CC-Dr. Steve Goldsmith, FBI Laboratory
Division
please note, I tried to forward this to the FBI, spoke with several folks
at FBI headquarters, and they were not interested...just saying...terry
FBI: Agroterrorism not likely, but very possible
Posted: Monday, October 19, 2015 10:00 am
FBI: Agroterrorism not likely, but very possible By Sara Bredesen, Regional
Editor | stbrede@gmail.com The Country Today | 0 comments
Acts of terrorism against U.S. agriculture are highly possible, but
not highly likely, according to Stephen Goldsmith, a veterinarian with the
Biological Countermeasures Unit of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
“The problem is, a lot of conflict areas in the world that are
unstable — there are terrorist groups in control — these are also endemic
areas for a lot of diseases. They have foot-and-mouth disease, they have PPR
(goat plague), they have lumpy skin disease, sheep and goat pox, and a lot of
these other diseases,” Goldsmith told his audience during an
agroterrorism seminar at World Dairy Expo earlier this month. “It doesn’t
take a rocket scientist to see what the threat is. We have to realize that
agriculture is a target. I hate to say it, (but) people don’t like
us.”
Goldsmith defined agroterrorism as the use of biological,
chemical, radiological, nuclear or explosive weapons against some
component of the agriculture industry. While any of these weapons of mass
destruction could be deployed, the intentional release of biologics is
the most worrisome because of its potential to damage the economy of the
country and food security.
Goldsmith used foot-and-mouth disease as an example. It is highly
contagious and spreads rapidly.
“If we had one positive or even presumptive diagnosis in the United
States, it would immediately shut down the export of every product live or
processed, food or other products, including semen (and) fetal calf serum
for diagnostic tests. Anything from a susceptible species would be shut
down immediately,” he said.
Another issue with contagious diseases is that most of them are
zoonotic, meaning they can spread among different domestic and wild species
and to humans. Seventy-five percent of emerging diseases are zoonotic, and
60 percent of all diseases that affect humans affect multiple species,
Goldsmith said.
It would be relatively easy for a terrorist to collect infected
material from an endemic area and introduce it into American
agriculture, which Goldsmith described as a soft target. Animals are
often kept close to roads, and crop fields can run for miles without a
fence.
“In Islam, it is against the Koran to attack food, but it is allowed in
the face of an overwhelming force against the jihad,” Goldsmith said. “Thank
heavens they tend to want to blow things up, and it’s harder to do that in the
United States than in other parts of the world, and they haven’t seen
bioterrorism as a credible thing.”
He added that in the U.S., animal rights and environmental activist
groups have committed more acts of terrorism than al-Qaeda has.
While there have been accidental introductions of diseases,
chemicals and invasive pests into agriculture and forestry, the FBI is
keeping tabs on suspicious circumstances that might suggest an
intentional attack. The concentration is on animal diseases, but crop
diseases are also a concern.
“The thing with these diseases, even if you get some of these diseases
and they are controllable, it increases the cost of production
tremendously, especially with some of the fungal (diseases),” he
said.
Goldsmith said the only way to prevent agroterrorism is through
biosecurity, and the only people that can do that are the producers
themselves.
He recommended beefing up physical security like gate and door
locks, being observant of clinical symptoms that are highly unusual in
the livestock herd, doing a thorough screening of new employees and
training them to report concerns, and watching for unusual activity or
unfamiliar people in the area,
“You hate to be suspicious of nice people, but there’s a lot of people
that are not nice that you need to be suspicious of,” Goldsmith said.
If a very unusual outbreak of symptoms shows up among livestock,
notify local or state health authorities immediately. It may not be an
intentional threat, but the FBI is able to track reports and identify
patterns if they exist.
“We don’t want you to lay awake at night, get nervous and have ulcers,
but think about things,” Goldsmith said.
Friday, October 2, 1 p.m.
“Agroterrorism Threat Briefing and Roles of Law Enforcement” Stephen
Goldsmith DVM, WMD Directorate-Biological Countermeasures Unit, HQ, FBI
Sponsored By: Quality Liquid Feeds, Inc. Continuing Education Credits: ARPAS
(1), RACE (1)
Agricultural terrorism is a primarily economic attack against the U.S. that
targets livestock and food crops. This seminar will describe the use of animal
and crop diseases as asymmetrical warfare tools and what the indicators and
triggers of these attacks are. As a longtime employee of the FBI and Army
National Guard and Reserve veteran, Stephan Goldsmith DVM will present the role
of law enforcement and agriculture agencies in the joint investigation of
intentional criminal or terrorist attacks against agriculture. Goldsmith
currently serves in the WMD Directorate-Biological Countermeasures Unit for the
FBI as an agricultural terrorism subject matter expert. Previously, he served
six years in the Hazardous Material Science Response Unit of the FBI Laboratory
Division, and was a Field Veterinary Medical Officer and FAD Diagnostician with
USDA-APHIS-Veterinary Services in Georgia, Bolivia and North Carolina. He also
worked as the Assistant Bureau Chief at the Bureau of Contagious and Infectious
Diseases with the Florida Department of Agriculture State Veterinarian’s Office
as was in private large animal practice in South Georgia for 10 years.
>>> Acts of terrorism against U.S. agriculture are highly
possible, but not highly likely, according to Stephen Goldsmith, a
veterinarian with the Biological Countermeasures Unit of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. <<<
now that is an oxymoron of a statement if I ever heard one.
That kind of mentality is what brought the twin towers down. you sit back
on one’s laurels, and people can die. see ;
USDA, APHIS, FSIS, HHS, ET AL, on animal disease preparedness grade score
= F+.
With Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE prion disease aka mad cow
disease, one mad cow caused total chaos, and to this day, the USA is not, and
has never been prepared.
all one has to do is look at mad cow disease, something these agencies
can’t even say now, but look at that blunder, Larry, Curly, and Moe could have
done a better job.
but that’s what happens when you let the wolf guard the henhouse. industry
governing and regulating itself will never work, especially when all they do is
ignore sound science, for the sake of the industry.
I know that there are a lot of very dedicated folks working for these
federal agencies, and I do applaud them, and I probably have not said that
enough. but, when you have the industry and their lobbyist infiltrated in policy
and decision making for human and animal health, over riding any sound decisions
based on sound science, there lay the problem, and nothing will get fixed as
long as this continues to happen.
ANOTHER CONCERN OF MINE HAS BEEN BIOTERRORISM. please see why ;
Air Traffic passengers, hidden meat products, and mad cow type disease BSE
TSE Prion ;
Docket No: 02-088-1 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002;
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 –0600
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: regulations@aphis.usda.gov Docket No: 02-088-1
Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use,
and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
Greetings,
i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for
biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known
BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA. please be
warned;
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 –0800
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding
system)
MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to
Foot-and-Mouth [Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]
snip...
Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine,
including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or
animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance
with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.
snip...
From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no
impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the
proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the
importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from
those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform
encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants
and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been
in Greece is prohibited.
snip...
========================
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the
country?
Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were
imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to
the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from
ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece
during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and
prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use
were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product. Sources: World
Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country? Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived
to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from
Greece arrived via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine
inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of
agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE;
most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although
one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida,
Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers.
None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a
ranch or farm while in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and
APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
Greetings list members, i just cannot accept this;
> 23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)
> The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
> products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
what kind of statement is this?
how stupid do they think we are?
it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Slovenia?
There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.
APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air
passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could
potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to
Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or
ranch in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the
Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers
originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights. As
part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air
passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural
interest in fiscal year 2000.
Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items
that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items
reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Source: US
Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection
data base
What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from
Austria? Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat,
animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified
species. Source: World Trade Atlas
snip...
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Austria?
A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US
airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria
arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural
quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled
for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat
(non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE.
None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to
visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US. Source: US Dept.
of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ
Greetings FDA and public,
if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check
out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low
number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much
for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.
[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001.
Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat
items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these
passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work
on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]
if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers
with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i
am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers
as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid
me.
[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was
imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS
is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]
more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of
these species are capable of carrying a TSE?
snip...
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from
Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived
in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural
quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled
for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001.
Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat
items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these
passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work
on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base.
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Japan?
Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan
arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers
from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture
quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for
items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an
average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items
were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their
visit to the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from
Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in
Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring,
8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural
interest.
Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of
items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the
passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while
in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE,
FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY. Source: US Department of Transportation, and
APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;
more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';
To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM
POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again
References: <3dc198e3 .8090704="" wt.net=""> Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean
Greetings again List Members, let me kick a madcow around here a bit.
on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding
system. the USDA/APHIS states;
> During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from
> Poland included non-species specific animal products
> used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal
> products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product
> imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant
> material.
NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially
_cross-contamination_, it states;
ANNEX 1 Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001
EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND
STABILITY
The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable
system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from
1987 onwards. This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system
and increased over time. The continuing very high external challenge supported
this development. Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK
Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence
provided on compliance. Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in
cattle feed. BSE surveillance: Not sufficient before 2001. Cross-contamination:
Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time
and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.
see full text and ANNEX 1 at;
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98
FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY
Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET
2003N-0312]
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM
To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov
Cc: ggraber@cvm.fda.gov; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L
Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO
DOCKET 2003N-0312]
Greetings FDA,
my name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr., i lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain
Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease).
i would kindly like to comment on the proposed HACCP method of detecting
and or preventing TSEs in the human/animal feed supply.
it seems to me by implementing something that was designed for Astronauts
instead of cattle, something that the GAO has already stated is terribly flawed
(HACCP), i find it very disturbing to continue to insist on refusing to use
rapid TSE TESTING in sufficient numbers to find TSEs, as with other Countries
that they too once thought they were BSE free. for example, it took Italy 1
MILLION rapid TSE tests since 2001 to find 102 cases of BSE. THE USA has only
tested 48,000 cattle in the 14 years of surveillance. there is documented proof
that indeed the USA cattle have been infected with a TSE for decades, but the
FDA/USDA and other USA Gov. agencies continue to conveniently ignore these
findings. YOU must not ignore what Richard Marsh found. Plus, you must not
ignore Asante/Collinge new findings that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine
genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type
2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD. The USA has been feeding ruminant
by-products back to cattle, deer, elk and sheep for decades, and TSEs in these
species have been recycled for feed for decades in the USA. The rendering
process here in the USA will not kill this agent. to implement any HACCP over
massive rapid TSE testing is only prolonging the inevitable, and will only allow
the agent to spread further. it is simply a band-aid approach to something that
needs a tourniquet...
3. Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety
Rules Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses. GAO-02-902, August
30.
FSIS Is Not Ensuring that Plants' HACCP Plans Meet Regulatory
Requirements
snip...
According to FSIS's food safety systems correlation reviews, inspectors are
not consistently identifying and documenting failures of plants' HACCP plans to
meet regulatory requirements. Furthermore, FSIS does not expect its inspectors
to determine whether HACCP plans are based on sound science--the cornerstone of
an effective plan. While in-depth verification reviews examine the scientific
aspects of HACCP plans, they have been conducted in very few plants, and
consumer safety officers hired to review the scientific soundness of HACCP plans
may take several years to assess the plans at all plants. Moreover, inspectors
in 55 percent of the 5,000 plants nationwide did not document any HACCP
violations during fiscal year 2001. When we brought this information to the
attention of FSIS officials, they were surprised that so many plants had no
HACCP violations for an entire year.
snip...
2. USDA believes that the title of the report is misleading. We disagree.
We believe the title accurately reflects the concerns detailed throughout the
body of the report.
snip...
FDA acknowledges that it has not yet identified and inspected all firms
subject to the ban” pg. 3 ;
The report concludes that “federal actions do not sufficiently ensure that
all BSE-infected animals or products are kept out or that if BSE were found it
would be detected promptly and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or
enter the human food chain” italics added pg. 3 ;
***********2015*********
THE last documented mad cow in the USA was in California, was an Atypical
BSE BASE TSE prion aka mad cow type disease, the most lethal strain documented
to date, and of which has now been linked to sporadic CJD. we have not heard
much about BSE aka mad cow disease, due to the Governments covering up mad cow
disease. all one as to do is look at the BSE MRR, which is a doctrine for the
legal trading of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease
around the globe. you can thank the OIE, USDA, WTO, just to name a few off the
top of my head. it's all about trade folks, nothing else matters, when it comes
to the TSE prion disease, due to the long incubation period, and no trace back
efforts, even though that once clinical, all of the tse prion disease are fatal.
then the federal governments continue to ignore more updated and ongoing sound
science, peer review science, that indeed sporadic cjd is linked to not only
atypical BSE mad cow disease, but also to atypical scrapie i.e the Nor-98 and
typical scrapie as well. or the fact that the 1997 ruminant feed ban aka mad cow
feed ban was and still is a terrible failure. but they don’t print that. ...just
saying. now, you think I am crazy for saying this....now think back to asbestos
and tobacco, and how those two man made killers were covered up for 100 years as
cancer causing and killers, by our fine federal friends. for your fileS, use as
you wish, but it’s the truth as I have come to know it from daily research of
all said science, since my mothers demise to the heidenhain variant of
creutzfeldt jakob disease i.e. hvcjd. ...just made a promise to mom, never
forget, and never let them forget. ...kind regards, terry
Thursday, May 28, 2015
OIE cuts six European countries' mad cow risk level, while increasing risk
factors for humans to the BSE TSE PRION DISEASE around the globe
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation
spontaneous atypical BSE ???
don’t let anyone fool you. spontaneous TSE prion disease is a hoax in
natural cases, never proven.
all one has to do is look at France. France is having one hell of an
epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem
solved $$$ same as the USA, that’s why they stopped testing for BSE mad cow
disease in numbers they could find any with, after those atypical BSE cases
started showing up. shut down the testing to numbers set up by OIE that are so
low, you could only by accident find a case of BSE aka mad cow disease. and this
brilliant idea by the WHO et al, to change the name of mad cow disease, thinking
that might change things is preposterous. it’s all about money now folks, when
the OIE, USDA and everyone else went along and made the TSE prion disease aka
mad cow type disease a legal trading commodity by the BSE MRR policy, I would
say everyone bit off more then they can chew, and they will just have to digest
those TSE Prions coming from North America, and like it, and just prey you don’t
get a mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE
prion disease in the decades to come, and or pass it to some other poor soul via
the iatrogenic medical surgical tissue friendly fire mode of transmission i.e.
second hand transmission. it’s real folks, just not documented much, due to lack
of trace back efforts. all iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, until the
iatrogenic event is tracked down and documented, and put into the academic and
public domain, which very seldom happens. ...
As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been
reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.
FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many
spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$
so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases
in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+
cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with
any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
snip...see link ;
Saturday, May 09, 2015
Expression of genes involved in the T cell signalling pathway in
circulating immune cells of cattle 24 months following oral challenge with
Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE)
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness;
Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC -254 Accepted -
Volume 11
*** PRION 2015 ORAL AND POSTER CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS ***
THANK YOU PRION 2015 TAYLOR & FRANCIS, Professor Chernoff, and
Professor Aguzzi et al, for making these PRION 2015 Congressional Poster and
Oral Abstracts available freely to the public. ...Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation
periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni,
Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys
Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies
reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The
transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that
an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the
absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a
transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are
reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD
summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first
evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic
potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for
BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their
phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to
assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid
origins even after very long silent incubation periods. ***We recently observed
the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after
a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to some reported for
human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than
BSE. ***Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the
third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), ***thus questioning the
origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our
different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended
incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...
===============
***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral
transmission of classical BSE. ***
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to
sheep and human. ***
P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants
and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification
Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama
National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan
To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and
humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion
protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical
scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to
proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding
cyclic amplification (PMCA).
Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from
transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc
seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain
homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion
of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc
seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA
and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested
prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical
and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.
Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports
describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human
transgenic mice, ***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of
H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether
the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
================
==========================================
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to
sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA
products are infectious to these animals.
==========================================
P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE
Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine
Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge;
Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology
Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada
Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and
food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle
and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally
assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to
disease as adults. Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with
100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or
resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and
feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to
neurological disease. At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central
nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were
euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE
rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts
S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing
resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and
PrPsc detection by PMCA only. Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult
cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. We are further examining
explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged
animal.
10 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997
2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
Sunday, June 14, 2015
Larry’s Custom Meats Inc. Recalls Beef Tongue Products That May Contain
Specified Risk Materials BSE TSE Prion
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical
BSE investigations
***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67
PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in
unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure
Posted by flounder on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
Singeltary et al
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these
countries. ***
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular
characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases
from Europe and Japan.
*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated
feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these
countries. ***
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical
BSE investigations
Saturday, September 19, 2015
*** An interview with Professor John Collinge: VIDEO Director of the MRC
Prion Unit Part of the Hayward Gallery's History Is Now ***
Thursday, July 30, 2015
Professor Lacey believes sporadic CJD itself originates from a cattle
infection number of cattle farmers falling victim to Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease is
much too high to be mere chance
Saturday, September 12, 2015
The Canadian Management of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Historical
and Scientific Perspective, 1990-2014
>>>We propose that Canadian policies largely ignored the implicit
medical nature of BSE, treating it as a purely agricultural and veterinary
issue. In this way, policies to protect Canadians were often delayed and
incomplete, in a manner disturbingly reminiscent of Britain’s failed management
of BSE. Despite assurances to the contrary, it is premature to conclude that BSE
(and with it the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) is a thing of
Canada’s past: BSE remains very much an issue in Canada’s present.
<<<
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding
Infected Cattle
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the
farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or
dead dairy cattle...
In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of
animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to
accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the
''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical
incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...
Wednesday, September 23, 2015
NIH Availability for Licensing AGENCY: [FR Doc. 2015–24117 Filed 9–22–15;
8:45 am] Detection and Discrimination of Classical and Atypical L-Type BSE
Strains by RT-QuIC
Thursday, October 1, 2015
H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein
polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle
following intracranial inoculation
Master Obi-Wan Kenobi, Kemosabe...THIS IS NOT GOOD
GOOSE!...grasshopper...tonto...tss
Wednesday, September 16, 2015
Ljubljana Slovenia First Mad Cow Disease Case in Eight Years Confirmed
Saturday, October 3, 2015
Wales Welsh Government Written Statement - Isolated case of Classical
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy detected in deceased bovine
Sunday, October 18, 2015
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Institut Pasteur
Cooperating on animal disease and zoonosis research
Friday, May 29, 2015
GAO FEDERAL VETERINARIANS US Federal Government Is Unprepared for a
Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak
Thursday, September 10, 2015
25th Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory
Committee Food and Drug Administration Silver Spring, Maryland June 1, 2015
PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FT. COLLINS CWD RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS
*** LATE-BREAKING ABSTRACTS PRION 2015 CONFERENCE ***
O18
Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions
Liuting Qing1, Ignazio Cali1,2, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang3, Diane Kofskey1,
Pierluigi Gambetti1, Wenquan Zou1, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve
University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 2Second University of Naples, Naples, Italy,
3Encore Health Resources, Houston, Texas, USA
*** These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect
human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic
human carriers of CWD infection.
==================
***These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect
human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic
human carriers of CWD infection.***
==================
P.105: RT-QuIC models trans-species prion transmission
Kristen Davenport, Davin Henderson, Candace Mathiason, and Edward Hoover
Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA
Conversely, FSE maintained sufficient BSE characteristics to more
efficiently convert bovine rPrP than feline rPrP. Additionally, human rPrP was
competent for conversion by CWD and fCWD.
***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the
barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously
estimated.
================
***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the
barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously
estimated.***
================
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 9:29 PM
To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Subject: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE R. G. WILL 1984
THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE
R. G. WILL
1984
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar
pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK
OF CJD (p = 0.04). (SEE LINK IN REPORT HERE...TSS) PLUS, THE CDC DID NOT PUT
THIS WARNING OUT FOR THE WELL BEING OF THE DEER AND ELK ;
snip...
July's Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article did prod state officials to ask
CDC to investigate the cases of the three men who shared wild game feasts. The
two men the CDC is still investigating were 55 and 66 years old. But there's
also Kevin Boss, a Minnesota hunter who ate Barron County venison and died of
CJD at 41. And there's Jeff Schwan, whose Michigan Tech fraternity brothers used
to bring venison sausage back to the frat house. His mother, Terry, says that in
May 2001, Jeff, 26, began complaining about his vision. A friend noticed
misspellings in his e-mail, which was totally unlike him. Jeff began losing
weight. He became irritable and withdrawn. By the end of June, he couldn't
remember the four-digit code to open the garage door or when and how to feed his
parents' cats. At a family gathering in July, he stuck to his parents and
girlfriend, barely talking. "On the night we took him to the hospital, he was
speaking like he was drunk or high and I noticed his pupils were so dilated I
couldn't see the irises," his mother says. By then, Jeff was no longer able to
do even simple things on his computer at work, and "in the hospital, he couldn't
drink enough water." When he died on September 27, 2001, an autopsy confirmed he
had sporadic CJD.
In 2000, Belay looked into three CJD cases reported by The Denver Post, two
hunters who ate meat from animals killed in Wyoming and the daughter of a hunter
who ate venison from a plant that processed Colorado elk. All three died of CJD
before they were 30 years old. The CDC asked the USDA to kill 1,000 deer and elk
in the area where the men hunted. Belay and others reported their findings in
the Archives of Neurology, writing that although "circumstances suggested a link
between the three cases and chronic wasting disease, they could find no 'causal'
link." Which means, says Belay, "not a single one of those 1,000 deer tested
positive for CWD. For all we know, these cases may be CWD. What we have now
doesn't indicate a connection. That's reassuring, but it would be wrong to say
it will never happen."
So far, says NIH researcher Race, the two Wisconsin cases pinpointed by the
newspaper look like spontaneous CJD. "But we don't know how CWD would look in
human brains. It probably would look like some garden-variety sporadic CJD."
What the CDC will do with these cases and four others (three from Colorado and
Schwan from Upper Michigan), Race says, is "sequence the prion protein from
these people, inject it into mice and wait to see what the disease looks like in
their brains. That will take two years."
CJD is so rare in people under age 30, one case in a billion (leaving out
medical mishaps), that four cases under 30 is "very high," says Colorado
neurologist Bosque. "Then, if you add these other two from Wisconsin [cases in
the newspaper], six cases of CJD in people associated with venison is very, very
high." Only now, with Mary Riley, there are at least seven, and possibly eight,
with Steve, her dining companion. "It's not critical mass that matters,"
however, Belay says. "One case would do it for me." The chance that two people
who know each other would both contact CJD, like the two Wisconsin sportsmen, is
so unlikely, experts say, it would happen only once in 140 years.
Given the incubation period for TSEs in humans, it may require another
generation to write the final chapter on CWD in Wisconsin. "Does chronic wasting
disease pass into humans? We'll be able to answer that in 2022," says Race.
Meanwhile, the state has become part of an immense experiment.
I urge everyone to watch this video closely...terry
*** you can see video here and interview with Jeff's Mom, and scientist
telling you to test everything and potential risk factors for humans ***
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic
potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human
PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests
that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP
codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in
the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies. ***
Wednesday, October 07, 2015
Deer Prion Proteins Modulate the Emergence and Adaptation of Chronic
Wasting Disease Strains
Saturday, October 03, 2015
TEXAS CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION GOD MUST NOT BE A TEXAN 2002 TO
2015
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
*** Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings
***
Last updated 15 May 2015
Monday, August 17, 2015
FDA Says Endoscope Makers Failed to Report Superbug Problems OLYMPUS
I told Olympus 15 years ago about these risk factors from endoscopy
equipment, disinfection, even spoke with the Doctor at Olympus, this was back in
1999. I tried to tell them that they were exposing patients to dangerous
pathogens such as the CJD TSE prion, because they could not properly clean them.
even presented my concern to a peer review journal GUT, that was going to
publish, but then it was pulled by Professor Michael Farthing et al... see ;
*** now, from all the consumption and exposure above, now think iatrogenic
cjd tse prion at a hospital near you, what if?
Thursday, August 13, 2015
Iatrogenic CJD due to pituitary-derived growth hormone with genetically
determined incubation times of up to 40 years
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***
THE BAXTER STUDY...SEE MORE HERE ;
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee TSEAC MEETING
SCHEDULED FOR June 1, 2015
Tuesday, August 4, 2015
*** FDA U.S. Measures to Protect Against BSE ***
Saturday, September 19, 2015
*** An interview with Professor John Collinge: VIDEO Director of the MRC
Prion Unit Part of the Hayward Gallery's History Is Now ***
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease
*** Kuru Video
Kuru: The Science and The Sorcery
*** Scrapie Video
*** Human Mad Cow Video
*** USA sporadic CJD MAD COW DISEASE HAS HUGE PROBLEM Video
Saturday, March 21, 2015
***Canada and United States Creutzfeldt Jakob TSE Prion Disease Incidence
Rates Increasing ***
CANADA SEE STEADY INCREASE OF THE SPORADIC CJD’S AND THE VPSPR’S (sporadic
CJD’s). ...tss
PLEASE NOTE, type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD)
in Canada is also on a steady increase.
please see ;
> 3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is
pending.
CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122
As of May 31, 2012
Deaths of Definite and Probable CJD
Year Sporadic Iatrogenic Familial GSS FFI vCJD Total
1994 2 0 0 1 0 0 3
1995 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
1996 13 0 0 0 0 0 13
1997 16 0 1 1 0 0 18
1998 22 1 0 1 0 0 24
1999 26 2 2 1 0 0 31
2000 32 0 0 3 0 0 35
2001 27 0 2 1 0 0 30
2002 31 0 2 2 0 1 36
2003 27 1 1 0 0 0 29
2004 42 0 1 0 0 0 43
2005 42 0 0 2 0 0 44
2006 39 0 1 3 1 0 44
2007 35 0 0 4 0 0 39
2008 48 0 1 0 0 0 49
2009 48 0 3 2 0 0 53
2010 34 0 3 0 0 0 37
2011 37 0 2 1 0 1 41
2012 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 525 4 19 22 1 2 573
1. CJDSS began in 1998
2. Data before 1998 are retrospective and partial, data from 1998 to 2008
are complete, and data for 2009 - 2012 are provisional
3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is
pending.
CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122
As of May 31, 2012
SEE DECEMBER 2012 CANADA
Saturday, June 15, 2013
Canada Fraser Health Statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease outbreak
===========================
Sunday, December 14, 2014
ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report
===========================
Friday, October 09, 2015
An alarming presentation level II trauma center of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease following a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14,
2001 JAMA
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1
reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD)
has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported
cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that
misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of
persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although
only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination
necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD
reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be
reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323.
Thursday, October 1, 2015
Alzheimergate, re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology
and cerebral amyloid angiopathy, Singeltary Submission to Nature
Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential
Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease
Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3,
2014
*** IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ***
Singeltary comment ;
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
please note, I tried to forward this to the FBI, spoke with several folks
at FBI headquarters, and they were not interested...just saying...terry
TSS
