Transcript - Technical Briefing to Provide an Update on Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alberta
Date/Date: February 27, 2015 4:00 p.m.
Location/Endroit: Teleconference, Ottawa, Ontario
Principal(s)/Principaux: Dr. Martine Dubuc, Vice President – Science, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Delegate at the World Organization for Animal Health Paul Mayers, Vice President - Policy and Programs, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Dr. Harpreet Kochhar, Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Marco Valicenti, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
Subject/Sujet: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) holds a technical briefing to provide an update on Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alberta.
Thank you all for joining us today for this technical briefing. My name is Denis Schryburt. We have with us today representatives from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.
Merci beaucoup à tous et à toutes d'être parmi nous aujourd'hui pour cette séance d'information technique. Mon nom est Denis Schryburt, agent principal des Relations avec les médias pour l'ACIA, et je serai le modérateur pour aujourd'hui.
In the room today, from CFIA we have Paul Mayers, Vice President for Policy and Program, for the CFIA, Dr. Martine Dubuc, vice-présidente de la direction des Sciences et déléguée pour le Canada à l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale. And we also have Dr. Harpreet Kochhar, Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada.
Thank you all for being here today. We will now begin today's technical briefing with an update on the investigation into the BSE case in Alberta with a statement from the CFIA. We will then open up the lines for questions and answers.
J'aimerais maintenant céder la parole à Paul Mayers.
Thank you very much. Good afternoon everyone. Thank you for calling in today. We would like to provide an update on the Canadian Food Inspection Agency's investigation into Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or BSE, in a cow from Alberta.
I would like to remind you that no part of the animal's carcass entered the human food or animal feed systems. Canada's suite of internationally recognized safeguards effectively protects the safety of food and animal feed. There's no risk to food safety.
Our in-depth investigation is continuing and includes identification of animals who may have been exposed to the same feed. The Agency has identified the birth cohort for this 2015 case. We're actively tracing these animals to determine their location and status.
The World Organization for Animal Health, the OIE, guidance establishes the birth cohorts as the animals born in the same year as the infected animal, along with animals born in the year before and after the infected animal. The CFIA is following this guidance.
Over the course of our investigation, we have confirmed that incidentally, this 2015 case was born on the same farm as the previous BSE case detected in 2010 and born in 2004. Out of an abundance of caution, we are including in our investigation animals that were born on this farm in the years between these two cases and that may have been potentially exposed to the same feed.
Moving forward, our focus is on tracing and determining the status of these animals. The investigation into potential sources of contamination of the feed will continue. As you can see, the scope of the investigation is broad. As well, the nature of this investigation is complex and requires us to be very thorough. It will take time.
We will continue to provide regular updates as the investigation continues. We continue to inform and reassure Canadians and our trading partners that Canadian beef remains safe.
Thanks to Canada's BSE controls, which include the enhanced feed ban, comprehensive surveillance programs and the removal and disposal of specified risk material, BSE cases are extremely rare in Canada. This has been the first case in four years. Canada continues to be officially recognized by the World Organization for Animal Health as a controlled BSE risk country.
We were informed this morning that China has imposed temporary trade restrictions on Canadian beef and beef products. We continue to work with our trading partners to share information and respond to questions they may have. We have and will continue to share information on the investigation with industry trading partners and other stakeholders. The CFIA remains committed to protecting animal health and takes BSE very seriously. All necessary resources have been directed towards managing this situation and investigation.
In closing, I encourage you to visit our website at inspection.gc.ca for details about this current investigation and more information about how Canada takes action when responding to the disease. Thank you.
Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Mayers. Maintenant, la déclaration de l'ACIA en français, Mme Dr. Dubuc.
Dre Martine Dubuc:
Bonjour et merci à vous tous d'être présents aujourd'hui. Nous souhaitons vous présenter une mise à jour concernant l'enquête que l'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments réalise sur le cas d'encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine, ou ESB, chez une vache de l'Alberta.
Je tiens à vous rappeler qu'aucune partie de la carcasse de l'animal ne s'est retrouvée dans la filière d'alimentation des humains ni celle des animaux. Les mesures de protection du Canada, qui sont reconnues à l'échelle internationale, protègent efficacement la salubrité des aliments et la salubrité des aliments du bétail. Il n'y a aucun risque pour la salubrité des aliments.
Nous poursuivons notre enquête approfondie qui comprend entre autres, l'identification des aliments, des animaux qui auraient pu avoir consommé les mêmes aliments. L'Agence a identifié la cohorte de naissance pour ce cas 2015. Nous travaillons activement à retracer ces animaux pour déterminer leur emplacement et leur statut.
Les lignes directrices de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale établissent que la cohorte de naissance correspond aux animaux nés la même année que l'animal infecté ainsi que les animaux nés une année avant et également les ani-, les animaux nés une année après l'animal infecté. L'ACIA suit ces lignes directrices actuellement dans son investigation.
Au cours de notre enquête, nous avons par ailleurs confirmé que la vache infectée de ESB en 2015 est née sur la même ferme que le précédent animal infecté d'ESB qui est né en 2004 et détecté en 2010. Par souci de prudence, nous avons inclus dans notre enquête les animaux qui sont nés sur cette ferme au cours des années séparant ces deux cas, qui auraient avoir pu consommé les mêmes aliments.
Au cours des prochaines étapes, l'Agence poursuivra son investigation afin de retracer et de déterminer le statut de ces animaux. L'enquête sur les sources possibles de contamination des aliments du bétail ne poursuivra également. Comme vous pouvez le constater, la portée de la présente enquête est vaste. Cette enquête est très complexe et exige que nous fassions preuve de minutie. Cela prendra du temps. Nous continuerons de fournir régulièrement des mises à jour au fur et à mesure que l'enquête progressera.
Nous continuons d'informer et de rassurer les Canadiens et nos partenaires commerciaux que le bœuf canadien est sain. Grâce aux mesures de contrôle mises en place au Canada à l'égard de l'ESB qui comprennent notamment l'interdiction renforcée frappant les aliments du bétail, le programme exhaustif de surveillance ainsi que le retrait et l'élimination des matières à risque spécifié, les cas d'ESB au Canada sont extrêmement rares.
Il s'agit du premier cas depuis quatre ans. Le canada continue d'être reconnu officiellement par l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale comme pays à risque maîtrisé à l'égard de l'ESB. Nous avons été informé ce matin que la Chine a imposé des restrictions commerciales temporaires pour le bœuf et les produits de bœuf canadiens. Nous continuons de collaborer avec nos partenaires commerciaux en communiquant l'information et en répondant à leurs questions.
Nous avons communiqué l'information sur l'enquête à l'industrie à nos partenaires commerciaux et à d'autres intervenants et nous entendons continuer à le faire. L'ACIA demeure résolue à protéger la santé animale et prend l'ESB très au sérieux. Toutes les ressources nécessaires ont été affectées à la gestion de cette situation et à l'enquête.
En terminant, je vous invite à consulter notre, site web à l'adresse inspection.gc.ca pour de plus amples détails sur l'enquête en cours et sur la façon dont le Canada intervient pour faire face à cette maladie. Nous vous remercions de votre attention.
Review of the Evidence for the Occurrence of ‘BARB’ BSE Cases in Cattle
Elimination of feed borne sources is now, as before, the key to elimination of BSE. The incidence of the disease can be greatly reduced but not readily eliminated in any country by adequate imposition of controls, particularly on animal feed. As the level of incidence falls both in the UK and internationally, the risks of contamination through feed, or indeed through any other source, fall whether or not controls in the UK and abroad are further tightened. With the current expertise in Defra and the VLA, GB is well placed to keep on top of and promote developments. Recommendations: It is essential that appropriate, risk based, controls and monitoring should be maintained on animals and feed until no cases of BSE are found, and controls tightened up where feasible, both in the UK and elsewhere that the UK can influence. In view of the very long incubation period of BSE in some animals, long-continued vigilance is necessary. It is not evident, however, that specific new measures are needed. Basically it is necessary to ‘keep taking the medicine’. Nevertheless, in view of new discoveries on the nature of the disease and the possibilities of new or changed TSEs arising, relevant research capacity in GB should be maintained.
Appendices Appendix I.
Summary of feed control measures
In July 1988 the initial ban on use on materials of ruminant origin in feedstuffs for ruminants was introduced. In September 1990, specified bovine offals were banned in any animal fed. A ban was imposed on export of feed to EU and in July 1991 worldwide. In November 1994 the ban was extended to feeding any mammalian protein to ruminants. In the EU, all mammalian protein was banned in animal feed, but restriction removed in March 1995 on e.g. milk and gelatin and blood products. In April 1996 the feeding of meat and bone meal (MBM) to any farm animal (including horses and farmed fish) was banned, in June a feed recall scheme started to remove any such feed from merchants or farms, and from 1 August 1996 the reinforced ban was started, including the prohibition of MBM on premises where livestock feeding stuffs were kept and disinfection of lorries etc. where MBM had been produced or stored. (This is the Reinforced Ban).
Fishmeal, animal derived dicalcium phosphate and hydrolysed protein may be fed to non-ruminant farmed livestock. Restrictions on feeding animal protein do not apply to non-ruminant pets (e.g. dogs and cats) that are not farmed (e.g. horses). The UK is largely self sufficient in production of pet foods, although materials are imported.
Control in the UK to 2001 was mainly by feed sampling and testing, with inspection of plants, vehicles and practices where positives were found, and identification of potential points of cross-contamination. Since 2001 plant and vehicles have been tested: of 2800 tests, 3 may have represented some risk to ruminant feeds.
In October 2000 use of material from condemned animals was stopped in the EU; and from December 2000 temporary, from May 2001, permanent harmonised EU–wide controls for BSE and other TSEs were introduced, and in August 2001 a ban was introduced on the feeding of processed animal protein to farm animals, from when EU regulations can be considered effective. Feedstuffs entering Europe from third countries should be tested for mammalian protein before movement in Europe. Measures in other countries now in the EU have been introduced at different times, and only standardised as of 2002 and when new members joined.
Appendix II. Summary of animal control measures
Those in charge of animals, including veterinary surgeons or others responsible for examining or inspecting animals, must notify the Divisional Veterinary Manager of any animal suspected of being affected with BSE. On receipt of notification the DVM arranges an enquiry by a Veterinary officer (VO). If a VO suspects BSE, the animal is restricted by notice. If a VO believes the suspect animal is affected with BSE the animal is compulsorily slaughtered. Diagnostic samples are removed from the carcase and the remainder incinerated. These clinically diagnosed cases are termed as identified by passive surveillance. From July 2001 active surveillance by EU approved rapid testing methods on brain tissue post mortem has been introduced in all EU member states. Cattle tested are: over 30 months and for human consumption (a limited number in the UK); all fallen stock and all casualties over 24 months; all cattle born after 31 July 1996 and aged over 42 months; and a random sample of 10000 OTMS animals born before August 1996. All offspring and, introduced more recently, all members of the farm–age (within 1 year) cohort of a BSE case are compulsorily slaughtered and tested. There are also measures in relation to human consumption.
Appendix III. Pattern of the epidemic from 1996 in Great Britain Total number of BSE cases confirmed per year in GB since 1996 has been (Table 1a, Defra February 2005 report), including BARBs (Table 6)
Slaughtered Other Total BARBs confirmed
1996 8013 3 8016 0 1997 4310 3 4313 0 1998 3179 1 3180 0 1999 2256 20 2276 0 2000 1311 44 1355 1 2001 781 332 1113 5 2002 445 594 1039 23 2003 173 374 547 41 2004 82 227 309 21
Appendix IV. Pattern of the epidemic from 2002 world wide BSE cases world-wide for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, for countries (or regions) which had cases in at least one of those years (Defra web page)
Year of detection Year of birth
2002 2003 2004 1995 1996 1997
GB 1039 547 309 1059 62 39 NI 98 63 34 123 28 5 Channel Isles 2 0 0 0 0 0 Belgium+Lux. 39 14 11 25 35 15 Denmark 2 2 1 7 2 1 France 239 137 54 355 95 39 Germany 106 54 65 83 141 42 Ireland 308 215 115 393 139 10 Italy 36 29 7 22 42 20 Netherlands 24 19 6 8 32 11 Portugal 86 133 92 84 70 58 Spain 127 167 137 83 100 126 Switzerland 24 21 3 40 12 15 Eastn Europe 13 11 23 4 3 2 Non Europe 3 6 6 2 5 1
2002 IN A PEMBROKESHIRE HERD BACKGROUND BSE was confirmed in a homebred pedigree Holstein Friesian cow born on 3 October 2001. This case was identified in the survey of emergency slaughtered Over Thirty Months Scheme (OTMS) animals and came from a dairy herd in Pembrokeshire, South West Wales. The animal calved in January 2004, was dried off in November 2004 and was due to calve again in late January 2005. The animal was housed in early January 2005 when the owner noticed that it was in poorer condition than the other dry cows. A few days after housing the animal was found recumbent in the building with its hindlegs splayed and only managed to rise with difficulty. The animal remained unsteady on its hindlegs and the owner disposed of it as an emergency slaughtered OTMS animal on 17 January 2005 aged 39 months and 14 days. Defra received the initial positive BioRad ELISA test result for this case on 21 January 2005. The case was confirmed on 1 March 2005 following a positive Western Blot result and detailed further investigations. Thirty-nine cohort animals1 and one offspring animal (born January 2004) were identified and effectively restricted within 24 hours of suspicion of the index case. The cohort and offspring animals were slaughtered following confirmation of the index case. Thirty-four cohorts were slaughtered in an OTMS abattoir on 12 May 2005. The offspring animal and five of the cohorts were slaughtered on farm. All the cohort animals were tested for BSE. Two of the animals slaughtered in the OTMS abattoir tested positive on BioRad ELISA. These homebred pedigree Holstein Friesian cows were born on 28 September 2001 and 1 May 2002, and were aged 43 and 36 months respectively at slaughter. These cases were confirmed on 27 May 2005 following positive Hybrid Western Blot (2001), OIE Western Blot (both), Immunohistochemistry (both) and Histopathology (2002) results. Where possible, samples from the BioRad negative cohorts were also subjected to further testing, all with negative results. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (as at 29 October 2010)
Monday, September 12, 2011
BSE PRION Agriculture Animal Feed Question House of Lords Thursday, 8 September 2011
House of LordsThursday, 8 September 2011
Agriculture: Animal Feed Question 11.15 am Asked by Baroness Jenkin of Kennington
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the scientific basis for continuing the ban on feeding animal by-products and catering waste to pigs and chickens.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Lord Henley): My Lords, the basis for banning the feeding of animal by-products and catering waste to
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pigs and chickens is to prevent the spread of serious animal diseases for which these materials may be a vector. The European Commission is proposing to lift the ban on feeding certain processed animal proteins to pigs and chickens in the light of scientific advice that the ban is no longer justified. The Government are considering their position.
Baroness Jenkin of Kennington: I thank my noble friend for his reply. Can he confirm that if the EC relaxes the ban on non-ruminant ABP being fed to pigs and chickens; and if, following the consultations he refers to, the Government are satisfied by the scientific evidence that there are no public health risks, they will then lift the ban in the UK?
Lord Henley: My Lords, obviously we want to take the scientific evidence into account and consider it very carefully. We also want to take into account likely consumer reaction because we want to take consumers along with us. If that were the case, yes, we would be prepared to lift the ban.
Lord May of Oxford: My Lords, does the Minister agree that although there is remaining uncertainty as to exactly the origins of the rogue prion that caused BSE and how it hopped into cattle, the balance of opinion and evidence is that it came from the unnatural practice of feeding animal by-products to cattle? In the light of that, would it not be wise to continue the current precautionary legislation?
Lord Henley: My Lords, as a very eminent scientist, the noble Lord is right to draw the attention of the House to the scientific evidence. At this stage there is no question of lifting the ban on feeding to cattle. We are talking purely about non-ruminants, such as pigs and chickens, at this stage. Obviously we will look at the evidence and at what the Food Standards Agency has to say, and then make a decision.
Lord Grantchester: We must proceed only on a risk-based approach and, as the Minister said, the other element to be considered is the acceptance by consumers of food so produced. The supermarkets are the gateway to the consumer. Can the Minister tell the House the attitude of supermarkets to reducing food waste by this change of policy? What discussion has his department had with supermarkets and the Food and Drink Federation?
Lord Henley: My Lords, we will continue to discuss these matters with the supermarkets and others. Obviously, where it is appropriate, food waste can go to feed animals-already some food waste can do so, when it has been appropriately separated from meat and other such products. However, as I made clear earlier, any loosening of what is happening will depend on scientific evidence and consideration of these matters. I also think that it is important, as the noble Lord makes clear, that we take opinion along with us on this matter.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: My Lords, would the Minister accept that traditionally fed pigs are very popular with the public in terms of the flavour of pork, and so on? They certainly were until the change in their food. Feeding pigs largely on soya
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has an unintended consequence, in that all the imports of soya are leading to the further destruction of the rainforests. We really must make clear that using our food waste as best we can to feed to pigs has important consequences much further away in the world.
Lord Henley: My noble friend is right to point to further consequences of feeding animals in this way, in terms of producing the amount of soya used. Again, I stress to her, we should not make any changes unless the scientific evidence assures us that that is right and proper.
Lord Whitty: My Lords, would the Minister accept that the Government and the European authorities are right to proceed with caution on this front? I speak both as the Minister who was allegedly in charge during the last stages of food and mouth and as a former consumer champion. The noble Lord, Lord May, has spoken about BSE and we still do not know how the foot and mouth virus entered the chain. While some relaxation may be possible, I advise extreme caution.
Lord Henley: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord was totally in charge, and not just allegedly. As he puts it, we will proceed only if the scientific evidence is right and proper.
Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, it is very important we realise that the public perception is that the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in February 2001, which had such horrific consequences for the economy and everything else, was the result of feeding animals to animals. Although there is a suggestion-or at least the Minister has stated-that that will not happen with cattle, in the minds of the Great British public it does not matter whether it is cattle, pigs or poultry; they would still have this feeling. We must be awfully careful before relaxing the ban.
Lord Henley: My Lords, the ban in 2001 that my noble friend refers to was a ban on swill. We had already banned the use of processed animal protein as a result of the BSE problems. I reiterate what I have said in answer to every question: we will proceed with extreme caution and we will base any decisions, as will the European Commission, on the scientific evidence available to us.
ARCHIVE: BSE: Disease control & eradication - The feed ban
The aim of our BSE-related feed control policy is to ensure the continued decline and eventual eradication of BSE in the UK. Effective controls on livestock feed are the key to achieving this.
The rate of BSE cases in cattle being reported now is significantly lower than in 1988, when the disease was first made notifiable, and the number of new cases continues to decline yet further. The key factor behind this success has been the very high level of compliance with BSE-related feed controls throughout the feed manufacture, supply, and livestock industries. Industry quality assurance schemes have considerably enhanced the level of compliance.
Experiments show that doses of infected tissue as low as 1 mg can infect a calf so there is a need for everyone involved in the feed chain to maintain the very high level of compliance seen to date.
In the UK, the original feed ban was introduced in 1988 to prevent ruminant protein being fed to ruminants. In addition, it has been illegal to feed ruminants with all forms of mammalian protein (with specific exceptions) since November 1994 and to feed any farmed livestock, including fish and horses, with mammalian meat and bone meal (mammalian MBM) since 04 April 1996.
EU-wide Feed Controls
Regulation (EC) No.999/2001 introduced EU controls to combat the spread of BSE. The measures included a ban on the feeding of processed animal proteins to animals which are kept, fattened or bred for the production of food. Some of these measures have been amended in line with the European Commission’s TSE Roadmap and further amendments are possible in the future. The Regulation is administered by the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Regulations.
Feed controls - At a glance
snip...see full text ;
ARCHIVE: BSE: Disease control & eradication - the feed ban - born after the July 1988 ban (BAB) cases
[back toThe feed ban]
The July 1988 ban on feeding ruminant proteins to ruminants (e.g. cattle, sheep, goats and deer) in Great Britain, significantly reduced the risk of BSE infection. There was a marked decrease in the number of confirmed BSE cases born after the July 1988 ban (BAB cases) although the long incubation period delayed the impact on BSE cases by approximately five years. Investigations of the initial BAB cases indicated that the most likely source of infection in these cases was the continued use of feed manufactured before the 1988 ban.
Reasons for BAB cases
By autumn 1994 the decline in the epidemic was occurring more slowly in the north and east of England in which the proportion of pigs relative to cattle was highest. At that time pig and poultry feed could legitimately contain ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) and there was an increased risk of cross contamination of cattle feed with MBM in these areas. Samples of cattle feed taken in August 1994 were found to contain ruminant MBM, demonstrating that such cross-contamination could occur. A 1994 case-control study looked at possible causes of BSE in BAB animals concluding that a food borne source of infection was the most likely explanation.
The continued presence of BSE infectivity in MBM suggested failings in the Specified Risk Material (formerly Specified Bovine Offals (SBO)) controls. The most likely source of this problem came from the practice of splitting bovine skulls. Brain was disposed as SBO and the skull was rendered to MBM, but brain tissue sometimes remained in the skull, allowing infectivity to enter MBM. Other SBO may have been inadequately separated from non-SBO material, providing another potential route of infection. Subsequent research has shown that some of the rendering systems in use until December 1994 had little effect on BSE.
Prevention of Cross Contamination
In August 1995, the controls on the handling of SBO were strengthened further to protect animal health. They required that the whole skull (except the tongue) be disposed of as SBO and that rendering plants use dedicated lines for processing SBO. In April 1996 the use of mammalian MBM was banned in all feed for livestock, fish and equine animals. This was not as a result of fears of BSE in non-ruminant species but to remove any possible risk of cross-contamination of cattle rations with MBM in feed intended for other species. A Voluntary Feed Recall Scheme, in June 1996, offered free collection and disposal of residual stocks of feed. From 1 August 1996 it became an offence (except in very tightly defined and controlled circumstances) to hold mammalian MBM on farms or in feed mills and premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored.
BSE: Disease Control & Eradication - The Feed Ban - Born After the Reinforced Ban (BARB) Cases
1 August 1996 is regarded as the date the reinforced feed ban became effective. BSE cases born after July 1996 are referred to as born after the reinforced ban (BARB) cases.
Details for cases in animals born after the reinforced feed ban of August 1996, that have been confirmed in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland, are available on the Veterinary Laboratories Agency website (PDF 300 KB).
Reasons for BARB Cases
Animal Health carries out a detailed epidemiological investigation into all BARB cases in Great Britain. One possible reason for BARB cases is the contamination of cattle feed ingredients with mammalian MBM handled, stored and transported outside the UK, prior to the 2001 EU-wide ban feeding of processed animal protein (PAP) to all farmed animals. Newer Member States may not have implemented full BSE controls until after January 2001.There is also evidence from epidemiological investigations into BARB cases that some cases result from the persistence of infection in feed stores.
In 2004, Professor William Hill FRS of the University of Edinburgh carried out an independent review of BARB cases in the UK. Professor Hill concluded that the UK controls in place to eliminate BSE in cattle were soundly based and confirmed that the elimination of food-borne sources was key to the eradication of BSE. He recommended that risk-based controls and monitoring should be maintained on animals and feed.
The report is available (PDF 177 KB) and the Defra response is available here (PDF 55KB).
Spontaneous occurrence (14-16) The evidence from the absence of BSE in many countries and the surveillance schemes abroad indicates that most BARBs cases cannot have arisen spontaneously, although the possibility cannot be excluded that a very few of them did so. The possibility of a very low frequency of spontaneous occurrence of BSE may be monitored from the output of surveillance in cattle populations elsewhere.
Genetic variation in susceptibility (17-21) a) Previous statistical and molecular genetic studies indicate there is little genetic variation of cattle associated with susceptibility to BSE. b) Preliminary information from the GB analysis and detailed information from the NI analyses of DNA sequence data on BARBs cases and controls as yet show no clear associations, with no genotype exclusively associated with BARBs cases whether acquired by infection or arising spontaneously.
Feed borne infection (31-34) a) Recent unpublished experiments at the VLA have shown that feeding exceptionally low doses (0.001g) of infected neural tissue can cause BSE. b) The working hypothesis of Defra that the major cause of BSE in BARBs cases has been through the ingestion of contaminated feed, most likely by young animals, is strongly supported. Thus control of the disease requires, as it has always required, completely eliminating the agent from the cattle feed chain. c) Understanding causes of variation in infectivity are important in terms of understanding the disease, but do not particularly impinge on the control of BSE, where risks have to be avoided. R: Defra continues to operate on the basis that BSE transmission via feed is the major route involved in BARB cases.
General conclusions Elimination of feed borne sources seems to be now, as before, the key to elimination of BSE. The incidence of the disease can be greatly reduced but not readily eliminated in any country by adequate imposition of controls, particularly on animal feed. As the level of incidence falls both in the UK and internationally, the risks of contamination through cattle feed, pet food, or indeed through any other source, fall whether or not controls in the UK and abroad are further tightened. With the current expertise in Defra and the VLA, GB is well placed to keep on top of and promote developments. R: It is essential that appropriate, risk based, controls and monitoring should be maintained on animals and feed until no cases of BSE are found, and controls tightened up where feasible, both in the UK and elsewhere that the UK can influence. In view of the very long incubation period of BSE in some animals, long-continued vigilance is necessary. It is not evident, however, that specific new measures are needed. Basically it is necessary to ‘keep taking the medicine’. Nevertheless, in view of new discoveries on the nature of the disease and the possibilities of new or changed TSEs arising, relevant research capacity in GB should be maintained.
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BSE SUMMARY OF PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE REPORTS IN GREAT BRITAIN
GENERAL STATISTICS ON BSE CASES IN GREAT BRITAIN
TSE EXOTIC SPECIES
Subject: Re: MAFF's views on the effects of pithing
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2000 13:16:25 –0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de References: 1
######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
Dear Lord Lucas and all,
> The Government has funded research which found evidence of > contamination of jugular blood by fragments of brain tissue in one > out of 16 animals which were pithed following stunning.
not much of a research program, but since they found contamination of one out of 16, this should merit further research ASAP.
> That research did not investigate whether any traces of brain tissue > could be transported in the blood to the rest of the carcase.
as i said, not much of a study
> The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee reviewed the research > findings and advised that there is no reason on the basis of current data > to change UK practices of stunning and pithing during slaughter of cattle.
[this would translate to, not enough human deaths yet, to change practice...TSS]
this is unfortunate for U.K. public, and could further spread the agent. did they research all the data?
why did SEAC refuse to look at the research put forth in the LANCET of Sept. 1996 on Pithing by Tam Garland of Texas A.M.?
>From what i understand they refused the data because the research was not done in the U.K.???
Who/Why would care, if the research proved that pithing could further spread the agent? Which in fact, it showed a published color photo of 14.5 cm of brain tissue in the LUNG. It had already gone through the heart. In their unpublished work they found 16.5 cm of brain tissue in the LIVER which means it blew through the heart and lungs to arrive in arterial circulation.
Their views...unfortunately for U.K.
Q.-- Research on the risks of contamination by stunning and slaughter procedures?
A.-- A MAFF-funded team at Bristol University has been carrying out research on the possibility that stunning and slaughter procedures may cause cattle carcases to be contaminated by brain tissue. An article about this research was published in the Veterinary Record on 16 Oct. 1999.
Q.-- What does this research show?
A.-- The researchers were looking for signs of brain tissue in the jugular vein (the blood vessel draining the head) of cattle which had been stunned using various different methods. They found brain tissue in jugular venous blood of one animal which had been stunned by a method used in the UK. This was one of sixteen animals which had been stunned using a penetrative captive bolt gun followed by pithing. None of fifteen animals stunned by penetrative captive bolt without subsequent pithing showed any sign of brain material in their blood.
Q.-- What is the significance of this finding?
A.-- The research has found evidence that neural contamination of the blood could result from stunning and pithing. If traces of brain tissue can be transported via the blood stream to the edible parts of the carcase, there could be implications for human health in relation to BSE.
Q.-- Does this research show that beef is unsafe?
A.-- No. The research did not demonstrate that meat can be contaminated by traces of brain tissue in the blood. Before any brain fragments in venous blood could get into the arterial system, they would have to pass through a network of very fine blood vessels in the lungs. Only very small particles would in principle be capable of doing so.
Q.-- What is SEAC's advice?
A.-- SEAC have advised that there is no reason on the basis of current data to change the common UK practices of stunning and pithing during slaughter of cattle.
Q.-- Why did SEAC take this view?
A.-- SEAC's view was that * the finding of brain tissue in the venous blood in one of a group of sixteen cattle slaughtered by penetrating captive bolt pistol and subsequent pithing provides insufficient data to give an accurate assessment of the frequency of this occurrence;
* there are no data as to whether or not neural tissue reached the arterial circulation in the single positive animal; * the very low number of infected animals at the late stage of the incubation period entering the food chain means that there is no need to alter current slaughter practices.
Q.-- What methods of stunning are used in the UK?
A.-- Animals are stunned to ensure immediate unconsciousness which lasts until death by bleeding. Of abattoirs in the UK killing cattle for sale for human consumption, about 80% currently use a penetrating captive bolt with pithing and about 20% a penetrating captive bolt without pithing.
Q.-- What is pithing?
A.-- Pithing is the insertion of a rod into the brain through the hole made by the captive bolt. It destroys brain tissue and speeds up brain death. Pithing is carried out, before hoisting the animal, to reduce the involuntary kicking actions of the stunned animal.
Q.-- Why is pithing used?
A.-- Pithing has benefits for both the safety of abattoir workers and animal welfare as it reduces involuntary kicking by stunned animals and removes any risk that a stunned animal may regain consciousness........
kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
Ralph Lucas wrote:
> > ######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
> > Lord Lucas asked Her Majesty's Government:
> > Whether the practice of "pithing" cattle at slaughter results in the
> contamination of the carcass with brain material; and, if so, what is the
> level of such contamination. (HL 1523)
> > The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Baroness
> Hayman): The Government has funded research which found evidence of
> contamination of jugular blood by fragments of brain tissue in one out of 16
> animals which were pithed following stunning. That research did not
> investigate whether any traces of brain tissue could be transported in the
> blood to the rest of the carcase. The results were published in the
> Veterinary Record of 16 October 1999. The Spongiform Encephalopathy
> Advisory Committee reviewed the research findings and advised that there is
> no reason on the basis of current data to change UK practices of stunning
> and pithing during slaughter of cattle.
> > ############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############
Veterinary Record 2015;176:159-160 doi:10.1136/vr.h784
Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President
CONCERN about the robustness of the surveillance network in England and Wales was expressed by the BVA President, John Blackwell, in his speech to the Association's annual London dinner last week.
Mr Blackwell said that, while the BVA understood the need for rationalisation and efficiency, it was concerned that the surveillance system that had been relied on in recent years was being dismantled without the replacement being properly tested. If information coming from postmortem examinations was not systematically and consistently fed into a central data collection point, it would be ‘a lot harder to join the dots’ and to spot a problem, something that was the ‘very foundation of a robust surveillance system’.
‘If there is now a risk that we have a less responsive and accurate diagnosis system, a system that is as yet not joined up and integrated, we leave ourselves vulnerable, less able to spot new and emerging diseases and act quickly to contain them’
As well as identifying known threats, a robust surveillance mechanism needed to identify the unknowns: ‘If there is now a risk that we have a less responsive and accurate diagnosis system, a system that is as yet not joined up and integrated, we leave ourselves vulnerable, less able to spot new and emerging diseases and act quickly to contain them,’ said Mr Blackwell. ‘This risk is multiplied if the network of surveillance – that strategic ability to horizon scan – is patchy. We fear this may now be the case. Soon after I qualified back in 1985, BSE was effectively diagnosed because of our network of surveillance laboratories. A network that allowed us to grasp and understand the emerging threat and identify the unknown risk. Are we confident we have the systems in place to spot the next emergent threat, the next …
> Could we spot the next BSE?
we have not spotted all the cases the first time around. with Nations like the United States and Canada, organizations like the USDA, OIE, and WTO et al, it was never about ‘spotting’ all the BSE TSE prion cases, it was more about how not to find them. the triple BSE mad cow firewall, was and still is, nothing but ink on paper. ...please see facts ;
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;
I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?
North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.
typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$
the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.
for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.
lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.
Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.
Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)
snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS
No documents available.
AttachmentsView All (1)
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Singeltary Submission to USDA 2014 BSE CJD TSE PRION
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
*** PLOS Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
PLOS Singeltary Comment ;
*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ?
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype at codon 129 of PRNP) , and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) .
Monday, December 1, 2014
Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review December 1, 2014
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Identification of H-type BSE in Portugal
Thursday, December 25, 2014
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Romania Confirmed
Monday, May 5, 2014
Brazil BSE Mad Cow disease confirmed OIE 02/05/2014
Mad cow disease (No 193): In the latest exchanges of one of the longest-running issues in the committee, Brazil complained about beef import restrictions in China, South Africa and Japan even though mad cow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE) was found in only one cow and did not find its way into the food chain.
The EU repeated its concern that countries ban imports on BSE grounds on products that are considered safe by the World Animal Health Organization (OIE), and on products from whole countries instead of recognizing that regions within them are disease-free. This time the EU said it is concerned about China’s import ban, urged Rep. Korea and the US to speed up their efforts on allowing imports, and praised Singapore for relaxing its restrictions.
Replying either to Brazil or the EU or both, China, South Africa, Japan and Rep Korea said they were discussing the issue bilaterally and in some cases seeking more information. China said there are many problems “undefined” in science, and that it has no BSE cases and has to protect its livestock. Its laws and regulations ban imports from countries that have BSE, China said.
Monday, October 21, 2013
WTO Mad cow disease (No 193)
Thursday, September 26, 2013
Brazil evaluate the implementation of health rules on animal by-products and derived products SRM BST TSE PRION aka MAD COW DISEASE
Friday, December 07, 2012
ATYPICAL BSE BRAZIL 2010 FINALLY CONFIRMED OIE 2012
Wednesday, December 19, 2012
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Brazil
spontaneous atypical BSE ???
if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$
As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.
FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$
so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
Thursday, January 29, 2015
OIE REPORT Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Prion (atypical BSE type H), Norway Information received on 29/01/2015
Thursday, October 02, 2014
[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December 4, 2013
TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on paper $$$
full text ;
Friday, January 23, 2015
Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
Sunday, December 28, 2014
Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFOIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE PRION aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST 2014
Thursday, October 02, 2014
[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
Saturday, August 30, 2014
Maine Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials SRM TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease
Friday, December 19, 2014
Rancho Alleged Cancerous Eyeball Case Going To Trial
Saturday, November 10, 2012
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
Friday, August 8, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
Saturday, April 5, 2008
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
Thursday, November 18, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS
Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in restitution.
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs
February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;
(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.
Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
WE can only hope that this is a single incident. BUT i have my doubts. I remember when the infamous TOKEN Purina Feed Mill in Texas was feeding up to 5.5 grams of potentially and probably tainted BANNED RUMINANT feed to cattle, and the FDA was bragging at the time that the amount of potentially BANNED product was so little and the cattle were so big ;
"It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated."
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. ... FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
WE now know all that was a lie. WE know that literally Thousands of TONS of BANNED and most likely tainted product is still going out to commerce. WE know now and we knew then that .005 to a gram was lethal. WE know that CWD infected deer and elk, scrapie infected sheep, BSE and BASE infected cattle have all been rendered and fed back to livestock (including cattle) for human and animal consumption.
Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'', and this was on March 15, 2006 ;
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain
Thursday, November 28, 2013
Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows
seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse), not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???
Saturday, September 21, 2013
Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ??? this recall was not for the welfare of the animals. ...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)
try this link ;
Sunday, November 13, 2011
*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock
Friday, January 30, 2015
*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type disease
what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.
why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping everything the USDA inc says.
sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.
My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.
with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how many bodies is this market worth?
Saturday, January 17, 2015
*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Thursday, January 15, 2015
41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE Prion: Case Report
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
NASDA BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE, PRION, Policy Statements updated with amendments passed during the NASDA Annual Meeting Updated September 18, 2014
Sunday, December 28, 2014
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE AKA MAD DEER DISIEASE USDA USAHA INC DECEMBER 28, 2014
*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC ***
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European
the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.
Sunday, December 14, 2014
ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report
Sunday, February 08, 2015
FDA SCIENCE BOARD TO THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION BOVINE HEPARIN BSE CJD TSE PRION Wednesday, June 4, 2014
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to disease etiology?
Saturday, February 14, 2015
*** Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
*** Alberta Canada First case of chronic wasting disease found in farm elk since 2002
UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD
BEEF AND VEAL
Wednesday, February 18, 2015
OIE Bovine spongiform encephalopathy ,Canada
Saturday, February 14, 2015
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President
Friday, February 20, 2015
A BSE CANADIAN COW MAD COW UPDATE Transcript - Briefing (February 18, 2015)
Monday, February 23, 2015
20th BSE Case Raises New Concerns about Canada's Feeding Practices and Voluntary Testing Program; Highlights Importance of COOL
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA
mom dod 12/14/97 confirmed hvCJD, just made a promise to mom, never forget, and never let them forget...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518