Revised Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Standards
Revised BSE standards
Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk status of Members
Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk status of Members
Original: English (EN) 1-4 October 2024
1. Opening ............................................................ 2
2. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of Chairperson and Rapporteur ................................................................. 2
3. Evaluation of two applications from a Member for official recognition of zonal negligible BSE risk status .................. 2
4. Evaluation of the risk assessments of two Members already having an official negligible BSE risk status ................. 9
5. Review of the meeting and working procedure (summary tables) ............................................................................ 17
6. Annual reconfirmation forms: supportive documented evidence and internal screening guidance for maintenance of official BSE …….. 17
7. Any other business .................................................................................................................. 18
8. Adoption of the report .................................................................................................................. 18
List of Annexes
Appendix 1. Terms of reference
Appendix 2. Agenda
Appendix 3. List of Participants
Status Department
disease.status@woah.org
A meeting of the ad hoc Group on the evaluation of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk status of Members (hereafter the Group) was held from 1 to 4 October 2024.
Snip…see full text
Meeting of the AHG on the evaluation of BSE risk status of Members/October 2024
https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2025/03/a-bse-ahg-report-2024-public-final.pdf
Canada
BSE Surveillance Program: Early participation and next steps
It’s been four months since we updated the National Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program to align with new international standards. Early results are promising: we’ve already received 152 samples and have paid $102,000 to support clinical history recording and sampling – all from private veterinarians in Alberta.
To keep the momentum going, we’re encouraging participation from across the country.
Whether you’re a bovine vet, cattle producer, pathologist, abattoir staff or deadstock collector, the new tools make it easier to contribute:
Is the animal eligible? Take 2 minutes to check using our simple online questionnaire Need a refresher on sampling and packaging? Clear, practical guidance is available Want to claim for services provided? Use our online invoice form – submitting takes less than 2 minutes and payment rates have been updated Your participation matters: Market access depends on our ability to prove we’re actively looking for eligible cattle.
Visit the National BSE Surveillance Program webpage to learn more and get started.
Thanks for supporting disease surveillance in Canada.
Programme de surveillance de l’ESB : Participation initiale et prochaines étapes
Cela fait maintenant quatre mois que nous avons mis à jour le Programme national de surveillance de l’encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine (ESB) afin de l’aligner sur les nouvelles normes internationales. Les premiers résultats sont prometteurs : nous avons déjà reçu 152 échantillons et versé 102 000 $ pour soutenir la consignation de l’historique clinique et l’échantillonnage – tous provenant de vétérinaires privés en Alberta.
Pour maintenir cet élan, nous encourageons la participation à l’échelle du pays. Que vous soyez vétérinaire bovin, producteur de bovins, pathologiste, membre du personnel d’abattoir ou collecteur de cadavres d’animaux, les nouveaux outils facilitent votre contribution :
L’animal est-il admissible? Vérifiez-le en 2 minutes à l’aide de notre questionnaire en ligne Besoin d’un rappel sur l'échantillonnage et l'emballage? Des directives claires et pratiques sont disponibles Vous souhaitez réclamer des services fournis? Utilisez notre formulaire de facturation en ligne – l’envoi prend moins de 2 minutes, et les taux de rémunération ont été mis à jour Votre participation est essentielle : l’accès aux marchés dépend de notre capacité à démontrer que nous recherchons activement les bovins admissibles.
Consultez la page du Programme national de surveillance de l'ESB pour en savoir plus et commencer
Merci de soutenir la surveillance des maladies au Canada.
https://inspection.canada.ca/en/animal-health/terrestrial-animals/diseases/reportable/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy/national-bse-surveillance-program
Updates on the WOAH activities in the field of TSEs
Natalie MOYEN Disease Status Officer
Status Department
May 14 th , 2024
2
Outline 1. Revised BSE standards (Terrestrial Code)
a) b) Transition process: where are we?
Official recognition of BSE risk status
i. Members/zones recognised as having a negligible or controlled BSE risk status
ii. New applications
iii. Annual reconfirmations
2. Revision of Scrapie standards (Terrestrial Code
https://www.eurl.craw.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/07_WOAH_Updates-on-the-WOAH-activities-in-the-field-of-TSEs.pdf
APHIS USDA BSE
6.8.Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 11.4.), Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 1.8.) and Glossary definition for ‘protein meal’
Background
In February 2018, following preliminary work and scientific exchanges, the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission agreed to an in-depth review of Chapter 11.4. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The OIE convened three different ad hoc Groups between July 2018 and March 2019: i) an ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment, which met twice, ii) an ad hoc Group on BSE surveillance, which met once, and iii) a joint ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment and surveillance, which met once. The Code Commission, at its September 2019 meeting, reviewed the four ad hoc Group reports and the opinion of the Scientific Commission regarding the draft revised chapter and circulated a revised draft Chapter 11.4. for comments.
In February 2020, the Code Commission considered comments received on the revised draft Chapter 11.4. and requested that the joint ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment and surveillance be reconvened to address comments of a technical nature. In June 2020, the joint ad hoc Group was convened to address relevant comments and was also requested to review Chapter 1.8. Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy to ensure alignment with the proposed changes in Chapter 11.4.
In September 2020, the Code Commission reviewed the joint ad hoc Group report and the revised draft Chapters 11.4. and 1.8. and made some additional amendments and circulated the revised chapters for comments in its September 2020 report. In February 2021, the Commission considered comments received and amended the chapters, as appropriate, and circulated the revised chapters for a third round of comments.
In preparation for the September 2021 meetings, some members of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission met to discuss key aspects of the revision of Chapters 11.4. and 1.8. to ensure a common understanding of the main concerns raised by Members, the decisions made on the revised chapters and their impact on the official status recognition, as well as on the adapted procedures that will be required. During this meeting, it was agreed that each Commission would address the issues relevant to its meeting and document discussions in their respective reports.
Discussion
Snip…see;
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/Sep-2021-Full-Comm-Report.docx
US BSE testing <25K annually…
Samples Tested by Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year v Total Samples Tested as Valid WOAH Points per Fiscal Year BSurvE Points
2024 22,848 207,808 468,946
2023 22,838 239,695 570,345
2022 21,816 360,553 842,517
2021 23,124 398,508 962,010
2020 21,441 331,561 795,183
2019 18,627 395,732 948,602
2018 21,809 540,960 1,305,585
2017 24,229 577,494 1,383,678
2016 26,564 547,959 1,314,579
2015 40,902 592,353 1,414,630
Updates on the WOAH activities in the field of TSEs
Natalie MOYEN Disease Status Officer
Status Department
May 14 th , 2024
2
Outline 1. Revised BSE standards (Terrestrial Code)
a) b) Transition process: where are we?
Official recognition of BSE risk status
i. Members/zones recognised as having a negligible or controlled BSE risk status
ii. New applications
iii. Annual reconfirmations
2. Revision of Scrapie standards (Terrestrial Code
https://www.eurl.craw.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/07_WOAH_Updates-on-the-WOAH-activities-in-the-field-of-TSEs.pdf
Wednesday, May 24, 2023
***> WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, United States of America Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Immediate notification
https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/5067
SATURDAY, MAY 20, 2023
***> Tennessee State Veterinarian Alerts Cattle Owners to Disease Detection Mad Cow atypical L-Type BSE
https://www.tn.gov/agriculture/news/2023/5/19/state-veterinarian-alerts-cattle-owners-to-disease-detection.html
MAY 19, 2023
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/newsroom/stakeholder-info/sa_by_date/sa-2023/bse
2 weeks before the announcement of this recent mad cow case in the USA, i submitted this to the APHIS et al;
***> APPRX. 2 weeks before the recent mad cow case was confirmed in the USA, in Tennessee, atypical L-Type BSE, I submitted this to the APHIS et al;
Document APHIS-2023-0027-0001 BSE Singeltary Comment Submission May 2, 2023
''said 'burden' cost, will be a heavy burden to bear, if we fail with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion disease, that is why this information collection is so critical''...
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/APHIS-2023-0027-0002
https://downloads.regulations.gov/APHIS-2023-0027-0002/attachment_1.pdf
Specified Risk Materials DOCKET NUMBER Docket No. FSIS-2022-0027 Singeltary Submission Attachment
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FSIS-2022-0027-0002
https://downloads.regulations.gov/FSIS-2022-0027-0002/attachment_1.pdf
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/APHIS-2018-0087-0002
https://downloads.regulations.gov/APHIS-2018-0087-0002/attachment_1.pdf
Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed PUBLIC SUBMISSION
Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. Posted by the Food and Drug Administration on May 17, 2016 Comment Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed Singeltary Submission
https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FDA-2003-D-0432
SCIENCE NEWS MAY 11, 2004 / 10:15 PM
USDA orders silence on mad cow in Texas
By STEVE MITCHELL, United Press International
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2004/05/11/USDA-orders-silence-on-mad-cow-in-Texas/49171084328148/
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II
and
Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
http://web.archive.org/web/20060210024116/http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Consumer Health
Inspector to file charges against USDA
By Steve Mitchell Sep 6, 2005, 22:46 GMT
http://web.archive.org/web/20050912185453/http://washingtontimes.com/upi/20050906-050340-6793r.htm
PAST US MAD COW CASES AND TRACEABILITY PROBLEMS, WHAT'S IT GOING TO TAKE?
AUG. 11, 2017
***>Assuming no other factors influenced the levels of correct diagnosis and that the numbers estimated for 1997 to 1999 were a true representation of the potential under-diagnosis of the entire epidemic up until 1999, then the total number of missed cases positive for BSE could have been in the region of 5,500.
***>As a result, using more sensitive diagnostic assays, we were able to diagnose BSE positive cattle from the years 1997-1999 inclusive that were originally negative by vacuolation. From these data we have estimated that approximately 3% of the total suspect cases submitted up until the year 1999 were mis-diagnosed.
YOU know, Confucius is confused again LOL, i seem to have remembered something in line with this here in the USA...
USDA did not test possible mad cows
By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM
WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2004/06/08/USDA-did-not-test-possible-mad-cows/38651086744622/
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
TEXAS 2ND MAD COW THAT WAS COVERED UP, AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, AND CALLS FROM TSE PRION SCIENTIST AROUND THE GLOBE, THIS 2ND MAD COW IN TEXAS WAS CONFIRMED
THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP
JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED
OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7 MONTHS LATER
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20090424121101/http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20060315165436/http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
NOT to forget ;
It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. Of those 9,200 routine tests, one test returned a non-definitive result on July 27, 2005. That sample underwent additional testing at NVSL, as well as at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, and results were negative. ......
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html
https://www.fsc.go.jp/fsciis/attachedFile/download?retrievalId=kai20050824pr1&fileId=142
r i g h t ............
By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 2/9/2004 7:06 PM
WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 (UPI) -- The federal laboratory in Ames, Iowa, that conducts all of the nation's tests for mad cow disease has a history of producing ambiguous and conflicting results -- to the point where many federal meat inspectors have lost confidence in it, Department of Agriculture veterinarians and a deer rancher told United Press International.
The veterinarians also claim the facility -- part of the USDA and known as the National Veterinary Services Laboratories -- has refused to release testing results to them and has been so secretive some suspect it is covering up additional mad cow cases. ...
http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040209-061848-3665r
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease
Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us
Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............
snip...
There will be several more emails of my research to follow.
I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...
Thank you,I
am sincerely,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx
Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST
In Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:
Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignations are unexpected. just pondering...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,
still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?
I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...
can you confirm???
terry
snip...see full transmission;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHYLLIS K. FONG INSPECTOR GENERAL Before the HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES March 1, 2006
snip...
For release only by the House Committee on Appropriations Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I thank you for inviting me to testify before you today to discuss the activities of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and to provide information about our oversight of the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) programs and operations. I would like to introduce the members of the OIG senior management team who are here with me today: Kathy Tighe, our new Deputy Inspector General; Robert Young, Assistant Inspector General for Audit; Mark Woods, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations; and Suzanne Murrin, Assistant Inspector General for Policy Development and Resources Management. I welcome this opportunity to provide the Subcommittee with an overview of the highlights of our audit and investigative activity over the past year. Fiscal Year 2005 presented many difficult challenges for the USDA and our country’s agricultural producers and consumers. In addition to administering programs relied upon by farmers and rural communities and managing the $128 billion in public resources entrusted to the Department, USDA assumed significant responsibilities responding to the hurricanes that ravaged the Gulf Coast in 2005 and addressing the threat of plant and animal disease. To best serve the Department, our Congressional oversight committees, and the general public, OIG has formally prioritized, organized, and planned our work according to three
2
central objectives. I will present my testimony to the Subcommittee according to the framework of these three objectives: supporting Safety, Security, and Public Health in USDA programs and operations; protecting Program Integrity as USDA provides assistance to individuals and entities; and improving the Department’s Management of Public Resources. I. Safety, Security, and Public Health The BSE Surveillance Program and SRM Controls We recently issued our second report focusing on the Department’s efforts to establish and enforce effective, interlocking safeguards to protect producers and consumers from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly referred to as “mad cow disease.” Our February 2006 report reviewed the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) implementation of its expanded BSE surveillance program and the Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) controls to prevent banned specified risk materials (SRM) from entering our Nation’s food supply. We found that USDA made significant efforts to implement and improve the expanded surveillance program. The Department faced many challenges in a short period of time to establish the necessary processes, controls, and infrastructure needed for this massive effort. In our recent report, we discuss specific areas where we believe corrective actions were not fully effective in addressing our prior findings and recommendations on issues such as obtaining representative samples of the U.S. herd, identifying and obtaining samples from high-risk surveillance streams, and ensuring the completeness/accuracy of data. The Department
3
has responded to our report with immediate actions. For example, at the Secretary’s direction, APHIS revised its testing protocols to provide for additional confirmatory procedures when inconclusive test results occur. Also, both APHIS and FSIS agreed with all OIG recommendations, and they have corrected, or have developed action plans to correct, the program weaknesses identified. APHIS’ Implementation of the Expanded Surveillance Plan APHIS obtained significantly more samples for testing than it originally anticipated would be needed to achieve its stated level of confidence in estimating the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd. The voluntary nature of the surveillance program, however, makes it difficult to determine how successful USDA was in obtaining a representative proportion of high-risk cattle for testing. OIG found that APHIS’ various statistical approaches to determining the prevalence of BSE mitigate some, but not all, of the limitations associated with its data and the agency’s underlying assumptions in the design and implementation of its surveillance program. The accuracy of the underlying data is critical to the development of a future maintenance surveillance program. We recommended that APHIS disclose the limitations in its surveillance program and underlying data when it makes its final assessment of the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. We also found that USDA needed to strengthen its processes to ensure the quality and capability of its BSE testing program, especially when inconclusive test results occur. We recommended that USDA re-evaluate and adjust its testing protocols based on its
4
evaluation of emerging science and strengthen its proficiency testing and quality assurance reviews at participating laboratories. Evaluation of FSIS Processes Regarding SRMs To examine FSIS’ inspection procedures to enforce regulations to prevent risk materials in meat products, OIG reviewed the SRM plans of several meat processing facilities, observed FSIS inspections, and evaluated the effectiveness of controls during the slaughter process. FSIS technical experts assisted us in these reviews. We did not identify SRMs entering the food supply during our plant visits. However, we could not determine whether required SRM procedures were followed or were adequate due to the lack of specificity in the plans. We found that the plants lacked documentation of compliance with SRM control procedures and FSIS actions to validate such compliance. In addition to the control issues we identified regarding SRM procedures at slaughter and processing establishments, we found that FSIS’ information system could not readily provide FSIS with the data it needed to identify trends in SRM violations. The expanded stage of USDA’s BSE surveillance program is now nearing its end. Accordingly, it is important that the issues we have raised be considered as USDA completes its BSE surveillance program and reports on the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd. The Department has responded to our report with immediate action and agreed to address all of our findings and recommendations.
5 Assessing USDA Controls for Beef Exported to Japan On January 20, 2006, Japanese officials announced that they had banned any further imports of beef products from the United States, based on the discovery that a U.S. plant had shipped a veal product containing vertebral column material that was prohibited by the terms of an agreement with Japan. On the same date, in response to Japan’s decision, the Secretary announced 12 actions USDA would undertake to facilitate resuming trade. These actions include delisting and investigating the plant that exported the ineligible product, requiring a second signature on export certificates, providing training to inspection personnel on export certification, and holding meetings with inspection officials and industry representatives to reaffirm program requirements. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary requested OIG to audit the adequacy of USDA’s coordination and control processes for the Beef Export Verification (BEV) program for Japan. OIG’s report, issued on February 16, 2006, concluded that the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) and FSIS could strengthen their controls over the BEV program by improving processes used to communicate BEV program requirements, clearly defining roles and responsibilities, and implementing additional oversight of FSIS inspection personnel. In response to our recommendations, the agencies agreed to an array of actions. AMS agreed to maintain a list of specific, export-eligible products for each facility with an approved BEV program; to systematically notify FSIS when any establishment is approved/delisted from a BEV program; and to review all establishments in the BEV program to ensure that they adhere to program requirements. FSIS agreed to
6
clarify the roles and responsibilities of FSIS personnel involved at each stage of the export verification process; expedite the development of export certification training; and increase supervisory oversight of the export certification process. OIG believes that the full implementation of these measures will strengthen and improve the Department’s compliance with BEV program requirements. Assessment of the Equivalence of the Canadian Beef Inspection System Last year, my testimony discussed OIG’s findings from our audit of APHIS’ oversight of the importation of beef products from Canada. Our work on that audit led us to conduct an evaluation of FSIS’ assessment of the equivalence of the Canadian food safety inspection system, which we issued in December 2005. The then FSIS Administrator and the Under Secretary for Food Safety had identified concerns with the Canadian inspection system in late 2003. Our audit determined that FSIS did not fully address the issues raised by USDA officials in a timely manner. For example, in July 2003 FSIS found that Canadian inspection officials were not enforcing certain pathogen reduction and HACCP system regulations. These same types of concerns were identified again in June 2005. At the time of our audit, FSIS did not have protocols for evaluating deficiencies in a foreign country’s inspection system which could be used to question the system’s equivalence to U.S. standards. In addition, FSIS had not instituted compensating controls (such as increased port-of-entry testing) to strengthen public health protections while
7
deficiencies were present. During the period of January 2003–May 2005, 4.4 billion pounds of Canadian processed product entered the U.S., even though FSIS officials questioned the equivalence of the Canadian inspection system. FSIS agreed with OIG’s five recommendations, which included implementing protocols to determine which deficiencies would lead FSIS to question whether a foreign country’s inspection system is equivalent to the U.S. system. In response to the report, FSIS committed to develop these protocols by March 2006 and to implement them immediately thereafter. Oversight of FSIS Recalls For the past several years we have testified about our continuing work regarding adulterated beef product recalls. In July 2004, a Pennsylvania firm initiated a recall of approximately 170,000 pounds of ground beef patties because of mislabeling. Approximately one-fourth of this product was made, in part, from beef trim from Canada which was not eligible for import to the U.S., following the detection of a Canadian cow with BSE. In May 2005, we reported on the adequacy of FSIS’ effectiveness checks and the agency’s oversight of the recall. Overall, we concluded that FSIS had strengthened its procedures regarding the agency’s oversight of recalls. However, we noted that FSIS personnel did not determine the amount of product purchased by firms on 26 of the 58 completed effectiveness checks. This resulted in reduced assurance that mislabeled product was completely retrieved from distribution. Agency officials concurred with the firms’ assertions that the product had been removed from the marketplace. In response to
8
our recommendations, FSIS agreed to provide more specific direction to its personnel on identifying and evaluating the amount of product purchased. The Subcommittee has been interested in OIG’s investigation of a Pennsylvania company’s recall of meat products. This remains an ongoing civil fraud investigation and we will be pleased to provide information on its resolution to the Subcommittee upon its conclusion.
snip. ...9 of 34 pages. ...tss
http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/FongTestimony.pdf
see archived url;
http://web.archive.org/web/20060330031103/http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/FongTestimony.pdf
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20080922232504/http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Washington, D.C. 20250 January 25, 2006 REPLY TO ATTN OF: 50601-10-KC
TO: W. Ron DeHaven Administrator Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Barbara Masters Administrator Food Safety and Inspection Service ATTN: William J. Hudnall Deputy Administrator Marketing Regulatory Program Business Services William C. Smith Assistant Administrator Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review
FROM: Robert W. Young /s/ Assistant Inspector General for Audit
SUBJECT: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
This report presents the results of our audit of the enhanced BSE surveillance program and controls over specified risk materials and advanced meat recovery products. Your written response to the official draft report, dated January 20, 2006, is included as exhibit G with excerpts of the response and the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) position incorporated into the Findings and Recommendations section of the report, where applicable. We accept the management decisions for all recommendations. Please follow your agency’s internal procedures in forwarding documentation for final action to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). We are providing a separate memorandum to the agencies and OCFO that provides specific information on the actions to be completed to achieve final action. We appreciate your timely response and the cooperation and assistance provided to our staff during the audit USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC/ Page i
Executive Summary
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
Results in Brief This report evaluates elements of the interlocking safeguards in place to protect United States (U.S.) beef from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, widely known as BSE or "mad cow disease." Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), has led a multi-agency effort to monitor and prevent BSE from entering the food supply. After discovering a BSE-positive cow in December 2003, APHIS expanded its BSE surveillance program. To further protect the food supply, USDA banned materials identified as being at risk of carrying BSE (specified risk materials (SRM)), such as central nervous system tissue. As part of this effort, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) required beef slaughter and processing facilities to incorporate controls for handling such materials into their operational plans. Onsite FSIS inspectors also inspect cattle for clinical signs in order to prevent diseased animals from being slaughtered for human consumption. To evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguards, we assessed APHIS’ implementation of the expanded surveillance program, as well as FSIS’ controls to prevent banned SRMs from entering the food supply.
In June 2004, APHIS implemented its expanded surveillance program; participation by industry in this surveillance program is voluntary. As of May 2005, over 350,000 animals were sampled and tested for BSE. To date, two animals tested positive for BSE; one tested positive after implementation of the expanded surveillance program.
USDA made significant efforts to implement the expanded BSE surveillance program. Much needed to be done in a short period of time to establish the necessary processes, controls, infrastructure, and networks to assist in this effort. In addition, extensive outreach and coordination was undertaken with other Federal, State, and local entities, private industry, and laboratory and veterinary networks. This report provides an assessment as to the progress USDA made in expanding its surveillance effort and the effectiveness of its controls and processes. This report also discusses the limitations of its program and data in assessing the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd.
snip...
40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive.
41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004.
42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue.
43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope.
44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue.
SNIP...
PLEASE SEE FLAMING EVIDENCE THAT THE USDA ET AL COVERED UP MAD COW DISEASE IN TEXAS ;
PAGE 43;
Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls
snip...
FULL TEXT 130 PAGES
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20080920075242/http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Panel questions Homeland Security inspection of food By Jerry Hagstrom, CongressDailyPM
Agriculture Department Inspector General Phyllis Fong and several members of the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee expressed concern Wednesday about whether the Homeland Security Department is properly inspecting food and other agricultural items when they arrive in the United States. Neither Fong nor the committee members provided any hard evidence of problems, but Fong said she and the Homeland Security Department's inspector general were conducting a joint review of inspection functions. Once the province of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, they were transferred to Homeland Security when that department was created.
"We are still very concerned about whether that broader inspection is being carried out," Fong said in testimony.
Fong said the joint inquiry was only in the stage of field investigation and had reached no conclusions.
Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio, suggested the inspector general focus on the impact of the inspections on plants from other countries. House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Henry Bonilla, R-Texas, said he had asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate the food inspection process. Rep. Tom Latham, R-Iowa, who noted he also sits on the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, said, "Apparently there are still some unresolved issues about what the heck [the department] is doing."
Under questioning from Agriculture Appropriations ranking member Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., Fong acknowledged it was APHIS Administrator Ron DeHaven who made the decision not to conduct further tests on a Texas cow whose initial test for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad cow disease, was inconclusive. Further tests ordered by the inspector general several months later showed that the cow had the disease.
DeLauro noted that when Japan stopped importing U.S. beef in December, USDA moved faster to deal with that issue than it had when the Texas cow was tested, a sign, she said, that USDA was more concerned about trade than human health.
"We are taking years to deal with public health," DeLauro said. "If APHIS is in charge of avian influenza and we have the kinds of problems existing here, it doesn't bode well for public safety."
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0306/030106cdpm2.htm
see archived url;
http://web.archive.org/web/20060311070356/http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0306/030106cdpm2.htm
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS.
Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.
This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20090626021608/http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf
Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006
Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20080921202102/http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.
October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20050308184249/http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/docket-no-fsis-2006-0011-fsis-harvard.html
snip...SEE FULL TEXT;
BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5
http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2020/12/
BSE REDBOOK
Preliminary Notification
The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE. Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this lab to confirm their first case of BSE).
snip...
BSE Response Team
The BSE Response Team will complete the informational memorandum for the Secretary. The Team will prepare the letter to the Office of International Epizootics (OIE), the international animal health organization, for signature by the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator. OIE requires that all countries submit official notification within 24 hours of confirming a diagnosis of BSE. The BSE Response Team and the office of the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all APHIS regional directors and AVIC'S. The BSE Response Team and the office of the FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all regional and field FSIS offices. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify other Federal agencies. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify key industry/consumer representatives. The BSE Response Team and APHIS International Services would notify foreign embassies. The BSE Response Team would establish a toll-free 800 telephone line for industry representatives, reporters, and the public. The BSE Response Team would coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs and USDA office of Communications to issue a press release the day the diagnosis is confirmed. The press release would announce a press conference to be held the morning after the diagnosis is confirmed......
THE END
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: Hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room...
SCIENCE NEWS MAY 11, 2004 / 10:15 PM
USDA orders silence on mad cow in Texas
By STEVE MITCHELL, United Press International
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2004/05/11/USDA-orders-silence-on-mad-cow-in-Texas/49171084328148/
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II
and
Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
http://web.archive.org/web/20060210024116/http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Consumer Health
Inspector to file charges against USDA
By Steve Mitchell Sep 6, 2005, 22:46 GMT
http://web.archive.org/web/20050912185453/http://washingtontimes.com/upi/20050906-050340-6793r.htm
PAST US MAD COW CASES AND TRACEABILITY PROBLEMS, WHAT'S IT GOING TO TAKE?
AUG. 11, 2017
***>Assuming no other factors influenced the levels of correct diagnosis and that the numbers estimated for 1997 to 1999 were a true representation of the potential under-diagnosis of the entire epidemic up until 1999, then the total number of missed cases positive for BSE could have been in the region of 5,500.
***>As a result, using more sensitive diagnostic assays, we were able to diagnose BSE positive cattle from the years 1997-1999 inclusive that were originally negative by vacuolation. From these data we have estimated that approximately 3% of the total suspect cases submitted up until the year 1999 were mis-diagnosed.
YOU know, Confucius is confused again LOL, i seem to have remembered something in line with this here in the USA...
USDA did not test possible mad cows
By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM
WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2004/06/08/USDA-did-not-test-possible-mad-cows/38651086744622/
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
TEXAS 2ND MAD COW THAT WAS COVERED UP, AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, AND CALLS FROM TSE PRION SCIENTIST AROUND THE GLOBE, THIS 2ND MAD COW IN TEXAS WAS CONFIRMED
THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP
JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED
OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7 MONTHS LATER
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20090424121101/http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20060315165436/http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
NOT to forget ;
It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. Of those 9,200 routine tests, one test returned a non-definitive result on July 27, 2005. That sample underwent additional testing at NVSL, as well as at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, and results were negative. ......
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html
https://www.fsc.go.jp/fsciis/attachedFile/download?retrievalId=kai20050824pr1&fileId=142
r i g h t ............
By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 2/9/2004 7:06 PM
WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 (UPI) -- The federal laboratory in Ames, Iowa, that conducts all of the nation's tests for mad cow disease has a history of producing ambiguous and conflicting results -- to the point where many federal meat inspectors have lost confidence in it, Department of Agriculture veterinarians and a deer rancher told United Press International.
The veterinarians also claim the facility -- part of the USDA and known as the National Veterinary Services Laboratories -- has refused to release testing results to them and has been so secretive some suspect it is covering up additional mad cow cases. ...
http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040209-061848-3665r
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease
Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us
Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............
snip...
There will be several more emails of my research to follow.
I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...
Thank you,I
am sincerely,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx
Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST
In Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:
Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignations are unexpected. just pondering...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,
still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?
I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...
can you confirm???
terry
snip...see full transmission;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHYLLIS K. FONG INSPECTOR GENERAL Before the HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES March 1, 2006
snip...
For release only by the House Committee on Appropriations Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I thank you for inviting me to testify before you today to discuss the activities of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and to provide information about our oversight of the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) programs and operations. I would like to introduce the members of the OIG senior management team who are here with me today: Kathy Tighe, our new Deputy Inspector General; Robert Young, Assistant Inspector General for Audit; Mark Woods, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations; and Suzanne Murrin, Assistant Inspector General for Policy Development and Resources Management. I welcome this opportunity to provide the Subcommittee with an overview of the highlights of our audit and investigative activity over the past year. Fiscal Year 2005 presented many difficult challenges for the USDA and our country’s agricultural producers and consumers. In addition to administering programs relied upon by farmers and rural communities and managing the $128 billion in public resources entrusted to the Department, USDA assumed significant responsibilities responding to the hurricanes that ravaged the Gulf Coast in 2005 and addressing the threat of plant and animal disease. To best serve the Department, our Congressional oversight committees, and the general public, OIG has formally prioritized, organized, and planned our work according to three
2
central objectives. I will present my testimony to the Subcommittee according to the framework of these three objectives: supporting Safety, Security, and Public Health in USDA programs and operations; protecting Program Integrity as USDA provides assistance to individuals and entities; and improving the Department’s Management of Public Resources. I. Safety, Security, and Public Health The BSE Surveillance Program and SRM Controls We recently issued our second report focusing on the Department’s efforts to establish and enforce effective, interlocking safeguards to protect producers and consumers from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly referred to as “mad cow disease.” Our February 2006 report reviewed the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) implementation of its expanded BSE surveillance program and the Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) controls to prevent banned specified risk materials (SRM) from entering our Nation’s food supply. We found that USDA made significant efforts to implement and improve the expanded surveillance program. The Department faced many challenges in a short period of time to establish the necessary processes, controls, and infrastructure needed for this massive effort. In our recent report, we discuss specific areas where we believe corrective actions were not fully effective in addressing our prior findings and recommendations on issues such as obtaining representative samples of the U.S. herd, identifying and obtaining samples from high-risk surveillance streams, and ensuring the completeness/accuracy of data. The Department
3
has responded to our report with immediate actions. For example, at the Secretary’s direction, APHIS revised its testing protocols to provide for additional confirmatory procedures when inconclusive test results occur. Also, both APHIS and FSIS agreed with all OIG recommendations, and they have corrected, or have developed action plans to correct, the program weaknesses identified. APHIS’ Implementation of the Expanded Surveillance Plan APHIS obtained significantly more samples for testing than it originally anticipated would be needed to achieve its stated level of confidence in estimating the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd. The voluntary nature of the surveillance program, however, makes it difficult to determine how successful USDA was in obtaining a representative proportion of high-risk cattle for testing. OIG found that APHIS’ various statistical approaches to determining the prevalence of BSE mitigate some, but not all, of the limitations associated with its data and the agency’s underlying assumptions in the design and implementation of its surveillance program. The accuracy of the underlying data is critical to the development of a future maintenance surveillance program. We recommended that APHIS disclose the limitations in its surveillance program and underlying data when it makes its final assessment of the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. We also found that USDA needed to strengthen its processes to ensure the quality and capability of its BSE testing program, especially when inconclusive test results occur. We recommended that USDA re-evaluate and adjust its testing protocols based on its
4
evaluation of emerging science and strengthen its proficiency testing and quality assurance reviews at participating laboratories. Evaluation of FSIS Processes Regarding SRMs To examine FSIS’ inspection procedures to enforce regulations to prevent risk materials in meat products, OIG reviewed the SRM plans of several meat processing facilities, observed FSIS inspections, and evaluated the effectiveness of controls during the slaughter process. FSIS technical experts assisted us in these reviews. We did not identify SRMs entering the food supply during our plant visits. However, we could not determine whether required SRM procedures were followed or were adequate due to the lack of specificity in the plans. We found that the plants lacked documentation of compliance with SRM control procedures and FSIS actions to validate such compliance. In addition to the control issues we identified regarding SRM procedures at slaughter and processing establishments, we found that FSIS’ information system could not readily provide FSIS with the data it needed to identify trends in SRM violations. The expanded stage of USDA’s BSE surveillance program is now nearing its end. Accordingly, it is important that the issues we have raised be considered as USDA completes its BSE surveillance program and reports on the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd. The Department has responded to our report with immediate action and agreed to address all of our findings and recommendations.
5 Assessing USDA Controls for Beef Exported to Japan On January 20, 2006, Japanese officials announced that they had banned any further imports of beef products from the United States, based on the discovery that a U.S. plant had shipped a veal product containing vertebral column material that was prohibited by the terms of an agreement with Japan. On the same date, in response to Japan’s decision, the Secretary announced 12 actions USDA would undertake to facilitate resuming trade. These actions include delisting and investigating the plant that exported the ineligible product, requiring a second signature on export certificates, providing training to inspection personnel on export certification, and holding meetings with inspection officials and industry representatives to reaffirm program requirements. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary requested OIG to audit the adequacy of USDA’s coordination and control processes for the Beef Export Verification (BEV) program for Japan. OIG’s report, issued on February 16, 2006, concluded that the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) and FSIS could strengthen their controls over the BEV program by improving processes used to communicate BEV program requirements, clearly defining roles and responsibilities, and implementing additional oversight of FSIS inspection personnel. In response to our recommendations, the agencies agreed to an array of actions. AMS agreed to maintain a list of specific, export-eligible products for each facility with an approved BEV program; to systematically notify FSIS when any establishment is approved/delisted from a BEV program; and to review all establishments in the BEV program to ensure that they adhere to program requirements. FSIS agreed to
6
clarify the roles and responsibilities of FSIS personnel involved at each stage of the export verification process; expedite the development of export certification training; and increase supervisory oversight of the export certification process. OIG believes that the full implementation of these measures will strengthen and improve the Department’s compliance with BEV program requirements. Assessment of the Equivalence of the Canadian Beef Inspection System Last year, my testimony discussed OIG’s findings from our audit of APHIS’ oversight of the importation of beef products from Canada. Our work on that audit led us to conduct an evaluation of FSIS’ assessment of the equivalence of the Canadian food safety inspection system, which we issued in December 2005. The then FSIS Administrator and the Under Secretary for Food Safety had identified concerns with the Canadian inspection system in late 2003. Our audit determined that FSIS did not fully address the issues raised by USDA officials in a timely manner. For example, in July 2003 FSIS found that Canadian inspection officials were not enforcing certain pathogen reduction and HACCP system regulations. These same types of concerns were identified again in June 2005. At the time of our audit, FSIS did not have protocols for evaluating deficiencies in a foreign country’s inspection system which could be used to question the system’s equivalence to U.S. standards. In addition, FSIS had not instituted compensating controls (such as increased port-of-entry testing) to strengthen public health protections while
7
deficiencies were present. During the period of January 2003–May 2005, 4.4 billion pounds of Canadian processed product entered the U.S., even though FSIS officials questioned the equivalence of the Canadian inspection system. FSIS agreed with OIG’s five recommendations, which included implementing protocols to determine which deficiencies would lead FSIS to question whether a foreign country’s inspection system is equivalent to the U.S. system. In response to the report, FSIS committed to develop these protocols by March 2006 and to implement them immediately thereafter. Oversight of FSIS Recalls For the past several years we have testified about our continuing work regarding adulterated beef product recalls. In July 2004, a Pennsylvania firm initiated a recall of approximately 170,000 pounds of ground beef patties because of mislabeling. Approximately one-fourth of this product was made, in part, from beef trim from Canada which was not eligible for import to the U.S., following the detection of a Canadian cow with BSE. In May 2005, we reported on the adequacy of FSIS’ effectiveness checks and the agency’s oversight of the recall. Overall, we concluded that FSIS had strengthened its procedures regarding the agency’s oversight of recalls. However, we noted that FSIS personnel did not determine the amount of product purchased by firms on 26 of the 58 completed effectiveness checks. This resulted in reduced assurance that mislabeled product was completely retrieved from distribution. Agency officials concurred with the firms’ assertions that the product had been removed from the marketplace. In response to
8
our recommendations, FSIS agreed to provide more specific direction to its personnel on identifying and evaluating the amount of product purchased. The Subcommittee has been interested in OIG’s investigation of a Pennsylvania company’s recall of meat products. This remains an ongoing civil fraud investigation and we will be pleased to provide information on its resolution to the Subcommittee upon its conclusion.
snip. ...9 of 34 pages. ...tss
http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/FongTestimony.pdf
see archived url;
http://web.archive.org/web/20060330031103/http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/FongTestimony.pdf
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20080922232504/http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Washington, D.C. 20250 January 25, 2006 REPLY TO ATTN OF: 50601-10-KC
TO: W. Ron DeHaven Administrator Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Barbara Masters Administrator Food Safety and Inspection Service ATTN: William J. Hudnall Deputy Administrator Marketing Regulatory Program Business Services William C. Smith Assistant Administrator Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review
FROM: Robert W. Young /s/ Assistant Inspector General for Audit
SUBJECT: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
This report presents the results of our audit of the enhanced BSE surveillance program and controls over specified risk materials and advanced meat recovery products. Your written response to the official draft report, dated January 20, 2006, is included as exhibit G with excerpts of the response and the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) position incorporated into the Findings and Recommendations section of the report, where applicable. We accept the management decisions for all recommendations. Please follow your agency’s internal procedures in forwarding documentation for final action to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). We are providing a separate memorandum to the agencies and OCFO that provides specific information on the actions to be completed to achieve final action. We appreciate your timely response and the cooperation and assistance provided to our staff during the audit USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC/ Page i
Executive Summary
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
Results in Brief This report evaluates elements of the interlocking safeguards in place to protect United States (U.S.) beef from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, widely known as BSE or "mad cow disease." Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), has led a multi-agency effort to monitor and prevent BSE from entering the food supply. After discovering a BSE-positive cow in December 2003, APHIS expanded its BSE surveillance program. To further protect the food supply, USDA banned materials identified as being at risk of carrying BSE (specified risk materials (SRM)), such as central nervous system tissue. As part of this effort, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) required beef slaughter and processing facilities to incorporate controls for handling such materials into their operational plans. Onsite FSIS inspectors also inspect cattle for clinical signs in order to prevent diseased animals from being slaughtered for human consumption. To evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguards, we assessed APHIS’ implementation of the expanded surveillance program, as well as FSIS’ controls to prevent banned SRMs from entering the food supply.
In June 2004, APHIS implemented its expanded surveillance program; participation by industry in this surveillance program is voluntary. As of May 2005, over 350,000 animals were sampled and tested for BSE. To date, two animals tested positive for BSE; one tested positive after implementation of the expanded surveillance program.
USDA made significant efforts to implement the expanded BSE surveillance program. Much needed to be done in a short period of time to establish the necessary processes, controls, infrastructure, and networks to assist in this effort. In addition, extensive outreach and coordination was undertaken with other Federal, State, and local entities, private industry, and laboratory and veterinary networks. This report provides an assessment as to the progress USDA made in expanding its surveillance effort and the effectiveness of its controls and processes. This report also discusses the limitations of its program and data in assessing the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd.
snip...
40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive.
41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004.
42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue.
43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope.
44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue.
SNIP...
PLEASE SEE FLAMING EVIDENCE THAT THE USDA ET AL COVERED UP MAD COW DISEASE IN TEXAS ;
PAGE 43;
Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls
snip...
FULL TEXT 130 PAGES
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20080920075242/http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Panel questions Homeland Security inspection of food By Jerry Hagstrom, CongressDailyPM
Agriculture Department Inspector General Phyllis Fong and several members of the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee expressed concern Wednesday about whether the Homeland Security Department is properly inspecting food and other agricultural items when they arrive in the United States. Neither Fong nor the committee members provided any hard evidence of problems, but Fong said she and the Homeland Security Department's inspector general were conducting a joint review of inspection functions. Once the province of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, they were transferred to Homeland Security when that department was created.
"We are still very concerned about whether that broader inspection is being carried out," Fong said in testimony.
Fong said the joint inquiry was only in the stage of field investigation and had reached no conclusions.
Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio, suggested the inspector general focus on the impact of the inspections on plants from other countries. House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Henry Bonilla, R-Texas, said he had asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate the food inspection process. Rep. Tom Latham, R-Iowa, who noted he also sits on the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, said, "Apparently there are still some unresolved issues about what the heck [the department] is doing."
Under questioning from Agriculture Appropriations ranking member Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., Fong acknowledged it was APHIS Administrator Ron DeHaven who made the decision not to conduct further tests on a Texas cow whose initial test for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad cow disease, was inconclusive. Further tests ordered by the inspector general several months later showed that the cow had the disease.
DeLauro noted that when Japan stopped importing U.S. beef in December, USDA moved faster to deal with that issue than it had when the Texas cow was tested, a sign, she said, that USDA was more concerned about trade than human health.
"We are taking years to deal with public health," DeLauro said. "If APHIS is in charge of avian influenza and we have the kinds of problems existing here, it doesn't bode well for public safety."
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0306/030106cdpm2.htm
see archived url;
http://web.archive.org/web/20060311070356/http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0306/030106cdpm2.htm
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS.
Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.
This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20090626021608/http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf
Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006
Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20080921202102/http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.
October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
NEW URL LINK;
http://web.archive.org/web/20050308184249/http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/docket-no-fsis-2006-0011-fsis-harvard.html
snip...SEE FULL TEXT;
BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5
http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2020/12/
BSE REDBOOK
Preliminary Notification
The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE. Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this lab to confirm their first case of BSE).
snip...
BSE Response Team
The BSE Response Team will complete the informational memorandum for the Secretary. The Team will prepare the letter to the Office of International Epizootics (OIE), the international animal health organization, for signature by the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator. OIE requires that all countries submit official notification within 24 hours of confirming a diagnosis of BSE. The BSE Response Team and the office of the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all APHIS regional directors and AVIC'S. The BSE Response Team and the office of the FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all regional and field FSIS offices. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify other Federal agencies. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify key industry/consumer representatives. The BSE Response Team and APHIS International Services would notify foreign embassies. The BSE Response Team would establish a toll-free 800 telephone line for industry representatives, reporters, and the public. The BSE Response Team would coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs and USDA office of Communications to issue a press release the day the diagnosis is confirmed. The press release would announce a press conference to be held the morning after the diagnosis is confirmed......
THE END
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: Hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room...
Date: February 14, 2000 at 9:04 am PST
Subject: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 01:55:54 -0800 From: tom Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
i am looking now a bizarre Oct 98 internal USDA publication describing a james bond-type US effort to control media should the long-anticipated first case of BSE in the US be admitted.
'Players' on the 27 member BSE Response Team are to be flown in from all over the country to a BSE Headquarters 'situation room' apparently an underground bunker in Riverdale, Maryland under the command of the Assistant Secretary of Marketing.
Authentic press releases are already prepared and ready to go out after a few specifics have been filled in. They are spelled out in a separate document, the BSE Red Book, aka BSE Emergency Disease Guidelines.
Aphis' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) activates team assembly. From the time a bovine brain sample is submitted, it takes 14-18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE. In the first 10-13 days, NVSL have enough information to determine the need for additional tests. If a provisional BSE diagnosis is made, the sample is 'hand-carried' (are they going to tell the airline and customs?) to the Central Veterinary Laboratory in England for confirmation, where they are expecting a 24 to 96 hour turn-around.
I guess that means we can get the white tiger brain analyzed by Friday despite the 22 year delay to date. Maybe we could throw in a few cougar brains from NE Colorado too.
A Team Member is designated to silently monitor this listserve and www.mad-cow.org(among others) -- for what, it doesn't say. The Freedom of Information Act request from the East Coast consumer group turned up numerous top-secret USDA downloads from that site and Dealler's.
After 24 hours of secret briefings for 'select industry and trading partners' (to allow them to take positions on the commodities markets opposite the 'non-select' industry and trading partners?), a press conference will be held the next day.
There are plans to trace the cow, its lineage, its herdmates, the renderer, traceout of product, buyout of herd, farm of origin, to get the state involved to quarantine the herd (pre-arranged for all 50 states), expectations for trade bans, notification of OIE within 24 hours, media 800 numbers, spokespersons and backups, notify CDC, FDA, NIH, and many other commendable activities. The Flow Chart is a sight to behold, I will try to scan it in tomorrow.
In short, that cow is going to be toast by the time the public first hears about it.
The Plan does not speak to the scenario in which the CVL says, yes, this is bovine spongiform encephalopathy all right but it is one of your strains, not ours. Invoking their Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence principle, there may be no perceived need for public disclosure in this case.
USDA is caught completely unprepared if BSE first turns up in a US zoo animal. These animals could easily be diagnosed outside the "system" and be the subject of a publicity-seeking lab press release. I think this is a more likely scenario because the US has likely imported many thousands of zoo animals with advanced infections from Britain and France and there has been zero monitoring. Unlike with downer cows, anyone with the right colleagues can get ahold of a fallen zoo animal. Zoo animals enter the food chain in some cases after being rendered.
Another scenario would be some stock market speculator obtaining the Red Book and issuing a flurry of bogus but authentic-looking press releases that included bogus 800 and hacked USDA web links. The press here is so lazy and so accustomed to putting out public relation handouts as news that the objectives would be accomplished for a few hour (or days, depending on the Response Team's paralysis vis-a-vis off-flow chart events). Some people think a practise run for this happened in the Indiana case a year or two back.
The first case of nvCJD in an American will also be a public relations fiasco. In the dim bulb of the public mind, any American with mad cow disease would have gotten it from eating meat here. USDA has no way to prove that the victim acquired it on a three week trip to England in 1987. This will sound lame even to the press. All CJD is synonymous with mad cow disease in the public perception; the more often the different kinds are explained, the more their suspicions are aroused. The first case of nvCJD in an American will simply validate what they already know and just be viewed as an overdue admission from the government.
tom
___________________________________________________________
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-130-102.ipset10.wt.net)
Subject: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 01:55:54 -0800 From: tom Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
i am looking now a bizarre Oct 98 internal USDA publication describing a james bond-type US effort to control media should the long-anticipated first case of BSE in the US be admitted.
'Players' on the 27 member BSE Response Team are to be flown in from all over the country to a BSE Headquarters 'situation room' apparently an underground bunker in Riverdale, Maryland under the command of the Assistant Secretary of Marketing.
Authentic press releases are already prepared and ready to go out after a few specifics have been filled in. They are spelled out in a separate document, the BSE Red Book, aka BSE Emergency Disease Guidelines.
Aphis' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) activates team assembly. From the time a bovine brain sample is submitted, it takes 14-18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE. In the first 10-13 days, NVSL have enough information to determine the need for additional tests. If a provisional BSE diagnosis is made, the sample is 'hand-carried' (are they going to tell the airline and customs?) to the Central Veterinary Laboratory in England for confirmation, where they are expecting a 24 to 96 hour turn-around.
I guess that means we can get the white tiger brain analyzed by Friday despite the 22 year delay to date. Maybe we could throw in a few cougar brains from NE Colorado too.
A Team Member is designated to silently monitor this listserve and www.mad-cow.org(among others) -- for what, it doesn't say. The Freedom of Information Act request from the East Coast consumer group turned up numerous top-secret USDA downloads from that site and Dealler's.
After 24 hours of secret briefings for 'select industry and trading partners' (to allow them to take positions on the commodities markets opposite the 'non-select' industry and trading partners?), a press conference will be held the next day.
There are plans to trace the cow, its lineage, its herdmates, the renderer, traceout of product, buyout of herd, farm of origin, to get the state involved to quarantine the herd (pre-arranged for all 50 states), expectations for trade bans, notification of OIE within 24 hours, media 800 numbers, spokespersons and backups, notify CDC, FDA, NIH, and many other commendable activities. The Flow Chart is a sight to behold, I will try to scan it in tomorrow.
In short, that cow is going to be toast by the time the public first hears about it.
The Plan does not speak to the scenario in which the CVL says, yes, this is bovine spongiform encephalopathy all right but it is one of your strains, not ours. Invoking their Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence principle, there may be no perceived need for public disclosure in this case.
USDA is caught completely unprepared if BSE first turns up in a US zoo animal. These animals could easily be diagnosed outside the "system" and be the subject of a publicity-seeking lab press release. I think this is a more likely scenario because the US has likely imported many thousands of zoo animals with advanced infections from Britain and France and there has been zero monitoring. Unlike with downer cows, anyone with the right colleagues can get ahold of a fallen zoo animal. Zoo animals enter the food chain in some cases after being rendered.
Another scenario would be some stock market speculator obtaining the Red Book and issuing a flurry of bogus but authentic-looking press releases that included bogus 800 and hacked USDA web links. The press here is so lazy and so accustomed to putting out public relation handouts as news that the objectives would be accomplished for a few hour (or days, depending on the Response Team's paralysis vis-a-vis off-flow chart events). Some people think a practise run for this happened in the Indiana case a year or two back.
The first case of nvCJD in an American will also be a public relations fiasco. In the dim bulb of the public mind, any American with mad cow disease would have gotten it from eating meat here. USDA has no way to prove that the victim acquired it on a three week trip to England in 1987. This will sound lame even to the press. All CJD is synonymous with mad cow disease in the public perception; the more often the different kinds are explained, the more their suspicions are aroused. The first case of nvCJD in an American will simply validate what they already know and just be viewed as an overdue admission from the government.
tom
___________________________________________________________
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-130-102.ipset10.wt.net)
Subject: When a case of B.S.E. is found in the U.S/Response to Disease outbreak...'redbook'
Date: March 13, 2000 at 10:13 am PST
BSE Red Book 2.1-26
5.0 Response to Disease Outbreak
snip...see full report of From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-130-102.ipset10.wt.net) Subject: When a case of B.S.E. is found in the U.S/Response to Disease outbreak...'redbook' Date: March 13, 2000 at 10:13 am PST
https://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html
Thursday, April 6, 2023
WOAH OIE CHAPTER 11.4 . BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY Article 11.4.1.
https://woahoie.blogspot.com/2023/04/woah-oie-chapter-114-bovine-spongiform.html
BSE TESTING ONLY 25K ANNUALLY WILL NOT FIND BSE CIRCULATING IN THE USA CATTLE HERDS, UNLESS IT'S REAL BAD...THAT'S WHEN YOU HAVE PROBLEMS, AND YOUR JUST TRYING TO HOLD THE NUMBERS DOWN...IMO...terry
Sample Size Estimate for BSE Ongoing Surveillance
July 20, 2006
snip...
In addition, we aim to meet the objective of conducting ongoing surveillance at a level that meets or exceeds OIE surveillance recommendations. We believe this objective is reached by the following sampling strategy, which is sufficient to detect BSE at 1 infected animal per 1,000,000 adult cattle in the population with a high degree of confidence.
Sample Size to Meet OIE Surveillance Recommendations
APHIS is committed to maintaining BSE surveillance that at least meets OIE guidelines. The OIE surveillance guidelines for BSE recommend a target number of surveillance points for Type A surveillance based on the size of a country’s cattle population. These points are accrued over 7 consecutive years, and are weighted according to the surveillance stream and age of the animal sampled. For a large cattle population, using the design prevalence of 1 case per 100,000 adult cattle and 95 percent confidence, 300,000 total points over 7 years, or 42,857 points per year, are required for Type A surveillance (OIE 2005).
http://web.archive.org/web/20090109193041/http://www.aphis.usda.gov/peer_review/downloads/BSE_sample_size_ongoing_surv_after.pdf
KEY POINTS In addition to a stringent feed ban imposed by the Food and Drug Administration in 1997 as well as the removal of all specified risk material which could harbor BSE, USDA has a strong surveillance program in place to detect signs of BSE in cattle in the United States. In fact, we test for BSE at levels greater than World Animal Health Organization standards. The program samples approximately 25,000 animals each year and targets cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be found. The targeted population for ongoing surveillance focuses on cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous disorders or any other signs that may be associated with BSE, including emaciation or injury, and dead cattle, as well as non-ambulatory animals. Samples from the targeted population are taken at farms, veterinary diagnostic laboratories, public health laboratories, slaughter facilities, veterinary clinics, and livestock markets.
https://www.usda.gov/topics/animals/bse-surveillance-information-center
THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, 2020
Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year?
https://animalhealthreportpriontse.blogspot.com/2020/08/why-is-usda-only-bse-tse-prion-testing.html
Comment from Singeltary Sr., Terry Posted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on Mar 22, 2023
Submission
Greetings again APHIS et al,
I would kindly comment and voice my concerns again about the lack of a NAIS/COOL mandatory policy, and how important it is.
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/APHIS-2021-0020-0999
https://downloads.regulations.gov/APHIS-2021-0020-0999/attachment_1.pdf
FSIS [Docket No. FSIS-2019-0021] Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials Singeltary Submission
Food Safety and Inspection Service [Docket No. FSIS-2019-0021] Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials
Greetings FSIS et al,
I would kindly like to comment on the following docket;
[Docket No. FSIS-2019-0021] Notice
http://web.archive.org/web/20210720163644/https://downloads.regulations.gov/FSIS-2019-0021-0002/attachment_1.pdf
APHIS-2018-0012 Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Singeltary…
https://beta.regulations.gov/comment/APHIS-2018-0012-0002
https://downloads.regulations.gov/APHIS-2018-0012-0002/attachment_1.pdf
Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada
* Published: May 14, 2010 * DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0010638
Reader Comments (1)
RE-Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada
Posted by flounder on 19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT
Greetings,
In my opinion ;
THE statement above is about as non-scientific as a statement can be. There is no proof what-so-ever that any of the atypical BSE cases or atypical scrapie cases anywhere on the globe was a spontaneous case without any route and source of the TSE agent. This is a myth. The USDA and the OIE are trying to make the atypical BSE cases and they have already made the atypical Scrapie cases a legal trading commodity, without any transmission studies first confirming that in fact these atypical TSE will not transmit via feed. I suppose it is a human transmission study in progress…
Snip…see my full comment ;
http://web.archive.org/web/20140912011905/http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action;jsessionid=635CE9094E0EA15D5362B7D7B809448C?root=7143
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2019
[Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Nicaragua being of negligible risk for BSE
https://animalhealthreportpriontse.blogspot.com/2019/11/docket-no-aphis-2018-0087-concurrence.html
MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 2025
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
“Based on the results of this study, and the 2006 H-BSE case in the USA, there is an expanded spectrum of aetiologies for bovine prion diseases similar to what is observed in humans, including sporadic, genetic and acquired versions.”
See;
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
https://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2025/08/canadian-2021-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html
WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2025
Classical BSE emergence from Nor98/atypical scrapie: Unraveling the shift vs. selection dichotomy in the prion field
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/07/classical-bse-emergence-from.html
MONDAY, JUNE 09, 2025
The naturally occurring lysine to glutamic acid substitution (E211K in the bovine prion protein) results in short incubation periods for H-type bovine spongioform encephalopathy (BSE), Singeltary Review
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/06/the-naturally-occurring-lysine-to.html
Tuesday, August 12, 2025
Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk status of Members Singeltary Review August 2025
https://woahoie.blogspot.com/2025/08/ad-hoc-group-on-evaluation-of-bovine.html
https://prpsc.proboards.com/thread/176/group-evaluation-risk-singeltary-review
MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 2025
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
“Based on the results of this study, and the 2006 H-BSE case in the USA, there is an expanded spectrum of aetiologies for bovine prion diseases similar to what is observed in humans, including sporadic, genetic and acquired versions.”
See;
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
https://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2025/08/canadian-2021-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html
WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2025
Classical BSE emergence from Nor98/atypical scrapie: Unraveling the shift vs. selection dichotomy in the prion field
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/07/classical-bse-emergence-from.html
MONDAY, JUNE 09, 2025
The naturally occurring lysine to glutamic acid substitution (E211K in the bovine prion protein) results in short incubation periods for H-type bovine spongioform encephalopathy (BSE), Singeltary Review
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/06/the-naturally-occurring-lysine-to.html
1985
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
https://web.archive.org/web/20090506002258/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20090506001031/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09a/tab01.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20090506024922/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1987/06/10004001.pdf
BSE Red Book 2.1-26
5.0 Response to Disease Outbreak
snip...see full report of From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-130-102.ipset10.wt.net) Subject: When a case of B.S.E. is found in the U.S/Response to Disease outbreak...'redbook' Date: March 13, 2000 at 10:13 am PST
https://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html
Thursday, April 6, 2023
WOAH OIE CHAPTER 11.4 . BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY Article 11.4.1.
https://woahoie.blogspot.com/2023/04/woah-oie-chapter-114-bovine-spongiform.html
BSE TESTING ONLY 25K ANNUALLY WILL NOT FIND BSE CIRCULATING IN THE USA CATTLE HERDS, UNLESS IT'S REAL BAD...THAT'S WHEN YOU HAVE PROBLEMS, AND YOUR JUST TRYING TO HOLD THE NUMBERS DOWN...IMO...terry
Sample Size Estimate for BSE Ongoing Surveillance
July 20, 2006
snip...
In addition, we aim to meet the objective of conducting ongoing surveillance at a level that meets or exceeds OIE surveillance recommendations. We believe this objective is reached by the following sampling strategy, which is sufficient to detect BSE at 1 infected animal per 1,000,000 adult cattle in the population with a high degree of confidence.
Sample Size to Meet OIE Surveillance Recommendations
APHIS is committed to maintaining BSE surveillance that at least meets OIE guidelines. The OIE surveillance guidelines for BSE recommend a target number of surveillance points for Type A surveillance based on the size of a country’s cattle population. These points are accrued over 7 consecutive years, and are weighted according to the surveillance stream and age of the animal sampled. For a large cattle population, using the design prevalence of 1 case per 100,000 adult cattle and 95 percent confidence, 300,000 total points over 7 years, or 42,857 points per year, are required for Type A surveillance (OIE 2005).
http://web.archive.org/web/20090109193041/http://www.aphis.usda.gov/peer_review/downloads/BSE_sample_size_ongoing_surv_after.pdf
KEY POINTS In addition to a stringent feed ban imposed by the Food and Drug Administration in 1997 as well as the removal of all specified risk material which could harbor BSE, USDA has a strong surveillance program in place to detect signs of BSE in cattle in the United States. In fact, we test for BSE at levels greater than World Animal Health Organization standards. The program samples approximately 25,000 animals each year and targets cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be found. The targeted population for ongoing surveillance focuses on cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous disorders or any other signs that may be associated with BSE, including emaciation or injury, and dead cattle, as well as non-ambulatory animals. Samples from the targeted population are taken at farms, veterinary diagnostic laboratories, public health laboratories, slaughter facilities, veterinary clinics, and livestock markets.
https://www.usda.gov/topics/animals/bse-surveillance-information-center
THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, 2020
Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year?
https://animalhealthreportpriontse.blogspot.com/2020/08/why-is-usda-only-bse-tse-prion-testing.html
Comment from Singeltary Sr., Terry Posted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on Mar 22, 2023
Submission
Greetings again APHIS et al,
I would kindly comment and voice my concerns again about the lack of a NAIS/COOL mandatory policy, and how important it is.
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/APHIS-2021-0020-0999
https://downloads.regulations.gov/APHIS-2021-0020-0999/attachment_1.pdf
FSIS [Docket No. FSIS-2019-0021] Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials Singeltary Submission
Food Safety and Inspection Service [Docket No. FSIS-2019-0021] Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials
Greetings FSIS et al,
I would kindly like to comment on the following docket;
[Docket No. FSIS-2019-0021] Notice
http://web.archive.org/web/20210720163644/https://downloads.regulations.gov/FSIS-2019-0021-0002/attachment_1.pdf
APHIS-2018-0012 Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Singeltary…
https://beta.regulations.gov/comment/APHIS-2018-0012-0002
https://downloads.regulations.gov/APHIS-2018-0012-0002/attachment_1.pdf
Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada
* Published: May 14, 2010 * DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0010638
Reader Comments (1)
RE-Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada
Posted by flounder on 19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT
Greetings,
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0010638“The occurrence of atypical cases of BSE in countries such as Canada with low BSE prevalence and transmission risk argues for the occurrence of sporadic forms of BSE worldwide. <<<
In my opinion ;
THE statement above is about as non-scientific as a statement can be. There is no proof what-so-ever that any of the atypical BSE cases or atypical scrapie cases anywhere on the globe was a spontaneous case without any route and source of the TSE agent. This is a myth. The USDA and the OIE are trying to make the atypical BSE cases and they have already made the atypical Scrapie cases a legal trading commodity, without any transmission studies first confirming that in fact these atypical TSE will not transmit via feed. I suppose it is a human transmission study in progress…
Snip…see my full comment ;
http://web.archive.org/web/20140912011905/http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action;jsessionid=635CE9094E0EA15D5362B7D7B809448C?root=7143
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2019
[Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Nicaragua being of negligible risk for BSE
https://animalhealthreportpriontse.blogspot.com/2019/11/docket-no-aphis-2018-0087-concurrence.html
MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 2025
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
“Based on the results of this study, and the 2006 H-BSE case in the USA, there is an expanded spectrum of aetiologies for bovine prion diseases similar to what is observed in humans, including sporadic, genetic and acquired versions.”
See;
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
https://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2025/08/canadian-2021-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html
WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2025
Classical BSE emergence from Nor98/atypical scrapie: Unraveling the shift vs. selection dichotomy in the prion field
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/07/classical-bse-emergence-from.html
MONDAY, JUNE 09, 2025
The naturally occurring lysine to glutamic acid substitution (E211K in the bovine prion protein) results in short incubation periods for H-type bovine spongioform encephalopathy (BSE), Singeltary Review
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/06/the-naturally-occurring-lysine-to.html
Tuesday, August 12, 2025
Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk status of Members Singeltary Review August 2025
https://woahoie.blogspot.com/2025/08/ad-hoc-group-on-evaluation-of-bovine.html
https://prpsc.proboards.com/thread/176/group-evaluation-risk-singeltary-review
MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 2025
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
“Based on the results of this study, and the 2006 H-BSE case in the USA, there is an expanded spectrum of aetiologies for bovine prion diseases similar to what is observed in humans, including sporadic, genetic and acquired versions.”
See;
Canadian 2021 H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy case associated with a novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene novel E211K polymorphism in prion protein gene, Singeltary Review
https://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2025/08/canadian-2021-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html
WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2025
Classical BSE emergence from Nor98/atypical scrapie: Unraveling the shift vs. selection dichotomy in the prion field
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/07/classical-bse-emergence-from.html
MONDAY, JUNE 09, 2025
The naturally occurring lysine to glutamic acid substitution (E211K in the bovine prion protein) results in short incubation periods for H-type bovine spongioform encephalopathy (BSE), Singeltary Review
https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2025/06/the-naturally-occurring-lysine-to.html
1985
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
https://web.archive.org/web/20090506002258/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20090506001031/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09a/tab01.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20090506024922/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1987/06/10004001.pdf
terry
