BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread
Robert A. SomervilleKaren FernieAllister SmithKeith BishopBen C. MaddisonKevin C. GoughEmail authorNora HunterEmail author
Open AccessOriginal Article
First Online: 24 February 2019
Abstract
The carcasses of animals infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), scrapie or chronic wasting disease (CWD) that remain in the environment (exposed or buried) may continue to act as reservoirs of infectivity. We conducted two experiments under near-field conditions to investigate the survival and dissemination of BSE infectivity after burial in a clay or sandy soil. BSE infectivity was either contained within a bovine skull or buried as an uncontained bolus of BSE-infected brain. Throughout the five-year period of the experiment, BSE infectivity was recovered in similar amounts from heads exhumed annually from both types of soil. Very low levels of infectivity were detected in the soil immediately surrounding the heads, but not in samples remote from them. Similarly, there was no evidence of significant lateral movement of infectivity from the buried bolus over 4 years although there was a little vertical movement in both directions. However, bioassay analysis of limited numbers of samples of rain water that had drained through the bolus clay lysimeter indicated that infectivity was present in filtrates. sPMCA analysis also detected low levels of PrPSc in the filtrates up to 25 months following burial, raising the concern that leakage of infectivity into ground water could occur. We conclude that transmissible spongiform encephalopathy infectivity is likely to survive burial for long periods of time, but not to migrate far from the site of burial unless a vector or rain water drainage transports it. Risk assessments of contaminated sites should take these findings into account.
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Discussion The resistance of TSE infectivity to inactivation is well documented [12, 29], as is the apparent long-term survival of scrapie on pastures [30]. Therefore, the question of disposal of carcasses of BSE-affected cattle is of considerable concern in the UK. Burial of farm animals that are found dead has been prohibited by the EU Animal By-Products Regulations since May 2002. However, there are exemptions to the rules. If animals die in remote locations where transport to processing plants is difficult or impossible, these are allowed to be buried on farm (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/fallen-stock). In addition, when there is a catastrophic epizootic, mass burial may be a necessary option, as it was during the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the UK in 2001 [22]. Rules issued by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) do advise burial as an option for fallen stock but also state that this process should be limited by a comprehensive list of factors such as soil depth and the need to prevent drainage into the water table and hence into drinking water (https://www.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_response/tools/on-site/htdocs/images/nahems_disposal.pdf). With regard to the UK, it is entirely likely that BSE-infected cattle carcasses remain decomposing in soil. To address possible concerns that BSE infectivity may disseminate from such burial sites, we have looked to model the burial and spread of BSE infectivity within field-scale experiments using animal bioassay as the primary read-out.
We have used rodent-passaged BSE (301V) as the BSE agent, as at the outset of this study it allowed known amounts of infectivity at high titre to be used and also had an accompanying mouse bioassay with relatively short incubation periods [23]. This rodent-passaged BSE has been shown to have very similar stability to cattle BSE, as measured by infectivity, under relatively low-stringency inactivation conditions, such as incubation with acid or SDS [31]. However, it shows less stability than cattle BSE under high-stringency conditions, for example, autoclaving or incubation with acid in combination with SDS [31]. The conditions in the present study are likely to cause relatively low levels of inactivation, and so 301V is likely to reflect cattle BSE stability. However, even if conditions are more favourable to prion inactivation than anticipated, the presence of 301V prion will still represent the survival of cattle BSE. Infected brain macerate was buried in large volumes of soil in lysimeters and placed either within the heads of cattle or as an unprotected bolus. Heads were buried for 5 years, and boluses for 4 years. We also tested the rainwater that eluted through glass fibre filters at the bottom of the lysimeters. Weather conditions included high amounts of rain and a range of temperatures (from – 11 °C in December 2010 to + 28 °C in July 2009).
These two experiments were designed to demonstrate what could happen to TSE infectivity when buried in near-natural conditions. There is an increasing amount of information on survival/degeneration of infectivity and/or PrPSc in brain homogenates mixed with various soils and therefore in full contact with soil particles and micro-organisms [32]. In the present study, brain macerates were used, and the tissue was buried in the form of undispersed boluses so that soil/micro-organism contact was at best around the outer edges of the bolus sample or, when inside the cows’ heads, not in immediate contact with the sample. Studies from other labs have also attempted to investigate the survival and/or destruction of TSE infectivity and PrPSc in simulated conditions which might occur in soil. For example, repeated cycles (n = 10) of drying and wetting resulted in reduction in detectable levels of PrPSc and infectivity from TME-affected hamster brain homogenates mixed with clay loam [33]. However, survival of infectivity may be different in the semi-protected conditions provided by being inside an animal carcass or in a solid bolus unmixed with soil. Here, we have shown that high levels of TSE infectivity can, and probably in most circumstances do, survive in brain tissue underground for very long periods of time – at least five years in this case – without significant loss of TSE infectivity. For example, we found that high levels of TSE infectivity were readily detected in cattle skull contents at similar levels each year for five years. Data also showed only limited migration from the site of deposition; infectivity was present in limited samples at 25 cm distance from the burial site, and up to 20 cm above the site and 50 cm below it. However, PrPSc was detectable by sPMCA in extracts of filters through which had drained a proportion of the water eluting from a 42.4-m3 clay lysimeter. PrPSc-positive samples were found up to 25 months after the burial of the 301V bolus sample. These data confirmed limited bioassay data that found infectivity in a filter extract sample taken at 25 months, one of two samples analysed. These results suggest a risk of spread of infection into watercourses if burial sites are not contained properly.
Our studies did not test the wide variety of soil chemistries and environmental conditions that might be encountered by TSE infectivity when deposited into soil. Nevertheless, these results should be taken into account when considering the future use and possible remediation of sites where BSE infectivity has been deposited. It should be assumed that high levels of BSE remain even after many years.
WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 2012
PO-248: TSE infectivity survives burial for five years with little reduction in titer
Allister Smith, Robert Somerville, Karen Fernie The Roslin Institute and R(D)SVS; University of Edinburgh; Edinburgh, UK
BSE infected animals, BSE-contaminated materials and other sources of TSE (prion) infection, such as carcasses from scrapie infected sheep, CWD infected deer and cadavers of individuals infected with CJD may all end up in the environment through burial or other methods of disposal. They may continue to act as a reservoir of TSE infectivity if cattle or other susceptible animals were to be exposed to these sources in the future. In order to address these concerns, we performed two large scale demonstration experiments under field conditions which were designed to mimic some of the ways by which TSE infected materials may have been disposed of. The project examined the fate of TSE infectivity over a period of five years in two scenarios; when the infectivity was contained within bovine heads and when the infectivity was buried without any containment. Two soil types were compared: a sandy loam and a clay loam. We used the 301V TSE strain which was derived by serial passage of BSE in VM mice.
TSE infectivity was recovered from all the heads exhumed annually for five years from both types of soil, with little reduction in the amount of infectivity throughout the period of the experiment. Small amounts of infectivity were found in the soil immediately surrounding the heads, but not in samples remote from them. Similarly there was no evidence of significant lateral movement of infectivity from the buried bolus. However large amounts of TSE infectivity were recovered at the site of burial of both boluses. There was limited vertical upward movement of infectivity from the bolus buried in clay soil and downward movement from the bolus buried in sandy soil.
Now that these experiments are completed we conclude that TSE infectivity is likely to survive burial for long periods of time with minimal loss of infectivity and restricted movement from the site of burial. These experiments emphasize that the environment is a viable reservoir for retaining large quantities of TSE infectivity, and reinforce the importance of risk assessment when disposing of this type of infectious material.
''Rules issued by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) do advise burial as an option for fallen stock but also state that this process should be limited by a comprehensive list of factors such as soil depth and the need to prevent drainage into the water table and hence into drinking water ( https://www.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_response/tools/on-site/htdocs/images/nahems_disposal.pdf ). With regard to the UK, it is entirely likely that BSE-infected cattle carcasses remain decomposing in soil. To address possible concerns that BSE infectivity may disseminate from such burial sites, we have looked to model the burial and spread of BSE infectivity within field-scale experiments using animal bioassay as the primary read-out.''
meanwhile, back at the ranch with larry, curly, and mo at USDA ET AL ON BSE ALABAMA STYLE
Epidemiology Update March 23, 2006
As of today, 13 locations and 32 movements of cattle have been examined with 27 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of locations and herds will continue. In addition, state and federal officials have confirmed that a black bull calf was born in 2005 to the index animal (the red cow). The calf was taken by the owner to a local stockyard in July 2005 where the calf died. The calf was appropriately disposed of in a local landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain. http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
> The calf was appropriately disposed of in a local
> landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
well, back at the ranch with larry, curly and mo heading up the USDA et al, what would you expect, nothing less than shoot, shovel and shut the hell up. no mad cow in USA, feed ban working, no civil war in Iraq either.
SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;
meanwhile, back at the ranch with larry, curly, and mo at USDA ET AL ON BSE ALABAMA STYLE
IT'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have been at the helm of the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH et al for many many years, or the incompetence of these agencies are so inept, either through ignorance and or just too overweight with industry reps., they then should be all done away with and a single agency brought forth, and if not, how will you correct this ongoing problem ?
Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries Policy Concerning the Disposal of Dead Farm Animals and the Disposal Offal from Custom Slaughter Facilities Updated: October 1, 2010
Statement of Need and Purpose:
The death of farm animals is a normal and inevitable part of livestock production. Due to human health, nuisance and environmental concerns, it is necessary to provide this policy as guidance to producers who have questions as to the lawful disposal of deceased farm animals.
The slaughter of cattle, goats, deer etc. is performed by licensed commercial slaughter facilities across Alabama. These slaughter facilities follow the guidelines of the Meat Inspection program. The systematic disposal of the offal or non‐edible by‐products from these activities has historically been rendering. In addition to the existing USDA regulations that require the removal of specified risk materials (SRMS) in cattle 30 months of age and older processed for human food, recent changes in FDA federal regulations, specific to BSE concerns found in CFR 21 589.2001, requires the additional removal of certain cattle material prohibited in animal feed (CMPAF) and will make the rendering of specific portions of the by‐products utilized for all animal feed unlawful. Rendering companies have responded in various ways; from refusal to accept offal entirely to the imposition of requirements for waste separation and liability insurance requirements. This policy lists options for these slaughter facilities.
Disposal of Dead Farm Animals Carcasses of farm animals meet the definition of a “solid waste” in the regulations of the Alabama Department of Environment Management, Division of Solid Waste Management found at www.adem.state.al.us. It is recommended that producers dispose of carcasses within 24 hours of discovery of the dead animal, regardless of weather conditions. The State Veterinarian with the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries is responsible for approving methods or systems of dead animal carcass disposal. Adequate records should be kept that document all actions taken during the complete disposal process. Therefore, owners of livestock have several options for dealing with dead farm animals. They are as follows:
On‐Farm Burial: According to Section 3-1-28 of the Code of Alabama: Burial or burning of bodies of dead animals generally; burning of hogs dying from cholera, etc.; failure to burn or bury dead animal,etc.
All owners or custodians of animals which die or are killed in their possession or custody, other than such as are slaughtered for food, within 24 hours shall cause the bodies of such animals to be burned or buried at least two feet below the surface of the ground. Hogs dying from cholera or any other disease whatsoever shall be burned. No such animal shall be burned or buried sufficiently near a residence or residences as to create a nuisance. Any person violating this section, whether by failure to burn or bury an animal dying or being killed in his possession or by causing the same to be burned in such proximity to a dwelling or in such other way as to become a nuisance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction, shall be fined not more than $50.00.
Burial should conform to the recommendations of the US Department of Agriculture‐Natural Resources Conservation Service found at:
When burying on farm, the disposal site should be evaluated for the following: • soil type
• depth to bedrock
• presence of fractured or cavernous bedrock
• depth to seasonal high water table 1/
• flooding hazard
• proximity to waterbodies (rivers, streams, ponds, lakes, etc.)
• proximity to wells
• distance to public areas
If the potential exists for animals such as coyotes, dogs, possums, etc., to dig into the burial or composting site, either use more than the two feet of cover material recommended or use an appropriate fence to exclude these type animals.
Site Approval Contact the local NRCS office for an on-site assessment to establish a suitable burial site. In the event of a catastrophic loss, notify the state veterinarian for approval to use the burial site prior to disposal. Site Evaluation Criteria Dead animal burial sites should be: • at least 300 ft. up gradient or 150 ft. down gradient from any well
• at least 165 ft. from a property line or public use area
• at least 100 ft. from a water body, stream, or drainageway
• no closer than 2 ft. to bedrock or the seasonal high water table 1/
• in soils with a permeability of less than 2.0 in/hr (soils with greater permeability will be avoided or will have a liner installed)
Burial Procedure Burial sites are to be excavated an appropriate depth for the specific soil and geologic conditions. The maximum size of the burial excavation should be 0.1 acre (about 4,400 sq. ft.). Multiple excavations may be needed. Carcasses of large animals (hogs, cattle, etc.) should be placed in a layer one carcass thick and covered with a minimum of two feet of soil. For deep soils (where bedrock is not a concern), carcasses and soil can be placed in multiple layers up to a total depth of eight feet. The burial site should be mounded with a covering of at least two feet of soil, and surface water should be diverted from the mound. The site should be vegetated immediately after completion to prevent erosion of the soil covering. For pits that are 4 to 5 ft. deep, a step or bench 18 in. wide and 1 ft. deep will be dug around the perimeter of the main pit so the remaining vertical wall will not exceed 4 feet. For pits greater than five feet deep, the earthen wall shall be sloped at 1.5 horizontal to 1 vertical or flatter.
Landfill Disposal at a landfill permitted by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) may be an option in some locations. Here is a link to a list of ADEM permitted landfills. http://www.adem.state.al.us/programs/land/landforms/MSWLFsMasterList9-19-07.pdf
Catastrophic Losses: The State Veterinarian with the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries should be notified of catastrophic losses of livestock. If on-site burial is unsuitable, landfilling, composting, or rendering may be the only options viable in the event of catastrophic livestock losses.
Composting An alternative to burial is composting in windrows, bins made with large hay bales, or static piles. Composting must be done under a roof or other suitable cover to prevent runoff contamination. Plastic sheeting (minimum 6 mil thick) may be used if secured properly to remain in place in high wind, no outside runoff will contact the plastic, and runoff leaving the site passes through a filter strip. Suitable bulking materials include chicken litter, sawdust, peanut hulls, straw, small wood chips, etc. Maximizing carcass contact with the bulking material will improve composting efficiency. Water may need to be added during the carcass and bulking material layering process when using dry bulking material. All composting processes should begin by placing 12 in. of bulking material on the ground. All carcass layers should be no more than one carcass thick. After the layering process is complete, cover the last layer with a minimum of one foot of bulking material.
Windrows Windrow composting is best suited for small animal carcasses and may require specialized equipment to turn the compost for subsequent stages. The base for windrowing should be approximately six feet wide. Place a layer of carcasses and cover with an equal thickness of bulking material. Add additional layers to a total depth of about three feet above ground.
Hay Bale Bins Place the bales end-to-end to form walls for three-sided enclosures. Excessively large bins should be avoided. A layout of two to three bales deep and three bales wide is the suggested size. Each layer of carcasses should be covered with an equal depth of bulking material. Fill the bins with alternating layers of carcasses and bulking material.
Static Piles Build the pile with alternating layers of carcasses and bulking material. Each layer of carcasses should be covered with an equal depth of bulking material.
Maintenance Inspect the compost process daily for signs of cover damage, spillage, leaching, etc. Add bulking material for cover as the composting material settles. The composting process will work best when the moisture content is 50% to 60% by weight (similar to a damp sponge with no free water present). Water may need to be added when compost is turned. Daily temperature monitoring is recommended to ensure adequate temperatures of 130°-150°F have occurred. As the temperature reaches a peak between 130°-150ºF and begins to decline, turn the compost for it to undergo a second composting stage. Any animal parts exposed in this process should be covered with additional bulking material. Allow two additional months before land applying this material. If raw animal parts are evident after the second composting stage, a third compost cycle will be required. The compost should be land-applied at agronomic rates using appropriate guidelines and best management practices.
References NRCS AL Conservation Practice Standard Code 316 - Animal Mortality Facility Code 317 - Composting Facility Code 393 - Filter Strip Code 590 - Nutrient Management AL Job Sheets AL 317 - Composting Poultry Mortality AL 317A - Composting Swine Mortality Form AL CNMP 1 ADEM Admin. Code Ch. 335-6-7 (AFO/CAFO Program) ADEM Admin. Code Div. 335-13 (Solid Waste Program) 1/ Seasonal high water table is defined as a zone of saturation at the highest average depth during the wettest season.
Disposal Options for Poultry Mortality Management: Under development.
Disposal Options for Slaughter Facilities Deer Only Processing Facilities Since the new rules only restrict byproducts from cattle, no changes will be necessary for facilities that only process deer. Cattle Slaughter and Processing Facilities Option 1. If you currently use a renderer for the disposal of the non‐edible byproducts from your operation and your renderer certifies to you (in writing) that they do not process the byproducts into any animal feed, no changes to your operation are required.
Option 2. If you currently use a renderer for the disposal of the non‐edible byproducts from your operation and your renderer has refused to accept any byproducts from your facility in the future, your options are disposal in a permitted landfill, incineration, or composting.
Option 3. If you currently use a renderer for the disposal of the non‐edible byproducts from your operation and your renderer is willing to accept the non‐restricted byproducts, then you must separate the restricted byproducts of the slaughtered cattle (brain and spinal cord) from the other offal. There are certification requirements on the slaughter facility and the renderer included in the new rules that must be followed. The restricted byproducts may be disposed in a permitted landfill, incinerated, or composted. If the owner of the slaughtered cow also owns a farm, the restricted byproducts may be transferred back to him for on‐farm disposal.
Option 4. If you slaughter cattle that are less than 30 months of age only and the renderer agrees to accept the non‐edible byproducts from your operation based on this fact. It is important to understand that all the non‐edible byproducts of cattle slaughtering and processing can be taken by a renderer and used for other purposes. The new FDA rule restricts the rendering of Cattle Materials Prohibited in Animal Food or Feed (CMPAF) including brains and spinal cords of cattle older than 30 months into all animal feed.
Additional information for ADEM permitted landfills: County Landfill Accept Livestock Carcasses Fee Comments/Contact # Baldwin Magnolia Sanitary Landfill YES YES 251-972-6878 Cherokee Three Corners Regional Landfill YES YES Call in advance 256-447-1881 Coffee Coffee County Sanitary Landfill YES YES 334-897-6773 Cullman Cullman Environmental Waste Management Center YES YES 256-257-0487 Dekalb Sand Valley Landfill YES YES 256-524-3208 Escambia Timberlands Sanitary Landfill YES YES Must have veterinarian certification that livestock is disease free 251-867-8921 Houston City of Dothan Sanitary Landfill YES YES 334-615-3820 Jackson Scottsboro Landfill YES YES 256-259-5548 Lauderdale Lauderdale County Solid Waste YES Residents not charged 256-760-5878 Lauderdale Florence Municipal Solid Waste Landfill YES YES Only accept livestock from within city limits 256-760-6495 Lawrence Morris Farm Sanitary Landfill YES YES 256-637-9211 Lee Salem Waste Disposal Center YES YES 334-663-1935 Limestone Seven Mile Post Road MSW Landfill Transfer station to Morris Farm Sanitary Landfill 256-233-6400 Mobile Chastang Sanitary Landfill YES YES 251-829-4006 Montgomery North Montgomery Landfill YES YES 334-240-4526 Morgan Morgan County Sanitary Landfill YES YES 256-355-3176
Perry Perry County Associates Landfill YES YES Negotiable 770-652-2273 Pike Brundidge Landfill LLC YES YES 334-735-5885 St. Clair Veolia ES Cedar Hill Landfill, Inc. YES YES 205-338-7821 St. Clair Veolia ES Star Ridge Landfill, Inc. YES YES 205-640-1799 Shelby Highway 70 Landfill YES YES Call in advance 205-669-3737 Tuscaloosa Black Warrior Solid Waste Facility YES YES 205-339-7330 Walker Pine View Sanitary Landfill YES YES 205-648-1000
Roadside Mortalities It is the responsibility of the owners of livestock to maintain fencing and property so as to prevent access to state and county roadways. In the event livestock gain access to roadways and are killed or injured to the point of humane euthanasia, the following guidelines should be implemented. -State and/or local responders should attempt to find livestock owner. It is the responsibility of the owner to properly dispose of carcasses.
-If the carcasses are on the state or county right of way, state and/or county responders should assist in the disposal. This may include burial on state/county/private property following land burial guidelines or transported to a permitted landfill. (See above chart) Other methods of disposal may be used under the direction of the State Veterinarian.
http://agi.alabama.gov/docs/default-source/Animal-Health/alabamalivestockdisposalpolicy.doc?sfvrsn=2
BSE found in Alabama Posted April 1, 2006 Tests results for a cow on an Alabama farm were positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, according to a March 13 statement by the Department of Agriculture. The animal, which was euthanized and buried on the farm, did not enter the human food or animal feed supplies.
USDA Chief Veterinarian John Clifford said the department was working with Alabama animal health officials to conduct an epidemiologic investigation to gather any further information on the origin of the cow. The cow had resided on the Alabama farm for less than a year.
A western blot test conducted at the USDA National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, on samples from the cow confirmed the infection. The western blot test is one of two confirmatory tests that the USDA uses to determine whether an animal is infected with BSE. The other test is the immunohistochemistry test.
Officials said the cow was believed to be about 10 years old, indicating that it was born prior to the implementation of the Food and Drug Administration's 1997 animal feed ban. "Older animals are more likely to have been exposed to contaminated feed circulating before the FDA's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding practices, which scientific research has indicated is the most likely route for BSE transmission," Dr. Clifford said.
FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 2019
Mad cow testing in Alabama halted by government shutdown while mad deer disease CWD is spreading in the USA like wildfire
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net)
Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary
Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000265/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas......
I thought it might be interesting for those of you who have not seen this plan, to do so. So here it is...........
The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to enhance the quality of life for the American people by supporting production agriculture; ensuring a safe, affordable, nutritious, and accessible food supply; caring for agricultural, forest, and range lands; supporting sound development of rural communities; providing economic opportunities for farm and rural residents; expanding global markets for agricultural and forest products and services; and working to reduce hunger in America and throughout the world.
USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants. APHIS improves agricultural productivity and competitiveness and contributes to the national economy and the public health. USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for protecting the Nation's meat and poultry supply--making sure it is safe, wholesome, unadulterated, and properly labeled and packaged. These two agencies have come together to lead USDA's actions in the prevention, monitoring, and control of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. livestock and food supply.
The public knows BSE as "MAD COW DISEASE", a disease linked to human cases of new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). USDA knows BSE as the disease that devastated the livestock industry in the United Kingdom and shattered consumer confidence in Europe. BSE has affected international trade and all aspects of the animal and public health communities. It has called even greater attention to the U.S. Government's accountability for a safe food supply.
No case of BSE has ever been found in the United States. Since 1989, USDA has had a number of stringent safeguards in place to prevent BSE from entering the country. USDA conducts an ongoing, comprehensive interagency surveillance program for BSE. This surveillance program allows USDA to monitor actively for BSE to ensure immediate detection in the event that BSE were to be introduced into the United States. Immediate detection allows for swift response. As an emergency preparedness measure, USDA has developed this BSE Response Plan to be initiated in the event that a case of BSE is diagnosed in the United States. The Plan details comprehensive instructions for USDA staff as to who is to do what, when, where, and how in the event that BSE were to be diagnosed in the United States.
BACKGROUND
APHIS is responsible for being prepared for potential FOREIGN animal disease outbreaks. The purpose of such preparation is to provide a step-by-step plan of action in the event that a FOREIGN animal disease, such as BSE, is detected in the United States. These plans, often referred to as "RED BOOKS", provide guidance by outlining certain actions that should take place, such as identification of a suspect animal, laboratory confirmation, epidemiologic investigation, and animal and herd disposition activities. Copies of Red Books for specific FOREIGN animal diseases are distributed to agency headquarters and each regional and field office to have in preparation for a disease outbreak.
In 1990, APHIS developed a plan to respond to a confirmation of BSE in the United States. In August 1996, a joint APHIS-FSIS working group updated the BSE Red Book in accordance with current science and research surrounding BSE and the related family of disease called transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE's). The BSE Red Book is officially entitled BSE EMERGENCY DISEASE GUIDELINES.
The APHIS-FSIS working group determined that the BSE Red Book, which detailed laboratory and field activities to be carried out in an emergency, needed another component. After the March 1996 announcement by the United Kingdom that BSE was linked to nvCJD, it became apparent to the working group that the Plan needed to address communication issues, both internally within USDA and the Federal Government and externally to the public at large. A confirmed case of BSE would affect such a vast array of stakeholders-consumers, cattle producers, the food animal industry, international trading partners, animal and public health communities, media, and others. Having clear, accurate information readily available would build trust and credibility and facilitate any response measures needed. There needed to be a notification plan. Who was responsible for notifying who, what, when, and how? The plan needed to identify clear channels of communication as to ensure immediate collection and dissemination of accurate information.
The joint APHIS--FSIS working group became formally known as the BSE Response Team and is responsible for the development of this BSE Response Response Plan. BSE Response Team members represent a mix of backgrounds and expertise, including veterinary medicine, food safety, public health, epidemiology, pathology, international trade, and public affairs. The Team is coordinatied by two Team Leaders, one each from APHIS and FSIS, who serve as liaisons and technical advisors to their respective agencies on regulations and policies regarding BSE. Over the past 2 years, the BSE Response Plan has been reviewed, edited, revised, and approved by officials at all levels of APHIS, FSIS, and USDA. The Plan has also been shared with other Government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and other stakeholders, such as the Animal Ag Coalition. The BSE Response Team monitors and assesses all ongoing events and research findings regarding TSE's. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that prevention and diagnostic measures are continually revised and adjusted as new information and knowledge become available.
NOTIFICATION: Roles and Responsibilities
Surveillance
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October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-40
7.7 Disposal Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass. Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may consider other disposal methods.
7.7.1 Incineration Incineration, although more expensive than burial, is the preferred disposal method for BSE-suspect carcasses. Federal, State, and local environmental regulations may restrict the use of this method and permits may be necessary. As soon as BSE suspects are reported to APHIS, field personnel should investigate the location and availability of incinerators of sufficient size to process a bovine carcass. Institutions likely to have incinerators include State and university diagnostic laboratories, waste contractors, large municipalities, and private industries. Ideally, the diagnostic laboratory where the pathologic examination was done will have incineration facilities. The BSE-suspect carcass disposal is APHIS' responsibility (not the diagnostic laboratory's). Field personnel should arrange for transportation and final disposal of the suspect carcass and should inform their supervisors and/or the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer of these arrangements.
Personnel should be aware that some laboratories dispose of carcasses by rendering and should specifically inquire if this is the case. CNS suspects should be incinerated or held from rendering until a diagnosis of BSE can be ruled out. Under no circumstances may BSE susuects be sent to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
Field personnel should be prepared to accompany the carcass from the farm of origin to the diagnostic laboratory and then to the disposal site if any doubt exists concerning the final disposal method.
7.7.2 Burial If there are no other avenues for carcass disposal, burial of BSE-suspect carcasses may be an acceptable disposal method. APHIS field personnel should inquire with environmental authorities concerning Federal, State, and local regulations that may impose restrictions on this method.
The burial site may be on the affected farm, at the diagnostic laboratory where the carcass is examined, or in a local landfill. The site should be inaccessible to animals, removed from populated areas, not used for agricultural purposes, clearly marked, and properly protected.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-41
Burial sites should also be located a sufficient distance from underground utility lines, septic systems, water wells, and surface water. Local environmental or public works officers may be helpful in locating a satisfactory site.
Field personnel should consult with their supervisors and/or the READEO Environmental Impact Officer before digging. Burial trenches are normally at least 9 feet deep with floor dimensions of 7 by 2 feet per adult bovine carcass. Carcasses should be covered with at least 6 feet of soil. This soil should not be tightly packed because gas formation may cause a tightly packed trench to crack and leak.
7.7.3 Rendering Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
7.7.4 Other Disposal Methods The AVIC, the State animal health officials, and the READEO Director may recommend other methods of disposal to the Deputy Administer, VS, for approval (9 CFR 53.4). Options for disposal must be discussed and approved by VS, Emergency Programs staff and must comply with all State and local Environmental Protection Agency regulations.
7.8 Cleaning and Disinfecting (C&D)
snip...see full text;
*** Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States
February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)
Tuesday, July 14, 2009 U.S.
*** Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book
Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
***> This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.
Rapid recontamination of a farm building occurs after attempted prion removal
Kevin Christopher Gough, BSc (Hons), PhD1, Claire Alison Baker, BSc (Hons)2, Steve Hawkins, MIBiol3, Hugh Simmons, BVSc, MRCVS, MBA, MA3, Timm Konold, DrMedVet, PhD, MRCVS3 and Ben Charles Maddison, BSc (Hons), PhD2
Abstract
The transmissible spongiform encephalopathy scrapie of sheep/goats and chronic wasting disease of cervids are associated with environmental reservoirs of infectivity.
Preventing environmental prions acting as a source of infectivity to healthy animals is of major concern to farms that have had outbreaks of scrapie and also to the health management of wild and farmed cervids.
Here, an efficient scrapie decontamination protocol was applied to a farm with high levels of environmental contamination with the scrapie agent.
Post-decontamination, no prion material was detected within samples taken from the farm buildings as determined using a sensitive in vitro replication assay (sPMCA).
A bioassay consisting of 25 newborn lambs of highly susceptible prion protein genotype VRQ/VRQ introduced into this decontaminated barn was carried out in addition to sampling and analysis of dust samples that were collected during the bioassay.
Twenty-four of the animals examined by immunohistochemical analysis of lymphatic tissues were scrapie-positive during the bioassay, samples of dust collected within the barn were positive by month 3.
The data illustrates the difficulty in decontaminating farm buildings from scrapie, and demonstrates the likely contribution of farm dust to the recontamination of these environments to levels that are capable of causing disease.
snip...
As in the authors' previous study,12 the decontamination of this sheep barn was not effective at removing scrapie infectivity, and despite the extra measures brought into this study (more effective chemical treatment and removal of sources of dust) the overall rates of disease transmission mirror previous results on this farm. With such apparently effective decontamination (assuming that at least some sPMCA seeding ability is coincident with infectivity), how was infectivity able to persist within the environment and where does infectivity reside? Dust samples were collected in both the bioassay barn and also a barn subject to the same decontamination regime within the same farm (but remaining unoccupied). Within both of these barns dust had accumulated for three months that was able to seed sPMCA, indicating the accumulation of scrapie-containing material that was independent of the presence of sheep that may have been incubating and possibly shedding low amounts of infectivity.
This study clearly demonstrates the difficulty in removing scrapie infectivity from the farm environment. Practical and effective prion decontamination methods are still urgently required for decontamination of scrapie infectivity from farms that have had cases of scrapie and this is particularly relevant for scrapiepositive goatherds, which currently have limited genetic resistance to scrapie within commercial breeds.24 This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.
Acknowledgements The authors thank the APHA farm staff, Tony Duarte, Olly Roberts and Margaret Newlands for preparation of the sheep pens and animal husbandry during the study. The authors also thank the APHA pathology team for RAMALT and postmortem examination.
Funding This study was funded by DEFRA within project SE1865.
Competing interests None declared.
Saturday, January 5, 2019
Rapid recontamination of a farm building occurs after attempted prion removal
***> CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS PRION CONFERENCE 2018
P69 Experimental transmission of CWD from white-tailed deer to co-housed reindeer
Mitchell G (1), Walther I (1), Staskevicius A (1), Soutyrine A (1), Balachandran A (1)
(1) National & OIE Reference Laboratory for Scrapie and CWD, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) continues to be detected in wild and farmed cervid populations of North America, affecting predominantly white-tailed deer, mule deer and elk. Extensive herds of wild caribou exist in northern regions of Canada, although surveillance has not detected the presence of CWD in this population. Oral experimental transmission has demonstrated that reindeer, a species closely related to caribou, are susceptible to CWD. Recently, CWD was detected for the first time in Europe, in wild Norwegian reindeer, advancing the possibility that caribou in North America could also become infected. Given the potential overlap in habitat between wild CWD-infected cervids and wild caribou herds in Canada, we sought to investigate the horizontal transmissibility of CWD from white-tailed deer to reindeer.
Two white-tailed deer were orally inoculated with a brain homogenate prepared from a farmed Canadian white-tailed deer previously diagnosed with CWD. Two reindeer, with no history of exposure to CWD, were housed in the same enclosure as the white-tailed deer, 3.5 months after the deer were orally inoculated. The white-tailed deer developed clinical signs consistent with CWD beginning at 15.2 and 21 months post-inoculation (mpi), and were euthanized at 18.7 and 23.1 mpi, respectively. Confirmatory testing by immunohistochemistry (IHC) and western blot demonstrated widespread aggregates of pathological prion protein (PrPCWD) in the central nervous system and lymphoid tissues of both inoculated white-tailed deer. Both reindeer were subjected to recto-anal mucosal associated lymphoid tissue (RAMALT) biopsy at 20 months post-exposure (mpe) to the white-tailed deer. The biopsy from one reindeer contained PrPCWD confirmed by IHC. This reindeer displayed only subtle clinical evidence of disease prior to a rapid decline in condition requiring euthanasia at 22.5 mpe. Analysis of tissues from this reindeer by IHC revealed widespread PrPCWD deposition, predominantly in central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues. Western blot molecular profiles were similar between both orally inoculated white-tailed deer and the CWD positive reindeer. Despite sharing the same enclosure, the other reindeer was RAMALT negative at 20 mpe, and PrPCWD was not detected in brainstem and lymphoid tissues following necropsy at 35 mpe. Sequencing of the prion protein gene from both reindeer revealed differences at several codons, which may have influenced susceptibility to infection.
Natural transmission of CWD occurs relatively efficiently amongst cervids, supporting the expanding geographic distribution of disease and the potential for transmission to previously naive populations. The efficient horizontal transmission of CWD from white-tailed deer to reindeer observed here highlights the potential for reindeer to become infected if exposed to other cervids or environments infected with CWD.
***> Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years
***> Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded.
Gudmundur Georgsson,1 Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3
Correspondence
Gudmundur Georgsson ggeorgs@hi.is
1 Institute for Experimental Pathology, University of Iceland, Keldur v/vesturlandsveg, IS-112 Reykjavı´k, Iceland
2 Laboratory of the Chief Veterinary Officer, Keldur, Iceland
3 Bethesda, Maryland, USA
Received 7 March 2006 Accepted 6 August 2006
In 1978, a rigorous programme was implemented to stop the spread of, and subsequently eradicate, sheep scrapie in Iceland. Affected flocks were culled, premises were disinfected and, after 2–3 years, restocked with lambs from scrapie-free areas. Between 1978 and 2004, scrapie recurred on 33 farms. Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded. Of special interest was one farm with a small, completely self-contained flock where scrapie recurred 18 years after culling, 2 years after some lambs had been housed in an old sheephouse that had never been disinfected. Epidemiological investigation established with near certitude that the disease had not been introduced from the outside and it is concluded that the agent may have persisted in the old sheep-house for at least 16 years.
TITLE: PATHOLOGICAL FEATURES OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE IN REINDEER AND DEMONSTRATION OF HORIZONTAL TRANSMISSION
*** DECEMBER 2016 CDC EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE JOURNAL CWD HORIZONTAL TRANSMISSION
SEE;
Back around 2000, 2001, or so, I was corresponding with officials abroad during the bse inquiry, passing info back and forth, and some officials from here inside USDA aphis FSIS et al. In fact helped me get into the USA 50 state emergency BSE conference call way back. That one was a doozy. But I always remember what “deep throat” I never knew who they were, but I never forgot;
Some unofficial information from a source on the inside looking out -
Confidential!!!!
As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland. Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!! A very frightening revelation!!!
---end personal email---end...tss
Infectivity surviving ashing to 600*C is (in my opinion) degradable but infective. based on Bown & Gajdusek, (1991), landfill and burial may be assumed to have a reduction factor of 98% (i.e. a factor of 50) over 3 years. CJD-infected brain-tissue remained infectious after storing at room-temperature for 22 months (Tateishi et al, 1988). Scrapie agent is known to remain viable after at least 30 months of desiccation (Wilson et al, 1950). and pastures that had been grazed by scrapie-infected sheep still appeared to be contaminated with scrapie agent three years after they were last occupied by sheep (Palsson, 1979).
Dr. Paul Brown Scrapie Soil Test BSE Inquiry Document
Using in vitro Prion replication for high sensitive detection of prions and prionlike proteins and for understanding mechanisms of transmission.
Claudio Soto Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's diseases and related Brain disorders, Department of Neurology, University of Texas Medical School at Houston.
Prion and prion-like proteins are misfolded protein aggregates with the ability to selfpropagate to spread disease between cells, organs and in some cases across individuals. I n T r a n s m i s s i b l e s p o n g i f o r m encephalopathies (TSEs), prions are mostly composed by a misfolded form of the prion protein (PrPSc), which propagates by transmitting its misfolding to the normal prion protein (PrPC). The availability of a procedure to replicate prions in the laboratory may be important to study the mechanism of prion and prion-like spreading and to develop high sensitive detection of small quantities of misfolded proteins in biological fluids, tissues and environmental samples. Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) is a simple, fast and efficient methodology to mimic prion replication in the test tube. PMCA is a platform technology that may enable amplification of any prion-like misfolded protein aggregating through a seeding/nucleation process. In TSEs, PMCA is able to detect the equivalent of one single molecule of infectious PrPSc and propagate prions that maintain high infectivity, strain properties and species specificity. Using PMCA we have been able to detect PrPSc in blood and urine of experimentally infected animals and humans affected by vCJD with high sensitivity and specificity. Recently, we have expanded the principles of PMCA to amplify amyloid-beta (Aβ) and alphasynuclein (α-syn) aggregates implicated in Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, respectively. Experiments are ongoing to study the utility of this technology to detect Aβ and α-syn aggregates in samples of CSF and blood from patients affected by these diseases.
=========================
***>>> Recently, we have been using PMCA to study the role of environmental prion contamination on the horizontal spreading of TSEs. These experiments have focused on the study of the interaction of prions with plants and environmentally relevant surfaces. Our results show that plants (both leaves and roots) bind tightly to prions present in brain extracts and excreta (urine and feces) and retain even small quantities of PrPSc for long periods of time. Strikingly, ingestion of prioncontaminated leaves and roots produced disease with a 100% attack rate and an incubation period not substantially longer than feeding animals directly with scrapie brain homogenate. Furthermore, plants can uptake prions from contaminated soil and transport them to different parts of the plant tissue (stem and leaves). Similarly, prions bind tightly to a variety of environmentally relevant surfaces, including stones, wood, metals, plastic, glass, cement, etc. Prion contaminated surfaces efficiently transmit prion disease when these materials were directly injected into the brain of animals and strikingly when the contaminated surfaces were just placed in the animal cage. These findings demonstrate that environmental materials can efficiently bind infectious prions and act as carriers of infectivity, suggesting that they may play an important role in the horizontal transmission of the disease.
========================
Since its invention 13 years ago, PMCA has helped to answer fundamental questions of prion propagation and has broad applications in research areas including the food industry, blood bank safety and human and veterinary disease diagnosis.
New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication
Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production
Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area
A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing
Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing process of meat and bone meals
PPo4-4:
Survival and Limited Spread of TSE Infectivity after Burial
Discussion Classical scrapie is an environmentally transmissible disease because it has been reported in naïve, supposedly previously unexposed sheep placed in pastures formerly occupied by scrapie-infected sheep (4, 19, 20).
Although the vector for disease transmission is not known, soil is likely to be an important reservoir for prions (2) where – based on studies in rodents – prions can adhere to minerals as a biologically active form (21) and remain infectious for more than 2 years (22).
Similarly, chronic wasting disease (CWD) has re-occurred in mule deer housed in paddocks used by infected deer 2 years earlier, which was assumed to be through foraging and soil consumption (23).
Our study suggested that the risk of acquiring scrapie infection was greater through exposure to contaminated wooden, plastic, and metal surfaces via water or food troughs, fencing, and hurdles than through grazing.
Drinking from a water trough used by the scrapie flock was sufficient to cause infection in sheep in a clean building.
Exposure to fences and other objects used for rubbing also led to infection, which supported the hypothesis that skin may be a vector for disease transmission (9).
The risk of these objects to cause infection was further demonstrated when 87% of 23 sheep presented with PrPSc in lymphoid tissue after grazing on one of the paddocks, which contained metal hurdles, a metal lamb creep and a water trough in contact with the scrapie flock up to 8 weeks earlier, whereas no infection had been demonstrated previously in sheep grazing on this paddock, when equipped with new fencing and field furniture.
When the contaminated furniture and fencing were removed, the infection rate dropped significantly to 8% of 12 sheep, with soil of the paddock as the most likely source of infection caused by shedding of prions from the scrapie-infected sheep in this paddock up to a week earlier.
This study also indicated that the level of contamination of field furniture sufficient to cause infection was dependent on two factors: stage of incubation period and time of last use by scrapie-infected sheep.
Drinking from a water trough that had been used by scrapie sheep in the predominantly pre-clinical phase did not appear to cause infection, whereas infection was shown in sheep drinking from the water trough used by scrapie sheep in the later stage of the disease.
It is possible that contamination occurred through shedding of prions in saliva, which may have contaminated the surface of the water trough and subsequently the water when it was refilled.
Contamination appeared to be sufficient to cause infection only if the trough was in contact with sheep that included clinical cases.
Indeed, there is an increased risk of bodily fluid infectivity with disease progression in scrapie (24) and CWD (25) based on PrPSc detection by sPMCA.
Although ultraviolet light and heat under natural conditions do not inactivate prions (26), furniture in contact with the scrapie flock, which was assumed to be sufficiently contaminated to cause infection, did not act as vector for disease if not used for 18 months, which suggest that the weathering process alone was sufficient to inactivate prions.
PrPSc detection by sPMCA is increasingly used as a surrogate for infectivity measurements by bioassay in sheep or mice.
In this reported study, however, the levels of PrPSc present in the environment were below the limit of detection of the sPMCA method, yet were still sufficient to cause infection of in-contact animals.
In the present study, the outdoor objects were removed from the infected flock 8 weeks prior to sampling and were positive by sPMCA at very low levels (2 out of 37 reactions).
As this sPMCA assay also yielded 2 positive reactions out of 139 in samples from the scrapie-free farm, the sPMCA assay could not detect PrPSc on any of the objects above the background of the assay.
False positive reactions with sPMCA at a low frequency associated with de novo formation of infectious prions have been reported (27, 28).
This is in contrast to our previous study where we demonstrated that outdoor objects that had been in contact with the scrapie-infected flock up to 20 days prior to sampling harbored PrPSc that was detectable by sPMCA analysis [4 out of 15 reactions (12)] and was significantly more positive by the assay compared to analogous samples from the scrapie-free farm.
This discrepancy could be due to the use of a different sPMCA substrate between the studies that may alter the efficiency of amplification of the environmental PrPSc.
In addition, the present study had a longer timeframe between the objects being in contact with the infected flock and sampling, which may affect the levels of extractable PrPSc.
Alternatively, there may be potentially patchy contamination of this furniture with PrPSc, which may have been missed by swabbing.
The failure of sPMCA to detect CWD-associated PrP in saliva from clinically affected deer despite confirmation of infectivity in saliva-inoculated transgenic mice was associated with as yet unidentified inhibitors in saliva (29), and it is possible that the sensitivity of sPMCA is affected by other substances in the tested material.
In addition, sampling of amplifiable PrPSc and subsequent detection by sPMCA may be more difficult from furniture exposed to weather, which is supported by the observation that PrPSc was detected by sPMCA more frequently in indoor than outdoor furniture (12).
A recent experimental study has demonstrated that repeated cycles of drying and wetting of prion-contaminated soil, equivalent to what is expected under natural weathering conditions, could reduce PMCA amplification efficiency and extend the incubation period in hamsters inoculated with soil samples (30).
This seems to apply also to this study even though the reduction in infectivity was more dramatic in the sPMCA assays than in the sheep model.
Sheep were not kept until clinical end-point, which would have enabled us to compare incubation periods, but the lack of infection in sheep exposed to furniture that had not been in contact with scrapie sheep for a longer time period supports the hypothesis that prion degradation and subsequent loss of infectivity occurs even under natural conditions.
In conclusion, the results in the current study indicate that removal of furniture that had been in contact with scrapie-infected animals should be recommended, particularly since cleaning and decontamination may not effectively remove scrapie infectivity (31), even though infectivity declines considerably if the pasture and the field furniture have not been in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for several months. As sPMCA failed to detect PrPSc in furniture that was subjected to weathering, even though exposure led to infection in sheep, this method may not always be reliable in predicting the risk of scrapie infection through environmental contamination.
These results suggest that the VRQ/VRQ sheep model may be more sensitive than sPMCA for the detection of environmentally associated scrapie, and suggest that extremely low levels of scrapie contamination are able to cause infection in susceptible sheep genotypes.
Keywords: classical scrapie, prion, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, sheep, field furniture, reservoir, serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification
Wednesday, December 16, 2015
*** Objects in contact with classical scrapie sheep act as a reservoir for scrapie transmission ***
''Atypical BSE is different, and it generally occurs in older cattle, usually 8 years of age or greater. It seems to arise rarely and spontaneously in all cattle populations.''
FALSE!
''The primary source of infection for classical BSE is feed contaminated with the infectious prion agent, such as meat-and-bone meal containing protein derived from rendered infected cattle. Regulations from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have prohibited the inclusion of mammalian protein in feed for cattle and other ruminants since 1997 and have also prohibited high risk tissue materials in all animal feed since 2009.''
FALSE!
oh what webs of deceit we weave, when all we do is practice to deceive $$$
LET'S REVIEW RECENT AND PAST SCIENCE THAT SHOWS THE ABOVE TWO STATEMENTS ARE FAR FROM TRUE;
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States.
reading up on this study from Prion 2018 Conference, very important findings ;
***> This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
***> These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2018
***> The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
PLOS ONE Journal
IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT
***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=86610
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=86610
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM
Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.
Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely undefined.
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.
Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.
see full text ;
Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle
CDC Volume 23, Number 2—February 2017
*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/23/2/16-1416_article
CDC Volume 23, Number 2—February 2017
*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/23/2/16-1416_article
Prion 2018 Conference
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
Prion 2018 Conference
https://prion2018.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/program.pdf
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://web.archive.org/web/20061003022720/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://web.archive.org/web/20061003022724/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque
"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States.
reading up on this study from Prion 2018 Conference, very important findings ;
***> This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
***> These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2018
Experimental Infection of Cattle With a Novel Prion Derived From Atypical H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
MONDAY, JANUARY 09, 2017
Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle
CDC Volume 23, Number 2—February 2017
*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 2018
USDA finds BSE infection in Florida cow 08/28/18 6:43 PM
http://animalhealthreportpriontse..blogspot.com/2018/08/usda-finds-bse-infection-in-florida-cow.html
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018
USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection USDA 08/29/2018 10:00 AM EDT
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Atypical BSE Confirmed Florida Update USA August 28, 2018
***> P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE
Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada
Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to disease as adults. Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with 100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to neurological disease. At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE.
We are further examining explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged animal.
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification
Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama
National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan
To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA).
Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.
Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
P.170: Potential detection of oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle using in vitro conversion
***P.170: Potential detection of oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle using in vitro conversion
Sandor Dudas, John G Gray, Renee Clark, and Stefanie Czub Canadian Food Inspection Agency; Lethbridge, AB Canada
Keywords: Atypical BSE, oral transmission, RT-QuIC
The detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has had a significant negative impact on the cattle industry worldwide. In response, governments took actions to prevent transmission and additional threats to animal health and food safety. While these measures seem to be effective for controlling classical BSE, the more recently discovered atypical BSE has presented a new challenge. To generate data for risk assessment and control measures, we have challenged cattle orally with atypical BSE to determine transmissibility and mis-folded prion (PrPSc) tissue distribution. Upon presentation of clinical symptoms, animals were euthanized and tested for characteristic histopathological changes as well as PrPSc deposition.
The H-type challenged animal displayed vacuolation exclusively in rostral brain areas but the L-type challenged animal showed no evidence thereof. To our surprise, neither of the animals euthanized, which were displaying clinical signs indicative of BSE, showed conclusive mis-folded prion accumulation in the brain or gut using standard molecular or immunohistochemical assays. To confirm presence or absence of prion infectivity, we employed an optimized real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC) assay developed at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory, Hamilton, USA.
Detection of PrPSc was unsuccessful for brain samples tests from the orally inoculated L type animal using the RT-QuIC. It is possible that these negative results were related to the tissue sampling locations or that type specific optimization is needed to detect PrPSc in this animal. We were however able to consistently detect the presence of mis-folded prions in the brain of the H-type inoculated animal. Considering the negative and inconclusive results with other PrPSc detection methods, positive results using the optimized RT-QuIC suggests the method is extremely sensitive for H-type BSE detection. This may be evidence of the first successful oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle and additional investigation of samples from these animals are ongoing.
Detection of PrPBSE and prion infectivity in the ileal Peyer’s patch of young calves as early as 2 months after oral challenge with classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Ivett Ackermann1 , Anne Balkema‑Buschmann1 , Reiner Ulrich2 , Kerstin Tauscher2 , James C. Shawulu1 , Markus Keller1 , Olanrewaju I. Fatola1 , Paul Brown3 and Martin H. Groschup1*
Abstract
In classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-BSE), an orally acquired prion disease of cattle, the ileal Peyer’s patch (IPP) represents the main entry port for the BSE agent. In earlier C-BSE pathogenesis studies, cattle at 4–6 months of age were orally challenged, while there are strong indications that the risk of infection is highest in young animals. In the present study, unweaned calves aged 4–6 weeks were orally challenged to determine the earli‑ est time point at which newly formed PrPBSE and BSE infectivity are detectable in the IPP. For this purpose, calves were culled 1 week as well as 2, 4, 6 and 8 months post-infection (mpi) and IPPs were examined for BSE infectivity using a bovine PrP transgenic mouse bioassay, and for PrPBSE by immunohistochemistry (IHC) and protein misfolding cyclic amplifcation (PMCA) assays. For the frst time, BSE prions were detected in the IPP as early as 2 mpi by transgenic mouse bioassay and PMCA and 4 mpi by IHC in the follicular dendritic cells (FDCs) of the IPP follicles. These data indi‑ cate that BSE prions propagate in the IPP of unweaned calves within 2 months of oral uptake of the agent.
In summary, our study demonstrates for the frst time PrPBSE (by PMCA) and prion infectivity (by mouse bioassay) in the ileal Peyer’s patch (IPP) of young calves as early as 2 months after infection. From 4 mpi nearly all calves showed PrPBSE positive IPP follicles (by IHC), even with PrPBSE accumulation detectable in FDCs in some animals. Finally, our results confrm the IPP as the early port of entry for the BSE agent and a site of initial propagation of PrPBSE and infectivity during the early pathogenesis of the disease. Terefore, our study supports the recommendation to remove the last four metres of the small intestine (distal ileum) at slaughter, as designated by current legal requirements for countries with a controlled BSE risk status, as an essential measure for consumer and public health protection.
A study comparing preclinical cattle infected naturally with BSE to clinically affected cattle either naturally or experimentally infected with BSE by the oral route found the most abundant PrPSc in the brainstem area (39), which is consistent with ascension to the brain from the gut by sympathetic and parasympathetic projections (40). In our experiment, abundant prions were observed in the brainstem of cattle with clinical signs of BSE, which is similar to the amount in their thalamus or midbrain regions. Interestingly, prions in the brainstem of cattle with clinical evidence of BSE seeded the RT-QuIC reactions faster than any other brain region despite the brainstem area having lower EIA OD values (Table 2) in comparison to other brain regions. This suggests that higher concentrations of prions do not necessarily seed the reaction faster. Perhaps prions of the brainstem exist in a preferred conformation for better conversion despite being present in lower concentrations.
snip...
The 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so flawed, that one of the top TSE prion Scientist for the CDC, Dr. Paul Brown stated ; Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
see ;
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain
IT is of my opinion, that the OIE and the USDA et al, are the soul reason, and responsible parties, for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion diseases, including typical and atypical BSE, typical and atypical Scrapie, and all strains of CWD, and human TSE there from, spreading around the globe. I have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. JUST because of low documented human body count with nvCJD and the long incubation periods, the lack of sound science being replaced by political and corporate science in relations with the fact that science has now linked some sporadic CJD with atypical BSE and atypical scrapie, and the very real threat of CWD being zoonosis, I believed the O.I.E. has failed terribly and again, I call for this organization to be dissolved...
Monday, May 05, 2014
Member Country details for listing OIE CWD 2013 against the criteria of Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing
Friday, December 5, 2014
SPECIAL ALERT The OIE recommends strengthening animal disease surveillance worldwide
IN A NUT SHELL ; (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006) 11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,
MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 2019
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Surveillance FDA USDA APHIS FSIS UPDATE 2019
USA MAD COW CASE 2018 FLORIDA
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2018
JAVMA In Short Update USDA announces detection of atypical BSE
ZOONOSIS OF SCRAPIE TSE PRION
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,
Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a
"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France
Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion... Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.
To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.
These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.
Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
***> why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man.
***> I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
***> Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
***> Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility. <***
Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period
Emmanuel E. Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Sophie Luccantoni-Freire, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Valérie Durand, Capucine Dehen, Olivier Andreoletti, Cristina Casalone, Juergen A. Richt, Justin J. Greenlee, Thierry Baron, Sylvie L. Benestad, Paul Brown & Jean-Philippe Deslys Scientific Reports volume 5, Article number: 11573 (2015) | Download Citation
Abstract
Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is the only animal prion disease reputed to be zoonotic, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans and having guided protective measures for animal and human health against animal prion diseases. Recently, partial transmissions to humanized mice showed that the zoonotic potential of scrapie might be similar to c-BSE. We here report the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to cynomolgus macaque, a highly relevant model for human prion diseases, after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to those reported for human cases of sporadic CJD. Scrapie is thus actually transmissible to primates with incubation periods compatible with their life expectancy, although fourfold longer than BSE. Long-term experimental transmission studies are necessary to better assess the zoonotic potential of other prion diseases with high prevalence, notably Chronic Wasting Disease of deer and elk and atypical/Nor98 scrapie.
SNIP...
Discussion We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.
The second possibility is a laboratory cross-contamination. Three facts make this possibility equally unlikely. First, handling of specimens in our laboratory is performed with fastidious attention to the avoidance of any such cross-contamination. Second, no laboratory cross-contamination has ever been documented in other primate laboratories, including the NIH, even between infected and uninfected animals housed in the same or adjacent cages with daily intimate contact (P. Brown, personal communication). Third, the cerebral lesion profile is different from all the other prion diseases we have studied in this model19, with a correlation between cerebellar lesions (massive spongiform change of Purkinje cells, intense PrPres staining and reactive gliosis26) and ataxia. The iron deposits present in the globus pallidus are a non specific finding that have been reported previously in neurodegenerative diseases and aging27. Conversely, the thalamic lesion was reminiscent of a metabolic disease due to thiamine deficiency28 but blood thiamine levels were within normal limits (data not shown). The preferential distribution of spongiform change in cortex associated with a limited distribution in the brainstem is reminiscent of the lesion profile in MM2c and VV1 sCJD patients29, but interspecies comparison of lesion profiles should be interpreted with caution. It is of note that the same classical scrapie isolate induced TSE in C57Bl/6 mice with similar incubation periods and lesional profiles as a sample derived from a MM1 sCJD patient30.
We are therefore confident that the illness in this cynomolgus macaque represents a true transmission of a sheep c-scrapie isolate directly to an old-world monkey, which taxonomically resides in the primate subdivision (parvorder of catarrhini) that includes humans. With an homology of its PrP protein with humans of 96.4%31, cynomolgus macaque constitutes a highly relevant model for assessing zoonotic risk of prion diseases. Since our initial aim was to show the absence of transmission of scrapie to macaques in the worst-case scenario, we obtained materials from a flock of naturally-infected sheep, affecting animals with different genotypes32. This c-scrapie isolate exhibited complete transmission in ARQ/ARQ sheep (332 ± 56 days) and Tg338 transgenic mice expressing ovine VRQ/VRQ prion protein (220 ± 5 days) (O. Andreoletti, personal communication). From the standpoint of zoonotic risk, it is important to note that sheep with c-scrapie (including the isolate used in our study) have demonstrable infectivity throughout their lymphoreticular system early in the incubation period of the disease (3 months-old for all the lymphoid organs, and as early as 2 months-old in gut-associated lymph nodes)33. In addition, scrapie infectivity has been identified in blood34, milk35 and skeletal muscle36 from asymptomatic but scrapie infected small ruminants which implies a potential dietary exposure for consumers.
Two earlier studies have reported the occurrence of clinical TSE in cynomolgus macaques after exposures to scrapie isolates. In the first study, the “Compton” scrapie isolate (derived from an English sheep) and serially propagated for 9 passages in goats did not transmit TSE in cynomolgus macaque, rhesus macaque or chimpanzee within 7 years following intracerebral challenge1; conversely, after 8 supplementary passages in conventional mice, this “Compton” isolate induced TSE in a cynomolgus macaque 5 years after intracerebral challenge, but rhesus macaques and chimpanzee remained asymptomatic 8.5 years post-exposure8. However, multiple successive passages that are classically used to select laboratory-adapted prion strains can significantly modify the initial properties of a scrapie isolate, thus questioning the relevance of zoonotic potential for the initial sheep-derived isolate. The same isolate had also induced disease into squirrel monkeys (new-world monkey)9. A second historical observation reported that a cynomolgus macaque developed TSE 6 years post-inoculation with brain homogenate from a scrapie-infected Suffolk ewe (derived from USA), whereas a rhesus macaque and a chimpanzee exposed to the same inoculum remained healthy 9 years post-exposure1. This inoculum also induced TSE in squirrel monkeys after 4 passages in mice. Other scrapie transmission attempts in macaque failed but had more shorter periods of observation in comparison to the current study. Further, it is possible that there are differences in the zoonotic potential of different scrapie strains.
The most striking observation in our study is the extended incubation period of scrapie in the macaque model, which has several implications. Firstly, our observations constitute experimental evidence in favor of the zoonotic potential of c-scrapie, at least for this isolate that has been extensively studied32,33,34,35,36. The cross-species zoonotic ability of this isolate should be confirmed by performing duplicate intracerebral exposures and assessing the transmissibility by the oral route (a successful transmission of prion strains through the intracerebral route may not necessarily indicate the potential for oral transmission37). However, such confirmatory experiments may require more than one decade, which is hardly compatible with current general management and support of scientific projects; thus this study should be rather considered as a case report.
Secondly, transmission of c-BSE to primates occurred within 8 years post exposure for the lowest doses able to transmit the disease (the survival period after inoculation is inversely proportional to the initial amount of infectious inoculum). The occurrence of scrapie 10 years after exposure to a high dose (25 mg) of scrapie-infected sheep brain suggests that the macaque has a higher species barrier for sheep c-scrapie than c-BSE, although it is notable that previous studies based on in vitro conversion of PrP suggested that BSE and scrapie prions would have a similar conversion potential for human PrP38.
Thirdly, prion diseases typically have longer incubation periods after oral exposure than after intracerebral inoculations: since humans can develop Kuru 47 years after oral exposure39, an incubation time of several decades after oral exposure to scrapie would therefore be expected, leading the disease to occur in older adults, i.e. the peak age for cases considered to be sporadic disease, and making a distinction between scrapie-associated and truly sporadic disease extremely difficult to appreciate.
Fourthly, epidemiologic evidence is necessary to confirm the zoonotic potential of an animal disease suggested by experimental studies. A relatively short incubation period and a peculiar epidemiological situation (e.g., all the first vCJD cases occurring in the country with the most important ongoing c-BSE epizootic) led to a high degree of suspicion that c-BSE was the cause of vCJD. Sporadic CJD are considered spontaneous diseases with an almost stable and constant worldwide prevalence (0.5–2 cases per million inhabitants per year), and previous epidemiological studies were unable to draw a link between sCJD and classical scrapie6,7,40,41, even though external causes were hypothesized to explain the occurrence of some sCJD clusters42,43,44. However, extended incubation periods exceeding several decades would impair the predictive values of epidemiological surveillance for prion diseases, already weakened by a limited prevalence of prion diseases and the multiplicity of isolates gathered under the phenotypes of “scrapie” and “sporadic CJD”.
Fifthly, considering this 10 year-long incubation period, together with both laboratory and epidemiological evidence of decade or longer intervals between infection and clinical onset of disease, no premature conclusions should be drawn from negative transmission studies in cynomolgus macaques with less than a decade of observation, as in the aforementioned historical transmission studies of scrapie to primates1,8,9. Our observations and those of others45,46 to date are unable to provide definitive evidence regarding the zoonotic potential of CWD, atypical/Nor98 scrapie or H-type BSE. The extended incubation period of the scrapie-affected macaque in the current study also underscores the limitations of rodent models expressing human PrP for assessing the zoonotic potential of some prion diseases since their lifespan remains limited to approximately two years21,47,48. This point is illustrated by the fact that the recently reported transmission of scrapie to humanized mice was not associated with clinical signs for up to 750 days and occurred in an extreme minority of mice with only a marginal increase in attack rate upon second passage13. The low attack rate in these studies is certainly linked to the limited lifespan of mice compared to the very long periods of observation necessary to demonstrate the development of scrapie. Alternatively, one could estimate that a successful second passage is the result of strain adaptation to the species barrier, thus poorly relevant of the real zoonotic potential of the original scrapie isolate of sheep origin49. The development of scrapie in this primate after an incubation period compatible with its lifespan complements the study conducted in transgenic (humanized) mice; taken together these studies suggest that some isolates of sheep scrapie can promote misfolding of the human prion protein and that scrapie can develop within the lifespan of some primate species.
In addition to previous studies on scrapie transmission to primate1,8,9 and the recently published study on transgenic humanized mice13, our results constitute new evidence for recommending that the potential risk of scrapie for human health should not be dismissed. Indeed, human PrP transgenic mice and primates are the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier. To what extent such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. During the past decades, many protective measures have been successfully implemented to protect cattle from the spread of c-BSE, and some of these measures have been extended to sheep and goats to protect from scrapie according to the principle of precaution. Since cases of c-BSE have greatly reduced in number, those protective measures are currently being challenged and relaxed in the absence of other known zoonotic animal prion disease. We recommend that risk managers should be aware of the long term potential risk to human health of at least certain scrapie isolates, notably for lymphotropic strains like the classical scrapie strain used in the current study. Relatively high amounts of infectivity in peripheral lymphoid organs in animals infected with these strains could lead to contamination of food products produced for human consumption. Efforts should also be maintained to further assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains in long-term studies, notably lymphotropic strains with high prevalence like CWD, which is spreading across North America, and atypical/Nor98 scrapie (Nor98)50 that was first detected in the past two decades and now represents approximately half of all reported cases of prion diseases in small ruminants worldwide, including territories previously considered as scrapie free... Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 04, 2018
Cervid to human prion transmission 5R01NS088604-04 Update
Saturday, December 15, 2018
***> ADRD Summit RFI Singeltary COMMENT SUBMISSION BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, AND HUMAN TSE PRION DISEASE December 14, 2018
SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 2019
Low levels of classical BSE infectivity in rendered fat tissue
***> FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2018 MAD COW USA FLASHBACK Texas Style
FRIDAY DECEMBER 14, 2018
THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 2019
MAD COW USDA DISEASE BSE TSE Prion
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015
Former Ag Secretary Ann Veneman talks women in agriculture and we talk mad cow disease USDA and what really happened
HOW TO COVER UP MAD COW DISEASE IN TEXAS
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018
OIE Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, United States of America Information received on 29/08/2018 from Dr John Clifford, Official Delegate, Chief Trade Advisor, APHIS USDA
''The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.''
well, so much for those herd mates exposed to this atypical BSE cow, and all those trace in and trace outs.
The OIE, USDA, and the BSE MRR policy is a joke, a sad, very sad joke...
Saturday, July 23, 2016
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, AND SRM REMOVAL UNITED STATE OF AMERICA UPDATE JULY 2016
Tuesday, July 26, 2016
Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion UPDATE JULY 2016
Monday, June 20, 2016
Specified Risk Materials SRMs BSE TSE Prion Program
Wednesday, January 23, 2019
CFIA SFCR Guidance on Specified risk material (SRM) came into force on January 15, 2019
MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 2019
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Surveillance FDA USDA APHIS FSIS UPDATE 2019
-----Original Message-----
From: Terry Singeltary <flounder9@verizon.net>
To: bse-l <bse-l@lists.aegee.org>
Cc: cjd-l <cjd-l@lists.aegee.org>; cjdvoice <cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com>; bloodcjd <bloodcjd@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Sun, Dec 9, 2018 4:10 pm
Subject: Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD, BSE, Scrapie, CWD, TSE Prion Annual Report December 14, 2018
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/734740/hpr3018_cjd.pdf
From: Terry Singeltary <flounder9@verizon.net>
To: bse-l <bse-l@lists.aegee.org>
Cc: cjd-l <cjd-l@lists.aegee.org>; cjdvoice <cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com>; bloodcjd <bloodcjd@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Sun, Dec 9, 2018 4:10 pm
Subject: Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD, BSE, Scrapie, CWD, TSE Prion Annual Report December 14, 2018
Merry Christmas and Seasons Greetings to Everyone,
It's that time of year, time to put out my annual report on the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE, CJD, BSE, Scrapie, CWD, Annual Report, December 14, 1997 Anniversary of the death of my mom to the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease hvCJD ie. just another strain of the same damn thing.
ONE thing i will elaborate on here and now, probably will not sound scholarly or politically correct, but, sporadic cjd is rising, and that old excuse, the same old excuse i have heard now for about 21 years, year after year, decade after decade, that sporadic cjd is rising due to better surveillance, still holding one in a million, and that only typical c-BSE is transmissible to humans, all other TSE prion disease in different species are not transmissible to humans, well, that dog don't hunt no more...terry
***> U.S.A. CJD
Tables of Cases Examined
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined¹
(September 18, 2018)
Year Total Referrals² Prion Disease Sporadic Familial Iatrogenic vCJD
1998 & earlier 259 157 135 20 2 0
1999 121 73 65 7 1 0
2000 145 102 90 12 0 0
2001 209 118 110 8 0 0
2002 241 144 124 18 2 0
2003 259 160 137 21 2 0
2004 315 180 163 16 0 1³
2005 328 179 157 21 1 0
2006 365 179 159 17 1 2⁴
2007 374 210 191 19 0 0
2008 384 221 205 16 0 0
2009 397 231 210 20 1 0
2010 402 246 218 28 0 0
2011 392 238 214 24 0 0
2012 413 244 221 23 0 0
2013 416 258 223 34 1 0
2014 354 208 185 21 1 1⁵
2015 402 264 244 20 0 0
2016 397 278 247 29 0 0
2017 370 263 233 19 0 0
2018 188 129 114 7 0 0
TOTAL 6734 4085⁷ 3656⁸ 400⁹ 12 4
1Listed based on the year of death or, if not available, on year of referral;
2Cases with suspected prion disease for which brain tissue was submitted;
3Disease acquired in the United Kingdom;
4Disease acquired in the United Kingdom in one case and in Saudi Arabia in the other;
5Disease possibly acquired in a Middle Eastern or Eastern European country;
6Includes 12 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 20 inconclusive cases;
7Includes 13 (8 from 2018) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.
8The sporadic cases include 3560 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), 63 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr) and 33 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI).
9Total does not include 247 Familial cases diagnosed by blood test only.
***> CANADA CJD
see substantial increase in sporadic cjd in Canada 2017...terry
Definite and probable CJD, 1998-2018
As of 31 October, 2018
Year Sporadic Iatrogenic Familial GSS FFI vCJD Total
1998 22 1 0 1 0 0 24
1999 27 2 2 1 0 0 32
2000 32 0 0 3 0 0 35
2001 27 0 2 1 0 0 30
2002 31 0 2 2 0 1 36
2003 27 1 1 0 0 0 29
2004 42 0 1 1 0 0 44
2005 42 0 1 1 0 0 44
2006 39 0 1 3 1 0 44
2007 35 0 0 4 0 0 39
2008 48 0 1 0 0 0 49
2009 48 0 3 2 0 0 53
2010 35 0 3 0 0 0 38
2011 46 0 3 1 0 1 51
2012 62 0 1 0 0 0 63
2013 50 0 0 0 1 0 51
2014 51 0 4 0 1 0 56
2015 44 0 5 1 2 0 52
2016 55 1 5 1 62
2017 77 1 1 1 80
2018 35 1 36
Total 875 5 36 23 7 2 948
***> U.K. CJD
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE IN THE UK (By Calendar Year) REFERRALS OF SUSPECT CJD DEATHS OF DEFINITE AND PROBABLE CJD
Year Referrals Year Sporadic1 Iatrogenic Genetic2 vCJD Total Deaths
1990 [53]† 1990 28 5 0 - 33
1991 75 1991 31 1 4 - 36
1992 96 1992 45 2 6 - 53
1993 79 1993 36 4 7 - 47
1994 119 1994 53 1 9 - 63
1995 87 1995 35 4 5 3 47
1996 132 1996 40 4 6 10 60
1997 163 1997 59 6 7 10 82
1998 155 1998 64 3 5 18 90
1999 170 1999 62 6 2 15 85
2000 178 2000 48 1 3 28 80
2001 179 2001 58 4 6 20 88
2002 164 2002 73 0 5 17 95
2003 162 2003 79 5 6 18 108
2004 114 2004 50 2 6 9 67
2005 124 2005 67 4 13 5 89
2006 112 2006 68 1 9 5 83
2007 119 2007 63 2 11 5 81
2008 150 2008 84 5 6 2 97
2009 153 2009 78 2 8 3 91
2010 150 2010 85 3 6 3 97
2011 158 2011 91 4 14 5 114
2012 127 2012 94 5 11 0 110
2013 152 2013 108 2 10 1 121
2014 130 2014 99 3 12 0 114
2015 140 2015 105 0 4 0 109
2016 148 2016 119 1 6 1 127
2017 156 2017 120 0 12 0 132
2018 156 2018 113 2 9 0 124
Total Referrals 3901 Total Deaths
2055 82 208 178 2523
† Referral figure for 1990 is from 1 May onwards * As at 6 th December 2018
Summary of vCJD cases
Deaths
Deaths from definite vCJD (confirmed): 123
Deaths from probable vCJD (without neuropathological confirmation): 55
Deaths from probable vCJD (neuropathological confirmation pending): 0
Number of deaths from definite or probable vCJD (as above): 178
Alive
Number of definite/probable vCJD cases still alive: 0
Total number of definite or probable vCJD (dead and alive): 178
1 There are in addition a total of 14 cases of VPSPr (death in 1997(1 case), 2004(1), 2006(1), 2008(3), 2010(1), 2012(4), 2013(1), 2016(1), 2017(1)) not included in the above figures.
2 includes all genetic prion disease, including GSS.
Source: NCJDRSU website www.cjd.ed.ac.uk - updated 06/12/2018
Latest CJD Figures
These figures show the number of suspect CJD cases referred to the NCJDRSU in Edinburgh, and the number of deaths of definite and probable cases in the UK from 1 January 1990.
Incidence of Variant CJD in the UK
Data on diagnosed cases of variant CJD in the UK have been reviewed in order to investigate trends in the underlying rate at which deaths and diagnoses are occurring.
Variant CJD Cases Worldwide
Figures for the number of definite and probable variant CJD cases worldwide are provided courtesy of the European CJD Surveillance Network, for all cases of variant CJD in the European Union, and through collaborations with other non-EU countries.
NCJDRSU Reports
Every year the NCJDRSU provides an update on the work of the Unit in the previous 12 months, reflecting the Unit's core surveillance work.
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (August 2018)
Health Protection Report Volume 12 Number 30
17 August 2018
Sunday, December 9, 2018
***> Variable Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy Transmission to Bank Voles CDC Volume 25, Number 1—January 2019
TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2018
USA CJD TSE Tables of Cases Examined National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined May 1, 2018
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 04, 2018
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined¹ (September 18, 2018)
***2018***
Cervid to human prion transmission
Kong, Qingzhong
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
Abstract
Prion disease is transmissible and invariably fatal. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease affecting deer, elk and moose, and it is a widespread and expanding epidemic affecting 22 US States and 2 Canadian provinces so far. CWD poses the most serious zoonotic prion transmission risks in North America because of huge venison consumption (>6 million deer/elk hunted and consumed annually in the USA alone), significant prion infectivity in muscles and other tissues/fluids from CWD-affected cervids, and usually high levels of individual exposure to CWD resulting from consumption of the affected animal among often just family and friends. However, we still do not know whether CWD prions can infect humans in the brain or peripheral tissues or whether clinical/asymptomatic CWD zoonosis has already occurred, and we have no essays to reliably detect CWD infection in humans.
We hypothesize that:
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and
(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.
Aim 1 will prove that the classical CWD strain may infect humans in brain or peripheral lymphoid tissues at low levels by conducting systemic bioassays in a set of humanized Tg mouse lines expressing common human PrP variants using a number of CWD isolates at varying doses and routes. Experimental human CWD samples will also be generated for Aim 3.
Aim 2 will test the hypothesis that the cervid-to-human prion transmission barrier is dependent on prion strain and influenced by the host (human) PrP sequence by examining and comparing the transmission efficiency and phenotypes of several atypical/unusual CWD isolates/strains as well as a few prion strains from other species that have adapted to cervid PrP sequence, utilizing the same panel of humanized Tg mouse lines as in Aim 1.
Aim 3 will establish reliable essays for detection and surveillance of CWD infection in humans by examining in details the clinical, pathological, biochemical and in vitro seeding properties of existing and future experimental human CWD samples generated from Aims 1-2 and compare them with those of common sporadic human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) prions.
Aim 4 will attempt to detect clinical CWD-affected human cases by examining a significant number of brain samples from prion-affected human subjects in the USA and Canada who have consumed venison from CWD-endemic areas utilizing the criteria and essays established in Aim 3. The findings from this proposal will greatly advance our understandings on the potential and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for CWD zoonosis and potentially discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.
Public Health Relevance
There are significant and increasing human exposure to cervid prions because chronic wasting disease (CWD, a widespread and highly infectious prion disease among deer and elk in North America) continues spreading and consumption of venison remains popular, but our understanding on cervid-to-human prion transmission is still very limited, raising public health concerns. This proposal aims to define the zoonotic risks of cervid prions and set up and apply essays to detect CWD zoonosis using mouse models and in vitro methods. The findings will greatly expand our knowledge on the potentials and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for such infections and may discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.
NIH 2015 R01 NS Cervid to human prion transmission Kong, Qingzhong / Case Western Reserve University $337,507
ZOONOTIC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE
here is the latest;
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge). To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years.
After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate.
The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD..
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA..
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio..
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017,
AND
included 104 patients. SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%),
AND
THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
snip...see more on Prion 2017 Macaque study from Prion 2017 Conference and other updated science on cwd tse prion zoonosis below...terry
Cervid to human prion transmission 5R01NS088604-04 Update
National Institute of Health (NIH)
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2018
***> The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2018
cwd, bse, scrapie, cjd, tse prion updated November 10 2018
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2018
***> Norway New additional requirements for imports of hay and straw for animal feed from countries outside the EEA due to CWD TSE Prion
***> cwd scrapie pigs oral routes
***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***
>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <***
***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).
***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period.
***> This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease.
***> Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
>>>> The successful transmission of pig-passaged CWD to Tg40 mice reported here suggests that passage of the CWD agent through pigs results in a change of the transmission characteristics which reduces the transmission barrier of Tg40 mice to the CWD agent. If this biological behavior is recapitulated in the original host species, passage of the CWD agent through pigs could potentially lead to increased pathogenicity of the CWD agent in humans.
Prion Conference 2018
O5 Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels
Babelhadj B (1), Di Bari MA (2), Pirisinu L (2), Chiappini B (2), Gaouar SB (3), Riccardi G (2), Marcon S (2), Agrimi U (2), Nonno R (2), Vaccari G (2) (1) École Normale Supérieure Ouargla. Laboratoire de protection des écosystèmes en zones arides et semi arides University Kasdi Merbah Ouargla, Ouargla, Algeria; (2) Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Department of Food Safety, Nutrition and Veterinary Public Health, Rome, Italy (3) University Abou Bekr Bélkaid, Tlemcen, Algeria.
Prions are responsible for fatal and transmissible neurodegenerative diseases including CreutzfeldtJakob disease in humans, scrapie in small ruminants and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Following the BSE epidemic and the demonstration of its zoonotic potential, general concerns have been raised on animal prions.
Here we report the identification of a prion disease in dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) in Algeria and designate it as Camel Prion Disease (CPD). In the last years, neurological symptoms have been observed in adult male and female dromedaries presented for slaughter at the Ouargla abattoir. The symptoms include weight loss, behavioral abnormalities and neurological symptoms such as tremors, aggressiveness, hyper-reactivity, typical down and upwards movements of the head, hesitant and uncertain gait, ataxia of the hind limbs, occasional falls and difficult getting up. During 2015 and 2016, symptoms suggestive of prion disease were observed in 3.1% of 2259 dromedaries presented at ante-mortem examination. Laboratory diagnosis was obtained in three symptomatic dromedaries, sampled in 2016 and 2017, by the detection of typical neurodegeneration and disease-specific prion protein (PrPSc) in brain tissues.
Histopathological examination revealed spongiform change, gliosis and neuronal loss preferentially in grey matter of subcortical brain areas. Abundant PrPSc deposition was detected in the same brain areas by immunohistochemistry and PET-blot. Western blot analysis confirmed the presence of PK-resistant PrPSc, whose N-terminal cleaved PK-resistant core was characterized by a mono-glycosylated dominant form and by a distinctive N-terminal cleavage, different from that observed in BSE and scrapie.
PrPSc was also detected, by immunohistochemistry, in all sampled lymph nodes (cervical, prescapular and lumbar aortic) of the only animal from which they were collected.
The PRNP sequence of the two animals for which frozen material was available, showed 100% nucleotide identity with the PRNP sequence already reported for dromedary camel.
Overall, these data demonstrate the presence of a prion disease in dromedary camelswhose nature, origin and spread need further investigations. However, our preliminary observations on the rather high prevalence of symptomatic dromedaries and the involvement of lymphoid tissues, are consistent with CPD being an infectious disease. In conclusion, the emergence of a new prion disease in a livestock species of crucial importance for millions of people around the world, makes urgent to assess the risk for humans and to develop policies able to control the spread of the disease in animals and to minimize human exposure.
CDC
New Outbreak of TSE Prion in NEW LIVESTOCK SPECIES
Mad Camel Disease
Volume 24, Number 6—June 2018 Research
Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels, Algeria
Abstract
Prions cause fatal and transmissible neurodegenerative diseases, including Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans, scrapie in small ruminants, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). After the BSE epidemic, and the associated human infections, began in 1996 in the United Kingdom, general concerns have been raised about animal prions. We detected a prion disease in dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) in Algeria. Symptoms suggesting prion disease occurred in 3.1% of dromedaries brought for slaughter to the Ouargla abattoir in 2015–2016. We confirmed diagnosis by detecting pathognomonic neurodegeneration and disease-specific prion protein (PrPSc) in brain tissues from 3 symptomatic animals. Prion detection in lymphoid tissues is suggestive of the infectious nature of the disease. PrPSc biochemical characterization showed differences with BSE and scrapie. Our identification of this prion disease in a geographically widespread livestock species requires urgent enforcement of surveillance and assessment of the potential risks to human and animal health.
SNIP...
The possibility that dromedaries acquired the disease from eating prion-contaminated waste needs to be considered.
Tracing the origin of prion diseases is challenging. In the case of CPD, the traditional extensive and nomadic herding practices of dromedaries represent a formidable factor for accelerating the spread of the disease at long distances, making the path of its diffusion difficult to determine. Finally, the major import flows of live animals to Algeria from Niger, Mali, and Mauritania (27) should be investigated to trace the possible origin of CPD from other countries.
Camels are a vital animal species for millions of persons globally. The world camel population has a yearly growth rate of 2.1% (28). In 2014, the population was estimated at ≈28 million animals, but this number is probably underestimated.. Approximately 88% of camels are found in Africa, especially eastern Africa, and 12% are found in Asia. Official data reported 350,000 dromedaries in Algeria in 2014 (28).
On the basis of phenotypic traits and sociogeographic criteria, several dromedary populations have been suggested to exist in Algeria (29). However, recent genetic studies in Algeria and Egypt point to a weak differentiation of the dromedary population as a consequence of historical use as a cross-continental beast of burden along trans-Saharan caravan routes, coupled with traditional extensive/nomadic herding practices (30).
Such genetic homogeneity also might be reflected in PRNP. Studies on PRNP variability in camels are therefore warranted to explore the existence of genotypes resistant to CPD, which could represent an important tool for CPD management as it was for breeding programs for scrapie eradication in sheep.
In the past 10 years, the camel farming system has changed rapidly, with increasing setup of periurban dairy farms and dairy plants and diversification of camel products and market penetration (13). This evolution requires improved health standards for infectious diseases and, in light of CPD, for prion diseases.
The emergence of another prion disease in an animal species of crucial importance for millions of persons worldwide makes it necessary to assess the risk for humans and develop evidence-based policies to control and limit the spread of the disease in animals and minimize human exposure. The implementation of a surveillance system for prion diseases would be a first step to enable disease control and minimize human and animal exposure. Finally, the diagnostic capacity of prion diseases needs to be improved in all countries in Africa where dromedaries are part of the domestic livestock.
***> IMPORTS AND EXPORTS <***
***SEE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF BANNED ANIMAL PROTEIN AKA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA DECADES AFTER POST BAN ***
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
