

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10684682&dopt=Abstract Title: Experimental Intracerebral and Oral Inoculation of Scrapie to Swine: Preliminary Report

 

In the United States, feeding of ruminant by-products to ruminants is prohibited, but feeding of ruminant materials to swine and poultry still occurs. The potential for swine to have access to scrapie-contaminated feedstuffs exists, but the potential for swine to serve as a host for replication/accumulation of the agent of scrapie is unknown. The purpose of this study was to perform oral and intracerebral inoculation of the U.S. scrapie agent to determine the potential of swine as a host for the scrapie agent and their clinical susceptibility. snip... snip... In the United States, feeding of ruminant by-products to ruminants is prohibited, but feeding of ruminant materials to swine and poultry still occurs. The potential for swine to have access to scrapie-contaminated feedstuffs exists, but the potential for swine to serve as a host for replication/accumulation of the agent of scrapie is unknown. The purpose of this study was to perform oral and intracerebral inoculation of the U.S. scrapie agent to determine the potential of swine as a host for the scrapie agent and their clinical susceptibility.

 

see full text and more transmission studies here ;

 


 

Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0764 for Animal Feed Regulatory Program Standards Singeltary Comment Submission

 


 


 


 

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

 

Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0764 for Animal Feed Regulatory Program Standards Singeltary Comment Submission

 


 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan.

 

*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

 


 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations

 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France

 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.

 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,

 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),

 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),

 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.

 

===============

 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***

 

===============

 


 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

 

Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions: An Update

 

Ignazio Cali1, Liuting Qing1, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang2, Diane Kofskey1,3, Nicholas Maurer1, Debbie McKenzie4, Jiri Safar1,3,5, Wenquan Zou1,3,5,6, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Qingzhong Kong1,5,6

 

1Department of Pathology, 3National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, 5Department of Neurology, 6National Center for Regenerative Medicine, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA.

 

4Department of Biological Sciences and Center for Prions and Protein Folding Diseases, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada,

 

2Encore Health Resources, 1331 Lamar St, Houston, TX 77010

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a widespread and highly transmissible prion disease in free-ranging and captive cervid species in North America. The zoonotic potential of CWD prions is a serious public health concern, but the susceptibility of human CNS and peripheral organs to CWD prions remains largely unresolved. We reported earlier that peripheral and CNS infections were detected in transgenic mice expressing human PrP129M or PrP129V. Here we will present an update on this project, including evidence for strain dependence and influence of cervid PrP polymorphisms on CWD zoonosis as well as the characteristics of experimental human CWD prions.

 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

 

In Conjunction with Asia Pacific Prion Symposium 2016

 

PRION 2016 Tokyo

 

Prion 2016

 


 

PRION 2016 TOKYO CONFERENCE

 

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

 

Taylor & Francis

 

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

 

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

 

Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,

 

Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a

 

"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France

 

Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion. Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.

 

To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.

 

These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.

 

Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 


 

Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES

 

Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period

 

Authors

 

item Comoy, Emmanuel - item Mikol, Jacqueline - item Luccantoni-Freire, Sophie - item Correia, Evelyne - item Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nathalie - item Durand, Valérie - item Dehen, Capucine - item Andreoletti, Olivier - item Casalone, Cristina - item Richt, Juergen item Greenlee, Justin item Baron, Thierry - item Benestad, Sylvie - item Hills, Bob - item Brown, Paul - item Deslys, Jean-Philippe -

 

Submitted to: Scientific Reports Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: May 28, 2015 Publication Date: June 30, 2015 Citation: Comoy, E.E., Mikol, J., Luccantoni-Freire, S., Correia, E., Lescoutra-Etchegaray, N., Durand, V., Dehen, C., Andreoletti, O., Casalone, C., Richt, J.A., Greenlee, J.J., Baron, T., Benestad, S., Brown, P., Deslys, J. 2015. Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period. Scientific Reports. 5:11573.

 

Interpretive Summary: The transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (also called prion diseases) are fatal neurodegenerative diseases that affect animals and humans. The agent of prion diseases is a misfolded form of the prion protein that is resistant to breakdown by the host cells. Since all mammals express prion protein on the surface of various cells such as neurons, all mammals are, in theory, capable of replicating prion diseases. One example of a prion disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE; also called mad cow disease), has been shown to infect cattle, sheep, exotic undulates, cats, non-human primates, and humans when the new host is exposed to feeds or foods contaminated with the disease agent. The purpose of this study was to test whether non-human primates (cynomologous macaque) are susceptible to the agent of sheep scrapie. After an incubation period of approximately 10 years a macaque developed progressive clinical signs suggestive of neurologic disease. Upon postmortem examination and microscopic examination of tissues, there was a widespread distribution of lesions consistent with a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. This information will have a scientific impact since it is the first study that demonstrates the transmission of scrapie to a non-human primate with a close genetic relationship to humans. This information is especially useful to regulatory officials and those involved with risk assessment of the potential transmission of animal prion diseases to humans.

 

Technical Abstract: Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is an animal prion disease that also causes variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. Over the past decades, c-BSE's zoonotic potential has been the driving force in establishing extensive protective measures for animal and human health.

 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.

 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.

 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.

 


 

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

 

Taylor & Francis

 

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

 

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

 

Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,

 

Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a

 

"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France

 

Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion. Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.

 

To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.

 

These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.

 

Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 


 


 

Saturday, April 23, 2016

 

Prion 2016 Tokyo Update

 

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

 

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

 


 

***UPDATE ON CWD ZOONOSIS***

 

Monday, May 02, 2016

 

*** Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions: An Update Prion 2016 Tokyo ***

 


 

*** NIH awards $11 million to UTHealth researchers to study deadly CWD prion diseases Claudio Soto, Ph.D. ***

 

Public Release: 29-Jun-2016

 


 

Monday, June 20, 2016

 

Specified Risk Materials SRMs BSE TSE Prion Program

 


 

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

 

USDA APHIS National Scrapie TSE Prion Eradication Program April 2016 Monthly Report Prion 2016 Tokyo Update

 


 

Saturday, July 23, 2016

 

*** BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, AND SRM REMOVAL UNITED STATE OF AMERICA UPDATE JULY 2016

 


 

Tuesday, July 26, 2016

 

*** Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion UPDATE JULY 2016

 


 

Friday, January 30, 2015

 

*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***

 


 

Thursday, August 04, 2016

 

*** MEETING ON THE FEASIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES ON CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE 1978 THE SCRAPIE FILES IN CONFIDENCE CONFIDENTIAL SCJD

 


 

*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of white-tailed deer were susceptible to scrapie. ***

 

I will post several links below, some of you may find interest in, others will want to disclaim it. the latest science with link source and references are all there, you will have to make your own minds up. I have wasted a third of my life chasing this damn disease. I am only vested in the truth. ...thank you, and good luck!

 

kindest regards, terry

 


 

Greetings Dr. Dagleish and Veterinary Record et al,

 

we can only pray that Europe is not lost to cwd tse prion.

 

I read with great interest, but only could read the short abstract, that is all I have access to as lay person. if you could please send me full text pdf that would be great. regardless, I wish to forward the latest from the USA, and some thoughts on where and how cwd was brought to Norway. I do know that there are no export papers needed for hay and such to be exported to Norway, and we now know there is a potential risk factor for TSE Prion and plants.

 

please see ;

 

***Recently, we have been using PMCA to study the role of environmental prion contamination on the horizontal spreading of TSEs. These experiments have focused on the study of the interaction of prions with plants and environmentally relevant surfaces. Our results show that plants (both leaves and roots) bind tightly to prions present in brain extracts and excreta (urine and feces) and retain even small quantities of PrPSc for long periods of time. Strikingly, ingestion of prioncontaminated leaves and roots produced disease with a 100% attack rate and an incubation period not substantially longer than feeding animals directly with scrapie brain homogenate. Furthermore, plants can uptake prions from contaminated soil and transport them to different parts of the plant tissue (stem and leaves). Similarly, prions bind tightly to a variety of environmentally relevant surfaces, including stones, wood, metals, plastic, glass, cement, etc. Prion contaminated surfaces efficiently transmit prion disease when these materials were directly injected into the brain of animals and strikingly when the contaminated surfaces were just placed in the animal cage. These findings demonstrate that environmental materials can efficiently bind infectious prions and act as carriers of infectivity, suggesting that they may play an important role in the horizontal transmission of the disease.

 

Since its invention 13 years ago, PMCA has helped to answer fundamental questions of prion propagation and has broad applications in research areas including the food industry, blood bank safety and human and veterinary disease diagnosis.

 


 

snip...

 

CELL REPORTS

 

Report

 

Grass Plants Bind, Retain, Uptake, and Transport Infectious Prions

 


 

PRION UPDATE VIA VEGETABLE PLANTS FROM THE SOIL

 

56. Members considered that there is no evidence that crops grown on the land which received composted excreta from BSE-challenged animals pose a TSE risk to humans or animals. One member suggested that, as some of these animals are orally challenged with high doses of BSE-infected materials, and the distribution of infectivity in the digestive system is not completely understood, it might be premature to conclude that there is no infective agent in the manure.

 

Furthermore, an unpublished study had indicated low level absorption of PrP from soil by tomato plants although it should be noted that this study had not been repeated. Details of this work would be sent to the SEAC Secretary. Dr Matthews explained that most of the manure from animals challenged with high doses of BSE had already been composted and used for coppicing. Members agreed that the risks from disposal of residual manure from experimental animals would be much less than historic risks of on farm contamination from naturally infected animals at the height of the BSE epidemic. ...SNIP...END

 


 

SRM are certain cattle tissues capable of transmitting BSE. There is no human health risk assessment to indicate the absence of human health concerns associated with use of composted SRM domestically. To date, scientific evidence has not been able to demonstrate that composting destroys prions. Although domestic use would pose a negligible risk to livestock, there is a potential risk to humans via direct ingestion of the compost or of compost particles adhered to skin or plant material (e.g. carrots). Another potential route of exposure is by ingestion of prions that have been taken up by plants. It has been proven that bacteria are readily taken up by some plants (e.g. E. coli in lettuce) thus the uptake of prions by plants cannot be precluded or dismissed at this time. As a science-based regulator, the CFIA cannot change the policy on this issue without a risk assessment demonstrating that the use of composted SRM poses an acceptable risk to humans.

 


 

The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 19B (supplementary) Dr Alan Colchester Issued 06/08/1999 (not scheduled to give oral evidence) SECOND STATEMENT TO THE BSE INQUIRY Dr A Colchester BA BM BCh PhD FRCP Reader in Neurosciences & Computing, University of Kent at Canterbury; Consultant Neurologist, Guy’s Hospital London and William Harvey Hospital Ashford April 1999

 

snip...

 

88. Natural decay: Infectivity persists for a long time in the environment. A study by Palsson in 1979 showed how scrapie was contracted by healthy sheep, after they had grazed on land which had previously been grazed by scrapie-infected sheep, even though the land had lain fallow for three years before the healthy sheep were introduced. Brown also quoted an early experiment of his own (1991), where he had buried scrapie-infected hamster brain and found that he could still detect substantial infectivity three years later near where the material had been placed. 89. Potential environmental routes of infection: Brown discusses the various possible scenarios, including surface or subsurface deposits of TSE-contaminated material, which would lead to a build-up of long-lasting infectivity. Birds feeding on animal remains (such as gulls visiting landfill sites) could disperse infectivity. Other animals could become vectors if they later grazed on contaminated land. "A further question concerns the risk of contamination of the surrounding water table or even surface water channels, by effluents and discarded solid wastes from treatment plants. A reasonable conclusion is that there is a potential for human infection to result from environmental contamination by BSE-infected tissue residues. The potential cannot be quantified because of the huge numbers of uncertainties and assumptions that attend each stage of the disposal process". These comments, from a long established authority on TSEs, closely echo my own statements which were based on a recent examination of all the evidence. 90. Susceptibility: It is likely that transmissibility of the disease to humans in vivo is probably low, because sheep that die from scrapie and cattle that die from BSE are probably a small fraction of the exposed population. However, no definitive data are available.

 

91. Recommendations for disposal procedures: Brown recommends that material which is actually or potentially contaminated by BSE should be: 1) exposed to caustic soda; 2) thoroughly incinerated under carefully inspected conditions; and 3) that any residue should be buried in landfill, to a depth which would minimise any subsequent animal or human exposure, in areas that would not intersect with any potable water-table source.

 

92. This review and recommendations from Brown have particular importance. Brown is one of the world's foremost authorities on TSEs and is a senior researcher in the US National Institutes of Health (NIH). It is notable that such a respected authority is forthright in acknowledging the existence of potential risks, and in identifying the appropriate measures necessary to safeguard public health. Paper by SM Cousens, L Linsell, PG Smith, Dr M Chandrakumar, JW Wilesmith, RSG Knight, M Zeidler, G Stewart, RG Will, "Geographical distribution of variant CJD in the UK (excluding Northern Ireland)". Lancet 353:18-21, 2 nd January 1999 93. The above paper {Appendix 41 (02/01/99)} (J/L/353/18) examined the possibility that patients with vCJD (variant CJD) might live closer to rendering factories than would be expected by chance. All 26 cases of vCJD in the UK with onset up to 31 st August 1998 were studied. The incubation period of vCJD is not known but by analogy with other human TSEs could lie within the range 5-25 years. If vCJD had arisen by exposure to rendering products, such exposure might plausibly have occurred 8-10 years before the onset of symptoms. The authors were able to obtain the addresses of all rendering plants in the UK which were in production in 1988. For each case of vCJD, the distance from the place of residence on 1st January 1998 to the nearest rendering plant was calculated

 

snip...

 


 

Friday, February 08, 2013

 

*** Behavior of Prions in the Environment: Implications for Prion Biology

 


 


 

snip...

 

***SO, my question, why is it the OIE and other trade officials and policy making there from, knowing that the USA and Canada, with not a clue about Mexico, why is it that nobody has Declared an EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY DUE TO A FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD IN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AMERICA ?

 

well, since no one else will, than I must.

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Declares a DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY DUE TO A FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD IN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AMERICA.

 

The elephant in the room I was speaking of that we all have missed was the feed, yes we all know of ruminant and non ruminant protein and risk factors there from with TSE Prion disease, but we missed the rest of the feed i.e. FEED GRAINS. YES, science has shown in the past, and now recently, the shedding of the CWD TSE Prion into the environment is indeed a risk factor, and for all the grains and such that goes into feed, even hay, hell, Norway does not require any APHIS-Veterinary Services certification for the import of hay/straw. see for yourself ;

 

Hay/Straw

 

Norway does not require any APHIS-Veterinary Services certification for the import of hay/straw.

 


 

you add up all the other grains in feed, and then wonder about exposure to the CWD TSE PRION from cervid and risk factor from the CWD there from via shedding or right down to the soil these grains were grown in, and you have a world of problems. see ;

 

Feed Grains Data: Yearbook Tables Created March 10, 2016 Updates of this data, and data covering more years and countries, can be found at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-yearbook-tables.aspx U.S. Acreage, Production, Yield, and Farm Price Table 1--Corn, sorghum, barley, and oats: Planted acreage, harvested acreage, production, yield, and farm price World Production, Supply, and Disappearance Table 2--Foreign coarse grains: Supply and disappearance Table 3--Feed grains (corn, sorghum, barley, and oats): Supply and disappearance U.S. Supply and Disappearance Table 4--Corn: Supply and disappearance Table 5--Sorghum: Supply and disappearance Table 6--Barley: Supply and disappearance Table 7--Oats: Supply and disappearance U.S. Production, Yield, and Stocks Table 8--Hay: Production, harvested acreage, yield, and stocks Domestic and International Prices Table 9--Corn and sorghum: Average prices received by farmers, United States Table 10--Barley and oats: Average prices received by farmers, United States Table 11--Hay: Average prices received by farmers, United States Table 12--Corn: Cash prices at principal markets Table 13--Sorghum: Cash prices at principal markets Table 14--Barley and oats: Cash prices at principal markets Table 15--Feed-price ratios for livestock, poultry, and milk Table 16--Byproduct feeds: Average wholesale price, bulk, specified markets Table 17--Processed corn products: Quoted market prices Exports and Imports Table 18--U.S. corn and sorghum exports Table 19--U.S. barley and oats exports Table 20--U.S. corn and sorghum imports Table 21--U.S. barley and oats imports Table 22--U.S. corn and sorghum exports by selected destinations Table 23--U.S. barley and oats exports by selected destinations Table 24--U.S. corn and sorghum imports by selected sources Table 25--U.S. barley and oats imports by selected sources Table 26--U.S. white corn exports by selected destinations Table 27--World coarse grain trade: Selected exporters and importers by commodity Rail rates and shipments Table 28--Rail rates and grain shipments Processed feeds and animal unit indexes Table 29--Processed feeds: Quantities fed and feed per grain-consuming animal unit Table 30--Indexes of feed consuming animal units Feed, seed, and industrial uses Table 31—Corn: Feed, seed, and industrial uses Exports and imports for ethyl alcohol and brewers’ and distillers’ dregs and waste Table 32—U.S. exports of ethyl alcohol by selected destinations Table 33—U.S. imports of ethyl alcohol by selected sources Table 34—U.S. exports of brewers’ and distillers’ dregs and waste by selected commodities Table 35—U.S. imports of brewers’ and distillers’ dregs and waste by selected sources Contact: Thomas Capehart at tcapehart+A25@ers.usda.gov

 


 

‘’The statement you were concerned about was corrected to "One sorghum DDGS out of 168 DG samples was contaminated with animal protein prohibited for use in ruminant feed and was channeled to poultry feed."

 

Subject: Re: TEXAS CONFIRMATION OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION IN ONE SAMPLE OF SORGHUM DDGS OUT OF 168 DG SAMPLES

 

***UDATED CORRECTION BY AUTHOR...SEE EMAIL TO ME...terry

 

From: Kyung-Min Lee Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2015 1:39 PM To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. ; BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG Cc: CJD-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG ; cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com ; bloodcjd@yahoogroups.com ; jcattanach@foodprotection.org ; cnc3@psu.edu ; dloynachan@foodprotection.org ; lhovey@foodprotection.org ; Timothy J. Herrman Subject: RE: TEXAS CONFIRMATION OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION IN ONE SAMPLE OF SORGHUM DDGS OUT OF 168 DG SAMPLES

 

Dear Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Thank for your interest and concern about our published article entitled “Evaluation of Selected Nutrients and Contaminants in Distillers Grains from Ethanol Production in Texas”. I should apologize you and others that there were some errors and misleading statements in this article due to inappropriate terminology. The statement you were concerned about was corrected to "One sorghum DDGS out of 168 DG samples was contaminated with animal protein prohibited for use in ruminant feed and was channeled to poultry feed." We requested the journal editor to correct some errors and the relevant statements, or to withdraw the article from the journal.

 

Again I sincerely apologize for any confusion and inconvenience this may cause. Thanks.

 

best wishes,

 

Kyung-Min

 

Kyung-Min Lee, Ph. D. Research Scientist Office of the Texas State Chemist

 

Texas A&M AgriLife Research P.O. Box 3160, College Station, TX 77841-3160 Phone: 979-845-4113 (ext 132) Email:kml@otsc.tamu.edu Fax: 979-845-1389

 

snip...end...tss

 

my link corrected

 

Sunday, September 27, 2015

 

TEXAS CONFIRMATION OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION IN ONE SAMPLE OF SORGHUM DDGS OUT OF 168 DG SAMPLES

 


 

kind regards, terry

 

Subject: Fw: TEXAS CONFIRMATION OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION IN ONE SAMPLE OF SORGHUM DDGS OUT OF 168 DG SAMPLES

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Sent: Sunday, September 27, 2015 4:39 PM To: BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG Cc: CJD-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG ; cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com ; bloodcjd@yahoogroups.com ; jcattanach@foodprotection.org ; cnc3@psu.edu ; dloynachan@foodprotection.org ; lhovey@foodprotection.org ; kml@otsc.tamu.edu Subject: TEXAS CONFIRMATION OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION IN ONE SAMPLE OF SORGHUM DDGS OUT OF 168 DG SAMPLES

 

TEXAS One sorghum DDGS sample out of 168 DG samples was contaminated with bovine spongiform encephalopathy, but the transmission route of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent could not be clearly defined.

 

J Food Prot. 2015 Oct;78(10):1861-9. doi: 10.4315/0362-028X.JFP-15-157.

 

Evaluation of Selected Nutrients and Contaminants in Distillers Grains from Ethanol Production in Texas.

 

Lee KM1, Herrman TJ2. Author information 1Office of the Texas State Chemist, Texas A&M AgriLife Research, Texas A&M University System, College Station, Texas 77841, USA. kml@otsc.tamu.edu. 2Office of the Texas State Chemist, Texas A&M AgriLife Research, Texas A&M University System, College Station, Texas 77841, USA.

 

Abstract

 

This study evaluated distillers grain (DG) by-products produced in different ethanol plants and supplemented in animal diets in Texas, based on samples analyzed from 2008 to 2014. The samples were assessed for concentration, occurrence, and prevalence of selected nutrients and contaminants. Protein and sulfur contents of DG were largely different between corn and sorghum by-products as well as wet distillers grain with solubles and dry distillers grain with solubles (DDGS), indicating a significant effect of grain feedstock and dry-grind process stream on DG composition and quality. Salmonella was isolated in 4 DDGS samples out of a total of 157 DG samples, a percentage (2.5%) that is much lower than the percentage of Salmonella-positive samples found in other feed samples analyzed during the same period. A small amount of virginiamycin residue was found in 24 corn DDGS, 1 corn wet distillers grain with solubles, and 2 sorghum DDGS samples out of 242 samples in total. One sorghum DDGS sample out of 168 DG samples was contaminated with bovine spongiform encephalopathy, but the transmission route of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent could not be clearly defined. The concentrations of aflatoxin and fumonisin DG by-products averaged 3.4 μg/kg and 0.7 mg/kg, respectively. Among contaminated corn DG samples, five DDGS samples for aflatoxin contained a higher concentration than the U.S. Food and Drug Administration action level for use in animal feed, whereas no sample for fumonisin was found above the action level. The study results raised some important issues associated with the quality and use of DG by-products, suggesting several approaches and strategies for their effective and safe use as a feed ingredient to promote animal and human health and welfare.

 

PMID: 26408135 [PubMed - in process]

 


 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Declares a DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY DUE TO A FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD IN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AMERICA.

 

it’s time someone steps up to the plate (OIE ...LMAO!), and declare an extraordinary emergency for foreign animal disease due to Chronic Wasting Disease or Cervid Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease from the United States of America, Canada, and Mexico i.e. North America, before this damn disease is spread to hell and back, and you can just throw in there BSE and Scrapie just for grins. ...and I ain’t grinning Sad smile OIE, you have floundered too long with mad cow type TSE Prion disease...

 

snip...see full text ;

 


 

Tuesday, August 02, 2016

 

*** Chronic wasting disease of deer – is the battle to keep Europe free already lost?

 


 

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

 

The first detection of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in Europe free-ranging reindeer from the Nordfjella population in South-Norway.

 


 

Tuesday, June 14, 2016

 

*** Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in a moose from Selbu in Sør-Trøndelag Norway ***

 


 

Thursday, July 07, 2016

 

Norway reports a third case Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in 2nd Norwegian moose

 

14/06/2016 - Norway reports a third case

 


 

Saturday, July 16, 2016

 

Chronic wasting Disease in Deer (CWD or Spongiform Encephalopathy) The British Deer Society 07/04/2016

 

Red Deer Ataxia or Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PRION?

 

could this have been cwd in the UK back in 1970’S ???

 


 


 


 


 

SEE FULL TEXT ;

 


 

Saturday, July 09, 2016

 

Texas Intrastate – within state movement of all Cervid or Trucking Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Moratorium

 


 

Wednesday, July 27, 2016

 

Arkansas CWD 101 positive cases documented to date, Biologists to take additional samples in in southern Pope County, Aug. 1-5

 


 

Friday, July 01, 2016

 

*** TEXAS Thirteen new cases of chronic wasting disease (CWD) were confirmed at a Medina County captive white-tailed deer breeding facility on June 29, 2016***

 


 

*** How Did CWD Get Way Down In Medina County, Texas?

 

DISCUSSION Observations of natural outbreaks of scrapie indicated that the disease spread from flock to flock by the movement of infected, but apparently normal, sheep which were incubating the disease.

 

There was no evidence that the disease spread to adjacent flocks in the absent of such movements or that vectors or other host species were involved in the spread of scrapie to sheep or goats; however, these possibilities should be kept open...

 


 


 


 

Tuesday, August 02, 2016

 

TEXAS TPWD Sets Public Hearings on Deer Movement Rule Proposals in Areas with CWD Rule Terry S. Singeltary Sr. comment submission

 


 

Friday, July 29, 2016

 

IOWA CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION TOTAL TO DATE 304 CASES WILD AND CAPTIVE REPORT UPDATE JULY 2016

 


 

Friday, August 05, 2016

 

MINNESOTA CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING CWD TSE PRION UPDATE

 


 

Friday, February 05, 2016

 

*** Report of the Committee on Wildlife Diseases FY2015 CWD TSE PRION Detections in Farmed Cervids and Wild ***

 


 

Sunday, May 08, 2016

 

WISCONSIN CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION SPIRALING FURTHER INTO THE ABYSS UPDATE

 


 

Sunday, July 17, 2016

 

*** CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION GLOBAL REPORT UPDATE JULY 17 2016 ***

 


 

Saturday, May 28, 2016

 

*** Infection and detection of PrPCWD in soil from CWD infected farm in Korea Prion 2016 Tokyo ***

 


 

Saturday, July 16, 2016

 

Importation of Sheep, Goats, and Certain Other Ruminants [Docket No. APHIS-2009-0095]RIN 0579-AD10

 

WITH great disgust and concern, I report to you that the OIE, USDA, APHIS, are working to further legalize the trading of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Pion disease around the globe.

 

THIS is absolutely insane. it’s USDA INC.

 


 

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

 

Thursday, August 4, 2016

 

Secretary's Advisory Committee on Animal Health [Docket No. APHIS-2016-0046] TSE PRION DISEASE

 


 

USDA BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, FEED, TESTING, SRM FIREWALLS...LMAO!

 

THE USDA FDA TRIPLE MAD COW DISEASE FIREWALL, WERE NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER !

 

infamous august 4, 1997 BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, part of usda fda et al TRIPLE MAD COW FIREWALL, 10 YEARS AFTER ;

 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

 

___________________________________

 

PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007 CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified. RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

2013

 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

*** Monday, October 26, 2015 ***

 

*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE October 2015 ***

 


 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV

 

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

 

PRODUCT

 

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

477.72 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.

 

Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

1,484 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TN and WV

 


 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS

 

Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

Approximately 2,223 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

1,220 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

40 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

LA and MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

7,150 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

87 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

350 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL and MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

 

CODE

 

All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

7,541-50 lb bags

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL, GA, MS, and TN

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

 

###

 


 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs

 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6

 

CODE

 

All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

27,694,240 lbs

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

MI

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

 

###

 


 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

 

PRODUCT

 

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6

 

CODE

 

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

125 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL and FL

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

 

###

 


 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6

 

CODE None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

?????

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

 

###

 


 

CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS

 

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

 

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22

 

71.248.128.67

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

10,878.06 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

Nationwide

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

 

###

 


 

Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006

 

Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST

 

Public Health Service

 

Food and Drug Administration

 

New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217

 

Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391

 

May 17, 2006

 

WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06

 

FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

 

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204

 

Dear Mr. Shirley:

 

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

 

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

 

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.

 

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

 

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.

 

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

 

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.

 

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

 

Sincerely,

 

/S

 

Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District

 


 

SINCE THE LAST TIME I REPORTED :

 

Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005

 

Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST

 

YOU can see that report at the bottom of this update.

 

UPDATEs AS FOLLOWS ;

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006

 

snip...

 

Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Large HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS

 

On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO

 

On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

 

snip...

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

Table 6. Administrative Actions: Small HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

 

BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 6/2/06 6/5/06 X 9/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

 

GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY 01248 M01248 P LINCOLN, MT 3/24/06 4/14/06 X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X 8/15/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

GIBSON PACKING COMPANY 05843 M05843 P SEYMOUR, MO 9/21/06 X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli). The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

 

HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X 9/26/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 7/5/06 X 8/11/06 On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X 7/25/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 


 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006

 

Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (4/01/06 to 6/30/06)

 

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On

 

12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

 

snip...

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 4/13/06 4/19/06 X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli).

 

6/2/06 6/5/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

???

 

3/24/06 4/14/06

 

X

 

The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

C & C MEAT SALES, INC., 18494 M18494 P, DURHAM, NC ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.

 

snip...

 

FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X 4/13/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

FRONTIER FOODS & COLD STORAGE, INC 20741 M20741 P EL PASO, TX 5/31/06 X On 6/8/06, DM closed case by firm’s requested voluntary withdrawal. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X 5/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 X On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

SAVORY CONNECTION, INC., 31764 M31764 P, SELINGSGROVE, PA. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.

 

snip...

 

STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NE. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.

 

snip...

 

THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X 4/4/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X 5/4/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 


 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006

 

Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)

 

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X 3/13/06 On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

EXCEL CORP. 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 8/11/04 2/22/05 X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

 

snip...

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M 3/12/04 3/18/04 X

 

LEXINGTON, NE

 

X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

GULF PACKING COMPANY, 00696 M00696 P, SAN BENITO, TX, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY, 01248 M01248 P, LINCOLN, MT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

HITCHIN POST STEAK COMPANY, 20773 M20773 P, KANSAS CITY, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO., 09150 M09150 P, FAIRBURY, NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)

 

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 21562 M ORD. NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

ALTA VISTA LOCKER 31931 M ALTA VISTA, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

C&C MEAT SALES, INC. 18494 M18494 P UPPER MARLBORO, MD 2/27/06 3/16/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X 3/6/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X 1/13/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, L.L.C. 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X 2/9/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

SAVORY CONNECTION, INC. 31764 M31764 P SELINGSGROVE, PA 3/14/06 3/31/06 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NW, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

TEARS MARKET, 04535 M04535 P, PENN YAN, NY, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

THE MEAT SHOP, 31561 M BENSON, VT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P, LEWISTON, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P, GRANTSVILLE, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

 

snip...

 

WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 

WILLIAM. G. MEST PACKING CO. 04431 M STRYKERSVILLE, NY 2/2/06 2/23/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. On 3/21/06, NOIE was modified and reissued. On 6/29/06, NOIE was rescinded.

 

YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X 2/23/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

snip...

 


 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005

 

SRM REMOVAL USA

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005

 

snip....

 

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X X On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

 

00245L M LEXINGTON, NE 3/12/04 3/18/04 X 5/4/05 X X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

9/16/05 9/29/05 X X TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. X X 00245D M EMPORIA, KS On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

 

DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 7/20/05 8/1/05 X X 12/29/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 9/1/05 9/20/05 X X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 21562 M concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

ALTA VISTA LOCKER 10/5/05 10/26/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a 31931 M basis, failure of the establishment toALTA VISTA, KS comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 8/8/05 8/16/05 X X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

CHAMPLAIN BEEF INC 2/28/05 3/4/05 3/8/05 X X X 08547 M WHITEHALL, NY 10/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

FIVE STAR PACK INC. 9/1/05 9/9/05 X X 12/29/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 08725 M08725 P concerning failure to meet regulatory GOLDEN CITY, MO requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. FRESH FARMS BEEF 12/16/05 12/28/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a 18579 M basis, failure of the establishment toRUTLAND, VT comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

GOETZ AND SONS WESTERN 11/15/05 11/23/05 12/1/05 X X MEATS INC 06245 M06245 P EVERETT, WA 12/17/05 12/28/05 X X X On 12/17/05, firm violated a regulatory control action by selling U.S.D.A retained product.

 

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 7/28/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 7/26/05 7/29/05 X X 11/15/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

S & S MEAT COMPANY 01046 M01046 P KANSAS CITY, MO 8/4/05 8/19/05 X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

STEAK MASTER 21159 M21159 P ELWOOD, NE 11/4/05 11/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/27/05 7/29/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P GRANTSVILLE, UT 7/25/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

WALNUT VALLEY PACKING LLC 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

 

full text 54 pages ;

 


 

Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST

 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 07/27/05 08/01/05 X On 7/27/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

MONTEBELLO MEAT PROCESSING, INC 19075 M19075 P MANATI, PR 08/01/05 08/18/05 X 09/26/05 On 8/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

snip...

 

Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (7/01/05 to 9/30/05)

 

snip...

 

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 09/01/05 09/20/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action

 

21562 M

 

concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli X X X Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 08/08/05 08/16/05 X On 8/8/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

FIVE STAR PACK INC. 08725 M08725 P GOLDEN CITY, MO 09/01/05 09/09/05 X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 07/28/05 08/08/05 08/17/05 08/19/05 X X On 8/17/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

 

snip...

 

HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 07/28/05 08/01/05 X On 7/28/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 07/26/05 07/29/05 X X On 7/26/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

 

snip...

 

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 09/21/05 X On 9/21/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31792 M31792 P WAUKON, IA 09/06/05 09/12/05 X On 9/6/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 07/01/05 07/28/05 X On 7/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

snip...

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

08/04/05

 

08/19/05

 

On 8/4/05,

 

an enforcement action 01046 M01046 P concerning Bovine SpongiformKANSAS CITY, MO X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

 

snip...

 

THE MEAT SHOP 08/18/05 09/06/05

 

09/09/05

 

On 9/6/05, a suspension action 31561 M concerning Bovine SpongiformBENSON, VT Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. XX X X X

 

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, 07/27/05 07/29/05

 

On 7/27/05, a suspension action INC concerning Bovine Spongiform31647 M31647 P Encephalopathy and Specified Risk X X

 

LEWISTON, UT Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

 

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 07/25/05 08/01/05

 

On 7/25/05, a suspension action 20594 M20594 Pconcerning Bovine Spongiform

 

GRANTSVILLE, UT X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

 

snip...

 

52 pages

 


 

PREVIOUS

 


 


 


 

P.9.21

 

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

 

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

 

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

 

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.

 

Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

 

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. ***It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan.

 

*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

 


 

SEE THE DRASTIC REDUCTION OF CONFIRMED BSE CASES IN THE UK ONCE THE FEED BAN TOOK HOLD FROM THE TOP YEAR DOWN TO THE FIRST ZERO YEAR ;

 

1992 36680 SLAUGHTERED SUSPECTS IN WHICH BSE CONFIRMED

 

2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

 


 


 


 


 


 

Saturday, January 31, 2015

 

RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to BSE

 


 

In the USA, USDA et al sometimes serves SRM’s up as appetizers or horderves.

 

Thursday, November 28, 2013

 

Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows

 


 

seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse), not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???

 

Saturday, September 21, 2013

 

Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT

 


 

DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???

 

this recall was not for the welfare of the animals. ...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)

 


 

try this link ;

 


 

Sunday, November 13, 2011

 

*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock

 


 

Wednesday, March 2, 2016

 

RANCHO He did not know that they were placing healthy cow heads next to suspect carcasses BSE TSE Prion

 


 

Sunday, June 14, 2015

 

Larry’s Custom Meats Inc. Recalls Beef Tongue Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials BSE TSE Prion

 


 

Thursday, June 12, 2014

 

Missouri Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials 4,012 pounds of fresh beef products because the dorsal root ganglia may not have been completely removed

 


 

Saturday, November 10, 2012

 

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues

 


 

Saturday, July 23, 2011

 

CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE

 


 

Sunday, October 18, 2009

 

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009

 


 

Thursday, October 15, 2009

 

Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009

 


 

Thursday, June 26, 2008

 

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

 


 

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

 

Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs

 


 

Friday, August 8, 2008

 

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

 


 

Saturday, April 5, 2008

 

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

 


 

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

 

Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings

 


 

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

 

Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings

 


 

Friday, October 15, 2010

 

BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle

 


 

Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr.

 

The is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products

 

For related information, Open Docket Folder

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Show agency attachment(s) AttachmentsView All (0)

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Comment View document:Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;

 

I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

 

North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

 

typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$

 

the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.

 

for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

 

lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.

 

Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

 

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

 

Country/Year

 

snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS No documents available. AttachmentsView All (1) Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:

 


 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. submission ;

 


 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 

Posted: 12/30/2014ID: APHIS-2014-0107-0001

 


 

Notice: Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass Management

 

Document ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0001 Docket ID: APHIS-2013-0044 Comment ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0002

 


 

(APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program (Document ID APHIS-2011-0032-0001)

 


 

Owens, Julie

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

 

To: FSIS RegulationsComments

 

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98

 


 

FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY Harvard BSE Risk Assessment ?

 


 

From:Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

Sent:Thursday, September 08, 2005 6:17 PM

 

To:fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov

 

Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

 


 

APHIS-2006-0118-0096 CWD

 


 

DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 0500 EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1

 


 


 

PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT SUBMISSION ;

 


 

*** 2001 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. comment submission ***

 


 

when USDA inc. contracts out for someone to pick up suspect BSE mad cow cattle heads for testing, you would hope they would be from suspect BSE mad cow cattle. NOT WITH THE USDA INC., they hired someone to pick up HEALTHY CATTLE THEY KNEW DID NOT HAVE MAD COW DISEASE BSE TO BE TESTED FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE.

 

Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

 

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

 

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

 

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

 

snip...

 

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

 

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

 

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

 

snip...

 

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

 

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

 


 

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

 

U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

 

WHERE did we go wrong $$$

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-129.ipset18.wt.net)

 

Subject: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book Date: March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm PST

 

BSE Red Book 2.1-35

 

7.0 Emergency Operations

 

The section below would be implemented only after a first case of BSE is confirmed in the United States.

 

7.1 READEO Activation

 

Prelimanary Notification

 

The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours

 


 

IT TOOK 7 MONTHS AND AN ACT OF CONGRESS TO GET THIS 2ND TEXAS BSE MAD COW CONFIRMED !

 

now, someone please tell me why I should expect anything different with Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion testing in Texas $$$

 

the good old boy system is still alive and well in Texas i.e. shoot, shovel, and shut the hell up i.e. SSS POLICY...

 

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

 

MAD COW DISEASE USA 4TH CASE DOCUMENTED ATYPICAL BSE CALIFORNIA

 


 

Wednesday, April 25, 2012

 

4th MAD COW DISEASE U.S.A. CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE 2012

 


 

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

 


 

Thursday, April 26, 2012

 

FDA Statement on USDA Announcement of Positive BSE Test Result For Immediate Release: April 26, 2012

 


 

Monday, June 23, 2014

 

PRION 2014 TYPICAL AND ATYPICAL BSE AND CJD REPORT UPDATES

 

***P.170: Potential detection of oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle using in vitro conversion

 

Sandor Dudas, John G Gray, Renee Clark, and Stefanie Czub Canadian Food Inspection Agency; Lethbridge, AB Canada

 

Keywords: Atypical BSE, oral transmission, RT-QuIC

 

The detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has had a significant negative impact on the cattle industry worldwide. In response, governments took actions to prevent transmission and additional threats to animal health and food safety. While these measures seem to be effective for controlling classical BSE, the more recently discovered atypical BSE has presented a new challenge. To generate data for risk assessment and control measures, we have challenged cattle orally with atypical BSE to determine transmissibility and mis-folded prion (PrPSc) tissue distribution. Upon presentation of clinical symptoms, animals were euthanized and tested for characteristic histopathological changes as well as PrPSc deposition.

 

The H-type challenged animal displayed vacuolation exclusively in rostral brain areas but the L-type challenged animal showed no evidence thereof. To our surprise, neither of the animals euthanized, which were displaying clinical signs indicative of BSE, showed conclusive mis-folded prion accumulation in the brain or gut using standard molecular or immunohistochemical assays. To confirm presence or absence of prion infectivity, we employed an optimized real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC) assay developed at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory, Hamilton, USA.

 

Detection of PrPSc was unsuccessful for brain samples tests from the orally inoculated L type animal using the RT-QuIC. It is possible that these negative results were related to the tissue sampling locations or that type specific optimization is needed to detect PrPSc in this animal. We were however able to consistently detect the presence of mis-folded prions in the brain of the H-type inoculated animal. Considering the negative and inconclusive results with other PrPSc detection methods, positive results using the optimized RT-QuIC suggests the method is extremely sensitive for H-type BSE detection. This may be evidence of the first successful oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle and additional investigation of samples from these animals are ongoing.

 

P.126: Successful transmission of chronic wasting disease (CWD) into mice over-expressing bovine prion protein (TgSB3985)

 

Larisa Cervenakova,1 Christina J Sigurdson,2 Pedro Piccardo,3 Oksana Yakovleva,1 Irina Vasilyeva,1 Jorge de Castro,1 Paula Saá,1 and Anton Cervenak1 1American Red Cross, Holland Laboratory; Rockville, MD USA; 2University of California; San Diego, CA USA; 3Lab TSE/OBRR /CBER/FDA; Rockville, MD USA

 

Keywords: chronic wasting disease, transmission, transgenic mouse, bovine prion protein

 

Background. CWD is a disease affecting wild and farmraised cervids in North America. Epidemiological studies provide no evidence of CWD transmission to humans. Multiple attempts have failed to infect transgenic mice expressing human PRNP gene with CWD. The extremely low efficiency of PrPCWD to convert normal human PrPC in vitro provides additional evidence that transmission of CWD to humans cannot be easily achieved. However, a concern about the risk of CWD transmission to humans still exists. This study aimed to establish and characterize an experimental model of CWD in TgSB3985 mice with the following attempt of transmission to TgHu mice.

 

Materials and Methods. TgSB3985 mice and wild-type FVB/ NCrl mice were intracranially injected with 1% brain homogenate from a CWD-infected Tga20 mouse (CWD/Tga20). TgSB3985 and TgRM (over-expressing human PrP) were similarly injected with 5% brain homogenates from CWD-infected white-tailed deer (CWD/WTD) or elk (CWD/Elk). Animals were observed for clinical signs of neurological disease and were euthanized when moribund. Brains and spleens were removed from all mice for PrPCWD detection by Western blotting (WB). A histological analysis of brains from selected animals was performed: brains were scored for the severity of spongiform change, astrogliosis, and PrPCWD deposition in ten brain regions.

 

Results. Clinical presentation was consistent with TSE. More than 90% of TgSB3985 and wild-type mice infected with CWD/Tga20, tested positive for PrPres in the brain but only mice in the latter group carried PrPCWD in their spleens. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of two CWD/ Tga20 strains based on biochemical and histological profiles. In TgSB3985 mice infected with CWD-elk or CWD-WTD, no animals tested positive for PrPCWD in the brain or in the spleen by WB. However, on neuropathological examination we found presence of amyloid plaques that stained positive for PrPCWD in three CWD/WTD- and two CWD/Elk-infected TgSB3985 mice. The neuropathologic profiles in CWD/WTD- and CWD/Elkinfected mice were similar but unique as compared to profiles of BSE, BSE-H or CWD/Tg20 agents propagated in TgSB3985 mice. None of CWD-infected TgRM mice tested positive for PrPCWD by WB or by immunohistochemical detection.

 

Conclusions. To our knowledge, this is the first established experimental model of CWD in TgSB3985. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of two CWD strains adapted to Tga20 mice and their replication in TgSB3985 mice. Finally, we observed phenotypic differences between cervid-derived CWD and CWD/Tg20 strains upon propagation in TgSB3985 mice. Further studies are underway to characterize these strains.

 

P.150: Zoonotic potential of L-type BSE prions: A new prion disease in humans?

 

Emilie Jaumain,1 Stéphane Haïk,2 Isabelle Quadrio,3 Laetitia Herzog,1 Fabienne Reine,1 Armand Perret-Liaudet,3 Human Rezaei,1 Hubert Laude,1 Jean-Luc Vilotte,4 and Vincent Béringue1 1INR A (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique); UR892; Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires; Jouy-en-Josas, France; 2IN SERM; Equipe maladie d’Alzheimer et maladies à Prions; CRicm; UMRS 1127; CNR S; UPMC. R.; ICM, Hôpital de la Salpêtrière; Paris, France; 3Neurobiologie, CMRR , Gériatrie, Hospices Civils de Lyon, Université Lyon 1-CNR S UMR5292-IN SERM U1028; Lyon, France; 3INR A; UMR1313; Génétique Animale et Biologie Intégrative; Jouy-en-Josas, France

 

In summary, L-type prions can be passaged on the human PrP sequence without any obvious transmission barrier. The phenotype obtained differs from the classical CJD prion types known so far. Careful extrapolation would suggest that the zoonotic transmission of this agent could establish a new prion disease type in humans.

 


 

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

 

PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus

 

Nadine Mestre-Frances,1 Simon Nicot,2 Sylvie Rouland,1 Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe,2 Isabelle Quadrio,3 Armand Perret-Liaudet,3 Thierry Baron,2 Jean-Michel Verdier1

 

1IN SER M UM2; Montpellier, France; 2Anses; Lyon, France; 3Hopitaux Civils de Lyon; Lyon, France

 

Here, we demonstrate that the L-BSE agent can be transmitted by oral route from cattle to young and adult mouse lemurs. In comparison to IC inoculated animals, orally challenged lemurs were characterized by longer survival periods as expected with this route of infection.

 


 

P04.27

 

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

 

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

 

Background:

 

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

 

Aims:

 

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

 

Methods:

 

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

 

Results:

 

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

 

Conclusions:

 

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

 

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

 


 

>>> Both of the atypical BSE subtypes are believed to occur spontaneously,<<<

 

LOL!

 

SPONTANEOUS ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

 

***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

 


 

Atypical BSE...Spontaneous...LOL

 

BSE identified in France

 

​Posted May 2, 2016

 

A cow in northern France has been confirmed to have bovine spongiform encephalopathy, according to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).

 

The cow had developed partial paralysis and was euthanized March 1, a March 25 OIE report states.

 

BSE is a fatal neurologic prion disease with a typical incubation period of four to five years. The cow in France was almost 5 years old.

 

The affected cow had the classic form of BSE, which is most often associated with feed containing neurologic tissue from infected animals. It is distinct from atypical BSE, which may develop spontaneously, according to information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

 

Investigators were trying to identify the source of infection and other animals at risk for BSE at the time the report was published.

 


 

The affected bovine, a Salers female born on April, 8th 2011, showed paresis and was euthanized on March, 1st 2016. Samples made on March, 4th 2016 during rendering were analyzed at the Department Laboratory of La Somme. The rapid test proved positive on March, 8th 2016 and the samples were then sent for further analysis to the National Reference Laboratory, ANSES, which confirmed a case of classical BSE on March, 21st 2016. The European Union Reference Laboratory confirmed those results on the basis of documentation on March, 23rd 2016.

 


 

>>> It is distinct from atypical BSE, which may develop spontaneously, according to information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

 

THIS IS A MYTH $$$

 

***atypical spontaneous BSE in France LOL***

 

FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$

 

***so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

 

Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

Thursday, March 24, 2016

 

FRANCE CONFIRMS BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE MAD COW (ESB) chez une vache dans les Ardennes

 


 

***atypical spontaneous BSE in France LOL***

 

FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$

 

If you Compare France to other Countries with atypical BSE, in my opinion, you cannot explain this with ‘spontaneous’.

 

Table 1: Number of Atypical BSE cases reported by EU Member States in the period 2001–2014 by country and by type (L- and H-BSE) (extracted from EU BSE databases on 1 July 2014). By 2015, these data might be more comprehensive following a request from the European Commission to Member States for re-testing and retrospective classification of all positive bovine isolates in the EU in the years 2003–2009

 

BSE type

 

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013(a) 2014(a) Total

 

H-BSE Austria 1 1

 

France(b) 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 15

 

Germany 1 1 2

 

Ireland 1 1 2 1 5

 

The Netherlands 1 1

 

Poland 1 1 2

 

Portugal 1 1

 

Spain 1 1 2

 

Sweden 1 1

 

United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 5

 

Total 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 5 1 4 1 35

 

L-BSE Austria 1 1 2

 

Denmark 1 1

 

France(b) 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 14

 

Germany 1 1 2

 

Italy 1 1 1 1 1 5

 

The Netherlands 1 1 1 3

 

Poland 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 12

 

Spain 2 2

 

United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 4

 

Total 0 5 3 4 3 3 6 3 3 4 3 6 1 1 45

 

Total Atypical cases (H + L)

 

2 8 6 5 4 5 8 5 7 8 8 7 5 2 80

 

(a): Data for 2013-2014 are incomplete and may not include all cases/countries reported.

 

(b): France has performed extensive retrospective testing to classify BSE cases, which is probably the explanation for the higher number of Atypical BSE cases reported in this country.

 

The number of Atypical BSE cases detected in countries that have already identified them seems to be similar from year to year. In France, a retrospective study of all TSE-positive cattle identified through the compulsory EU surveillance between 2001 and 2007 indicated that the prevalence of H-BSE and L-BSE was 0.35 and 0.41 cases per million adult cattle tested, respectively, which increased to 1.9 and 1.7 cases per million, respectively, in tested animals over eight years old (Biacabe et al., 2008). No comprehensive study on the prevalence of Atypical BSE cases has yet been carried out in other EU Member States. All cases of Atypical BSE reported in the EU BSE databases have been identified by active surveillance testing (59 % in fallen stock, 38 % in healthy slaughtered cattle and 4 % in emergency slaughtered cattle). Cases were reported in animals over eight years of age, with the exception of two cases (one H-BSE and one L-BSE) detected in Spain in 2011/2012. One additional case of H-BSE was detected in Switzerland in 2012 in a cow born in Germany in 2005 (Guldimann et al., 2012).

 


 


 

Atypical BSE study protocol

 

EFSA Journal 2014;12(7):3798 8

 

Table 1: Number of Atypical BSE cases reported by EU Member States in the period 2001–2014 by country and by type (L- and H-BSE) (extracted from EU BSE databases on 1 July 2014). By 2015, these data might be more comprehensive following a request from the European Commission to Member States for re-testing and retrospective classification of all positive bovine isolates in the EU in the years 2003–2009

 

BSE type Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013(a) 2014(a) Total

 

H-BSE

 

Austria 1 1

 

France(b) 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 15

 

Germany 1 1 2 Ireland 1 1 2 1 5

 

The Netherlands 1 1

 

Poland 1 1 2

 

Portugal 1 1

 

Spain 1 1 2

 

Sweden 1 1

 

United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 5

 

Total 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 5 1 4 1 35

 

L-BSE

 

Austria 1 1 2

 

Denmark 1 1

 

France(b) 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 14

 

Germany 1 1 2 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 5

 

The Netherlands 1 1 1 3

 

Poland 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 12

 

Spain 2 2

 

United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 4

 

Total 0 5 3 4 3 3 6 3 3 4 3 6 1 1 45

 

Total Atypical cases (H + L) 2 8 6 5 4 5 8 5 7 8 8 7 5 2 80

 

(a): Data for 2013-2014 are incomplete and may not include all cases/countries reported.

 

(b): France has performed extensive retrospective testing to classify BSE cases, which is probably the explanation for the higher number of Atypical BSE cases reported in this country.

 

SNIP...

 

The current lack of information on the distribution of infectivity in tissues from Atypical BSE-infected cattle does not allow judgement of whether the current list of bovine SRM, set by EU Atypical BSE study protocol legislation based on data relating to the pathogenesis and tissue distribution of C-BSE, is fit for the purpose of removing most of the Atypical BSE infectivity from bovine carcasses. As is the case for C-BSE, Atypical BSE (H-BSE and/or L-BSE) agents are able to propagate in experimentally challenged foreign species such as mice, sheep, voles, primates and hamsters, and in transgenic mice expressing heterologous, i.e. non-bovine, PrP sequences.

 

EFSA Journal 2014;12(7):3798 13

 

SNIP...

 

2.4. Concluding remarks

 

Where data exist from both field cases and experimental animals (i.e. for L-BSE only), there is good agreement of the data with regard to abnormal PrP distribution. There are no data for field case H-BSE.

 

All data currently available relate to the presence or absence of PrPSc, but do not quantify relative amounts of PrPSc or levels of infectivity.

 

Disease-related PrP has been reported consistently in CNS tissues, peripheral ganglia and nerves, muscles (predominantly muscle spindles), adrenal glands and retina for both H-BSE and L-BSE. All of these tissues are also positive in C-BSE.

 

By contrast with C-BSE, at this stage no lymphoid tissues or gastrointestinal tissues from H-BSE- and L-BSE-affected animals have tested positive for PrPSc presence (IHC, WB) or infectivity (bioassay).

 

There are insufficient data at present to be clear about whether these apparent differences in the distribution of disease-specific markers reflect absolute differences between C-BSE and the H-BSE and L-BSE variants, whether they are a consequence of detection threshold limitations, or whether they are a consequence of the different routes of challenge.

 

No studies have been explicitly designed to address the issue of Atypical BSE with respect to SRM regulations. Without further experimental challenges or tissue collection from ongoing studies it will not be possible to obtain any data on duodenum, the jejunum and ileum (without Peyer’s patches), the caecum, the colon and the mesenteric fat.

 

SNIP...

 

4.1. Selection of tissues

 

4.1.1. BSE infectivity in bovine tissues

 

The current SRM list in cattle (see Table 5) has been established and amended in accordance with current knowledge related to C-BSE agent distribution in the tissues of infected cattle.

 

Atypical BSE study protocol

 

EFSA Journal 2014;12(7):3798 24

 

The SRM measure is aimed at preventing the entry into the food chain of tissues and anatomical structures that might contain significant amounts of infectivity. In the framework of C-BSE infection in cattle, these measures are extremely efficient. However, certain tissues that might contain low amounts of infectivity in certain BSE-infected cattle are not included in the cattle SRM list (Table 6).

 

Table 5: Bovine SRM list, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 999/2001

 

Bovine SRM list

 

The skull excluding the mandible and including the brain and eyes, and the spinal cord of animals aged over 12 months

 

The vertebral column excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the spinous and transverse processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae and the median sacral crest and wings of the sacrum, but including the dorsal root ganglia, of animals aged over 30 months

 

The tonsils, the intestines from the duodenum to the rectum and the mesentery of animals of all ages

 

Table 6: Cattle tissues with known infectivity or PrPSc presence for C-BSE according to WHO (2010), and their inclusion or not in the current SRM list

 

Higher-infectivity tissues

 

SRM

 

Brain

 

Dura mater

 

Spinal cord

 

Optic nerve

 

Retina

 

Spinal ganglia

 

Trigeminal ganglia

 

Lower-infectivity tissues

 

Nictitating membrane

 

Autonomic ganglia

 

Tonsil

 

Ileum

 

Jejunum

 

Non-SRM

 

Peripheral nerves

 

Adrenal glands

 

Bone marrow

 

Skeletal muscle

 

All the TSE agents replicate and accumulate at a high level in the CNS and can disseminate (centrifugally and centripetally) along the peripheral (autonomic and motor) nervous system. However, in a given host the agent distribution and the relative level of infectivity in other tissues can vary substantially according to the TSE strain.

 

For instance, in humans, although sCJD infectivity is mostly confined to the CNS, numerous lymphoid organs have been shown to be infectious in patients affected with variant CJD (vCJD) (Gill et al., 2013).

 

Similarly, in sheep infected with Classical scrapie, a significant level of infectivity can be found in lymphoid organs (about 103 times less than in the same weight of brain tissue), whereas in animals affected with Atypical scrapie lymphoid organs contain either very low (about 107 times less than in the same weight of brain tissue) or no detectable infectivity (Andreoletti et al., 2011).

 

There are currently no quantitative data on the distribution of H-BSE and L-BSE in cattle tissues.

 

4.1.2. Prioritisation of tissues to be included in further studies

 

In order to assess the adequacy and the relative effectiveness of the current SRM measures for mitigating human dietary exposure to H-BSE and L-BSE, a large number of tissues/anatomical structures need to be tested for the presence of PrPSc and/or infectivity.

 

Considering the potential number of samples and the requirement for bioassay, the choice of tissues to be tested should be prioritised according to three criteria:

 

the level of infectivity they contain in C-BSE-infected cattle (SRM list);

 

the presence of infectivity, or PrPSc presence, demonstrated in Atypical BSEs or other TSEs in ruminants;

 

the importance in terms of input into the food chain in the EU.

 

SNIP...

 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

Data relating to the prevalence and geographical distribution of Atypical BSE are incomplete.

 

The recent cessation of the testing of healthy slaughtered cattle in some EU Member States will lead to a loss of capacity of the monitoring system to detect Atypical BSE cases.

 

For transmission studies, i.c. challenge would be an appropriate proxy for studying the distribution of the agent if the origin of the disease was spontaneous, and originating in the brain, while oral challenge would be more appropriate if the origin of the disease was through ingestion of infected material.

 

The current lack of information on the distribution of infectivity in tissues of Atypical BSE-infected cattle does not allow judgement of whether the current list of bovine SRM, set by EU legislation based on data relating to the pathogenesis and tissue distribution of C-BSE, is fit for the purpose of removing most of the Atypical BSE infectivity from bovine carcasses.

 

Where data exist from both field cases and experimental animals (i.e. for L-BSE only), there is good agreement of the data with regard to abnormal PrP distribution. There are no data for field case H-BSE.

 

Disease-related PrP has been reported consistently in CNS tissues, peripheral ganglia and nerves, muscles (predominantly muscle spindles), adrenal glands and retina for both H-BSE and L-BSE. All of these tissues are also positive in C-BSE.

 

By contrast with C-BSE, at this stage no lymphoid tissues or gastrointestinal tissues from H-BSE- and L-BSE-affected animals have tested positive for PrPSc presence (IHC, WB) or infectivity (bioassay).

 

The reference method for the estimation of prion infectious titre in tissues is endpoint dilution titration in animals. To achieve maximum sensitivity regarding Atypical H-BSE and L-BSE, this bioassay should ideally be done in mouse lines over-expressing bovine PrPC. Several mouse lines over-expressing bovine PrPC are available worldwide.

 

In vitro amplification techniques can be used to determine whether a tissue contains any prion seeding activity. A correlation must be made between the sensitivity achieved by the cell-free assays and bioassays using reference material such as brain tissue from animals at the terminal stage of disease.

 

The application of the proposed protocol would provide elements allowing the assessment of the relative infectious titre, PrPSc accumulation and prion seeding activity in the tissues of cattle that developed H-BSE or L-BSE (using posterior brainstem as a reference).

 

Tissues to be covered by further studies are categorised in three priorities, based on their inclusion in the cattle SRM list, on the presence of infectivity, or PrPSc presence, demonstrated in Atypical BSEs or other TSEs in ruminants, and on the importance in terms of input into the food chain in the EU.

 

Atypical BSE study protocol

 

EFSA Journal 2014;12(7):3798 32

 

Applying the protocol only to the tissues obtained through the EURL study would provide information on some but not all the tissues from the cattle SRM list. It would also provide information on some additional tissues not included in the cattle SRM list, but relevant for the food chain.

 

Material from other studies could be used to augment the range of SRM and non-SRM tissues available.

 

There is no identified source able to provide all the samples necessary to assess infectivity in tissues belonging to the full cattle SRM list in H- and L-BSE-infected animals. Therefore, to complete this objective, new inoculations of cattle would have to be considered.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

In accordance with former EFSA recommendations, through the implementation of the protocol information should also be obtained on the performance of currently validated rapid tests for TSE active surveillance in cattle/bioassay for detecting H-BSE and L-BSE agents.

 

If new inoculation experiments are carried out in cattle with H-BSE and L-BSE, the following should be considered:

 

- inoculation through both the i.c. and oral route (despite the potential length of the oral route experiment);

 

- inclusion of C-BSE controls in the i.c. route experiment;

 

- sequential time killing of animals;

 

- collection of all tissues listed in Table 7.

 

DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO EFSA

 

1. Summary of the samples available and the tests already carried out by the EURL-TSE. Submitted by the European Commission as Annex 1 to the mandate.

 

2. Information on protocols and tests results provided by the EURL-TSE. Submitted by the European Commission as Annex 2 to the mandate.

 

REFERENCES

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

>>>(b): France has performed extensive retrospective testing to classify BSE cases, which is probably the explanation for the higher number of Atypical BSE cases reported in this country.<<<

 

LMAO!!!

 

Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

we have seen the spontaneous BSE epidemic in France, what about the other HIGH INCIDENCE ATYPICAL BSE COUNTRY OF POLAND, another atypical spontaneous event of high incidence. how can this be blamed on a happenstance of nothing, i.e. old age? goes against all junk science to date on the spontaneous atypical BSE i.e.

 

see more ;

 

Tuesday, July 26, 2016

 

Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion UPDATE JULY 2016

 


 

Saturday, July 23, 2016

 

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, AND SRM REMOVAL UNITED STATE OF AMERICA UPDATE JULY 2016

 


 

*** Needless conflict ***

 

Nature 485, 279–280 (17 May 2012) doi:10.1038/485279b

 

Published online 16 May 2012

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. said:

 

I kindly wish to submit the following please ;

 


 

What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal FeedIngredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health

 

Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker11Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of PublicHealth, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute forApplied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance,University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA;3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA

 

snip...

 

Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds

 

Animal

 

Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bonemeal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals andother meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, andanimal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products

 

snip...

 

Conclusions

 

Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed ingredients, including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibiotic resistant bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxin like compounds in animals and resulting animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial infections (antibiotic resistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed. In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004), contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from farm to fork” to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and veterinary and public health officials.

 

REFERENCES...snip...end

 

Sapkota et al.668 VOLUME 115 NUMBER 5 May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives

 


 

Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. ......... http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose

 

look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

 

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

 

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, NathalieLescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-PhilippeDeslysSummary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiformencephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oralinfection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier totransmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE tonon-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenatefrom a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurologicaldisease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of diseaseat 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, wemade a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, whichprovides additional assurance that existing public health measures canprevent transmission of BSE to man.

 

snip...

 

BSE bovine brain inoculum

 

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

 

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

 

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)1/15 (7%)

 

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

 

PrPres biochemical detection

 

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculumused in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with asimilar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. icip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

 

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infectedorally with similar BSE brain inocula

 

Published online January 27, 2005

 


 

It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

 


 

it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

 


 

In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

 

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...

 


 


 

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

 

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

 

snip...

 

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

 


 


 


 

”The occurrence of CWD must be viewed against the contest of the locations in which it occurred. It was an incidental and unwelcome complication of the respective wildlife research programmes. Despite it’s subsequent recognition as a new disease of cervids, therefore justifying direct investigation, no specific research funding was forthcoming. The USDA veiwed it as a wildlife problem and consequently not their province!” ...page 26.

 


 

*** Spraker suggested an interesting explanation for the occurrence of CWD. The deer pens at the Foot Hills Campus were built some 30-40 years ago by a Dr. Bob Davis. At or abut that time, allegedly, some scrapie work was conducted at this site. When deer were introduced to the pens they occupied ground that had previously been occupied by sheep.

 


 

CONFIDENTIAL

 

>>> The only tenable public line will be that "more research is required’’ <<<

 

>>> possibility on a transmissible prion remains open<<<

 

O.K., so it’s about 23 years later, so somebody please tell me, when is "more research is required’’ enough time for evaluation ?

 


 

SWISS MEDICAL WEEKLY

 

Alzheimer-type brain pathology may be transmitted by grafts of dura mater 26/01/2016 Singeltary comment ;

 


 

re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy

 

Nature 525, 247?250 (10 September 2015) doi:10.1038/nature15369 Received 26 April 2015 Accepted 14 August 2015 Published online 09 September 2015 Updated online 11 September 2015 Erratum (October, 2015)

 

snip...see full Singeltary Nature comment here;

 


 

Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease

 

*** Singeltary comment PLoS ***

 

Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ?

 

Posted by flounder on 05 Nov 2014 at 21:27 GMT

 


 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

 

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323.

 


 

2016 PRION CONFERENCE TOKYO

 

Saturday, April 23, 2016

 

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

 

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

 

Taylor & Francis

 

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

 

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

 

Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,

 

Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a

 

"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France

 

Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion. Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.

 

To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.

 

These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.

 

Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 


 


 

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

 

Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions

 

Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics

 

Abstract

 

Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human ​prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 

snip...

 

Do our transmission results in tgHu imply that sheep scrapie is the cause of sCJD cases in humans? This question challenges well-established dogma that sCJD is a spontaneous disorder unrelated to animal prion disease. In our opinion, our data on their own do not unequivocally establish a causative link between natural exposure to sheep scrapie and the subsequent appearance of sCJD in humans. However, our studies clearly point out the need to re-consider this possibility. Clarification on this topic will be aided by informed and modern epidemiological studies to up-date previous analysis that was performed at the end of the last century3, 4. The value of such an approach is highlighted by the implementation in the year 2000 of large-scale active animal TSE surveillance programs around the world that provided an informed epidemiological-based view of the occurrence and geographical spread of prion disease in small ruminant populations51. The fact that both Australia and New-Zealand, two countries that had been considered for more than 50 years as TSE-free territories, were finally identified positive for atypical scrapie in their sheep flocks provides an example of how prion dogma can be reversed52. However, the incubation period for prion disease in humans after exposure to prions via the peripheral route, such as in iatrogenic CJD transmission and Kuru, can exceed several decades53, 54. In this context, it will be a challenge to combine epidemiological data collected contemporarily in animal populations and humans to investigate the existence of a causative link between prion disease occurrence in these different hosts. Furthermore, it is crucial to bear in mind that sporadic sCJD in humans is a rare disease (1–2 individuals per million of the population per year) and that scrapie has been circulating in small ruminants populations used for food purposes for centuries. Consequently, it is our opinion that even if a causative link was established between sheep scrapie exposure and the occurrence of certain sCJD cases, it would be wrong to consider small ruminant TSE agents as a new major threat for public health. Despite this, it remains clear that our data provide a new impetus to establish the true zoonotic potential of sheep scrapie prions.

 

Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance

 


 

Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES

 

Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period

 

Authors

 

item Comoy, Emmanuel - item Mikol, Jacqueline - item Luccantoni-Freire, Sophie - item Correia, Evelyne - item Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nathalie - item Durand, Valérie - item Dehen, Capucine - item Andreoletti, Olivier - item Casalone, Cristina - item Richt, Juergen item Greenlee, Justin item Baron, Thierry - item Benestad, Sylvie - item Hills, Bob - item Brown, Paul - item Deslys, Jean-Philippe -

 

Submitted to: Scientific Reports Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: May 28, 2015 Publication Date: June 30, 2015 Citation: Comoy, E.E., Mikol, J., Luccantoni-Freire, S., Correia, E., Lescoutra-Etchegaray, N., Durand, V., Dehen, C., Andreoletti, O., Casalone, C., Richt, J.A., Greenlee, J.J., Baron, T., Benestad, S., Brown, P., Deslys, J. 2015. Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period. Scientific Reports. 5:11573.

 

Interpretive Summary: The transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (also called prion diseases) are fatal neurodegenerative diseases that affect animals and humans. The agent of prion diseases is a misfolded form of the prion protein that is resistant to breakdown by the host cells. Since all mammals express prion protein on the surface of various cells such as neurons, all mammals are, in theory, capable of replicating prion diseases. One example of a prion disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE; also called mad cow disease), has been shown to infect cattle, sheep, exotic undulates, cats, non-human primates, and humans when the new host is exposed to feeds or foods contaminated with the disease agent. The purpose of this study was to test whether non-human primates (cynomologous macaque) are susceptible to the agent of sheep scrapie. After an incubation period of approximately 10 years a macaque developed progressive clinical signs suggestive of neurologic disease. Upon postmortem examination and microscopic examination of tissues, there was a widespread distribution of lesions consistent with a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. This information will have a scientific impact since it is the first study that demonstrates the transmission of scrapie to a non-human primate with a close genetic relationship to humans. This information is especially useful to regulatory officials and those involved with risk assessment of the potential transmission of animal prion diseases to humans. Technical Abstract: Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is an animal prion disease that also causes variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. Over the past decades, c-BSE's zoonotic potential has been the driving force in establishing extensive protective measures for animal and human health.

 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.

 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.

 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.

 


 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations

 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France

 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.

 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,

 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),

 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),

 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.

 

===============

 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***

 

===============

 


 

 2016

 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE TSE PRION

 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

 

Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions: An Update

 

Ignazio Cali1, Liuting Qing1, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang2, Diane Kofskey1,3, Nicholas Maurer1, Debbie McKenzie4, Jiri Safar1,3,5, Wenquan Zou1,3,5,6, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Qingzhong Kong1,5,6

 

1Department of Pathology, 3National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, 5Department of Neurology, 6National Center for Regenerative Medicine, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA.

 

4Department of Biological Sciences and Center for Prions and Protein Folding Diseases, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada,

 

2Encore Health Resources, 1331 Lamar St, Houston, TX 77010

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a widespread and highly transmissible prion disease in free-ranging and captive cervid species in North America. The zoonotic potential of CWD prions is a serious public health concern, but the susceptibility of human CNS and peripheral organs to CWD prions remains largely unresolved. We reported earlier that peripheral and CNS infections were detected in transgenic mice expressing human PrP129M or PrP129V. Here we will present an update on this project, including evidence for strain dependence and influence of cervid PrP polymorphisms on CWD zoonosis as well as the characteristics of experimental human CWD prions.

 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

 

In Conjunction with Asia Pacific Prion Symposium 2016

 

PRION 2016 Tokyo

 

Prion 2016

 


 

Prion 2016

 

Purchase options Price * Issue Purchase USD 198.00

 


 

Cervid to human prion transmission

 

Kong, Qingzhong

 

Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States

 

Abstract

 

Prion disease is transmissible and invariably fatal. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease affecting deer, elk and moose, and it is a widespread and expanding epidemic affecting 22 US States and 2 Canadian provinces so far. CWD poses the most serious zoonotic prion transmission risks in North America because of huge venison consumption (>6 million deer/elk hunted and consumed annually in the USA alone), significant prion infectivity in muscles and other tissues/fluids from CWD-affected cervids, and usually high levels of individual exposure to CWD resulting from consumption of the affected animal among often just family and friends. However, we still do not know whether CWD prions can infect humans in the brain or peripheral tissues or whether clinical/asymptomatic CWD zoonosis has already occurred, and we have no essays to reliably detect CWD infection in humans. We hypothesize that:

 

(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;

 

(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;

 

(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans;and

 

(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.

 

Aim 1 will prove that the classical CWD strain may infect humans in brain or peripheral lymphoid tissues at low levels by conducting systemic bioassays in a set of "humanized" Tg mouse lines expressing common human PrP variants using a number of CWD isolates at varying doses and routes. Experimental "human CWD" samples will also be generated for Aim 3.

 

Aim 2 will test the hypothesis that the cervid-to-human prion transmission barrier is dependent on prion strain and influenced by the host (human) PrP sequence by examining and comparing the transmission efficiency and phenotypes of several atypical/unusual CWD isolates/strains as well as a few prion strains from other species that have adapted to cervid PrP sequence, utilizing the same panel of humanized Tg mouse lines as in Aim 1.

 

Aim 3 will establish reliable essays for detection and surveillance of CWD infection in humans by examining in details the clinical, pathological, biochemical and in vitro seeding properties of existing and future experimental "human CWD" samples generated from Aims 1-2 and compare them with those of common sporadic human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) prions.

 

Aim 4 will attempt to detect clinical CWD-affected human cases by examining a significant number of brain samples from prion-affected human subjects in the USA and Canada who have consumed venison from CWD-endemic areas utilizing the criteria and essays established in Aim 3. The findings from this proposal will greatly advance our understandings on the potential and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for CWD zoonosis and potentially discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.

 

Public Health Relevance There are significant and increasing human exposure to cervid prions because chronic wasting disease (CWD, a widespread and highly infectious prion disease among deer and elk in North America) continues spreading and consumption of venison remains popular, but our understanding on cervid-to-human prion transmission is still very limited, raising public health concerns. This proposal aims to define the zoonotic risks of cervid prions and set up and apply essays to detect CWD zoonosis using mouse models and in vitro methods. The findings will greatly expand our knowledge on the potentials and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for such infections and may discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.

 

Funding Agency Agency National Institute of Health (NIH)

 

Institute National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS)

 

Type Research Project (R01)

 

Project # 1R01NS088604-01A1

 

Application # 9037884

 

Study Section Cellular and Molecular Biology of Neurodegeneration Study Section (CMND)

 

Program Officer Wong, May

 

Project Start 2015-09-30

 

Project End 2019-07-31

 

Budget Start 2015-09-30

 

Budget End 2016-07-31

 

Support Year 1

 

Fiscal Year 2015

 

Total Cost $337,507

 

Indirect Cost $118,756

 

Institution

 

Name Case Western Reserve University

 

Department Pathology

 

Type Schools of Medicine

 

DUNS # 077758407

 

City Cleveland

 

State OH

 

Country United States

 

Zip Code 44106

 


 

===========================================================

 

We hypothesize that:

 

(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;

 

(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;

 

(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans;and

 

(4) *** CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. *** We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.

 

============================================================

 

Key Molecular Mechanisms of TSEs

 

Zabel, Mark D.

 

Colorado State University-Fort Collins, Fort Collins, CO, United States Abstract Prion diseases, or transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), are fatal neurodegenerative diseases affecting humans, cervids, bovids, and ovids. The absolute requirement of PrPC expression to generate prion diseases and the lack of instructional nucleic acid define prions as unique infectious agents. Prions exhibit species-specific tropism, inferring that unique prion strains exist that preferentially infct certain host species and confront transmission barriers to heterologous host species. However, transmission barriers are not absolute. Scientific consensus agrees that the sheep TSE scrapie probably breached the transmission barrier to cattle causing bovine spongiform encephalopathy that subsequently breached the human transmission barrier and likely caused several hundred deaths by a new-variant form of the human TSE Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK and Europe. The impact to human health, emotion and economies can still be felt in areas like farming, blood and organ donations and the threat of a latent TSE epidemic. This precedent raises the real possibility of other TSEs, like chronic wasting disease of cervids, overcoming similar human transmission barriers. A groundbreaking discovery made last year revealed that mice infected with heterologous prion strains facing significant transmission barriers replicated prions far more readily in spleens than brains6. Furthermore, these splenic prions exhibited weakened transmission barriers and expanded host ranges compared to neurogenic prions. These data question conventional wisdom of avoiding neural tissue to avoid prion xenotransmission, when more promiscuous prions may lurk in extraneural tissues. Data derived from work previously funded by NIH demonstrate that Complement receptors CD21/35 bind prions and high density PrPC and differentially impact prion disease depending on the prion isolate or strain used. Recent advances in live animal and whole organ imaging have led us to generate preliminary data to support novel, innovative approaches to assessing prion capture and transport. We plan to test our unifying hypothesis for this proposal that CD21/35 control the processes of peripheral prion capture, transport, strain selection and xenotransmission in the following specific aims.

 

1. Assess the role of CD21/35 in splenic prion strain selection and host range expansion.

 

2. Determine whether CD21/35 and C1q differentially bind distinct prion strains

 

3. Monitor the effects of CD21/35 on prion trafficking in real time and space

 

4. Assess the role of CD21/35 in incunabular prion trafficking

 

Public Health Relevance Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, or prion diseases, are devastating illnesses that greatly impact public health, agriculture and wildlife in North America and around the world. The impact to human health, emotion and economies can still be felt in areas like farming, blood and organ donations and the threat of a latent TSE epidemic. This precedent raises the real possibility of other TSEs, like chronic wasting disease (CWD) of cervids, overcoming similar human transmission barriers. Early this year Canada reported its first case of BSE in over a decade audits first case of CWD in farmed elk in three years, underscoring the need for continued vigilance and research. Identifying mechanisms of transmission and zoonoses remains an extremely important and intense area of research that will benefit human and other animal populations.

 

Funding Agency Agency National Institute of Health (NIH)

 

Institute National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)

 

Type High Priority, Short Term Project Award (R56)

 

Project # 1R56AI122273-01A1

 

Application # 9211114

 

Study Section Cellular and Molecular Biology of Neurodegeneration Study Section (CMND)

 

Program Officer Beisel, Christopher E

 

Project Start 2016-02-16

 

Project End 2017-01-31

 

Budget Start 2016-02-16

 

Budget End 2017-01-31

 

Support Year 1

 

Fiscal Year 2016

 

Total Cost

 

Indirect Cost Institution Name Colorado State University-Fort Collins

 

Department Microbiology/Immun/Virology

 

Type Schools of Veterinary Medicine

 

DUNS # 785979618 City Fort Collins

 

State CO

 

Country United States

 

Zip Code 80523

 


 

PMCA Detection of CWD Infection in Cervid and Non-Cervid Species

 

Hoover, Edward Arthur

 

Colorado State University-Fort Collins, Fort Collins, CO, United States Abstract Chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer and elk is an emerging highly transmissible prion disease now recognized in 18 States, 2 Canadian provinces, and Korea. We have shown that Infected deer harbor and shed high levels of infectious prions in saliva, blood, urine, and feces, and in the tissues generating those body fluids and excreta, thereby leading to facile transmission by direct contact and environmental contamination. We have also shown that CWD can infect some non-cervid species, thus the potential risk CWD represents to domestic animal species and to humans remains unknown. Whether prions borne in blood, saliva, nasal fluids, milk, or excreta are generated or modified in the proximate peripheral tissue sites, may differ in subtle ways from those generated in brain, or may be adapted for mucosal infection remain open questions. The increasing parallels in the pathogenesis between prion diseases and human neurodegenerative conditions, such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, add relevance to CWD as a transmissible protein misfolding disease. The overall goal of this work is to elucidate the process of CWD prion transmission from mucosal secretory and excretory tissue sites by addressing these questions: (a) What are the kinetics and magnitude of CWD prion shedding post-exposure? (b) Are excreted prions biochemically distinct, or not, from those in the CNS? (c) Are peripheral epithelial or CNS tissues, or both, the source of excreted prions? and (d) Are excreted prions adapted for horizontal transmission via natural/trans-mucosal routes? The specific aims of this proposal are: (1) To determine the onset and consistency of CWD prion shedding in deer and cervidized mice; (2); To compare the biochemical and biophysical properties of excretory vs. CNS prions; (3) To determine the capacity of peripheral tissues to support replication of CWD prions; (4) To determine the protease- sensitive infectious fraction of excreted vs. CNS prions; and (5) To compare the mucosal infectivity of excretory vs. CNS prions. Understanding the mechanisms that enable efficient prion dissemination and shedding will help elucidate how horizontally transmissible prions evolve and succeed, and is the basis of this proposal. Understanding how infectious misfolded proteins (prions) are generated, trafficked, shed, and transmitted will aid in preventing, treating, and managing the risks associated with these agents and the diseases they cause.

 

Public Health Relevance Chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer and elk is an emergent highly transmissible prion disease now recognized throughout the USA as well as in Canada and Korea. We have shown that infected deer harbor and shed high levels of infectious prions in saliva, blood, urine, and feces thereby leading to transmission by direct contact and environmental contamination. In that our studies have also shown that CWD can infect some non-cervid species, the potential risk CWD may represents to domestic animal species and humans remains unknown. The increasing parallels in the development of major human neurodegenerative conditions, such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, and prion diseases add relevance to CWD as a model of a transmissible protein misfolding disease. Understanding how infectious misfolded proteins (prions) are generated and transmitted will aid in interrupting, treating, and managing the risks associated with these agents and the diseases they cause.

 

Funding Agency Agency National Institute of Health (NIH)

 

Institute National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS)

 

Type Research Project (R01)

 

Project # 4R01NS061902-07

 

Application # 9010980

 

Study Section Cellular and Molecular Biology of Neurodegeneration Study Section (CMND)

 

Program Officer Wong, May Project Start 2009-09-30

 

Project End 2018-02-28

 

Budget Start 2016-03-01

 

Budget End 2017-02-28

 

Support Year 7

 

Fiscal Year 2016

 

Total Cost $409,868

 

Indirect Cost $134,234 Institution Name Colorado State University-Fort Collins

 

Department Microbiology/Immun/Virology

 

Type Schools of Veterinary Medicine

 

DUNS # 785979618 City Fort Collins

 

State CO

 

Country United States

 

Zip Code 80523

 


 

LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$

 

*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***

 


 

PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FT. COLLINS CWD RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS

 

*** LATE-BREAKING ABSTRACTS PRION 2015 CONFERENCE ***

 

O18

 

Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions

 

Liuting Qing1, Ignazio Cali1,2, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang3, Diane Kofskey1, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Wenquan Zou1, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 2Second University of Naples, Naples, Italy, 3Encore Health Resources, Houston, Texas, USA

 

*** These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.

 

==================

 

***These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.***

 

==================

 

P.105: RT-QuIC models trans-species prion transmission

 

Kristen Davenport, Davin Henderson, Candace Mathiason, and Edward Hoover Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA

 

Conversely, FSE maintained sufficient BSE characteristics to more efficiently convert bovine rPrP than feline rPrP. Additionally, human rPrP was competent for conversion by CWD and fCWD.

 

***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously estimated.

 

================

 

***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously estimated.***

 

================

 


 

*** PRICE OF CWD TSE PRION POKER GOES UP 2014 ***

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE PRION update January 2, 2014

 

*** chronic wasting disease, there was no absolute barrier to conversion of the human prion protein.

 

*** Furthermore, the form of human PrPres produced in this in vitro assay when seeded with CWD, resembles that found in the most common human prion disease, namely sCJD of the MM1 subtype.

 


 


 

*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***

 


 

*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.

 


 

***********CJD REPORT 1994 increased risk for consumption of veal and venison and lamb***********

 

CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM THIRD ANNUAL REPORT AUGUST 1994

 

Consumption of venison and veal was much less widespread among both cases and controls. For both of these meats there was evidence of a trend with increasing frequency of consumption being associated with increasing risk of CJD. (not nvCJD, but sporadic CJD...tss)

 

These associations were largely unchanged when attention was restricted to pairs with data obtained from relatives. ...

 

Table 9 presents the results of an analysis of these data.

 

There is STRONG evidence of an association between ‘’regular’’ veal eating and risk of CJD (p = .0.01).

 

Individuals reported to eat veal on average at least once a year appear to be at 13 TIMES THE RISK of individuals who have never eaten veal.

 

There is, however, a very wide confidence interval around this estimate. There is no strong evidence that eating veal less than once per year is associated with increased risk of CJD (p = 0.51).

 

The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04).

 

There is some evidence that risk of CJD INCREASES WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY OF LAMB EATING (p = 0.02).

 

The evidence for such an association between beef eating and CJD is weaker (p = 0.14). When only controls for whom a relative was interviewed are included, this evidence becomes a little STRONGER (p = 0.08).

 

snip...

 

It was found that when veal was included in the model with another exposure, the association between veal and CJD remained statistically significant (p = < 0.05 for all exposures), while the other exposures ceased to be statistically significant (p = > 0.05).

 

snip...

 

In conclusion, an analysis of dietary histories revealed statistical associations between various meats/animal products and INCREASED RISK OF CJD. When some account was taken of possible confounding, the association between VEAL EATING AND RISK OF CJD EMERGED AS THE STRONGEST OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS STATISTICALLY. ...

 

snip...

 

In the study in the USA, a range of foodstuffs were associated with an increased risk of CJD, including liver consumption which was associated with an apparent SIX-FOLD INCREASE IN THE RISK OF CJD. By comparing the data from 3 studies in relation to this particular dietary factor, the risk of liver consumption became non-significant with an odds ratio of 1.2 (PERSONAL COMMUNICATION, PROFESSOR A. HOFMAN. ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM). (???...TSS)

 

snip...see full report ;

 


 

CJD9/10022

 

October 1994

 

Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ

 

Dear Mr Elmhirst,

 

CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT

 

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.

 

The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.

 

The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.

 

The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.

 

I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.

 


 

Monday, May 02, 2016

 

*** Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions: An Update Prion 2016 Tokyo ***

 


 

*** PRION 2014 CONFERENCE CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD

 


 

*** PPo3-7: Prion Transmission from Cervids to Humans is Strain-dependent

 

*** Here we report that a human prion strain that had adopted the cervid prion protein (PrP) sequence through passage in cervidized transgenic mice efficiently infected transgenic mice expressing human PrP,

 

*** indicating that the species barrier from cervid to humans is prion strain-dependent and humans can be vulnerable to novel cervid prion strains.

 

PPo2-27:

 

Generation of a Novel form of Human PrPSc by Inter-species Transmission of Cervid Prions

 

*** Our findings suggest that CWD prions have the capability to infect humans, and that this ability depends on CWD strain adaptation, implying that the risk for human health progressively increases with the spread of CWD among cervids.

 

PPo2-7:

 

Biochemical and Biophysical Characterization of Different CWD Isolates

 

*** The data presented here substantiate and expand previous reports on the existence of different CWD strains.

 


 

Envt.07:

 

Pathological Prion Protein (PrPTSE) in Skeletal Muscles of Farmed and Free Ranging White-Tailed Deer Infected with Chronic Wasting Disease

 

***The presence and seeding activity of PrPTSE in skeletal muscle from CWD-infected cervids suggests prevention of such tissue in the human diet as a precautionary measure for food safety, pending on further clarification of whether CWD may be transmissible to humans.

 


 

>>>CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE , THERE WAS NO ABSOLUTE BARRIER TO CONVERSION OF THE HUMAN PRION PROTEIN<<<

 

*** PRICE OF CWD TSE PRION POKER GOES UP 2014 ***

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE PRION update January 2, 2014

 

Wednesday, January 01, 2014

 

Molecular Barriers to Zoonotic Transmission of Prions

 

*** chronic wasting disease, there was no absolute barrier to conversion of the human prion protein.

 

*** Furthermore, the form of human PrPres produced in this in vitro assay when seeded with CWD, resembles that found in the most common human prion disease, namely sCJD of the MM1 subtype.

 


 


 

*** now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal communications years ago, and then the latest on the zoonotic potential from CWD to humans from the TOKYO PRION 2016 CONFERENCE.

 

see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does this mean there IS casual evidence ???? “Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans”

 

From: TSS (216-119-163-189.ipset45.wt.net)

 

Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???

 

Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST

 

From: "Belay, Ermias"

 

To: Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"

 

Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM

 

Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

 

Dear Sir/Madam,

 

In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD. That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.

 

Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

 

-----Original Message-----

 

From: Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM

 

To: rr26k@nih.gov; rrace@niaid.nih.gov; ebb8@CDC.GOV

 

Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

 

Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM ......snip........end..............TSS

 

Thursday, April 03, 2008

 

A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41 A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease Sigurdson CJ.

 

snip...

 

*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,

 

snip... full text ;

 


 

Monday, May 02, 2016

 

*** Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions: An Update Prion 2016 Tokyo ***

 


 

*** NIH awards $11 million to UTHealth researchers to study deadly CWD prion diseases Claudio Soto, Ph.D. ***

 

Public Release: 29-Jun-2016

 


 

I urge everyone to watch this video closely...terry

 

*** you can see video here and interview with Jeff's Mom, and scientist telling you to test everything and potential risk factors for humans ***

 


 

Tuesday, July 12, 2016

 

Chronic Wasting Disease CWD, Scrapie, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE, TSE, Prion Zoonosis Science History

 

see history of NIH may destroy human brain collection

 


 

 

IN A NUT SHELL ;

 

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

 

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,

 


 

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

 

OIE and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reinforce Collaboration

 


 

Friday, April 4, 2014

 

China, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Morocco, Israel, South Africa and Saudi Arabia still retain BSE-related closures

 


 

Thursday, May 30, 2013

 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has upgraded the United States' risk classification for mad cow disease to "negligible" from "controlled", and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease

 

U.S. gets top mad-cow rating from international group and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease

 


 


 

The OIE is nothing more than a trading brokerage for the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease aka mad cow type disease. Frances is still in the midst of a mad cow disease outbreak with atypical BSE cases still growing. mad cow disease is so bad in France, as with the USA, they stopped testing for mad cow disease (France altogether and the USA to figures so low, you would only detect a case of mad cow disease, only by chance).

 

from the inside looking out ;

 

Quote: Maybe familirise yourself with the OIE. The primary concern is animal health of the world they are the animal version of the WHO. It is a long way down from that ivory tower but here we go, until pressured by the USA representatives a country could not export animals for 6 years after finding a BSE/BASE positive animal so under the old rules the US would not be able to export anywhere in the world for another 4 1/2 years. Who got the risk levels system put in to allow some trade - your US representatives. You guys want to change rules - OK , but you do not get special rules that only apply to the US. As i have told you before Sand h I market all my own slaughter animals and you know that, so don't do the whole holier than thow act.

 

With all due respect, it is obvious that you know little about the OIE and how it actually works. Having been to their offices in Paris and talked personally with the Head of the Animal Test Section, you would choke if you knew how many lobby groups attend that office daily. There is a steady stream of paid lobby groups that have one goal in life and that is to sway the Section Heads of each department within the OIE to suit the needs of different jurisdictions around the world, which curiously enough, also includes the USA and Canada. Anyone can go there and chat with them - providing they can provide valid cause to be let in. To say that the only goal of the OIE is animal health is actually only part of their function. They are more than that and my discussions with Dr. Diaz there has showed me that. But to blindly make a statement regarding what they do when you have no idea what they actually do is like eating the skin of the orange and not knowing what is actually under.

 

Interestingly you state that the US Government applied pressure (to the OIE) I assume and that is a great example of the lobby groups doing their job. So, at the end of the day, one can safely assume that it is the pressure applied by certain influential lobby groups that will determine a likely outcome to an apparent OIE directive. Man alive, isn't it great to live in a democracy wherein the people get to make the choices and not just some "other" interested party or group - say like........Cargill or Tyson for example?

 

So, one last question, question?

 

Who wags the tail of that dog?? And for what reason other than one that is purely associated with trade and international agreements and greed?

 

And you think it is so simply explainable.

 

end...tss

 

Subject: UPDATED WHO Guidelines include tissues from Cervidae affected with Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD)

 

snip...see full text ;

 

Sunday, October 18, 2015

 

*** World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Institut Pasteur Cooperating on animal disease and zoonosis research

 


 


 

Sunday, October 18, 2015

 

World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Institut Pasteur Cooperating on animal disease and zoonosis research

 


 

SSS SHOOT SHOVEL AND SHUT UP !

 

*** you can find some history of the BSE cases in Canada and Klein’s BSE SSS policy comment here ;

 


 

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

 

MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST 2014

 


 

Saturday, December 12, 2015

 

*** BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION REPORT DECEMBER 14, 2015

 


 

Thursday, October 22, 2015

 

*** Former Ag Secretary Ann Veneman talks women in agriculture and we talk mad cow disease USDA and what really happened ***

 


 

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

 

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

 

snip...

 

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

 


 


 


 

In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

 

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...

 


 

”The occurrence of CWD must be viewed against the contest of the locations in which it occurred. It was an incidental and unwelcome complication of the respective wildlife research programmes. Despite it’s subsequent recognition as a new disease of cervids, therefore justifying direct investigation, no specific research funding was forthcoming. The USDA veiwed it as a wildlife problem and consequently not their province!” ...page 26.

 


 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.