Monday, June 6, 2022

APHIS USDA History Highlight: APHIS Combats Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Published Jun 1, 2022

APHIS USDA History Highlight: APHIS Combats Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Published Jun 1, 2022

History Highlight: APHIS Combats Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Published: Jun 1, 2022

photo of two farmers holding a US flag in a field

In the mid-1990s, thousands of cattle in the United Kingdom (UK) were affected by an outbreak of a fatal neurological disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly referred to as “mad cow disease.” Concern grew when it was discovered that some people who had eaten meat from infected cows had gotten a version of the disease called new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD).

BSE, which is invariably fatal, is caused by a malformed protein that is not neutralized by high heat or other measures commonly used to kill bacteria, viruses, or other organisms. As a result of the UK outbreak, imports of British beef were banned from the United States and other countries.

However, in May 2003, the first North American case of BSE was reported in Alberta, Canada, sending shockwaves through the highly integrated North American beef supply chain. The United States, along with many other countries around the world, immediately closed its border to Canadian beef and cattle.

photo of black angus cows grazing in a fieldBlack Angus cattle graze in a field.

The Cow That Stole Christmas

Despite the import bans, in late December 2003, APHIS confirmed the first U.S. case of BSE in a dairy cow that had been imported from Canada to Washington State. The ‘cow that stole Christmas,’ as then Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator Dr. W. Ron DeHaven put it, sent the agency into full-on emergency mode. Holiday plans were canceled, and hundreds of APHIS employees were mobilized to determine the source of the disease, ensure that no animals from the affected herd had entered the food supply, and—along with other USDA agencies and the Food and Drug Administration—implement new prevention and surveillance measures.

APHIS Administrator Bobby Acord ably managed stakeholder relations during early days of the emergency, establishing new outreach practice, such as regular calls with the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture. Other employees were involved in formulating new public policy or trying to assuage public concern and explain the complicated science involved. This included the fact that BSE is not contagious in the traditional sense, that the disease is mainly transmitted through feed and may lie dormant in the nervous system for many years, and that there are no simple “food safety” tests to detect BSE in meat or other products. Rather, it was necessary to find and test those cattle most likely to have the disease, a process called “targeted surveillance.”

APHIS Rises to the Challenge

In response to the first U.S. BSE detection, many countries stopped importing U.S. beef. After APHIS launched its enhanced surveillance program, the Agency tested nearly 1 million animals. The data indicated the prevalence of BSE in the United States was very low—less than 1 infected animal per million based on a population of 42 million adult cattle. APHIS and USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service also implemented further preventive measures, including blocking certain cattle from entering the food chain, removing and destroying certain organs, and restricting certain meat collection methods that were thought to present a risk.

These measures were successful and helped support restored trade of U.S. beef. From 2003 to 2018, only 26 BSE cases were found in North America, just 6 of which were detected in the United States. Moreover, the United States never recorded a human case of BSE.

photo of Ron DeHaven and Lisa FergusonIn October 2004, APHIS Administrator Ron DeHaven and VS’ Dr. Lisa Ferguson celebrate the work of the BSE enhanced surveillance program.

In 2013, the World Organisation for Animal Health upgraded the United States to negligible risk status for BSE, the highest status available. Today, most countries that previously prohibited U.S. beef due to BSE have removed those restrictions. Even better, the incidence of BSE worldwide has plummeted. By 2011, only 29 cases were detected worldwide.

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and issues with the international and domestic supply chains, the United States remains the world’s largest beef producer and second-largest exporter. APHIS’ efforts were critical to quickly facing and overcoming the BSE crisis, and—as in so many other ways—safeguarding American agriculture.

Want to learn more? Check out the “Securing the Homeland: APHIS in the 2000s” StoryMap.

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USDA touches the lives of all Americans each day in so many positive ways. In the Biden-Harris Administration, USDA is transforming America’s food system with a greater focus on more resilient local and regional food production, fairer markets for all producers, ensuring access to safe, healthy and nutritious food in all communities, building new markets and streams of income for farmers and producers using climate smart food and forestry practices, making historic investments in infrastructure and clean energy capabilities in rural America, and committing to equity across the Department by removing systemic barriers and building a workforce more representative of America. To learn more, visit www.usda.gov.


USA Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE: description of typical and atypical cases Published TUESDAY, MAY 31, 2022 
USA Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE: description of typical and atypical cases

Title: BSE: description of typical and atypical cases

Author item Richt, Juergen Submitted to: American College of Veterinary Internal Medicine Publication Type: Proceedings

Publication Acceptance Date: 4/1/2007

Publication Date: 6/6/2007

Citation: Richt, J. 2007. BSE: description of typical and atypical cases. In: Proceedings of the American College of Veterinary Internal Medicine. 2007 ACVIM Forum, June 6-9, 2007, Seattle, Washington. Paper No. 159. Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: Introduction Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) agents or prions induce fatal neurodegenerative diseases in humans and in other mammalian species. They are transmissible among their species of origin, but they can also cross the species barrier and induce infection and/or disease in other species. Human TSEs include Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD), Gerstmann–Sträussler–Scheinker syndrome (GSS), Kuru and fatal familial insomnia (FFI) (1). In animals, four distinct TSE diseases are recognized: scrapie in sheep and goats, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in mink, chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle. Although considerable research has been undertaken, the precise nature of the causative agent remains controversial. A number of theories describe the etiology, however the "protein only" theory has emerged to dominate the literature. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Widely referred to as "mad cow disease", BSE was first identified as a TSE of cattle in the mid 1980s in the U.K. and more than 180,000 positive cases have been diagnosed in the U.K. to date. BSE is also transmissible via BSE-contaminated feed to cats (feline spongiform encephalopathy, FSE) and exotic ungulates (exotic ungulate encephalopathy, EUE) (2, 3). BSE is a chronic degenerative disease affecting the central nervous system of cattle. Affected animals display changes in temperament, abnormal posture, incoordination and difficulty in rising, decreased milk production, and/or loss of body weight despite continued appetite (4). The average incubation period is about 4-6 years and all affected animals succumb to the disease (5). Following the onset of clinical signs, the animal's condition deteriorates until it either dies or is destroyed. This process usually takes from 2 weeks to 6 months. Most cases in the U.K. occurred in dairy cows between 3 and 6 years of age with the highest susceptibility to infection being in the first 6 months of life; adult cattle appear to be at relatively low risk of infection (6). Using epidemiological surveillance programs, many European and non-European countries have discovered BSE-positive animals within the last decade (7) (8). BSE has been reported in native-born cattle in twenty-four countries with a geographic distribution that includes Europe, the Middle East, North America, and Asia. These outbreaks, caused by the consumption of infected meat and bone meal containing a malformed prion protein, have resulted in the destruction of thousands of cattle and have caused significant economic losses. All currently validated diagnostic tests for BSE require brain tissue. There are no validated ante mortem tests for BSE available at present. "Typical" versus "Atypical" BSE cases Molecular characterization of the abnormal form of the prion protein, called PrPres, has allowed the identification of "atypical" cases of BSE cases in cattle. BSE in cattle was considered to be a disease with unique features (9) and the majority of BSE cases so far have been defined as "typical" BSE cases. However, unusual or "atypical" cases of BSE have been reported in the past 3 years by investigators from several countries. Most of these animals were greater than 8 years of age and of various breeds. There have been two molecular types of "atypical" BSE isolates described in the literature so far: (i) a type with a lower molecular mass of the unglycosylated isoform also called the L-type and (ii) a type with a higher molecular mass of the unglycosylated isoform, also called the H-type. The L-type has been found in cattle in Italy (10), Japan (11), Germany (12) and Belgium (13). So far, the H-type has been described in cattle from France (14), Germany (12) and the United States (15). The U.S. cases were animals born and raised in the U.S. (Texas, Alabama). Unus


USDA APHIS BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE

HISTORY

Six cases of BSE have been identified in the U.S. The first case was detected in 2003 in Washington State in a 6 year-old dairy cow imported from Canada and confirmed as classical BSE. The subsequent five cases were confirmed as atypical BSE forms. The second, in 2005, was a 12 year-old beef cow in Texas. The third, in 2006, was a 10 year-old beef cow in Alabama. The fourth, in 2012, was a 10 year-old dairy cow in California. The fifth case, in 2017, was an 11 year-old beef cow in Alabama. The sixth case, in 2018, was a 6 year old mixed breed beef cow in Florida.


AUG. 11, 2017

***>Assuming no other factors influenced the levels of correct diagnosis and that the numbers estimated for 1997 to 1999 were a true representation of the potential under-diagnosis of the entire epidemic up until 1999, then the total number of missed cases positive for BSE could have been in the region of 5,500.

***>As a result, using more sensitive diagnostic assays, we were able to diagnose BSE positive cattle from the years 1997-1999 inclusive that were originally negative by vacuolation.  From these data we have estimated that approximately 3% of the total suspect cases submitted up until the year 1999 were mis-diagnosed. 

YOU know, Confucius is confused again LOL, i seem to have remembered something in line with this here in the USA...

USDA did not test possible mad cows

By Steve Mitchell

United Press International

Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM

WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.



"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

TEXAS 2ND MAD COW THAT WAS COVERED UP, AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, AND CALLS FROM TSE PRION SCIENTIST AROUND THE GLOBE, THIS 2ND MAD COW IN TEXAS WAS CONFIRMED

THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP

JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED

OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7 MONTHS LATER

TEXAS MAD COW

THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;

During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.


Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.

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Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.

Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.

Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.

Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.


Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

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4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half


Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Washington, D.C. 20250 January 25, 2006 REPLY TO ATTN OF: 50601-10-KC TO: W. Ron DeHaven Administrator Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Barbara Masters Administrator Food Safety and Inspection Service ATTN: William J. Hudnall Deputy Administrator Marketing Regulatory Program Business Services William C. Smith Assistant Administrator Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review FROM: Robert W. Young /s/ Assistant Inspector General for Audit SUBJECT: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III This report presents the results of our audit of the enhanced BSE surveillance program and controls over specified risk materials and advanced meat recovery products. Your written response to the official draft report, dated January 20, 2006, is included as exhibit G with excerpts of the response and the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) position incorporated into the Findings and Recommendations section of the report, where applicable. We accept the management decisions for all recommendations. Please follow your agency’s internal procedures in forwarding documentation for final action to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). We are providing a separate memorandum to the agencies and OCFO that provides specific information on the actions to be completed to achieve final action. We appreciate your timely response and the cooperation and assistance provided to our staff during the audit USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC/ Page i

Executive Summary

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Results in Brief This report evaluates elements of the interlocking safeguards in place to protect United States (U.S.) beef from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, widely known as BSE or "mad cow disease." Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), has led a multi-agency effort to monitor and prevent BSE from entering the food supply. After discovering a BSE-positive cow in December 2003, APHIS expanded its BSE surveillance program. To further protect the food supply, USDA banned materials identified as being at risk of carrying BSE (specified risk materials (SRM)), such as central nervous system tissue. As part of this effort, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) required beef slaughter and processing facilities to incorporate controls for handling such materials into their operational plans. Onsite FSIS inspectors also inspect cattle for clinical signs in order to prevent diseased animals from being slaughtered for human consumption. To evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguards, we assessed APHIS’ implementation of the expanded surveillance program, as well as FSIS’ controls to prevent banned SRMs from entering the food supply.

In June 2004, APHIS implemented its expanded surveillance program; participation by industry in this surveillance program is voluntary. As of May 2005, over 350,000 animals were sampled and tested for BSE. To date, two animals tested positive for BSE; one tested positive after implementation of the expanded surveillance program.

USDA made significant efforts to implement the expanded BSE surveillance program. Much needed to be done in a short period of time to establish the necessary processes, controls, infrastructure, and networks to assist in this effort. In addition, extensive outreach and coordination was undertaken with other Federal, State, and local entities, private industry, and laboratory and veterinary networks. This report provides an assessment as to the progress USDA made in expanding its surveillance effort and the effectiveness of its controls and processes. This report also discusses the limitations of its program and data in assessing the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd.

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40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive.

41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004.

42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue.

43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope.

44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue.

SNIP...

PLEASE SEE FLAMING EVIDENCE THAT THE USDA ET AL COVERED UP MAD COW DISEASE IN TEXAS ;

PAGE 43;

Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls

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FULL TEXT 130 PAGES


Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS.

Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.

This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:


Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006

Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;


Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.

October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024


Sunday, February 14, 2010

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)


snip...SEE FULL TEXT;

BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5


***> The U.S. cases were animals born and raised in the U.S. (Texas, Alabama). Unus

SEE HISTORY AT THE BOTTOM...TSS

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION Virtual meeting, 7–16 & 23 September 2021
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The Code Commission was provided with an update on the progress of the work to develop case definitions to support notification being conducted by the Scientific Commission. In response to this update, the Code Commission recognised the value of this work and reminded Members that in order to support notification, newly developed case definitions of listed diseases would be published on the OIE Website if they do not conflict with existing OIE Standards. These case definitions would then be considered for inclusion in the relevant disease-specific chapter of the Terrestrial Code according to the prioritisation of the Code Commission’s work programme and the standard-setting process.
The Code Commission acknowledged the rationale provided in the Scientific Commission’s February 2021 report that chronic wasting disease does not meet the criteria for listing, specifically for point 2 of Article 1.2.2. of Chapter 1.2. Criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the OIE list. The Commission also noted that the Scientific Commission will consider the expert consultation reports and the opinion of the Laboratories Commission on assessments undertaken for paratuberculosis and West Nile virus in accordance with Chapter 1.2.
The Code Commission wished to thank the Scientific Commission for its collaborative work in providing opinions to support the consideration of relevant Member comments received. The Code Commission reminded Members that its consideration of the Scientific Commission contributions is noted under the relevant agenda items of this report and encouraged Members to read this report together with the September 2021 Scientific Commission report. 
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Virtual, 1–11 February 2021 

iv) Chronic wasting disease

The Commission considered the request by the Code Commission for clarification on the rationale for the Commission’s opinion that CWD did not fulfil the criteria for listing, specifically for point 2 of Article 1.2.26 of the Terrestrial Code. The Commission explained that the opinion was based on an extensive consultation process that took into account the opinions of the ad hoc Group on BSE, the Working Group on Wildlife and several subject-matter expert consultations. Based on this extensive consultation, the Commission indicated that the low disease prevalence, the impractical nature of currently available diagnostic tests, and the limited number of control measures make it difficult to eliminate the disease or scientifically provide evidence to demonstrate either freedom or impending freedom. The Commission considered also that despite the implementation of surveillance programmes by some Members, no country can currently demonstrate either freedom or impending freedom from disease. 


Annex 19

WORK PROGRAMME OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES (FEB 2021)

Define a procedure for the evaluation of diseases against the listing criteria of Chapter 1.2., and responding to requests for listing decisions

Evaluated proposals for (de)listing of:

• M. tuberculosis • Infestation of honey bees with Acarapis woodi • Infestation of honey bees with Tropilaelaps spp. 

• Chronic wasting disease 

• Atypical BSE


6.8. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 11.4.), Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 1.8.) and Glossary definition for ‘protein meal’

Background 

In February 2018, following preliminary work and scientific exchanges, the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission agreed to an in-depth review of Chapter 11.4. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The OIE convened three different ad hoc Groups between July 2018 and March 2019: i) an ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment, which met twice, ii) an ad hoc Group on BSE surveillance, which met once, and iii) a joint ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment and surveillance, which met once. The Code Commission, at its September 2019 meeting, reviewed the four ad hoc Group reports and the opinion of the Scientific Commission regarding the draft revised chapter and circulated a revised draft Chapter 11.4. for comments. In February 2020, the Code Commission considered comments received on the revised draft Chapter 11.4. and requested that the joint ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment and surveillance be reconvened to address comments of a technical nature. In June 2020, the joint ad hoc Group was convened to address relevant comments and was also requested to review Chapter 1.8. Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy to ensure alignment with the proposed changes in Chapter 11.4.

In September 2020, the Code Commission reviewed the joint ad hoc Group report and the revised draft Chapters 11.4. and 1.8. and made some additional amendments and circulated the revised chapters for comments in its September 2020 report. In February 2021, the Commission considered comments received and amended the chapters, as appropriate, and circulated the revised chapters for a third round of comments. In preparation for the September 2021 meetings, some members of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission met to discuss key aspects of the revision of Chapters 11.4. and 1.8. to ensure a common understanding of the main concerns raised by Members, the decisions made on the revised chapters and their impact on the official status recognition, as well as on the adapted procedures that will be required. During this meeting, it was agreed that each Commission would address the issues relevant to its meeting and document discussions in their respective reports. 

Discussion 

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT; 


OIE Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle

Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided. 


Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 2019

34 Scientific Commission/September 2019

3. Atypical BSE

The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.

The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.

4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greaves

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REFERENCES

SNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;


Atypical L-type BSE

Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb; 23(2): 284–287. doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161416 PMCID: PMC5324790 PMID: 28098532

Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle 


Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.


 In most cases of naturally occurring atypical BSE identified so far, the animals were >8 years of age, except for 3 cases: 1 H-BSE and 1 L-BSE in Spain (1) and 1 H-BSE in Germany (12). Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that L-BSE developed sporadically/spontaneously.

Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.


Atypical H-type BSE

Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion

Research Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 

This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.


Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies

Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge

Author item Greenlee, Justin item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University

Submitted to: Prion

Publication Type: Abstract Only

Publication Acceptance Date: 5/14/2018

Publication Date: 5/22/2018

Citation: Greenlee, J.J., Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H. 2018. The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge. Prion 2018, May 22-25, 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Paper No. P98, page 116. Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure. Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with either H-type BSE from the 2004 US H-type BSE case (n=3) or from the 2006 US H-type case associated with the E211K polymorphism (n=4) using 10% w/v brain homogenates. Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. At approximately 50 months post-inoculation, one steer (EK211 inoculated with E211K associated H-BSE) developed clinical signs including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and was euthanized. Enzyme immunoassay confirmed that abundant misfolded protein was present in the brainstem, and immunohistochemistry demonstrated PrPSc throughout the brain. Western blot analysis of brain tissue from the clinically affected steer was consistent with the E211K H-type BSE inoculum. With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.


P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 

Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States. 

With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains. 

PRION CONFERENCE 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT

Published: 23 June 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSE-infected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission. In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.

References...END


2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

PLEASE NOTE;

2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author:

‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).

In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE. 


3.2.1.2 Non‐cervid domestic species

The remarkably high rate of natural CWD transmission in the ongoing NA epidemics raises the question of the risk to livestock grazing on CWD‐contaminated shared rangeland and subsequently developing a novel CWD‐related prion disease. This issue has been investigated by transmitting CWD via experimental challenge to cattle, sheep and pigs and to tg mouse lines expressing the relevant species PrP.

For cattle challenged with CWD, PrPSc was detected in approximately 40% of intracerebrally inoculated animals (Hamir et al., 2005, 2006a, 2007). Tg mice expressing bovine PrP have also been challenged with CWD and while published studies have negative outcomes (Tamguney et al., 2009b), unpublished data provided for the purposes of this Opinion indicate that some transmission of individual isolates to bovinised mice is possible (Table 1).

In small ruminant recipients, a low rate of transmission was reported between 35 and 72 months post‐infection (mpi) in ARQ/ARQ and ARQ/VRQ sheep intracerebrally challenged with mule deer CWD (Hamir et al., 2006b), while two out of two ARQ/ARQ sheep intracerebrally inoculated with elk CWD developed clinical disease after 28 mpi (Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). However, tg mice expressing ARQ sheep PrP were resistant (Tamguney et al., 2006) and tg mice expressing the VRQ PrP allele were poorly susceptible to clinical disease (Beringue et al., 2012; Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). In contrast, tg mice expressing VRQ sheep PrP challenged with CWD have resulted in highly efficient, life‐long asymptomatic replication of these prions in the spleen tissue (Beringue et al., 2012).

A recent study investigated the potential for swine to serve as hosts of the CWD agent(s) by intracerebral or oral challenge of crossbred piglets (Moore et al., 2016b, 2017). Pigs sacrificed at 6 mpi, approximately the age at which pigs reach market weight, were clinically healthy and negative by diagnostic tests, although low‐level CWD agent replication could be detected in the CNS by bioassay in tg cervinised mice. Among pigs that were incubated for up to 73 mpi, some gave diagnostic evidence of CWD replication in the brain between 42 and 72 mpi. Importantly, this was observed also in one orally challenged pig at 64 mpi and the presence of low‐level CWD replication was confirmed by mouse bioassay. The authors of this study argued that pigs can support low‐level amplification of CWD prions, although the species barrier to CWD infection is relatively high and that the detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs with a mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity.


Very low oral exposure to prions of brain or saliva origin can transmit chronic wasting disease

Nathaniel D. Denkers ,Clare E. Hoover ,Kristen A. Davenport,Davin M. Henderson,Erin E. McNulty,Amy V. Nalls,Candace K. Mathiason,Edward A. Hoover 

Published: August 20, 2020


We report that oral exposure to as little as 300 nanograms (ng) of CWD-positive brain or to saliva containing seeding activity equivalent to 300 ng of CWD-positive brain, were sufficient to transmit CWD disease. This was true whether the inoculum was administered as a single bolus or divided as three weekly 100 ng exposures. However, when the 300 ng total dose was apportioned as 10, 30 ng doses delivered over 12 weeks, no infection occurred. While low-dose exposures to prions of brain or saliva origin prolonged the time from inoculation to first detection of infection, once infection was established, we observed no differences in disease pathogenesis. These studies suggest that the CWD minimum infectious dose approximates 100 to 300 ng CWD-positive brain (or saliva equivalent), and that CWD infection appears to conform more with a threshold than a cumulative dose dynamic.


Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease 

Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.



Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP 

Author item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item Kokemuller, Robyn item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University item BALKEMA-BUSCHMANN, ANNE - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item GROSCHUP, MARTIN - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item Greenlee, Justin Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 5/10/2018 Publication Date: 5/22/2018 Citation: Moore, S.J., Kokemuller, R.D., West-Greenlee, M.H., Balkema-Buschmann, A., Groschup, M.H., Greenlee, J.J. 2018. The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP. Prion 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, May 22-25, 2018. Paper No. WA15, page 44.

Interpretive Summary:

 The successful transmission of pig-passaged CWD to Tg40 mice reported here suggests that passage of the CWD agent through pigs results in a change of the transmission characteristics which reduces the transmission barrier of Tg40 mice to the CWD agent. If this biological behavior is recapitulated in the original host species, passage of the CWD agent through pigs could potentially lead to increased pathogenicity of the CWD agent in humans.


cwd scrapie pigs oral routes 

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.


CONFIDENTIAL

EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

LINE TO TAKE

3. If questions on pharmaceuticals are raised at the Press conference, the suggested line to take is as follows:- 

 "There are no medicinal products licensed for use on the market which make use of UK-derived porcine tissues with which any hypothetical “high risk" ‘might be associated. The results of the recent experimental work at the CSM will be carefully examined by the CSM‘s Working Group on spongiform encephalopathy at its next meeting.

DO Hagger RM 1533 MT Ext 3201


While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...


we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.


May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...


3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...


But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...


Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....


Pathogens . 2022 May 20;11(5):597. doi: 10.3390/pathogens11050597.

Experimental Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Squirrel Monkeys: The Same Complex Proteinopathy Appearing after Very Different Incubation Times

Pedro Piccardo 1 2 3, Juraj Cervenak 1, Wilfred Goldmann 2, Paula Stewart 2, Kitty L Pomeroy 1, Luisa Gregori 1, Oksana Yakovleva 1, David M Asher 1 Affiliations expand PMID: 35631118 DOI: 10.3390/pathogens11050597 Cite Abstract

Incubation periods in humans infected with transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) agents can exceed 50 years. In humans infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agents, the effects of a "species barrier," often observed when TSE infections are transmitted from one species to another, would be expected to increase incubation periods compared with transmissions of same infectious agents within the same species. As part of a long-term study investigating the susceptibility to BSE of cell cultures used to produce vaccines, we inoculated squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sp., here designated SQ) with serial dilutions of a bovine brain suspension containing the BSE agent and monitored them for as long as ten years. Previously, we showed that SQ infected with the original "classical" BSE agent (SQ-BSE) developed a neurological disease resembling that seen in humans with variant CJD (vCJD). Here, we report the final characterization of the SQ-BSE model. We observed an unexpectedly marked difference in incubation times between two animals inoculated with the same dilution and volume of the same C-BSE bovine brain extract on the same day. SQ-BSE developed, in addition to spongiform changes and astrogliosis typical of TSEs, a complex proteinopathy with severe accumulations of protease-resistant prion protein (PrPTSE), hyperphosphorylated tau (p-tau), ubiquitin, and α-synuclein, but without any amyloid plaques or β-amyloid protein (Aβ) typical of Alzheimer's disease. These results suggest that PrPTSE enhanced the accumulation of several key proteins characteristically seen in human neurodegenerative diseases. The marked variation in incubation periods in the same experimental TSE should be taken into account when modeling the epidemiology of human TSEs.

snip...

As part of a long-term study investigating susceptibility of several widely used cell cultures to BSE infection, we inoculated squirrel monkeys (SQ) with serial dilutions of a bovine brain suspension containing the C-BSE agent and monitored them for ten years. In a preliminary study, we showed that SQ infected with C-BSE (SQ-BSE) developed a spongiform encephalopathy resembling that seen in humans with vCJD [10,11], albeit without PrP plaques. Here, we report the final characterization of this experimental model after observation over ten years. We observed an unexpected extreme difference in incubation times between two animals inoculated with the same dilution and volume of a C-BSE brain suspension on the same day. SQ-BSE developed, in addition to spongiform changes and astrogliosis, a complex proteinopathy with severe accumulations of PrPTSE, hyperphosphorylated tau (p-tau), ubiquitin, and α-synuclein but without the beta-amyloid (Aβ) protein typical of Alzheimer’s disease.

Keywords: TSE; bovine spongiform encephalopathy; prion; squirrel monkey.

Grant support

224-05-1307/NH/NIH HHS/United States




*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. ***These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.



***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.

https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). 

Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 

=============== 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 

=============== 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 

============== 

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf 

***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

Taylor & Francis

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20

Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160

GAME FARM INDUSTRY WANTS TO COVER UP FINDINGS OF INCREASE RISK TO CJD FROM CERVID

BSE INQUIRY

CJD9/10022

October 1994

Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane 

BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ

Dear Mr Elmhirst,

CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.

The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended.. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.

The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.

The statistical results regarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.

I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all. 


Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasized by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterize the human dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the scrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6


IN CONFIDENCE

SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

IN CONFIDENCE

reference...

RB3.20

TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

1. Kuru and CJD have been successfully transmitted to chimpanzees but scrapie and TME have not.

2. We cannot say that scrapie will not transmit to chimpanzees. There are several scrapie strains and I am not aware that all have been tried (that would have to be from mouse passaged material). Nor has a wide enough range of field isolates subsequently strain typed in mice been inoculated by the appropriate routes (i/c, ilp and i/v) :

3. I believe the proposed experiment to determine transmissibility, if conducted, would only show the susceptibility or resistance of the chimpanzee to infection/disease by the routes used and the result could not be interpreted for the predictability of the susceptibility for man. Proposals for prolonged oral exposure of chimpanzees to milk from cattle were suggested a long while ago and rejected.

4. In view of Dr Gibbs' probable use of chimpazees Mr Wells' comments (enclosed) are pertinent. I have yet to receive a direct communication from Dr Schellekers but before any collaboration or provision of material we should identify the Gibbs' proposals and objectives.

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severely would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

6. A negative result would take a lifetime to determine but that would be a shorter period than might be available for human exposure and it would still not answer the question regarding mans' susceptibility. In the meantime no doubt the negativity would be used defensively. It would however be counterproductive if the experiment finally became positive. We may learn more about public reactions following next Monday' s meeting.

R. Bradley

23 September 1990

CVO (+Mr Wells' comments)

Dr T W A Little

Dr B J Shreeve

90/9.23/1.1.


IN CONFIDENCE CHIMPANZEES

CODE 18-77 Reference RB3.46

Some further information that may assist in decision making has been gained by discussion with Dr Rosalind Ridley.

She says that careful study of Gajdusek's work shows no increased susceptibility of chimpanzees over New World Monkeys such as Squirrel Monkeys. She does not think it would tell you anything about the susceptibility to man. Also Gajdusek did not, she believes, challenge chimpanzees with scrapie as severely as we did pigs and we know little of that source of scrapie. Comparisons would be difficult. She also would not expect the Home Office to sanction such experiments here unless there was a very clear and important objective that would be important for human health protection. She doubted such a case could be made. If this is the case she thought it would be unethical to do an experiment abroad because we could not do it in our own country.

Retrospectively she feels they should have put up more marmosets than they did. They all remain healthy. They would normally regard the transmission as negative if no disease resulted in five years.

We are not being asked for a decision but I think that before we made one we should gain as much knowledge as we can. If we decided to proceed we would have to bear any criticisms for many years if there was an adverse view by scientists or ­media. This should not be undertaken lightly. There is already some adverse comment here, I gather, on the pig experiment though that will subside.

The Gibbs' (as' distinct from Schellekers') study is somewhat different. We are merely supplying material for comparative studies in a laboratory with the greatest experience of human SEs in the world and it has been sanctioned by USDA (though we do not know for certain yet if chimpanzees specifically will be used). This would keep it at a lower profile than if we conducted such an experiment in the UK or Europe.

I consider we must have very powerful and defendable objectives to go beyond Gibbs' proposed experiments and should not initiate others just because an offer has been made.

Scientists have a responsibility to seek other methods of investigative research other than animal experimentation. At present no objective has convinced me we need to do research using Chimpanzees - a species in need of protection. Resisting such proposals would enable us to communicate that information to the scientist and the public should the need arise. A line would have been drawn.

CVO cc Dr T Dr B W A Little Dr B J Shreeve

R Bradley

26 September 1990

90/9.26/3.2


this is tse prion political theater here, i.e. what i call TSE PRION POKER...tss



3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs.

snip...

PAGE 26

Transmission Studies

Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases {the following was written but with a single line marked through it ''first passage (by this route)}....TSS

resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret.

The occurrence of CWD must be viewed against the contest of the locations in which it occurred. It was an incidental and unwelcome complication of the respective wildlife research programmes. Despite its subsequent recognition as a new disease of cervids, therefore justifying direct investigation, no specific research funding was forthcoming. The USDA viewed it as a wildlife problem and consequently not their province! ...page 26. 

snip...see;

IN CONFIDENCE

PERCEPTIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL SLOW VIRUS DISEASE OF ANIMALS IN THE USA

GAH WELLS

REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE USA

APRIL-MAY 1989


why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. 

***> I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. 

***> Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

snip...


MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019

***> MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019


Tuesday, May 31, 2022 

89th General Session of the World Assembly of OIE Delegates image for WOAH General Summit 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Discussions and Concerns


Published: 06 September 2021

***> Chronic wasting disease: a cervid prion infection looming to spillover

Alicia Otero, Camilo Duque Velásquez, Judd Aiken & Debbie McKenzie 

Veterinary Research volume 52, Article number: 115 (2021) 


Sunday, January 10, 2021 
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission June 17, 2019

APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission

Greetings APHIS et al, 

I would kindly like to comment on APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], and my comments are as follows, with the latest peer review and transmission studies as references of evidence.

THE OIE/USDA BSE Minimal Risk Region MRR is nothing more than free pass to import and export the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. December 2003, when the USDA et al lost it's supposedly 'GOLD CARD' ie BSE FREE STATUS (that was based on nothing more than not looking and not finding BSE), once the USA lost it's gold card BSE Free status, the USDA OIE et al worked hard and fast to change the BSE Geographical Risk Statuses i.e. the BSE GBR's, and replaced it with the BSE MRR policy, the legal tool to trade mad cow type disease TSE Prion Globally. The USA is doing just what the UK did, when they shipped mad cow disease around the world, except with the BSE MRR policy, it's now legal. 

Also, the whole concept of the BSE MRR policy is based on a false pretense, that atypical BSE is not transmissible, and that only typical c-BSE is transmissible via feed. This notion that atypical BSE TSE Prion is an old age cow disease that is not infectious is absolutely false, there is NO science to show this, and on the contrary, we now know that atypical BSE will transmit by ORAL ROUTES, but even much more concerning now, recent science has shown that Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in deer and elk which is rampant with no stopping is sight in the USA, and Scrapie TSE Prion in sheep and goat, will transmit to PIGS by oral routes, this is our worst nightmare, showing even more risk factors for the USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban. 

The FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban has failed terribly bad, and is still failing, since August 1997. there is tonnage and tonnage of banned potential mad cow feed that went into commerce, and still is, with one decade, 10 YEARS, post August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban, 2007, with 10,000,000 POUNDS, with REASON, Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. you can see all these feed ban warning letters and tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce, year after year, that is not accessible on the internet anymore like it use to be, you can see history of the FDA failure August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban here, but remember this, we have a new outbreak of TSE Prion disease in a new livestock species, the camel, and this too is very worrisome.

WITH the OIE and the USDA et al weakening the global TSE prion surveillance, by not classifying the atypical Scrapie as TSE Prion disease, and the notion that they want to do the same thing with typical scrapie and atypical BSE, it's just not scientific.

WE MUST abolish the BSE MRR policy, go back to the BSE GBR risk assessments by country, and enhance them to include all strains of TSE Prion disease in all species. With Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion disease spreading in Europe, now including, Norway, Finland, Sweden, also in Korea, Canada and the USA, and the TSE Prion in Camels, the fact the the USA is feeding potentially CWD, Scrapie, BSE, typical and atypical, to other animals, and shipping both this feed and or live animals or even grains around the globe, potentially exposed or infected with the TSE Prion. this APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], under it's present definition, does NOT show the true risk of the TSE Prion in any country. as i said, it's nothing more than a legal tool to trade the TSE Prion around the globe, nothing but ink on paper.

AS long as the BSE MRR policy stays in effect, TSE Prion disease will continued to be bought and sold as food for both humans and animals around the globe, and the future ramifications from friendly fire there from, i.e. iatrogenic exposure and transmission there from from all of the above, should not be underestimated. ... 






Control of Chronic Wasting Disease OMB Control Number: 0579-0189 APHIS-2021-0004 Singeltary Submission



Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification



RE-Inactivation of porcine endogenous retrovirus in pigs using CPISPR-Cas9
RE: Inactivation of porcine endogenous retrovirus in pigs using CRISPR-Cas9
TERRY S. SINGELTARY SR. 
  • retired
  •  
  • Mr.
seems that the USA feed ban for ruminant protein is still a serious problem, so there seems to still be a risk factor for pigs and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease. now with the updated science showing that pigs are susceptible to the Chronic Wasting Disease TSE Prion ORALLY, and cwd running rampant in the USA, any use of porcine organs should be tested for the CWD TSE Prion...

Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES
Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease
Author item Moore, Sarah item Kunkle, Robert item Kondru, Naveen item Manne, Sireesha item Smith, Jodi item Kanthasamy, Anumantha item West Greenlee, M item Greenlee, Justin

Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 3/15/2017 Publication Date: N/A Citation: N/A Interpretive Summary:
Technical Abstract: Aims: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally-occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of cervids. We previously demonstrated that disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) can be detected in the brain and retina from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent. In that study, neurological signs consistent with prion disease were observed only in one pig: an intracranially challenged pig that was euthanized at 64 months post-challenge. The purpose of this study was to use an antigen-capture immunoassay (EIA) and real-time quaking-induced conversion (QuIC) to determine whether PrPSc is present in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the CWD agent.

Methods: At two months of age, crossbred pigs were challenged by the intracranial route (n=20), oral route (n=19), or were left unchallenged (n=9). At approximately 6 months of age, the time at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled (<6 month challenge groups). The remaining pigs (>6 month challenge groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post challenge (mpc). The retropharyngeal lymph node (RPLN) was screened for the presence of PrPSc by EIA and immunohistochemistry (IHC). The RPLN, palatine tonsil, and mesenteric lymph node (MLN) from 6-7 pigs per challenge group were also tested using EIA and QuIC.

Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). Conclusions:

This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge.

CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease.

Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.


CONFIDENTIAL

EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...


we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.


Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....


snip...see much more here ;

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


Very low oral exposure to prions of brain or saliva origin can transmit chronic wasting disease

Nathaniel D. Denkers ,Clare E. Hoover ,Kristen A. Davenport,Davin M. Henderson,Erin E. McNulty,Amy V. Nalls,Candace K. Mathiason,Edward A. Hoover 

Published: August 20, 2020


We report that oral exposure to as little as 300 nanograms (ng) of CWD-positive brain or to saliva containing seeding activity equivalent to 300 ng of CWD-positive brain, were sufficient to transmit CWD disease. This was true whether the inoculum was administered as a single bolus or divided as three weekly 100 ng exposures. However, when the 300 ng total dose was apportioned as 10, 30 ng doses delivered over 12 weeks, no infection occurred. While low-dose exposures to prions of brain or saliva origin prolonged the time from inoculation to first detection of infection, once infection was established, we observed no differences in disease pathogenesis. These studies suggest that the CWD minimum infectious dose approximates 100 to 300 ng CWD-positive brain (or saliva equivalent), and that CWD infection appears to conform more with a threshold than a cumulative dose dynamic.


TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 07, 2021
Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE OIE, FDA 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, and Ingestion Therefrom



Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Origin USA?


WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 2022 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Origin USA, what if?


PLOS ONE Journal 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;


IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***


MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2020 

***> REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION

see updated concerns with atypical BSE from feed and zoonosis...terry


WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2021 

Importation of Sheep, Goats, and Certain Other Ruminants AGENCY: Animal APHIA, USDA, FINAL RULE [Docket No. APHIS–2009–0095] RIN 0579–AD10 


WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2021 

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 2020 IMPACT REPORT BSE TSE Prion Testing and Surveillance MIA 


THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, 2020 

Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year? 


SUNDAY, MARCH 21, 2021 

Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Aug. 30, 2005 Singeltary's Regiew 2021 


***> The U.S. cases were animals born and raised in the U.S. (Texas, Alabama).

SEE HISTORY AT THE BOTTOM...TSS

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006 


Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY 

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 2022 
USDA TAKES THE C OUT OF COOL, what's up with that?

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2022 
EFSA ONE Conference 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PrP of Cervid and Zoonosis Zoonotic Transmission Singeltary Submission 
TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2022
***> OIE Agent causing chronic wasting disease (CWD) TSE Prion of Cervid <***
Tuesday, May 31, 2022 

89th General Session of the World Assembly of OIE Delegates image for WOAH General Summit 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Discussions and Concerns

(this link is good and safe from one of my tse prion blogs, My Norton has chosen wrongly to mark it as suspicious, at this time...terry)


TUESDAY, MAY 31, 2022 
USA Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE: description of typical and atypical cases 
SUNDAY, MAY 08, 2022 
USA National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Surveillance Update April 11th, 2022

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2022 
Texas Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD TSE Prion Update Singeltary FOIA Request Received May 23, 2022

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2022 
Concordance of CSF RT-QuIC across the European Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease surveillance network

TUESDAY, APRIL 05, 2022 
Incidence of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in the United States 1993-2014

MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 2022 
Validation of Revised International Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Network Diagnostic Criteria for Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary Comment Submission



Friday, March 11, 2022 

Prevalence of Surgical Procedures at Symptomatic Onset of Prion Disease


WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 02, 2022 

Understanding the nature of PrP found in Appendix tissues in the UK population 

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 24, 2021 
***> Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD TSE Prion Update December 25, 2021 <***

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2021 
Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Very Young Person Singeltary Reply 2021

Saturday, December 18, 2021 

Direct neural transmission of vCJD/BSE in macaque after finger incision 


Tuesday, November 30, 2021 

Second death in France in a laboratory working on prions


Second lab worker with deadly prion disease prompts research pause in France

A lab worker died of prion disease in 2019, nine years after a lab accident.

BETH MOLE - 7/29/2021, 5:16 PM

https://arstechnica.com/science/2021/07/second-lab-worker-with-deadly-prion-disease-prompts-research-pause-in-france/

A 2020 paper published in the New England Journal of Medicine left little doubt that Jaumain had been infected on the job. She had variant CJD, but since Europe’s ‘mad cow’ outbreak ended after 2000 and the disease virtually disappeared, the paper said it was virtually impossible for someone her age in France to contract food-borne vCJD.

Science also said two independent reports – one by government inspectors – had found no safety violations at the lab where Jaumain worked. The press release also noted that the inspectors concluded there was “the presence of a risk control culture within the research teams”. The Jaumain family’s lawyer called the neutrality of the reports into question, however.

At the same time, the government inspectors’ report also revealed that there had been at least 17 accidents among the 100 or so scientists and technicians in France working with prions in the previous decade, raising concerns about how effective this risk control culture is. Five of these occurred when workers “stabbed or cut themselves with contaminated syringes or blades”.


Wednesday, July 28, 2021 

France issues moratorium on prion research after fatal brain disease strikes two lab workers


Wednesday, July 28, 2021 

France issues moratorium on prion research after fatal brain disease strikes two lab workers


Friendly fire, pass it forward, they call it iatrogenic cjd, or what i call 'tse prion poker', are you all in $$$

all iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, before the iatrogenic event is discovered, traced back, proven, documented, put into the academic domain, and then finally the public domain, this very seldom happens, thus problem solved, it's all sporadic cjd...

SATURDAY, AUGUST 01, 2020

Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease among Physicians, Germany, 1993–2018 high proportion of physicians with sCJD were surgeons


SUNDAY, JULY 19, 2020 

Joseph J. Zubak Orthopaedic surgeon passed away Monday, July 6, 2020, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD)


Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease Diagnosed 7.5 Years after Occupational Exposure

Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease was identified in a technician who had cut her thumb while handling brain sections of mice infected with adapted BSE 7.5 years earlier. The long incubation period was similar to that of the transfusion-transmitted form of the disease.



THURSDAY, JULY 02, 2020 

Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease Diagnosed 7.5 Years after Occupational Exposure

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

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