P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States.
reading up on this study from Prion 2018 Conference, very important findings ;
***> This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
***> These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
Sunday, February 25, 2018
PRION ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE 2018 MAY, 22-25 A REVIEW
Yup, sure enough, not like nobody tried to tell them a decade or so ago. ...tss
>>> The occurrence of atypical cases of BSE in countries such as Canada with low BSE prevalence and transmission risk argues for the occurrence of sporadic forms of BSE worldwide. <<<
In my opinion ;
THE statement above is about as non-scientific as a statement can be.
There is no proof what-so-ever that any of the atypical BSE cases or atypical scrapie cases anywhere on the globe was a spontaneous case without any route and source of the TSE agent. This is a myth.
The USDA and the OIE are trying to make the atypical BSE cases and they have already made the atypical Scrapie cases a legal trading commodity, without any transmission studies first confirming that in fact these atypical TSE will not transmit via feed.
I suppose it is a human transmission study in progress.
IT's like what happened in England with c-BSE and the transmission to humans via nvCJD never happened to the OIE and the USDA. Canada does not have a low prevalence of BSE either, they have a high prevalence.
WHO knows about North America ?
it's just that the U.S.A. try's much harder at concealing cases of mad cow disease.
THIS was proven with the first stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas, that was Wisk away to be rendered without any test at all.
Then, you had the second case of mad cow disease that the USDA et al was almost as successful with as the first one, but the O.I.G. stepped in and demanded testing over seas, this after many scientist around the globe spoke out. Finally, after an act of Congress, the second case of mad cow disease in Texas was confirmed.
all this was done for a reason, and that reason was the OIE USDA BSE MRR policy.
Again, This study reeks of TRADE policy wrangling.
There is NO proof that the atypical TSE are spontaneous.
please show me these transmission studies ?
on the other hand, we now know that the L-type atypical BSE is much more virulent than the typical C-BSE, and we now know that the
H-type atypical BSE will transmit to humans.
WHY can it not be that these atypical cases are simply from feed that had different strains of TSE ? WHY is it that no one will comment on the studies that was suppose to show infectivity of tissues from atypical BSE ?
WHY is it I had to file a FOIA on that issue?
L-type atypical BSE (BASE) is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice.
BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice.
SEE Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 et al 2009 ;
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
snip...
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM
Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.
Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely undefined.
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.
Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.
see full text ;
snip...
full test Singeltary et al PLOS
THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017
USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200
LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.
This new prionopathy in humans?
the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......
wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow,
WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ???
there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$
ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama
In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America.
This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD.
This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene.
We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).
This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.
Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013
Unique Properties of the Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Strain and Its Emergence From H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Substantiated by VM Transmission Studies
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK-resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
PPo4-15:
A Surprisingly High Number of the Plaque-Like VV sCJD Subtype Among the Polish sCJD-is There a Connection with BASE?
Beata Sikorska and Pawel P. Liberski Department of Molecular Pathology and Neuropathology; Medical University of Lodz; Lodz, Poland
Recently described bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) or L type BSE-was is overrepresented in Poland (15% of all cases of BSE). Moreover, the number of BASE cases in Poland per million bovines is the highest in Europe. A potential human risk from BASE is evident from experimental transmission to "humanized" transgenic animals and primates. Taking into consideration that non-human primate inoculated with BASE had a shorter incubation period than monkeys infected with classical BSE, and that humanized Tg mice have been found to be highly susceptible to infection with atypical form of BSE, it seems probable that BASE may be more pathogenic for humans than BSE, but the transmitted disease may differ from BSE-derived vCJD. Among 47 cases which have been diagnosed as definite in our laboratory, in 19 cases complete histopathological examination and codon 129 status were available. On the basis of the histological pattern and codon 129 status the cases of sCJD were divided into subtypes according to the Parchi&Gambetti classification. The results are as follows: type 1 (MMorMV)- 42%, type 2 (VV)-32%, type 3 (MV)-10.5%, type 4c (MM)- 10.5% and type 5 (VV)-5 %. Although the number of cases is too low to conclude a significantly different distribution of sCJD subtypes in Polish population those data show surprisingly high number of the plaque-like VV sCJD subtype. Interestingly, it was shown before that Tg mice inoculated with BASE showed granular and plaque-like aggregates or PrPSc in brains resembling those observed in VV2 subtype of sCJD.
PPo2-26:
Transmission of Classical and Atypical (L-type) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Prions to Cynomolgus macaques
Fumiko Ono,1 Yoshio Yamakawa,2 Minoru Tobiume,3 Yuko Sato,3 Harutaka Katano,3 Kenichi Hagiwara,2 Iori Itagaki,1 Akio Hiyaoka,1 Katuhiko Komatuzaki,1 Yasunori Emoto,1 Hiroaki Shibata,4 Yuichi Murayama,5 Keiji Terao,4 Yasuhiro Yasutomi4 and Tetsutaro Sata3
1The Corporation for Production and Research of Laboratory Primates; Tsukuba City, Japan; 2Departments of Cell Biology and Biochemistry; and 3Pathology; National Institute of Infectious Diseases; Tokyo, Japan; 4Tsukuba Primate Research Center; National Institute of Biomedical Innovation; Tsukuba City, Japan; 5Prion Disease Research Team; National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba City, Japan
Key words: L-type BSE, cBSE, cynomolgus macaques, transmission
BSE prion derived from classical BSE (cBSE) or L-type BSE was characterized by inoculation into the brain of cynomolgus macaques. The neurologic manifestation was developed in all cynomolgus macaques at 27-43 months after intracerebral inoculation of brain homogenate from cBSE-affected cattle (BSE JP/6). Second transmission of cBSE from macaque to macaque shortened incubation period to 13-18 months. cBSE-affected macaques showed the similar clinical signs including hyperekplexia, tremor and paralysis in both primary and second transmission.
Two macaques were intracerebrally inoculated brain homogenate from the L-type BSE-affected cattle (BSE JP/24). The incubation periods were 19-20 months in primary transmission.
The clinical course of the L-type BSE-affected macaques differed from that in cBSE-affected macaques in the points of severe myoclonus without hyperekplexia. The glycoform profile of PrPSc detected in macaque CNS was consistent with original pattern of either cBSE or L-typeBSE PrPSc, respectively. Although severe spongiform change in the brain was remarkable in all BSE-affected macaques, severe spongiform spread widely in cerebral cortex in L-type BSE-affected macaques. Heavy accumulation of PrPSc surrounded by vacuola formed florid plaques in cerebral cortex of cBSE-affected macaques. Deposit of PrPSc in L-type BSE-affected macaque was weak and diffuse synaptic pattern in cerebrum, but large PrPSc plaques were evident at cerebellum. MRI analysis, T2, T1, DW and flair sequences, at the time of autopsy revealed that brain atrophy and dilatation of cerebral ventricles were significantly severe in L-type BSE-affected macaques. These results suggest that L-type BSE is more virulent strain to primates comparing to cBSE.
SP1-4:
Evidence from Molecular Strain Typing
Gianluigi Zanusso Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences; Section of Clinical Neurology; University of Verona; Verona, Italy
Key words: molecular analysis, strain typing, atypical BSE, CJD
In 2001, active surveillance for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) led to the discovery of atypical BSE phenotypes in aged cattle distinct from classical BSE (C-type). These atypical BSE cases had been classified as low L-type (BASE) or high H-type BSE based on the molecular mass and the degree of glycosylation of of the pathological prion protein (PrPSc). Transmission studies in TgBov mice showed that H-type BSE, C-type BSE and BASE behave as distinct prion strains with different incubation periods, PrPSc molecular patterns and pathological phenotypes. A still unclear issue concerns the potential transmissibility and phenotypes of atypical BSEs in humans. We previously indicated that BASE was similar to a distinct subgroup of sporadic form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) MV2, based on molecular similarities and on neuropathological pattern of PrP deposition. To investigate a possible link between BASE and sCJD, Kong et al. and Comoy et al. experimentally inoculated TgHu mice (129MM) and a non-human primate respectively, showing in both models that BASE was more virulent compare to BSE. Further, non-human primate reproduced a clinical phenotype resembling to that of sCJD subtype MM2. Here, we presented a comparative analysis of the biochemical fingerprints of PrPSc between the different sCJD subtypes and animal TSEs and after experimental transmission to animals.
57 The experiment which might have determined whether BSE and scrapie were caused by the same agent (ie, the feeding of natural scrapie to cattle) was never undertaken in the UK.
It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32
The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33
The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive.
The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995.
Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34
The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
32 Clark, W., Hourrigan, J. and Hadlow, W. (1995) Encephalopathy in Cattle Experimentally Infected with the Scrapie Agent, American Journal of Veterinary Research, 56, 606-12
33 YB88/10.00/1.1
Technical Abstract:
Prion strains may vary in their ability to transmit to humans and animals. Few experimental studies have been done to provide evidence of differences between U.S. strains of scrapie, which can be distinguished by incubation times in inbred mice, microscopic lesions, immunoreactivity to various antibodies, or molecular profile (electrophoretic mobility and glycoform ratio). Recent work on two U.S. isolates of sheep scrapie supports that at least two distinct strains exist based on differences in incubation time and genotype of sheep affected. One isolate (No. 13-7) inoculated intracerebrally caused scrapie in sheep AA at codon 136 (AA136) and QQ at codon 171 (QQ171) of the prion protein in an average of 19 months post-inoculation (PI) whereas a second isolate (No. x124) caused disease in less than 12 months after oral inoculation in AV136/QQ171 sheep. Striking differences were evident when further strain analysis was done in R111, VM, C57Bl6, and C57Bl6xVM (F1) mice. No. 13-7 did not induce disease in any mouse strain at any time post-inoculation (PI) nor were brain tissues positive by western blot (WB). Positive WB results were obtained from mice inoculated with isolate No. x124 starting at day 380 PI. Incubation times averaged 508, 559, 601, and 633 days PI for RIII, C57Bl6, VM, and F1 mice, respectively. Further passage will be required to characterize these scrapie strains in mice.
***>This work provides evidence that multiple scrapie strains exist in U.S. sheep.
One of these isolates (TR316211) behaved like the CH1641 isolate, with PrPres features in mice similar to those in the sheep brain. From two other isolates (O100 and O104), two distinct PrPres phenotypes were identified in mouse brains, with either high (h-type) or low (l-type) apparent molecular masses of unglycosylated PrPres, the latter being similar to that observed with CH1641, TR316211, or BSE. Both phenotypes could be found in variable proportions in the brains of the individual mice. In contrast with BSE, l-type PrPres from "CH1641-like" isolates showed lower levels of diglycosylated PrPres. From one of these cases (O104), a second passage in mice was performed for two mice with distinct PrPres profiles. This showed a partial selection of the l-type phenotype in mice infected with a mouse brain with predominant l-type PrPres, and it was accompanied by a significant increase in the proportions of the diglycosylated band. These results are discussed in relation to the diversity of scrapie and BSE strains.
In the US, scrapie is reported primarily in sheep homozygous for 136A/171Q (AAQQ) and the disease phenotype is similar to that seen with experimental strain CH1641.
- 59-
P-088 Transmission of experimental CH1641-like scrapie to bovine PrP overexpression mice
Kohtaro Miyazawa1, Kentaro Masujin1, Hiroyuki Okada1, Yuichi Matsuura1, Takashi Yokoyama2
1Influenza and Prion Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, NARO, Japan; 2Department of Planning and General Administration, National Institute of Animal Health, NARO
Introduction: Scrapie is a prion disease in sheep and goats. CH1641-lke scrapie is characterized by a lower molecular mass of the unglycosylated form of abnormal prion protein (PrpSc) compared to that of classical scrapie. It is worthy of attention because of the biochemical similarities of the Prpsc from CH1641-like and BSE affected sheep. We have reported that experimental CH1641-like scrapie is transmissible to bovine PrP overexpression (TgBoPrP) mice (Yokoyama et al. 2010). We report here the further details of this transmission study and compare the biological and biochemical properties to those of classical scrapie affected TgBoPrP mice.
Methods: The details of sheep brain homogenates used in this study are described in our previous report (Yokoyama et al. 2010). TgBoPrP mice were intracerebrally inoculated with a 10% brain homogenate of each scrapie strain. The brains of mice were subjected to histopathological and biochemical analyses.
Results: Prpsc banding pattern of CH1641-like scrapie affected TgBoPrP mice was similar to that of classical scrapie affected mice. Mean survival period of CH1641-like scrapie affected TgBoPrP mice was 170 days at the 3rd passage and it was significantly shorter than that of classical scrapie affected mice (439 days). Lesion profiles and Prpsc distributions in the brains also differed between CH1641-like and classical scrapie affected mice.
Conclusion: We succeeded in stable transmission of CH1641-like scrapie to TgBoPrP mice. Our transmission study demonstrates that CH 1641-like scrapie is likely to be more virulent than classical scrapie in cattle.
http://prion2016.org/
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES
Title: Comparison of two US sheep scrapie isolates supports identification as separate strains
Authors
item Moore, Sarah - item Smith, Jodi item West Greenlee, Mary - item Nicholson, Eric item Richt, Juergen item Greenlee, Justin
Submitted to: Veterinary Pathology Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: December 22, 2015 Publication Date: N/A
Interpretive Summary: Scrapie is a fatal disease of sheep and goats that causes damaging changes in the brain. The infectious agent is an abnormal protein called a prion that has misfolded from its normal state. Whether or not a sheep will get scrapie is determined primarily by their genetics. Furthermore, different scrapie strains exist that may result in a different expression of disease such as shorter incubation periods, unusual clinical signs, or unique patterns of lesions within the brain. This study evaluated two U.S. scrapie isolates in groups of sheep with varying susceptibilities to scrapie. Our data indicates that there are differences in incubation periods, sheep genotype susceptibilities, and lesion profiles that support designating these scrapie isolates as unique strains. The identification of a new scrapie strain in the United States means that control measures, methods of decontamination, and the potential for transmission to other species may need to be reevaluated. This information is useful to sheep farmers and breeders that are selectively breeding animals with genotypes resistant to the most prevalent strain of scrapie and could impact future regulations for the control of scrapie in the United States. Technical Abstract: Scrapie is a naturally occurring transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) of sheep and goats. There are different strains of sheep scrapie that are associated with unique molecular, transmission, and phenotype characteristics, but very little is known about the potential presence of scrapie strains within sheep in the US. Scrapie strain and PRNP genotype could both affect susceptibility, potential for transmission, incubation period, and control measures required for eliminating scrapie from a flock. Here we evaluate two US scrapie isolates, No. 13-7 and x124, after intranasal inoculation to compare clinical signs, incubation periods (IP), spongiform lesions, and patterns of PrPSc deposition in sheep with scrapie-susceptible PRNP genotypes (QQ171). After inoculation with x124, susceptibility and IP were associated with valine at codon 136 (V136) of the prion protein: VV136 had short IPs (6.9 months), AV136 sheep were 11.9 months, and AA136 sheep did not develop scrapie. All No.13-7 inoculated sheep developed scrapie with IP’s of 20.1 months for AA136 sheep, 22.8 months for AV136 sheep, and 26.7 months for VV136 sheep. Patterns of immunoreactivity in the brain were influenced by challenge isolate and host genotype. Differences in PrPSc profiles versus isolate were most striking when examining brains from sheep with the VV136 genotype. In summary, intranasal inoculation with isolates x124 and No. 13-7 resulted in differences in IP, sheep genotype susceptibility, and PrPSc profile that support designation as separate strains.
Last Modified: 6/6/2016
31
Appendix I VISIT TO USA - OR A E WRATHALL — INFO ON BSE AND SCRAPIE
Dr Clark lately of the scrapie Research Unit, Mission Texas has
successfully transmitted ovine and caprine scrapie to cattle. The
experimental results have not been published but there are plans to do
this. This work was initiated in 1978. A summary of it is:-
Expt A 6 Her x Jer calves born in 1978 were inoculated as follows with
a 2nd Suffolk scrapie passage:-
i/c 1ml; i/m, 5ml; s/c 5ml; oral 30ml.
1/6 went down after 48 months with a scrapie/BSE-like disease.
Expt B 6 Her or Jer or HxJ calves were inoculated with angora Goat
virus 2/6 went down similarly after 36 months.
Expt C Mice inoculated from brains of calves/cattle in expts A & B were resistant, only 1/20 going down with scrapie and this was the reason given for not publishing.
Diagnosis in A, B, C was by histopath. No reports on SAF were given.
Dr Warren Foote indicated success so far in eliminating scrapie in offspring from experimentally— (and naturally) infected sheep by ET. He had found difficulty in obtaining embryos from naturally infected sheep (cf SPA).
Prof. A Robertson gave a brief accout of BSE. The us approach was to
32
accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr A Thiermann showed the picture in the "Independent" with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs.
BSE was not reported in USA.
4. Scrapie incidents (ie affected flocks) have shown a dramatic increase since 1978. In 1953 when the National Control scheme was started there were 10-14 incidents, in 1978 - 1 and in 1988 so far 60.
5. Scrapie agent was reported to have been isolated from a solitary fetus.
6. A western blotting diagnostic technique (? on PrP) shows some promise.
7. Results of a questionnaire sent to 33 states on the subject of the national sheep scrapie programme survey indicated
17/33 wished to drop it
6/33 wished to develop it
8/33 had few sheep and were neutral
Information obtained from Dr Wrathall‘s notes of a meeting of the u.s.
Animal Health Association at Little Rock, Arkansas Nov. 1988.
33
In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...
also see hand written notes ;
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
EVIDENCE OF SCRAPIE IN SHEEP AS A RESULT OF FOOD BORNE EXPOSURE
This is provided by the statistically significant increase in the incidence of sheep scrape from 1985, as determined from analyses of the submissions made to VI Centres, and from individual case and flock incident studies. ........
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY 1989
snip...
4.2.9 ...Also, if it resulted from a localised chance transmission of the scrapie strain from sheep to cattle giving rise to a mutant, a different pattern of disease would have been expected: its range would have increased with time. Thus the evidence from Britain is against the disease being due to a new strain of the agent, but we note that in the United States from 1984 to 1988 outbreaks of scrapie in sheep flocks are reported to have Increased markedly, now being nearly 3 times as high as during any previous period (18).
Monday, September 13, 2010
atypical BSE strains and sporadic CJD strains, is there a connection and why shouldn't there be $
snip...see full text;
INDEED, thanks to the O.I.E., and the U.S.D.A. SSS policy, and the fact they are using science dated back to 1985 still in some cases. THE infamous June 2004 enhanced bse surveillance program was set up to fail from the beginning, and fail they did, not only with the surveillance for TSE, but also the partial and voluntary feed ban of August 4, 1997 was nothing but ink on paper. What i predicted a decade ago, has in fact come to pass, the TSE agent has mutated in every species from CWD now at two documented strains, BSE with 4 strains documented to date (c-BSE, h-BSE [typical h-BSE or the one and only documented g-h-BSEalabama strain?], l-BSE, and the IBNC BSE), and the different Scrapie strains are too many to count, not included the atypical Nor-98 and or BSE in sheep. with the 3 strains of BSE documented in North America to date, the two strains of CWD, TME, and all the strains of Scrapie, with 5 cases of the Nor-98 atypical scrapie cases already documented in 2010 here in the USA, all of which of the past two decades have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for animals and humans, and any human TSE there from ??? please note that the sporadic CJD case here in the USA has had a steady increase since 1997. it's not rocket science. what the USDA, FDA et al have used is junk science, bought and paid for by your local cattle dealer i.e. INDUSTRY. the BSE MRR policy was nothing more than a legal tool to do the same thing when the U.K. poisoned the globe with BSE, except now it's legal $$$
these are the facts as i have come to know them. just my take. ...
Let's take a look at the facts shall we $
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, NORTH AMERICA TYPICAL AND ATYPICAL
Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice
snip...see full text;
IBNC BSE TSE Prion mad cow disease
***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***
Posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT
let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.
please see history of infamous atypical ghBSE Alabama style. the second Texas mad cow that was finally documented, was the ‘typical’ atypical h-BSE, not genetic. ...tss
Tuesday, November 6, 2012
Transmission of New Bovine Prion to Mice, Atypical Scrapie, BSE, and Sporadic CJD, November-December 2012 update
***>2018<***
TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 2018
Unexpected prion phenotypes in experimentally transfused animals: predictive models for humans?
TUESDAY, AUGUST 07, 2018
Passage of scrapie to deer results in a new phenotype upon return passage to sheep
TUESDAY, AUGUST 07, 2018
Cervid Health Operational Plan Fiscal Year 2018 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services Veterinary Services
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Global Report Update, USA, CANADA, KOREA, NORWAY, FINLAND, Game Farms and Fake news
SUNDAY, APRIL 8, 2018
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease Global Pandemic Urgent Update April 9, 2018
***> NEW TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE (MAD CAMEL DISEASE) IN A NEW SPECIES <***
NEW OUTBREAK OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE IN A NEW SPECIES
Subject: Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels, Algeria
Our identification of this prion disease in a geographically widespread livestock species requires urgent enforcement of surveillance and assessment of the potential risks to human and animal health.
Wednesday, May 30, 2018
Dromedary camels in northern Africa have a neurodegenerative prion disease that may have originated decades ago
***> IMPORTS AND EXPORTS <***
SEE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF BANNED ANIMAL PROTEIN AKA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA DECADES AFTER POST BAN
WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2018
CONFIDENTIAL IN CONFIDENCE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS FDA EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR RULE CHANGE USA Section 21 C.F.R. 589.2000
CONFIDENTIAL IN CONFIDENCE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS
*** ''but feeding of other ruminant protein, including scrapie-infected sheep, can continue to pigs.''
CONFIDENTIAL SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS
FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 2018
From Gate to Plate, BSE aka mad cow disease, USDA, NAIS, AND TRACEABILITY
TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 2018
Unexpected prion phenotypes in experimentally transfused animals: predictive models for humans?
TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2018
***> USA CJD TSE Tables of Cases Examined National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined May 1, 2018 <***
WEDNESDAY, JULY 04, 2018
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE: GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL WORKERS IN ENGLAND June 2018
MONDAY, JUNE 18, 2018
Ecuador Six Case series of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in a third-level hospital in Quito
***> Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility. <***
Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period
Emmanuel E. Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Sophie Luccantoni-Freire, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Valérie Durand, Capucine Dehen, Olivier Andreoletti, Cristina Casalone, Juergen A. Richt, Justin J. Greenlee, Thierry Baron, Sylvie L. Benestad, Paul Brown & Jean-Philippe Deslys Scientific Reports volume 5, Article number: 11573 (2015) | Download Citation
Abstract
Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is the only animal prion disease reputed to be zoonotic, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans and having guided protective measures for animal and human health against animal prion diseases. Recently, partial transmissions to humanized mice showed that the zoonotic potential of scrapie might be similar to c-BSE. We here report the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to cynomolgus macaque, a highly relevant model for human prion diseases, after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to those reported for human cases of sporadic CJD. Scrapie is thus actually transmissible to primates with incubation periods compatible with their life expectancy, although fourfold longer than BSE. Long-term experimental transmission studies are necessary to better assess the zoonotic potential of other prion diseases with high prevalence, notably Chronic Wasting Disease of deer and elk and atypical/Nor98 scrapie.
SNIP...
Discussion We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.
The second possibility is a laboratory cross-contamination. Three facts make this possibility equally unlikely. First, handling of specimens in our laboratory is performed with fastidious attention to the avoidance of any such cross-contamination. Second, no laboratory cross-contamination has ever been documented in other primate laboratories, including the NIH, even between infected and uninfected animals housed in the same or adjacent cages with daily intimate contact (P. Brown, personal communication). Third, the cerebral lesion profile is different from all the other prion diseases we have studied in this model19, with a correlation between cerebellar lesions (massive spongiform change of Purkinje cells, intense PrPres staining and reactive gliosis26) and ataxia. The iron deposits present in the globus pallidus are a non specific finding that have been reported previously in neurodegenerative diseases and aging27. Conversely, the thalamic lesion was reminiscent of a metabolic disease due to thiamine deficiency28 but blood thiamine levels were within normal limits (data not shown). The preferential distribution of spongiform change in cortex associated with a limited distribution in the brainstem is reminiscent of the lesion profile in MM2c and VV1 sCJD patients29, but interspecies comparison of lesion profiles should be interpreted with caution. It is of note that the same classical scrapie isolate induced TSE in C57Bl/6 mice with similar incubation periods and lesional profiles as a sample derived from a MM1 sCJD patient30.
We are therefore confident that the illness in this cynomolgus macaque represents a true transmission of a sheep c-scrapie isolate directly to an old-world monkey, which taxonomically resides in the primate subdivision (parvorder of catarrhini) that includes humans. With an homology of its PrP protein with humans of 96.4%31, cynomolgus macaque constitutes a highly relevant model for assessing zoonotic risk of prion diseases. Since our initial aim was to show the absence of transmission of scrapie to macaques in the worst-case scenario, we obtained materials from a flock of naturally-infected sheep, affecting animals with different genotypes32. This c-scrapie isolate exhibited complete transmission in ARQ/ARQ sheep (332 ± 56 days) and Tg338 transgenic mice expressing ovine VRQ/VRQ prion protein (220 ± 5 days) (O. Andreoletti, personal communication). From the standpoint of zoonotic risk, it is important to note that sheep with c-scrapie (including the isolate used in our study) have demonstrable infectivity throughout their lymphoreticular system early in the incubation period of the disease (3 months-old for all the lymphoid organs, and as early as 2 months-old in gut-associated lymph nodes)33. In addition, scrapie infectivity has been identified in blood34, milk35 and skeletal muscle36 from asymptomatic but scrapie infected small ruminants which implies a potential dietary exposure for consumers.
Two earlier studies have reported the occurrence of clinical TSE in cynomolgus macaques after exposures to scrapie isolates. In the first study, the “Compton” scrapie isolate (derived from an English sheep) and serially propagated for 9 passages in goats did not transmit TSE in cynomolgus macaque, rhesus macaque or chimpanzee within 7 years following intracerebral challenge1; conversely, after 8 supplementary passages in conventional mice, this “Compton” isolate induced TSE in a cynomolgus macaque 5 years after intracerebral challenge, but rhesus macaques and chimpanzee remained asymptomatic 8.5 years post-exposure8. However, multiple successive passages that are classically used to select laboratory-adapted prion strains can significantly modify the initial properties of a scrapie isolate, thus questioning the relevance of zoonotic potential for the initial sheep-derived isolate. The same isolate had also induced disease into squirrel monkeys (new-world monkey)9. A second historical observation reported that a cynomolgus macaque developed TSE 6 years post-inoculation with brain homogenate from a scrapie-infected Suffolk ewe (derived from USA), whereas a rhesus macaque and a chimpanzee exposed to the same inoculum remained healthy 9 years post-exposure1. This inoculum also induced TSE in squirrel monkeys after 4 passages in mice. Other scrapie transmission attempts in macaque failed but had more shorter periods of observation in comparison to the current study. Further, it is possible that there are differences in the zoonotic potential of different scrapie strains.
The most striking observation in our study is the extended incubation period of scrapie in the macaque model, which has several implications. Firstly, our observations constitute experimental evidence in favor of the zoonotic potential of c-scrapie, at least for this isolate that has been extensively studied32,33,34,35,36. The cross-species zoonotic ability of this isolate should be confirmed by performing duplicate intracerebral exposures and assessing the transmissibility by the oral route (a successful transmission of prion strains through the intracerebral route may not necessarily indicate the potential for oral transmission37). However, such confirmatory experiments may require more than one decade, which is hardly compatible with current general management and support of scientific projects; thus this study should be rather considered as a case report.
Secondly, transmission of c-BSE to primates occurred within 8 years post exposure for the lowest doses able to transmit the disease (the survival period after inoculation is inversely proportional to the initial amount of infectious inoculum). The occurrence of scrapie 10 years after exposure to a high dose (25 mg) of scrapie-infected sheep brain suggests that the macaque has a higher species barrier for sheep c-scrapie than c-BSE, although it is notable that previous studies based on in vitro conversion of PrP suggested that BSE and scrapie prions would have a similar conversion potential for human PrP38.
Thirdly, prion diseases typically have longer incubation periods after oral exposure than after intracerebral inoculations: since humans can develop Kuru 47 years after oral exposure39, an incubation time of several decades after oral exposure to scrapie would therefore be expected, leading the disease to occur in older adults, i.e. the peak age for cases considered to be sporadic disease, and making a distinction between scrapie-associated and truly sporadic disease extremely difficult to appreciate.
Fourthly, epidemiologic evidence is necessary to confirm the zoonotic potential of an animal disease suggested by experimental studies. A relatively short incubation period and a peculiar epidemiological situation (e.g., all the first vCJD cases occurring in the country with the most important ongoing c-BSE epizootic) led to a high degree of suspicion that c-BSE was the cause of vCJD. Sporadic CJD are considered spontaneous diseases with an almost stable and constant worldwide prevalence (0.5–2 cases per million inhabitants per year), and previous epidemiological studies were unable to draw a link between sCJD and classical scrapie6,7,40,41, even though external causes were hypothesized to explain the occurrence of some sCJD clusters42,43,44. However, extended incubation periods exceeding several decades would impair the predictive values of epidemiological surveillance for prion diseases, already weakened by a limited prevalence of prion diseases and the multiplicity of isolates gathered under the phenotypes of “scrapie” and “sporadic CJD”.
Fifthly, considering this 10 year-long incubation period, together with both laboratory and epidemiological evidence of decade or longer intervals between infection and clinical onset of disease, no premature conclusions should be drawn from negative transmission studies in cynomolgus macaques with less than a decade of observation, as in the aforementioned historical transmission studies of scrapie to primates1,8,9. Our observations and those of others45,46 to date are unable to provide definitive evidence regarding the zoonotic potential of CWD, atypical/Nor98 scrapie or H-type BSE. The extended incubation period of the scrapie-affected macaque in the current study also underscores the limitations of rodent models expressing human PrP for assessing the zoonotic potential of some prion diseases since their lifespan remains limited to approximately two years21,47,48. This point is illustrated by the fact that the recently reported transmission of scrapie to humanized mice was not associated with clinical signs for up to 750 days and occurred in an extreme minority of mice with only a marginal increase in attack rate upon second passage13. The low attack rate in these studies is certainly linked to the limited lifespan of mice compared to the very long periods of observation necessary to demonstrate the development of scrapie. Alternatively, one could estimate that a successful second passage is the result of strain adaptation to the species barrier, thus poorly relevant of the real zoonotic potential of the original scrapie isolate of sheep origin49. The development of scrapie in this primate after an incubation period compatible with its lifespan complements the study conducted in transgenic (humanized) mice; taken together these studies suggest that some isolates of sheep scrapie can promote misfolding of the human prion protein and that scrapie can develop within the lifespan of some primate species.
In addition to previous studies on scrapie transmission to primate1,8,9 and the recently published study on transgenic humanized mice13, our results constitute new evidence for recommending that the potential risk of scrapie for human health should not be dismissed. Indeed, human PrP transgenic mice and primates are the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier. To what extent such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. During the past decades, many protective measures have been successfully implemented to protect cattle from the spread of c-BSE, and some of these measures have been extended to sheep and goats to protect from scrapie according to the principle of precaution. Since cases of c-BSE have greatly reduced in number, those protective measures are currently being challenged and relaxed in the absence of other known zoonotic animal prion disease. We recommend that risk managers should be aware of the long term potential risk to human health of at least certain scrapie isolates, notably for lymphotropic strains like the classical scrapie strain used in the current study. Relatively high amounts of infectivity in peripheral lymphoid organs in animals infected with these strains could lead to contamination of food products produced for human consumption. Efforts should also be maintained to further assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains in long-term studies, notably lymphotropic strains with high prevalence like CWD, which is spreading across North America, and atypical/Nor98 scrapie (Nor98)50 that was first detected in the past two decades and now represents approximately half of all reported cases of prion diseases in small ruminants worldwide, including territories previously considered as scrapie free. Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,
Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a
"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France
Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion. Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.
To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.
These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.
***> Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***> Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***> These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
PRION CONFERENCE 2018 CWD TSE PRION
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA.
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio.
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017, AND included 104 patients.
SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%), AND THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge).
To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys.
Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years. After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate. The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology. Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP. The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD.
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
TUESDAY, JULY 17, 2018
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice PRION 2018 Conference
2018
Jul 2018: A team of CCBS researchers led by Marcelo Barria have published findings that prions that cause chronic wasting disease in deer and elk can convert human prions in a test tube to the disease-associated form.
TUESDAY, JULY 17, 2018
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice PRION 2018 Conference
JUST OUT CDC AHEAD OF PRINT JOURNAL OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE !!!
WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2018
***> Susceptibility of Human Prion Protein to Conversion by Chronic Wasting Disease Prions CDC AHEAD OF PRINT
Prion 2017
Conference Abstracts CWD 2017 PRION CONFERENCE
First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress
Stefanie Czub1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Christiane Stahl-Hennig3, Michael Beekes4, Hermann Schaetzl5 and Dirk Motzkus6 1
University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Canadian Food Inspection Agency; 2Universitatsklinikum des Saarlandes und Medizinische Fakultat der Universitat des Saarlandes; 3 Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen; 4 Robert-Koch-Institut Berlin; 5 University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; 6 presently: Boehringer Ingelheim Veterinary Research Center; previously: Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen
This is a progress report of a project which started in 2009. 21 cynomolgus macaques were challenged with characterized CWD material from white-tailed deer (WTD) or elk by intracerebral (ic), oral, and skin exposure routes. Additional blood transfusion experiments are supposed to assess the CWD contamination risk of human blood product. Challenge materials originated from symptomatic cervids for ic, skin scarification and partially per oral routes (WTD brain). Challenge material for feeding of muscle derived from preclinical WTD and from preclinical macaques for blood transfusion experiments. We have confirmed that the CWD challenge material contained at least two different CWD agents (brain material) as well as CWD prions in muscle-associated nerves. Here we present first data on a group of animals either challenged ic with steel wires or per orally and sacrificed with incubation times ranging from 4.5 to 6.9 years at postmortem. Three animals displayed signs of mild clinical disease, including anxiety, apathy, ataxia and/or tremor. In four animals wasting was observed, two of those had confirmed diabetes. All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals. Protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuiC) and PET-blot assays to further substantiate these findings are on the way, as well as bioassays in bank voles and transgenic mice. At present, a total of 10 animals are sacrificed and read-outs are ongoing. Preclinical incubation of the remaining macaques covers a range from 6.4 to 7.10 years. Based on the species barrier and an incubation time of > 5 years for BSE in macaques and about 10 years for scrapie in macaques, we expected an onset of clinical disease beyond 6 years post inoculation.
PRION 2017
DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS
Subject: PRION 2017 CONFERENCE DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS VIDEO
PRION 2017
CONFERENCE DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS
*** PRION 2017 CONFERENCE VIDEO
TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2017
PRION 2017 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress
SATURDAY, JULY 29, 2017
Risk Advisory Opinion: Potential Human Health Risks from Chronic Wasting Disease CFIA, PHAC, HC (HPFB and FNIHB), INAC, Parks Canada, ECCC and AAFC
***We have concluded that the human protein has a region that confers unusual susceptibility to conversion by CWD prions. CWD is unique among prion diseases in its rapid spread in natural populations. BSE prions are essentially unaltered upon passage to a new species, while CWD adapts to the new species. This adaptation has consequences for surveillance of humans exposed to CWD. Wildlife Disease Risk Communication Research Contributes to Wildlife Trust Administration Exploring perceptions about chronic wasting disease risks among wildlife and agriculture professionals and stakeholders
CDC CWD 2018 TRANSMISSION
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.
SATURDAY, JULY 21, 2018
Chronic Wasting Disease: new experience in Europe
WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2018
CONFIDENTIAL IN CONFIDENCE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS FDA EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR RULE CHANGE USA Section 21 C.F.R. 589.2000
TUESDAY, JULY 03, 2018
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Global Report Update, USA, CANADA, KOREA, NORWAY, FINLAND, Game Farms and Fake news
SUNDAY, APRIL 8, 2018
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease Global Pandemic Urgent Update April 9, 2018
Cervid to human prion transmission
Kong, Qingzhong
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
Abstract
Prion disease is transmissible and invariably fatal. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease affecting deer, elk and moose, and it is a widespread and expanding epidemic affecting 22 US States and 2 Canadian provinces so far. CWD poses the most serious zoonotic prion transmission risks in North America because of huge venison consumption (>6 million deer/elk hunted and consumed annually in the USA alone), significant prion infectivity in muscles and other tissues/fluids from CWD-affected cervids, and usually high levels of individual exposure to CWD resulting from consumption of the affected animal among often just family and friends. However, we still do not know whether CWD prions can infect humans in the brain or peripheral tissues or whether clinical/asymptomatic CWD zoonosis has already occurred, and we have no essays to reliably detect CWD infection in humans. We hypothesize that:
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans;and
*** (4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred.
We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.
Aim 1 will prove that the classical CWD strain may infect humans in brain or peripheral lymphoid tissues at low levels by conducting systemic bioassays in a set of "humanized" Tg mouse lines expressing common human PrP variants using a number of CWD isolates at varying doses and routes. Experimental "human CWD" samples will also be generated for Aim 3.
Aim 2 will test the hypothesis that the cervid-to-human prion transmission barrier is dependent on prion strain and influenced by the host (human) PrP sequence by examining and comparing the transmission efficiency and phenotypes of several atypical/unusual CWD isolates/strains as well as a few prion strains from other species that have adapted to cervid PrP sequence, utilizing the same panel of humanized Tg mouse lines as in Aim 1.
Aim 3 will establish reliable essays for detection and surveillance of CWD infection in humans by examining in details the clinical, pathological, biochemical and in vitro seeding properties of existing and future experimental "human CWD" samples generated from Aims 1-2 and compare them with those of common sporadic human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) prions.
Aim 4 will attempt to detect clinical CWD-affected human cases by examining a significant number of brain samples from prion-affected human subjects in the USA and Canada who have consumed venison from CWD-endemic areas utilizing the criteria and essays established in Aim 3. The findings from this proposal will greatly advance our understandings on the potential and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for CWD zoonosis and potentially discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.
Public Health Relevance There are significant and increasing human exposure to cervid prions because chronic wasting disease (CWD, a widespread and highly infectious prion disease among deer and elk in North America) continues spreading and consumption of venison remains popular, but our understanding on cervid-to-human prion transmission is still very limited, raising public health concerns. This proposal aims to define the zoonotic risks of cervid prions and set up and apply essays to detect CWD zoonosis using mouse models and in vitro methods. The findings will greatly expand our knowledge on the potentials and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for such infections and may discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.
Funding Agency Agency National Institute of Health (NIH)
Institute National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS)
Type Research Project (R01)
Project # 1R01NS088604-01A1
Application # 9037884
Study Section Cellular and Molecular Biology of Neurodegeneration Study Section (CMND)
Program Officer Wong, May
Project Start 2015-09-30
Project End 2019-07-31
Budget Start 2015-09-30
Budget End 2016-07-31
Support Year 1
Fiscal Year 2015
Total Cost $337,507
Indirect Cost $118,756
Institution
Name Case Western Reserve University
Department Pathology
Type Schools of Medicine
DUNS # 077758407
City Cleveland
State OH
Country United States
Zip Code 44106http://grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01-NS088604-01A1 http://grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01-NS088604-01A1
CWD TSE Prion Zoonosis to squirrel monkey and macaque
BSE INQUIRY
CJD9/10022
October 1994
Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane
BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ
Dear Mr Elmhirst,
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT
Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.
The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.
The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.
The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.
I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***
There is some evidence that risk of CJD INCREASES WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY OF LAMB EATING (p = 0.02).
The evidence for such an association between beef eating and CJD is weaker (p = 0.14). When only controls for whom a relative was interviewed are included, this evidence becomes a little STRONGER (p = 0.08).
snip...
It was found that when veal was included in the model with another exposure, the association between veal and CJD remained statistically significant (p = < 0.05 for all exposures), while the other exposures ceased to be statistically significant (p = > 0.05).
snip...
In conclusion, an analysis of dietary histories revealed statistical associations between various meats/animal products and INCREASED RISK OF CJD. When some account was taken of possible confounding, the association between VEAL EATING AND RISK OF CJD EMERGED AS THE STRONGEST OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS STATISTICALLY. ...
snip...
In the study in the USA, a range of foodstuffs were associated with an increased risk of CJD, including liver consumption which was associated with an apparent SIX-FOLD INCREASE IN THE RISK OF CJD. By comparing the data from 3 studies in relation to this particular dietary factor, the risk of liver consumption became non-significant with an odds ratio of 1.2 (PERSONAL COMMUNICATION, PROFESSOR A. HOFMAN. ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM). (???...TSS)
snip...see full report ;
Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases {the following was written but with a single line marked through it ''first passage (by this route)}...TSS
resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret.
snip...
*** now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal communications years ago, and then the latest on the zoonotic potential from CWD to humans from the TOKYO PRION 2016 CONFERENCE.
see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does this mean there IS casual evidence ???? “Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans”
Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???
Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST
To: Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM
Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD. That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.
Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
-----Original Message-----
From: Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM
Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM ......snip........end..............TSS
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41 A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease Sigurdson CJ.
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,
ZOONOTIC, ZOONOSIS, CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION
10. ZOONOTIC, ZOONOSIS, CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION AKA MAD DEER ELK DISEASE IN HUMANS, has it already happened, that should be the question...
''In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II)
EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) Antonia Ricci Ana Allende Declan Bolton Marianne Chemaly Robert Davies Pablo Salvador Fernández Escámez ... See all authors
also, see;
8. Even though human TSE‐exposure risk through consumption of game from European cervids can be assumed to be minor, if at all existing, no final conclusion can be drawn due to the overall lack of scientific data. In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids. It might be prudent considering appropriate measures to reduce such a risk, e.g. excluding tissues such as CNS and lymphoid tissues from the human food chain, which would greatly reduce any potential risk for consumers. However, it is stressed that currently, no data regarding a risk of TSE infections from cervid products are available.
snip...
The tissue distribution of infectivity in CWD‐infected cervids is now known to extend beyond CNS and lymphoid tissues. While the removal of these specific tissues from the food chain would reduce human dietary exposure to infectivity, exclusion from the food chain of the whole carcass of any infected animal would be required to eliminate human dietary exposure.
zoonosis zoonotic cervid tse prion cwd to humans, preparing for the storm
***An alternative to modeling the species barrier is the cell-free conversion assay which points to CWD as the animal prion disease with the greatest zoonotic potential, after (and very much less than) BSE.116***
To date there is no direct evidence that CWD has been or can be transmitted from animals to humans.
However, initial findings from a laboratory research project funded by the Alberta Prion Research Institute (APRI) and Alberta Livestock Meat Agency (ALMA), and led by a Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) scientist indicate that CWD has been transmitted to cynomolgus macaques (the non-human primate species most closely related to humans that may be used in research), through both the intracranial and oral routes of exposure.
Both infected brain and muscle tissues were found to transmit disease.
Health Canada’s Health Products and Food Branch (HPFB) was asked to consider the impact of these findings on the Branch’s current position on CWD in health products and foods.
Summary and Recommendation:
snip...
Health Portfolio partners were recently made aware of initial findings from a research project led by a CFIA scientist that have demonstrated that cynomolgus macaques can be infected via intracranial exposure and oral gavage with CWD infected muscle.
These findings suggest that CWD, under specific experimental conditions, has the potential to cross the human species barrier, including by enteral feeding of CWD infected muscle.
> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people.
key word here is 'reported'. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can't, and it's as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it's being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. ...terry
*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
SEE; Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey
Monday, May 23, 2011
CDC Assesses Potential Human Exposure to Prion Diseases Travel Warning
Public release date: 23-May-2011
CDC assesses potential human exposure to prion diseases Study results reported in the Journal of the American Dietetic Association Philadelphia, PA, May 23, 2011 – Researchers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have examined the potential for human exposure to prion diseases, looking at hunting, venison consumption, and travel to areas in which prion diseases have been reported in animals. Three prion diseases in particular – bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “Mad Cow Disease”), variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), and chronic wasting disease (CWD) – were specified in the investigation. The results of this investigation are published in the June issue of the Journal of the American Dietetic Association.
“While prion diseases are rare, they are generally fatal for anyone who becomes infected. More than anything else, the results of this study support the need for continued surveillance of prion diseases,” commented lead investigator Joseph Y. Abrams, MPH, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC, Atlanta.”But it’s also important that people know the facts about these diseases, especially since this study shows that a good number of people have participated in activities that may expose them to infection-causing agents.”
Although rare, human prion diseases such as CJD may be related to BSE. Prion (proteinaceous infectious particles) diseases are a group of rare brain diseases that affect humans and animals. When a person gets a prion disease, brain function is impaired. This causes memory and personality changes, dementia, and problems with movement. All of these worsen over time. These diseases are invariably fatal. Since these diseases may take years to manifest, knowing the extent of human exposure to possible prion diseases could become important in the event of an outbreak.
CDC investigators evaluated the results of the 2006-2007 population survey conducted by the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet). This survey collects information on food consumption practices, health outcomes, and demographic characteristics of residents of the participating Emerging Infections Program sites. The survey was conducted in Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, and Tennessee, as well as five counties in the San Francisco Bay area, seven counties in the Greater Denver area, and 34 counties in western and northeastern New York.
Survey participants were asked about behaviors that could be associated with exposure to the agents causing BSE and CWD, including travel to the nine countries considered to be BSE-endemic (United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, France, Portugal, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain) and the cumulative length of stay in each of those countries. Respondents were asked if they ever had hunted for deer or elk, and if that hunting had taken place in areas considered to be CWD-endemic (northeastern Colorado, southeastern Wyoming or southwestern Nebraska). They were also asked if they had ever consumed venison, the frequency of consumption, and whether the meat came from the wild.
The proportion of survey respondents who reported travel to at least one of the nine BSE endemic countries since 1980 was 29.5%. Travel to the United Kingdom was reported by 19.4% of respondents, higher than to any other BSE-endemic country. Among those who traveled, the median duration of travel to the United Kingdom (14 days) was longer than that of any other BSE-endemic country. Travelers to the UK were more likely to have spent at least 30 days in the country (24.9%) compared to travelers to any other BSE endemic country. The prevalence and extent of travel to the UK indicate that health concerns in the UK may also become issues for US residents.
The proportion of survey respondents reporting having hunted for deer or elk was 18.5% and 1.2% reported having hunted for deer or elk in CWD-endemic areas. Venison consumption was reported by 67.4% of FoodNet respondents, and 88.6% of those reporting venison consumption had obtained all of their meat from the wild. These findings reinforce the importance of CWD surveillance and control programs for wild deer and elk to reduce human exposure to the CWD agent. Hunters in CWD-endemic areas are advised to take simple precautions such as: avoiding consuming meat from sickly deer or elk, avoiding consuming brain or spinal cord tissues, minimizing the handling of brain and spinal cord tissues, and wearing gloves when field-dressing carcasses.
According to Abrams, “The 2006-2007 FoodNet population survey provides useful information should foodborne prion infection become an increasing public health concern in the future. The data presented describe the prevalence of important behaviors and their associations with demographic characteristics. Surveillance of BSE, CWD, and human prion diseases are critical aspects of addressing the burden of these diseases in animal populations and how that may relate to human health.”
###
The article is “Travel history, hunting, and venison consumption related to prion disease exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet population survey” by Joseph Y. Abrams, MPH; Ryan A. Maddox, MPH; Alexis R Harvey, MPH; Lawrence B. Schonberger, MD; and Ermias D. Belay, MD. It appears in the Journal of the American Dietetic Association, Volume 111, Issue 6 (June 2011) published by Elsevier.
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey
Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.
Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey
Joseph Y. Abrams, MPH, Ryan A. Maddox, MPH , Alexis R. Harvey, MPH , Lawrence B. Schonberger, MD , Ermias D. Belay, MD
Accepted 15 November 2010. Abstract Full Text PDF References .
Abstract
The transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) to human beings and the spread of chronic wasting disease (CWD) among cervids have prompted concerns about zoonotic transmission of prion diseases. Travel to the United Kingdom and other European countries, hunting for deer or elk, and venison consumption could result in the exposure of US residents to the agents that cause BSE and CWD. The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network 2006-2007 population survey was used to assess the prevalence of these behaviors among residents of 10 catchment areas across the United States. Of 17,372 survey respondents, 19.4% reported travel to the United Kingdom since 1980, and 29.5% reported travel to any of the nine European countries considered to be BSE-endemic since 1980. The proportion of respondents who had ever hunted deer or elk was 18.5%, and 1.2% had hunted deer or elk in a CWD–endemic area. More than two thirds (67.4%) reported having ever eaten deer or elk meat. Respondents who traveled spent more time in the United Kingdom (median 14 days) than in any other BSE-endemic country. Of the 11,635 respondents who had consumed venison, 59.8% ate venison at most one to two times during their year of highest consumption, and 88.6% had obtained all of their meat from the wild. The survey results were useful in determining the prevalence and frequency of behaviors that could be important factors for foodborne prion transmission.
PLUS, THE CDC DID NOT PUT THIS WARNING OUT FOR THE WELL BEING OF THE DEER AND ELK ;
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey
Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.
NOR IS THE FDA recalling this CWD positive elk meat for the well being of the dead elk ;
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Noah's Ark Holding, LLC, Dawson, MN RECALL Elk products contain meat derived from an elk confirmed to have CWD NV, CA, TX, CO, NY, UT, FL, OK RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: FOODS CLASS II
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2017
CDC Now Recommends Strongly consider having the deer or elk tested for CWD before you eat the meat
SATURDAY, JANUARY 27, 2018
CDC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE REPORT USA JANUARY 2018
Subject: CDC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE REPORT USA JANUARY 2018
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION IS THE USA AND NORTH AMERICA'S MAD COW DISEASE.
THE USDA INC ET AL WORKED VERY HARD CONCEALING BSE TSE PRION IN CATTLE. they almost succeeded $$$
BUT CWD TSE PRION IN CERVIDS IS A DIFFERENT BEAST, THE COVER UP THERE, USDA INC COULD NOT CONTAIN.
SPORADIC CJD IS 85%+ OF ALL HUMAN TSE PRION DISEASE.
SPORADIC CJD HAS NOW BEEN LINKED TO TYPICAL AND ATYPICAL BSE, SCRAPIE, AND CWD.
SPORADIC/SPONTANEOUS TSE HAS NEVER BEEN PROVEN.
***> Re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy
>>> The only tenable public line will be that "more research is required’’ <<<
>>> possibility on a transmissible prion remains open<<<
O.K., so it’s about 23 years later, so somebody please tell me, when is "more research is required’’ enough time for evaluation ?
Re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy
Nature 525, 247?250 (10 September 2015) doi:10.1038/nature15369 Received 26 April 2015 Accepted 14 August 2015 Published online 09 September 2015 Updated online 11 September 2015 Erratum (October, 2015)
snip...see full Singeltary Nature comment here;
Alzheimer's disease
let's not forget the elephant in the room. curing Alzheimer's would be a great and wonderful thing, but for starters, why not start with the obvious, lets prove the cause or causes, and then start to stop that. think iatrogenic, friendly fire, or the pass it forward mode of transmission. think medical, surgical, dental, tissue, blood, related transmission. think transmissible spongiform encephalopathy aka tse prion disease aka mad cow type disease...
Commentary: Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy
Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease
*** Singeltary comment PLoS ***
Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ?
Posted by flounder on 05 Nov 2014 at 21:27 GMT
IN CONFIDENCE
5 NOVEMBER 1992
TRANSMISSION OF ALZHEIMER TYPE PLAQUES TO PRIMATES
[9. Whilst this matter is not at the moment directly concerned with the iatrogenic CJD cases from hgH, there remains a possibility of litigation here, and this presents an added complication.
There are also results to be made available shortly
(1) concerning a farmer with CJD who had BSE animals,
(2) on the possible transmissibility of Alzheimer’s and
(3) a CMO letter on prevention of iatrogenic CJD transmission in neurosurgery, all of which will serve to increase media interest.]
snip...see full Singeltary Nature comment at bottom here;
re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-? pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy Nature 525, 247?250 (10 September 2015) doi:10.1038/nature15369 Received 26 April 2015 Accepted 14 August 2015 Published online 09 September 2015 Updated online 11 September 2015 Erratum (October, 2015)
I would kindly like to comment on the Nature Paper, the Lancet reply, and the newspaper articles.
First, I applaud Nature, the Scientist and Authors of the Nature paper, for bringing this important finding to the attention of the public domain, and the media for printing said findings.
Secondly, it seems once again, politics is getting in the way possibly of more important Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion scientific findings. findings that could have great implications for human health, and great implications for the medical surgical arena. but apparently, the government peer review process, of the peer review science, tries to intervene again to water down said disturbing findings.
where have we all heard this before? it's been well documented via the BSE Inquiry. have they not learned a lesson from the last time?
we have seen this time and time again in England (and other Country's) with the BSE mad cow TSE Prion debacle.
That 'anonymous' Lancet editorial was disgraceful. The editor, Dick Horton is not a scientist.
The pituitary cadavers were very likely elderly and among them some were on their way to CJD or Alzheimer's. Not a bit unusual. Then the recipients, who got pooled extracts injected from thousands of cadavers, were 100% certain to have been injected with both seeds. No surprise that they got both diseases going after thirty year incubations.
That the UK has a "system in place to assist science journalists" to squash embargoed science reports they find 'alarming' is pathetic.
Sounds like the journalists had it right in the first place: 'Alzheimer's may be a transmissible infection' in The Independent to 'You can catch Alzheimer's' in The Daily Mirror or 'Alzheimer's bombshell' in The Daily Express
if not for the journalist, the layperson would not know about these important findings.
where would we be today with sound science, from where we were 30 years ago, if not for the cloak of secrecy and save the industry at all cost mentality?
when you have a peer review system for science, from which a government constantly circumvents, then you have a problem with science, and humans die.
to date, as far as documented body bag count, with all TSE prion named to date, that count is still relatively low (one was too many in my case, Mom hvCJD), however that changes drastically once the TSE Prion link is made with Alzheimer's, the price of poker goes up drastically.
so, who makes that final decision, and how many more decades do we have to wait?
the iatrogenic mode of transmission of TSE prion, the many routes there from, load factor, threshold from said load factor to sub-clinical disease, to clinical disease, to death, much time is there to spread a TSE Prion to anywhere, but whom, by whom, and when, do we make that final decision to do something about it globally? how many documented body bags does it take? how many more decades do we wait? how many names can we make up for one disease, TSE prion?
Professor Collinge et al, and others, have had troubles in the past with the Government meddling in scientific findings, that might in some way involve industry, never mind human and or animal health.
FOR any government to continue to circumvent science for monetary gain, fear factor, or any reason, shame, shame on you.
in my opinion, it's one of the reasons we are at where we are at to date, with regards to the TSE Prion disease science i.e. money, industry, politics, then comes science, in that order.
greed, corporate, lobbyist there from, and government, must be removed from the peer review process of sound science, it's bad enough having them in the pharmaceutical aspect of healthcare policy making, in my opinion.
my mother died from confirmed hvCJD, and her brother (my uncle) Alzheimer's of some type (no autopsy?). just made a promise, never forget, and never let them forget, before I do.
I kindly wish to remind the public of the past, and a possible future we all hopes never happens again. ...
comment at bottom of these links...
IN a time when FSIS/APHIS/USDA/FDA et al should be strengthening the TSE regulations, it seems corporate interest has won out again over sound science and consumer protection from an agent that is 100% fatal for the ones that go clinical. With the many different atypical TSEs showing up in different parts of the world, and with GWs BSE MRR policy (the legal policy of trading all strains of TSEs), the battle that has waged for the last 25 years to eradicate this agent from this planet will be set back decades, if not lost for good. ...
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##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
> The calf was appropriately disposed of in a local
> landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
well, back at the ranch with larry, curly and mo heading up the USDA et al,
what would you expect, nothing less than shoot, shovel and shut the hell up.
no mad cow in USA, feed ban working, no civil war in Iraq either.
but what has past history shown us, evidently it has shown the USDA et al
nothing ;
Disposal of meat and bone meal (MBM) derived from specified risk material
(SRM) and over thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill
The Committee was asked to consider a quantitative risk assessment of the
disposal of meat and bone meal derived from specified risk material and over
thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill, prepared in response to a request
from the Committee at its June 1999 meeting.
The Committee was asked whether, in the light of the results of the risk
assessment, it held to its earlier published (June 1999) view that landfill
was an acceptable outlet for MBM of any origin, although it retained a
preference for incineration. The Committee reiterated that it had a strong
preference for incineration as the favoured route for the disposal of MBM
and were uneasy about the use of landfill for the disposal of this material.
If there were cases where incineration was not practical the Committee felt
it would be preferable for any material going to landfill to be
pressure-cooked first or possibly stored above ground prior to incineration.
http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/summ_0700.htm
Disposal of BSE suspect carcases
It is the Department's policy to dispose of BSE suspects by incineration
wherever feasible. No BSE suspect carcases have been landfilled since 1991.
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/publichealth/notification.html#disp
OPINION ON
THE USE OF BURIAL FOR DEALING WITH ANIMAL
CARCASSES AND OTHER ANIMAL MATERIALS THAT
MIGHT CONTAIN BSE/TSE
ADOPTED BY THE
SCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEE
MEETING OF 16-17 JANUARY 2003
The details of the SSC’s evaluation are provided in the attached report. The
SSC
concludes as follows:
(1) The term “burial” includes a diversity of disposal conditions. Although
burial is
widely used for disposal of waste the degradation process essential for
BSE/TSE
infectivity reduction is very difficult to control. The extent to which such
an
infectivity reduction can occur as a consequence of burial is poorly
characterised.
It would appear to be a slow process in various circumstances.
(2) A number of concerns have been identified including potential for
groundwater
contamination, dispersal/transmission by birds/animals/insects, accidental
uncovering by man.
(3) In the absence of any new data the SSC confirms its previous opinion
that animal
material which could possibly be contaminated with BSE/TSEs, burial poses a
risk except under highly controlled conditions (e.g., controlled landfill).
SNIP...
4. CONCLUSION
In the absence of new evidence the opinion of the SSC “Opinion on Fallen
Stock”
(SSC 25th June 1999) must be endorsed strongly that land burial of all
animals and
material derived from them for which there is a possibility that they could
incorporate BSE/TSEs poses a significant risk. Only in exceptional
circumstances
where there could be a considerable delay in implementing a safe means of
disposal
should burial of such materials be considered. Guidelines should be made
available
to aid on burial site selection.
4 PAGES;
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out309_en.pdf
During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the UK, the
Department of Health prepared a rapid qualitative
assessment of the potential risks to human health
associated with various methods of carcass disposal
(UK Department of Health, 2001c). The most
relevant hazards to human health resulting from
burial were identified as bacteria pathogenic to
humans, water-borne protozoa, and BSE. The main
potential route identified was contaminated water
supplies, and the report generally concluded that an
engineered licensed landfill would always be
preferable to unlined burial. In general terms, the
findings of the qualitative assessment relative to
biological agents are summarized in Table 13.
TABLE 13. Potential health hazards and associated pathways of exposure
resulting from landfill or burial of
animal carcasses (adapted from UK Department of Health, 2001c).
PLEASE SEE TABLE AT;
http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/research/books/carcassdispfiles/PDF%20Fi
les/CH%201%20-%20Burial.pdf
PART 2
Rendering and fixed-facility incineration were
preferred, but the necessary resources were not
immediately available and UK officials soon learned
that the capacity would only cover a portion of the
disposal needs. Disposal in commercial landfills was
seen as the next best environmental solution, but
legal, commercial, and local community problems
limited landfill use. With these limitations in mind,
pyre burning was the actual initial method used but
was subsequently discontinued following increasing
public, scientific, and political concerns. Mass burial
and on-farm burial were last on the preferred
method list due to the complicating matter of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and the risk posed
to groundwater (Hickman & Hughes, 2002).
http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/research/books/carcassdispfiles/PDF%20Fi
les/Introduction%20to%20Part%202%20-%20Cross-Cutting%20&%20Policy%20Issues.p
df
Carcase disposal:
A Major Problem of the
2001 FMD Outbreak
Gordon Hickman and Neil Hughes, Disposal Cell,
FMD Joint Co-ordination Centre, Page Street
snip...
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/svj/fmd/pages27-40.pdf
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought
this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...
snip...
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
PAUL BROWN SCRAPIE SOIL TEST
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac07/tab03.pdf
Some unofficial information from a source on the inside looking out -
Confidential!!!!
As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small
pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station
associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland.
Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both
heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures
free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness
each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie
free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also
broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE
contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!!
A very frightening revelation!!!
----------
You can take that with however many grains of salt you wish, and
we can debate these issues all day long, but the bottom line,
this is not rocket-science, all one has to do is some
experiments and case studies. But for the life of me,
I don't know what they are waiting on?
Kind regards,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas USA
More here:
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s018.pdf
INCINERATION TEMPS
Requirements include:
a. after burning to the range of 800 to 1000*C to eliminate smell;
well heck, this is just typical public relations fear factor control.
do you actually think they would spend the extra costs for fuel,
for such extreme heat, just to eliminate smell, when they spread
manure all over your veg's. i think not. what they really meant were
any _TSE agents_.
b. Gas scrubbing to eliminate smoke -- though steam may be omitted;
c. Stacks to be fitted with grit arreaters;
snip...
1.2 Visual Imact
It is considered that the requirement for any carcase incinerator
disign would be to ensure that the operations relating to the reception,
storage and decepitation of diseased carcasses must not be publicly
visible and that any part of a carcase could not be removed or
interfered with by animals or birds.
full text;
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/04/03006001.pdf
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out311_en.pdf
TSS
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 4:39 PM
Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 23, 2006
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
>
> Epidemiology Update March 23, 2006
> As of today, 13 locations and 32 movements of cattle have been examined
with
> 27 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> locations and herds will continue. In addition, state and federal
officials
> have confirmed that a black bull calf was born in 2005 to the index animal
> (the red cow). The calf was taken by the owner to a local stockyard in
July
> 2005 where the calf died. The calf was appropriately disposed of in a
local
> landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
>
>
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
>
>
> TSS
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To:
> Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2006 3:33 PM
> Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
>
>
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
>
> CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD
> TSS
> BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
> Sun Mar 19, 2006 15:29
> 70.110.86.250
>
>
>
> BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
>
> MONTGOMERY - Alabama Agriculture & Industries Commissioner Ron Sparks,
State
> Veterinarian Dr. Tony Frazier, and Dr. Ken Angel with the USDA held a
press
> conference today to answer questions about yesterday's exhumation of the
> remains of the cow that tested positive for BSE.
>
>
> Federal and state agriculture workers excavated the remains of the animal,
> which had been buried on the farm and did not enter the animal or human
food
> chain, in accordance with USDA protocols. The carcass was that of a red
> crossbred beef type cow. An examination of the cow's teeth confirmed that
> the animal was at least 10 years of age. Samples were taken of the animal
> and the remaining carcass was transported to one of the department's
> diagnostic labs for proper disposal. State and Federal staff are
continuing
> the traceback to determine the herd of origin.
>
> One calf was identified by the owner as belonging to the red cow. The calf
> is approximately 6 weeks old and appeared to be a healthy animal. The calf
> was transported to a USDA lab where DNA from the calf will be compared to
> that of the red cow to confirm relation. If confirmed, this would be the
> first offspring of a BSE diagnosed cow in the United States. Officials
today
> learned that in early 2005 the BSE-positive cow gave birth to another
black
> bull calf. This animal is in the process of being traced.
>
> The cow was first examined by a local veterinarian in late February 2006.
> After the animal failed to respond to medical attention, it was humanely
> euthanized. The cattle producer buried the cow at the farm because Alabama
> Department of Agriculture & Industries regulations require burial of
> livestock within 24 hours. The producer did not suspect that the cow had
> BSE. The local veterinarian sent samples of the cow to the Alabama
> Department of Agriculture & Industries lab
> system, which was then forwarded to the USDA lab in Athens, GA as part of
> the routine voluntary surveillance program for BSE testing. After the
rapid
> test for BSE gave an inconclusive result, the samples were sent to Ames,
> Iowa for a Western Blot test, which gave a positive result. A third test,
> the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, was performed this week and also
> returned positive results for BSE.
>
> The Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries and the USDA have
been
> encouraging participation in Premises ID Registration as an important step
> in controlling animal disease. Since starting the program in 2005, over
> 2,000 premises have been registered in Alabama. For more information on
> Premises ID Registration call 334-240-7253
>
> http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update
>
> http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update?pn=2
>
>
>
> ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS
>
> 39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the
>
> BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and
>
> bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases
>
> had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,
>
> mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in
>
> successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none
>
> to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had
>
> been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the
>
> prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected
>
> animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the
>
> 1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%
>
> confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the
>
> geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of
>
> pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform
>
> 14
>
> © SEAC 2005
>
> distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared
>
> that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in
>
> certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases
>
> within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1
>
> quadruplet).
>
> 40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been
>
> investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in
>
> September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The
>
> animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002
>
> but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further
>
> investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for
>
> the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July
>
> 2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All
>
> 3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding
>
> suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September
>
> 1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of
>
> this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus
>
> young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to
>
> feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected
>
> because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.
>
> 41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no
>
> association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.
>
> 42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline
>
> in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB
>
> epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July
>
> 2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional
>
> infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this
>
> risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for
>
> the BARB cases.
>
> 43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from
>
> feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of
>
> BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study
>
> suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be
>
> required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the
>
> environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and
>
> noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material
>
> was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little
>
> dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.
>
> Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4
>
> years in the feed bin.
>
> 44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.
>
>
>
> snip...
>
>
>
> http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf
>
>
> TSS
>
>
|
|
USDA 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND HOW NOT TO FIND BSE CASES (OFFICIAL DRAFT OIG REPORT)
snip...
CATTLE With CNS Symptoms Were NOT Always Tested
snip...
Between FYs 2002 and 2004, FSIS condemned 680 cattle of all ages due to CNS symptoms. About 357 of these could be classified as adult. We could validate that ONLY 162 were tested for BSE (per APHIS records. ...
snip...
WE interviewed officials at five laboratories that test for rabies. Those officials CONFIRMED THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SUBMIT RABIES-NEGATIVE SAMPLES TO APHIS FOR BSE TESTING. A South Dakota laboratory official said they were not aware they could submit rabies-negative samples to APHIS for BSE testing. A laboratory official in another State said all rabies-negative cases were not submitted to APHIS because BSE was ''NOT ON THEIR RADAR SCREEN." Officials from New York, Wisconsin, TEXAS, and Iowa advised they would NOT submit samples from animals they consider too young. Four of the five States contacted defined this age as 24 months; Wisconsin defined it as 30 months. TEXAS officials also advised that they do not always have sufficient tissue remaining to submit a BSE sample. ...
snip...
FULL TEXT 54 PAGES OF HOW NOT TO FIND BSE IN USA ;
http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_july_13_ig_rep.pdf
USDA/FDA MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE 2006
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL,
TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone
on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is
complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6;
b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6.
CODE
None. Bulk product
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on
June 28, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated
recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone
meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,484 tons
DISTRIBUTION
TN and WV
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA,
MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or
about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Approximately 2,223 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006.
FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,220 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated
recall is completed.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients
that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone
meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
40 tons
DISTRIBUTION
LA and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients
that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone
meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,150 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
87 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
350 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD
Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher,
50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE
All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit
on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated
recall is ongoing.
REASON
Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION
AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN
COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6
CODE
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J.
Baker recalled feed products.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated
with mammalian protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
27,694,240 lbs
DISTRIBUTION
MI
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125
TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,
net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,
Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,
Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,
Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,
Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete
Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,
Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying
Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED,
net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-112-6
CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and
visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
125 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated
recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
?????
DISTRIBUTION
KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD
TSS
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22
71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),
Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL
FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6
CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and
by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone
meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION
Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
Subject:
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From:
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"Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
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Reply-To:
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
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Date:
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Wed, 12 Apr 2006 15:43:07 -0500
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Content-Type:
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text/plain
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##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Apr 12, 2006 — There is nothing new to report and the investigation
continues. An updated flow chart has been posted below.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse.shtml
Flow chart
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/content/printable_version/
external_bse_al_4_10_06.pdf
help!
TSS
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 11:18 AM
Subject: Re: BSE ALABAMA UPDATE Apr 6, 2006
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
>
> Apr 10, 2006 — As of today, 15 locations and 61 movements of cattle have
> been examined with 40 of those being substantially completed. Additional
> investigations of locations and herds will continue. A location includes
> stockyards or farms where the index cow lived previously or where her
> immediate family members may have lived. The movements include any
arrivals
> or departures from those locations.
>
>
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
>
>
> THE SILENCE IS DEAFENING ...
>
>
> TSS
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To:
> Sent: Saturday, April 08, 2006 10:12 AM
> Subject: Re: BSE ALABAMA UPDATE Apr 6, 2006
>
>
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
> >
> > Apr 7, 2006 — As of today, 15 locations and 61 movements of cattle have
> been
> > examined with 40 of those being substantially completed. Additional
> > investigations of locations and herds will continue. A location includes
> > stockyards or farms where the index cow lived previously or where her
> > immediate family members may have lived. The movements include any
> arrivals
> > or departures from those locations.
> >
> >
> > http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse.shtml
> >
> >
> > tss
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> > To:
> > Sent: Friday, April 07, 2006 9:26 AM
> > Subject: BSE ALABAMA UPDATE Apr 6, 2006
> >
> >
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> > #####################
> >
> > Subject: BSE ALABAMA UPDATE Apr 6, 2006
> > Date: April 7, 2006 at 6:57 am PST
> > Apr 6, 2006 — As of today, 14 locations and 45 movements of cattle have
> been
> > examined with 40 of those being substantially completed. Additional
> > investigations of locations and herds will continue. A location includes
> > stockyards or farms where the index cow lived previously or where her
> > immediate family members may have lived. The movements include any
> arrivals
> > or departures from those locations.
> >
> >
> >
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/bse_al_epi-update.shtml
> >
> >
> > HOW OLD IS THIS COW?
> >
> >
> > TSS
> >
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2017
USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE and BANNED FEED USDA Detects a Case of Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alabama
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service sent this bulletin at 07/18/2017 07:05 PM EDT
USDA Detects a Case of Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alabama
Washington, D.C., July 18, 2017 – The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced an atypical case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), a neurologic disease of cattle, in an eleven-year old cow in Alabama. This animal never entered slaughter channels and at no time presented a risk to the food supply, or to human health in the United States.
snip...end
TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 2018
Unexpected prion phenotypes in experimentally transfused animals: predictive models for humans?
TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2018
***> USA CJD TSE Tables of Cases Examined National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined May 1, 2018 <***
WEDNESDAY, JULY 04, 2018
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE: GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL WORKERS IN ENGLAND June 2018
MONDAY, JUNE 18, 2018
Ecuador Six Case series of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in a third-level hospital in Quito
***atypical spontaneous BSE in France LOL***
FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$
***so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
Thursday, March 24, 2016
FRANCE CONFIRMS BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE MAD COW (ESB) chez une vache dans les Ardennes
***atypical spontaneous BSE in France LOL***
FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$
If you Compare France to other Countries with atypical BSE, in my opinion, you cannot explain this with ‘spontaneous’.
Table 1: Number of Atypical BSE cases reported by EU Member States in the period 2001–2014 by country and by type (L- and H-BSE) (extracted from EU BSE databases on 1 July 2014). By 2015, these data might be more comprehensive following a request from the European Commission to Member States for re-testing and retrospective classification of all positive bovine isolates in the EU in the years 2003–2009
BSE type
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013(a) 2014(a) Total
H-BSE Austria 1 1
France(b) 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 15
Germany 1 1 2
Ireland 1 1 2 1 5
The Netherlands 1 1
Poland 1 1 2
Portugal 1 1
Spain 1 1 2
Sweden 1 1
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 5
Total 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 5 1 4 1 35
L-BSE Austria 1 1 2
Denmark 1 1
France(b) 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 14
Germany 1 1 2
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 5
The Netherlands 1 1 1 3
Poland 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 12
Spain 2 2
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 4
Total 0 5 3 4 3 3 6 3 3 4 3 6 1 1 45
Total Atypical cases (H + L)
2 8 6 5 4 5 8 5 7 8 8 7 5 2 80
(a): Data for 2013-2014 are incomplete and may not include all cases/countries reported.
(b): France has performed extensive retrospective testing to classify BSE cases, which is probably the explanation for the higher number of Atypical BSE cases reported in this country.
The number of Atypical BSE cases detected in countries that have already identified them seems to be similar from year to year. In France, a retrospective study of all TSE-positive cattle identified through the compulsory EU surveillance between 2001 and 2007 indicated that the prevalence of H-BSE and L-BSE was 0.35 and 0.41 cases per million adult cattle tested, respectively, which increased to 1.9 and 1.7 cases per million, respectively, in tested animals over eight years old (Biacabe et al., 2008). No comprehensive study on the prevalence of Atypical BSE cases has yet been carried out in other EU Member States. All cases of Atypical BSE reported in the EU BSE databases have been identified by active surveillance testing (59 % in fallen stock, 38 % in healthy slaughtered cattle and 4 % in emergency slaughtered cattle). Cases were reported in animals over eight years of age, with the exception of two cases (one H-BSE and one L-BSE) detected in Spain in 2011/2012. One additional case of H-BSE was detected in Switzerland in 2012 in a cow born in Germany in 2005 (Guldimann et al., 2012).
Wednesday, July 15, 2015
Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed?
snip...see full text;
MONDAY, MAY 09, 2016
A comparison of classical and H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism in wild type and EK211 cattle following intracranial inoculation
FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 2018
From Gate to Plate, BSE aka mad cow disease, USDA, NAIS, AND TRACEABILITY
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
