Tuesday, March 5, 2024

McDonald's Leads Charge in Beef Safety, Sets Deadline for Suppliers on Mad Cow Disease Prevention

McDonald's Leads Charge in Beef Safety, Sets Deadline for Suppliers on Mad Cow Disease Prevention

McDonald's Corp enforces strict compliance with federal feeding regulations among its beef suppliers to safeguard against mad cow disease, setting a precedent for the industry.

author-image Olalekan Adigun 04 Mar 2024 09:35 EST

McDonald's Leads Charge in Beef Safety, Sets Deadline for Suppliers on Mad Cow Disease Prevention

McDonald's Leads Charge in Beef Safety, Sets Deadline for Suppliers on Mad Cow Disease Prevention In a proactive measure to keep the United States free from mad cow disease, McDonald's Corp. has mandated its beef suppliers to adhere strictly to federal feeding regulations. This decision comes in the wake of a report from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) highlighting the non-compliance of numerous feed makers with crucial feed regulations. By setting an April 1 deadline for compliance documentation, McDonald's aims to fortify the beef supply chain against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

Strategic Prevention Measures

With the looming threat of BSE, commonly known as mad cow disease, McDonald's is taking no chances in ensuring the safety of its beef. The fast-food giant demands that its meatpackers provide concrete documentation proving the cattle they purchase are fed according to the stringent federal guidelines. This move not only underscores McDonald's commitment to food safety but also sets a precedent for the industry. "Here in the U.S., it's always been BSE-free. We want to keep it that way," stated a McDonald's spokesperson, emphasizing the importance of this initiative.

Industry-Wide Impact

The ripple effect of McDonald's decision is palpable throughout the beef industry. Major beef packers, such as IBP Inc., have followed suit, requiring their cattle suppliers to furnish evidence of compliance with the feed rules. This collective action signifies a heightened industry standard for beef safety, underscoring the shared responsibility of preventing BSE. The fast-food giant's stance has not only raised the bar for beef suppliers but also demonstrated a proactive approach to addressing potential public health concerns.

Market Response and Future Outlook

Despite the proactive measures taken by McDonald's, the company's shares experienced a slight dip, closing off 26 cents at $27.80 on the New York Stock Exchange. This market response may reflect the immediate costs associated with implementing these stringent supply chain standards. However, the long-term implications of McDonald's decision could greatly benefit the beef industry by ensuring a safer beef supply and bolstering consumer confidence in beef products. As the deadline approaches, the industry awaits to see the full impact of these measures on beef safety standards and public health.

This initiative by McDonald's marks a significant step in the fight against mad cow disease in the United States. By holding its suppliers to higher standards, McDonald's not only protects its consumers but also leads by example, encouraging other corporations to prioritize food safety. As the industry adapts to these new regulations, the collective efforts of fast-food giants, meatpackers, and cattle suppliers will play a crucial role in maintaining the safety and integrity of the nation's beef supply.


WOW, McDonald's has been trying for a long time to make USDA et al comply with mad cow regulations, and to this day, imo, USDA still plays the Prion Poker Game.

WITH atypical H-type and L-type BSE transmitting to cattle by oral routes, CWD and Scrapie transmits to pigs by oral routes, and cwd will transmit to cervid by oral routes, PLUS, CWD will now transmit to cattle by oral routes, while existing feed bans will not stop all of this, PLUS, an increase of mad cow disease is popping up in the USA, and ABROAD, IMO, a reevaluation of the mad cow feed ban must be done ASAP!

please let me explain, but first, i remember back when, McDonald's was trying to get USDA FDA et al to comply with BSE regulations. let's review this shall we. see;

Subject: Re: McDonald's Corp. seven scientists and experts and a pharmaceutical supplier Seriologicals Corp. U.S. NOT PROTECTED AGAINST MAD COW DISEASE

Date: January 11, 2006 at 9:27 am PST

December 19, 2005

Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305)

Food and Drug Administration 5630 Fishers Lane Room 1061 Rockville, MD 20852

Re: Docket No: 2002N-0273 (formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food and Feed

Dear Sir or Madame:

The McDonalds Corporation buys more beef than any other restaurant in the United States. It is essential for our customers and our company that the beef has the highest level of safety. Concerning BSE, the most effective way to insure this is to create a system that processes cattle that are not exposed to the disease. As a company we take numerous precautions via our strict specifications to help and assure this, however we feel that the force of federal regulation is important to ensure that the risk of exposure in the entire production system is reduced to as close to zero as possible. The exemptions in the current ban as well as in the newly proposed rule make this difficult if not impossible, as there are still legal avenues for ruminants to consume potentially contaminated ruminant protein. In addition, the USDA still has not implemented a system of identification and traceability. It is our opinion that the government can take further action to reduce this risk and appreciate the opportunity to submit comments to this very important proposed rule.

After the identification of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in indigenous North American cattle, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) responded rapidly to implement measures to protect public health in regard to food. Our company recognizes and supports the importance of the current feed ban which went into effect in August 1997. However, given what is known about the epidemiology and characteristically long incubation period of BSE, we urge the FDA to act without further delay and implement additional measures which will reduce the risk of BSE recycling in the US cattle herd. We caution against using the 18 month enhanced surveillance as a justification to relax or impede further actions. While this surveillance indicates an epidemic is not underway, it does not clear the US cattle herd from infection. The positive cases indicate probable exposure prior to the 1997 feed ban, a time when BSE appears to have been circulating in animal feed. BSE cases are most likely clustered in time and location, so while enhanced surveillance provides an 18 month snapshot, it does not negate the fact that US and Canadian cattle were exposed to BSE and that the current feed controls contain “leaks”.

We feel that for the FDA to provide a more comprehensive and protective feed ban, specified risk materials (SRMs) and deadstock must be removed from all animal feed and that legal exemptions which allow ruminant protein to be fed back to ruminants (with the exception of milk) should be discontinued. SRMs, as defined by the USDA, are tissues which, in a BSE infected animal, are known to either harbor BSE infectivity or to be closely associated with infectivity. If SRMs are not removed, they may introduce BSE infectivity and continue to provide a source of animal feed contamination. Rendering will reduce infectivity but it will not totally eliminate it. This is significant, as research in the United Kingdom has shown that a calf may be infected with BSE by the ingestion of as little as .001 gram of untreated brain.

The current proposed rule falls short of this and would still leave a potential source of infectivity in the system. In fact by the FDA’s own statement the exempted tissues which are known to have infectivity (such as distal ileum, DRGs, etc) would cumulatively amount to approximately 10% of the infectivity in an infected animal. Leaving approximately 10% of the infectious tissues in the system is not good enough. The proposed rule still allows the possibility for cattle to be exposed to BSE through: Feeding of materials currently subject to legal exemptions from the ban (e.g., poultry litter, plate waste) Cross feeding (the feeding of non-ruminant rations to ruminants) on farms; and Cross contamination of ruminant and non-ruminant feed We are most concerned that the FDA has chosen to include a provision that would allow tissues from deadstock into the feed chain. We do not support the provision to allow the removal of brain and spinal cord from down and deadstock over 30 months of age for several reasons. These are the animals with the highest level of infectivity in tissues which include more than brain and spinal cord. Firstly, there are two issues regarding the complex logistics of this option. We do not feel that it is possible to have adequate removal especially during the warmer months. In addition, we do not feel that there are adequate means to enforce complete removal. Unlike slaughterhouses, there are no government inspectors at rendering plants or deadstock collection points.

Most importantly, there is emerging information that at end stage disease (a natural BSE case); infectivity may also be included in additional tissues such as peripheral nerves (Buschmann and Groschup, 2005 – see attached). This published work supports publicly reported studies in Japan where by western blot testing, prions have been found in the peripheral nerves of a naturally infected 94-month-old cow. If this is the case, the amount of infectivity left in the system from an infected bovine would surpass 10% and the full extent is still unknown.

McDonalds has convened it own International Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) as well as co-sponsored a symposium of TSE scientists on the issue of tissue distribution. The consensus of both groups was that the pathogenesis of BSE might not be entirely different from TSEs in other species at the point where the animal is showing signs of the disease. These scientists feel that the studies as reported above have merit. The current studies not only re-enforce the risk of down and deadstock but also appear to provide additional information that these animals may be a potential source of greater levels of infectivity into the feed system. Hence, we suggest that the FDA consult with TSE scientists as well.

Leaving the tissues from the highest risk category of cattle in the animal feed chain will effectively nullify the intent of this regulation. This point is illustrated by the 2001 Harvard risk assessment model that demonstrated that eliminating dead and downer, 4D cattle, from the feed stream was a disproportionately effective means of reducing the risk of re-infection.

“The disposition of cattle that die on the farm would also have a substantial influence on the spread of BSE if the disease were introduced.” The base case scenario showed that the mean total number of ID50s (i.e., dosage sufficient to infect 50 percent of exposed cattle) from healthy animals at slaughter presented to the food/feed system was 1500. The mean total number of ID50s from adult cattle deadstock presented to the feed system was 37,000. This illustrates the risk of “4D cattle” (i.e., deadstock).

From the Harvard Risk Assessment, 2001, Appendix 3A Base Case and Harvard Risk Assessment, 2001 Executive Summary McDonalds also urges agencies of the US government to work with academia and industry on research in the following areas:

· Methods to inactivate TSEs agents which then may allow a product to be used and even fed to animals without risk

· Alternative uses for animal byproducts which would maintain some value

In July 2004, McDonalds in cooperation with others sponsored a meeting at Penn State. The purpose of the meeting was to review work conducted by Dr. Bruce Miller looking at the feasibility of using carcasses and animal byproducts as renewable alternatives to fossil fuels in large energy generating boilers. A number of government representatives were also invited to this meeting. We are aware that Dr. Miller continues this work which shows great promise. We suggest that the FDA explore the possibility of this alternative use that may also have a positive impact on the environment. The McDonalds Corporation will continue to work with the FDA and other government agencies to implement a strong BSE risk control program. We would like to reiterate our opinion that for the FDA to provide a more comprehensive and protective feed ban, specified risk materials (SRMs) and deadstock must be removed from all animal feed and that legal exemptions which allow ruminant protein to be fed back to ruminants (with the exception of milk) should be discontinued. Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments to the public record.

Respectfully,

Dick Crawford

Corporate Vice President, Government Relations

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

dick.crawford@mcd.com




BSE FEED FDA 7 Scientists Report Comment


9 December 2005 Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)

SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION James J. Kramer, Ph.D. Vice President, Corporate Operations

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf


Embassy of Japan

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02N-0273-EC240.htm


PAUL BROWN M.D.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000490-vol40.pdf


[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf


[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12. 

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf


03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. 

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf


Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF] ... 2005 6:17 PM To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ... 

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf


03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF] ... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al [Docket No. 03- 025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and ... 

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf


In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF] Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone: 732-741-2290 Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf


Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Update 2024

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2023


The Mad Cow That Stole Christmas, 20 Years Later


https://animalhealthreportpriontse.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-mad-cow-that-stole-christmas-23.html


THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 2024


Disease phenotype of classical sheep scrapie is changed upon experimental passage through white-tailed deer


https://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2024/01/disease-phenotype-of-classical-sheep.html


WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 3, 2024 


PROCEEDINGS ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING USAHA CWD, Scrapie, and BSE, October 2022 updated science 2024


https://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2024/01/proceedings-one-hundred-and-twenty.html 


Wednesday, May 24, 2023 


***> WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, United States of America Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Immediate notification


https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/5067


https://woahoie.blogspot.com/2023/05/wahis-woah-oie-united-states-of-america.html


https://prpsc.proboards.com/thread/125/wahis-woah-oie-immediate-notification


SATURDAY, MAY 20, 2023 


***> Tennessee State Veterinarian Alerts Cattle Owners to Disease Detection Mad Cow atypical L-Type BSE


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2023/05/tennessee-state-veterinarian-alerts.html


https://prpsc.proboards.com/thread/123/tennessee-veterinarian-alerts-cattle-confirmed


MAY 19, 2023


https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/newsroom/stakeholder-info/sa_by_date/sa-2023/bse


2 weeks before the announcement of this recent mad cow case in the USA, i submitted this to the APHIS et al;


***> APPRX. 2 weeks before the recent mad cow case was confirmed in the USA, in Tennessee, atypical L-Type BSE, I submitted this to the APHIS et al;


Document APHIS-2023-0027-0001 BSE Singeltary Comment Submission May 2, 2023


''said 'burden' cost, will be a heavy burden to bear, if we fail with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion disease, that is why this information collection is so critical''...


https://www.regulations.gov/comment/APHIS-2023-0027-0002


https://downloads.regulations.gov/APHIS-2023-0027-0002/attachment_1.pdf


spontaneous my ass, big outbreak of spontaneous mad cow disease evidently, around the same time, strange;


WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 08, 2023 


Ireland Atypical BSE confirmed November 3 2023 


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2023/11/ireland-atypical-bse-confirmed-november.html


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2023 


Ireland Atypical BSE case, 3 progeny of case cow to be culled 


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2023/11/ireland-atypical-bse-case-3-progeny-of.html


SUNDAY, JULY 16, 2023 


Switzerland Atypical BSE detected in a cow in the canton of St. Gallen 


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2023/07/switzerland-atypical-bse-detected-in.html


WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type


Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type


Switzerland - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy - Immediate notification


https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/4962


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2020/02/switzerland-oie-bovine-spongiform.html


Monday, March 20, 2023 


WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT United Kingdom Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical H-Type 


https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/4977


https://www.gov.uk/government/news/single-case-of-atypical-bse-confirmed-on-a-farm-in-cornwall


https://woahoie.blogspot.com/2023/03/wahis-woah-oie-report-united-kingdom.html


https://woahoie.blogspot.com/2023/03/wahis-woah-oie-report-united-kingdom.html


BRAZIL BSE START DATE 2023/01/18


BRAZIL BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/22


BRAZIL BSE END DATE 2023/03/03


https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/4918


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2019/06/brazil-reports-another-cases-of-mad-cow.html


SPAIN BSE START DATE 2023/01/21


SPAIN BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/03


SPAIN BSE END DATE 2023/02/06


https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/4888


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2023/02/spain-bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html


NETHERLANDS BSE START DATE 2023/02/01


NETHERLANDS BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/01


NETHERLANDS BSE END DATE 2023/03/13


https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/4876


https://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2023/02/netherlands-bovine-spongiform.html


PLEASE NOTE, USDA ET AL ONLY TESTING <25k CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE, woefully inadequate, yet USDA just documented a case Atypical L-Type BSE, the most virulent strain to date...


Monday, May 22, 2023 


***> BSE TSE Prion MAD COW TESTING IN THE USA COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES? 


https://specifiedriskmaterial.blogspot.com/2023/05/bse-tse-prion-mad-cow-testing-in-usa.html 


Transmission of Idiopathic human prion disease CJD MM1 to small ruminant mouse models (Tg338 and Tg501). 


Results: No evidence of transmission was found on a first passage in Tg338 nor Tg501ovinized mice, but on second passage, 4/10 Tg338 mice succumbed to CJDMM1 (40% attack rate after 645 dpi) and 1/12 Tg501 mice (519dpi, 10 still alive). The remaining 2nd passages are still ongoing. Conclusions: In this poster, the neuropathological features of the resulting strain are discussed. 


https://prion2023.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Meeting-book-final-version2.pdf


Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period


*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.


*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.


*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.


http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160


***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.


***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.


***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.


http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20


***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***


Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.


https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573


https://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publication/?seqNo115=361032


O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 


*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 


***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 


***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 


***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 


============== 


PRION 2015 CONFERENCE


https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5019500/


PRION 2016 TOKYO


Saturday, April 23, 2016


SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016


Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 1933-690X 


WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential


Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 


These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 


http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20


Tuesday, December 16, 2014 


Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions 


Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications 


Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 


Abstract 


Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. 


***The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. 


***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 


Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance


http://www.nature.com/ncomms/2014/141216/ncomms6821/full/ncomms6821.html 


why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $ 5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis. 


snip... R. BRADLEY 


http://web.archive.org/web/20090506041740/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf


1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8 


Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates


Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC. 


Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation. 


snip... 


The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. PMID: 6997404


http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract 


Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias" Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously. snip... 76/10.12/4.6 


http://web.archive.org/web/20010305223125/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf


Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4. 


Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis) 


Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC. Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0 


Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis) 


C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland 


SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).


http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v236/n5341/abs/236073a0.html 


http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html 


http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/ 


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/ 


CWD


https://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/


Price of TSE Prion Poker goes up substantially, all you cattle ranchers and such, better pay close attention here...terry

Prion Conference 2023

Transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent from elk to cattle after oronasal exposure

Justin Greenlee, Jifeng Bian, Zoe Lambert, Alexis Frese, and Eric Cassmann Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, USDA-ARS, Ames, IA, USA 

Aims: The purpose of this study was to determine the susceptibility of cattle to chronic wasting disease agent from elk. 

Materials and Methods: Initial studies were conducted in bovinized mice using inoculum derived from elk with various genotypes at codon 132 (MM, LM, LL). Based upon attack rates, inoculum (10% w/v brain homogenate) from an LM132 elk was selected for transmission studies in cattle. At approximately 2 weeks of age, one wild type steer (EE211) and one steer with the E211K polymorphism (EK211) were fed 1 mL of brain homogenate in a quart of milk replacer while another 1 mL was instilled intranasally. The cattle were examined daily for clinical signs for the duration of the experiment. One steer is still under observation at 71 months post-inoculation (mpi). 

Results: Inoculum derived from MM132 elk resulted in similar attack rates and incubation periods in mice expressing wild type or K211 bovine PRNP, 35% at 531 days post inoculation (dpi) and 27% at 448 dpi, respectively. Inoculum from LM132 elk had a slightly higher attack rates in mice: 45% (693 dpi) in wild type cattle PRNP and 33% (468) in K211 mice. Inoculum from LL132 elk resulted in the highest attack rate in wild type bovinized mice (53% at 625 dpi), but no K211 mice were affected at >700 days. At approximately 70 mpi, the EK211 genotype steer developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease, depression, low head carriage, hypersalivation, and ataxia, and was necropsied. Enzyme immunoassay (IDEXX) was positive in brainstem (OD=4.00, but non-detect in retropharyngeal lymph nodes and palatine tonsil. Immunoreactivity was largely limited to the brainstem, midbrain, and cervical spinal cord with a pattern that was primarily glia-associated. 

Conclusions: Cattle with the E211K polymorphism are susceptible to the CWD agent after oronasal exposure of 0.2 g of infectious material. 

"Cattle with the E211K polymorphism are susceptible to the CWD agent after oronasal exposure of 0.2 g of infectious material."

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Strain characterization of chronic wasting disease in bovine-PrP transgenic mice 

Conclusions: Altogether, these results exhibit the diversity of CWD strains present in the panel of CWD isolates and the ability of at least some CWD isolates to infect bovine species. Cattle being one of the most important farming species, this ability represents a potential threat to both animal and human health, and consequently deserves further study. 

"Altogether, these results exhibit the diversity of CWD strains present in the panel of CWD isolates and the ability of at least some CWD isolates to infect bovine species. Cattle being one of the most important farming species, this ability represents a potential threat to both animal and human health, and consequently deserves further study."

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Prion 2023 Experimental Oronasal Inoculation of the Chronic Wasting Disease Agent into White Tailed Deer 

Author list: Sarah Zurbuchena,b , S. Jo Moorea,b , Jifeng Biana , Eric D. Cassmanna , and Justin J. Greenleea . a. Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, ARS, United States Department of Agriculture, Ames, IA, US b. Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, United States 

Aims: The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether white-tailed deer (WTD) are susceptible to inoculation of chronic wasting disease (CWD) via oronasal exposure. 

Materials and methods: Six male, neutered WTD were oronasally inoculated with brainstem material (10% w/v) from a CWD-positive wild-type WTD. The genotypes of five inoculated deer were Q95/G96 (wild-type). One inoculated deer was homozygous S at codon 96 (96SS). Cervidized (Tg12; M132 elk PrP) mice were inoculated with 1% w/v brainstem homogenate from either a 96GG WTD (n=10) or the 96SS WTD (n=10). 

Results: All deer developed characteristic clinical signs of CWD including weight loss, regurgitation, and ataxia. The 96SS individual had a prolonged disease course and incubation period compared to the other deer. Western blots of the brainstem on all deer yielded similar molecular profiles. All deer had widespread lymphoid distribution of PrPCWD and neuropathologic lesions associated with transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Both groups of mice had a 100% attack rate and developed clinical signs, including loss of body condition, ataxia, and loss of righting reflex. Mice inoculated with material from the 96SS deer had a significantly shorter incubation period than mice inoculated with material from 96GG deer (Welch two sample T-test, P<0.05). Serial dilutions of each inocula suggests that differences in incubation period were not due to a greater concentration of PrPCWD in the 96SS inoculum. Molecular profiles from western blot of brain homogenates from mice appeared similar regardless of inoculum and appear similar to those of deer used for inoculum. 

Conclusions: This study characterizes the lesions and clinical course of CWD in WTD inoculated in a similar manner to natural conditions. It supports previous findings that 96SS deer have a prolonged disease course. Further, it describes a first pass of inoculum from a 96SS deer in cervidized mice which shortened the incubation period. 

Funded by: This research was funded in its entirety by congressionally appropriated funds to the United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service. The funders of the work did not influence study design, data collection, analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. 

Acknowledgement: We thank Ami Frank and Kevin Hassall for their technical contributions to this project.

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PRION 2023 CONTINUED; 


Cattle with the EK211 PRNP polymorphism are susceptible to the H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent from either E211K or wild type donors after oronasal inoculation

Justin J. Greenleea, Eric D. Cassmanna, S. Jo Moorea,b, and M. Heather West Greenleec

aVirus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, ARS, United States Department of Agriculture, Ames, IA, USA; bOak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, US; cDepartment of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, US

Aims: In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (H-BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure.

Material and Methods: Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with the H-BSE agent from either the US 2004 case (wild type donor; n = 3) or from the US 2006 case with the E211K polymorphism (n = 4). Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. When signs were noted, animals were euthanized and necropsied. Cattle were confirmed positive for abnormal BSE prions by enzyme immunoassay (EIA; Idexx HerdChek BSE Ag Test), anti-PrP immunohistochemistry (IHC) on brainstem, and microscopic examination for vacuolation.

Results: Three-out-of-four (75%) calves with the EK211 genotype developed clinical signs of H-BSE including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and were euthanized. Two of the positive EK211 steers received H-BSE US 2004 inoculum (Incubation Period (IP): 59.3 and 72.3 months) while the other positive steer received the E211K H-BSE inoculum (IP: 49.7 months). EIA confirmed that abundant misfolded protein (O.D. 2.57–4.0) in the brainstem, and IHC demonstrated PrPScthroughout the brain. All wild type recipient cattle and a single EK211 steer remained asymptomatic for the duration of the experiment (approximately 7 years post-inoculation) and no abnormal prion protein was detected in these cattle by EIA.

Conclusions: This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. Cattle with the EK211 genotype are oronasally susceptible to small doses of the H-BSE agent from either EK211 or EE211 (wild type) donors. Wild-type EE211 cattle remained asymptomatic for the duration of the experiment with this small dose (0.1 g) of inoculum. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.

Funded by: US Department of Agriculture


How in the hell do you make a complete recall of 27,694,240 lbs of feed that was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein, in one state, Michigan, 2006? Wonder how much was fed out?

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II 

______________________________


PRODUCT


a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;


b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,
net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;


c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;


d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,
Recall # V-103-6;


e) "Big Jim’s" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,
Recall # V-104-6;


f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,
Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;


g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,
Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;


h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete
Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,
Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-107-6;


i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying
Chickens, Recall # 108-6;


j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;


k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED,
net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;


l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-111-6;


m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-112-6


CODE 
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
 Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006.

FDA initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


125 tons


DISTRIBUTION


AL and FL 
______________________________


PRODUCT


Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6 
CODE
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006.

Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


27,694,240 lbs


DISTRIBUTION


MI 
______________________________


PRODUCT


Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6


CODE
 None


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON


Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


???


DISTRIBUTION


KY

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media: 301-827-6242 Broadcast Media: 301-827-3434 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.


Monday, November 13, 2023

Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) Singeltary Another Request for Update 2023


FRIDAY, JULY 07, 2023 

***> TME, 589.2000 (21 C.F.R. 589.2000), atypical L-BSE, who’s testing MINK for TSE? 


Control of Chronic Wasting Disease OMB Control Number: 0579-0189 APHIS-2021-0004 Singeltary Submission

Comment ID APHIS-2021-0004-0002

Greetings APHIS et al, i would kindly like to comment on Control of Chronic Wasting Disease OMB Control Number: 0579-0189 APHIS-2021-0004.

Greetings APHIS et al, i would kindly like to comment on Control of Chronic Wasting Disease OMB Control Number: 0579-0189 APHIS-2021-0004.

***> 1st and foremost your biggest problem is 'VOLUNTARY'! AS with the BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, especially since it is still voluntary with cervid, knowing full well that cwd and scrapie will transmit to pigs by oral route. VOLUNTARY DOES NOT WORK! all animal products should be banned and be made mandatory, and the herd certification program should be mandatory, or you don't move cervid. IF THE CWD HERD CERTIFICATION IS NOT MANDATORY, it will be another colossal tse prion failure from the start.

***> 2nd USA should declare a Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency due to CWD, and all exports of cervid and cervid products must be stopped internationally, and there should be a ban of interstate movement of cervid, until a live cwd test is available.

***> 3rd Captive Farmed cervid ESCAPEES should be made mandatory to report immediately, and strict regulations for those suspect cwd deer that just happen to disappear. IF a cervid escapes and is not found, that farm should be indefinitely shut down, all movement, until aid MIA cervid is found, and if not ever found, that farm shut down permanently.

***> 4th Captive Farmed Cervid, INDEMNITY, NO MORE Federal indemnity program, or what i call, ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM for game farm industry. NO MORE BAIL OUTS FROM TAX PAYERS. if the captive industry can't buy insurance to protect not only themselves, but also their customers, and especially the STATE, from Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion or what some call mad deer disease and harm therefrom, IF they can't afford to buy that insurance that will cover all of it, then they DO NOT GET A PERMIT to have a game farm for anything. This CWD TSE Prion can/could/has caused property values to fall from some reports in some places. roll the dice, how much is a state willing to lose?

***> 5th QUARANTINE OF ALL FARMED CAPTIVE, BREEDERS, URINE, ANTLER, VELVET, SPERM, OR ANY FACILITY, AND THEIR PRODUCTS, that has been confirmed to have Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion, the QUARANTINE should be for 21 years due to science showing what scrapie can do. 5 years is NOT near long enough. see; Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 to 21 years.

***> 6th America BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS CWD TSE Prion

***> 7TH TRUCKING TRANSPORTING CERVID CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE TSE PRION VIOLATING THE LACEY ACT

***> 8TH ALL CAPTIVE FARMING CERVID OPERATIONS MUST BE INSURED TO PAY FOR ANY CLEAN UP OF CWD AND QUARANTINE THERE FROM FOR THE STATE, NO MORE ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM FOR CERVID GAME FARMING PAY TO PLAY FOR CWD TSE PRION OFF THE TAX PAYERS BACK.

***> 9TH ANY STATE WITH DOCUMENTED CWD, INTERSTATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF ALL CERVID, AND ALL CERVID PRODUCTS MUST BE HALTED!

***> 10TH BAN THE SALE OF STRAW BRED BUCKS AND ALL CERVID SEMEN AND URINE PRODUCTS

***> 11th ALL CAPTIVE FARMED CERVID AND THEIR PRODUCTS MUST BE CWD TSE PRION TESTED ANNUALLY AND BEFORE SALE FOR CWD TSE PRION

SEE FULL SCIENCE REFERENCES AND REASONINGS ;

***> 1st and foremost your biggest problem is 'VOLUNTARY'!

''APHIS created a cooperative, voluntary Federal-State-private sector CWD Herd Certification Program designed to identify farmed or captive herds infected with CWD.''

key word failure is 'voluntary'.

WE know for a fact now that voluntary does NOT WORK!



Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification



APHIS Indemnity Regulations [Docket No. APHIS-2021-0010] RIN 0579-AE65 Singeltary Comment Submission

Comment from Singeltary Sr., Terry

Posted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on Sep 8, 2022



Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr.

Posted by the Food and Drug Administration on May 17, 2016 Comment

Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed Singeltary Submission




Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

2

Guidance for Industry

Use of Material from Deer and Elk

in Animal Feed

This guidance represents the current thinking of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) on this topic. It does not establish any rights for any person and is not binding on FDA or the public. You can use an alternative approach if it satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations. To discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA office responsible for this guidance as listed on the title page.

I. Introduction

Under FDA’s BSE feed regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. This guidance document describes FDA’s recommendations regarding the use in all animal feed of all material from deer and elk that are positive for Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) or are considered at high risk for CWD. The potential risks from CWD to humans or non-cervid animals such as poultry and swine are not well understood. However, because of recent recognition that CWD is spreading rapidly in white-tailed deer, and because CWD’s route of transmission is poorly understood, FDA is making recommendations regarding the use in animal feed of rendered materials from deer and elk that are CWD-positive or that are at high risk for CWD.

In general, FDA’s guidance documents do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. Instead, guidances describe the Agency’s current thinking on a topic and should be viewed only as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited. The use of the word should in Agency guidances means that something is suggested or recommended, but not required.

II. Background

CWD is a neurological (brain) disease of farmed and wild deer and elk that belong in the animal family cervidae (cervids). Only deer and elk are known to be susceptible to CWD by natural transmission. The disease has been found in farmed and wild mule deer, white-tailed deer, North American elk, and in farmed black-tailed deer. CWD belongs to a family of animal and human diseases called transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). These include bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow” disease) in cattle; scrapie in sheep and goats; and classical and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob diseases (CJD and vCJD) in humans. There is no known treatment for these diseases, and there is no vaccine to prevent them. In addition, although validated postmortem diagnostic tests are available, there are no validated diagnostic tests for CWD that can be used to test for the disease in live animals.

Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

3

III. Use in animal feed of material from CWD-positive deer and elk

Material from CWD-positive animals may not be used in any animal feed or feed ingredients. Pursuant to Sec. 402(a)(5) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, animal feed and feed ingredients containing material from a CWD-positive animal would be considered adulterated. FDA recommends that any such adulterated feed or feed ingredients be recalled or otherwise removed from the marketplace.

IV. Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD Deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD include: (1) animals from areas declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and (2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

FDA recommends that materials from deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD no longer be entered into the animal feed system. Under present circumstances, FDA is not recommending that feed made from deer and elk from a non-endemic area be recalled if a State later declares the area endemic for CWD or a CWD eradication zone. In addition, at this time, FDA is not recommending that feed made from deer and elk believed to be from a captive herd that contained no CWD-positive animals be recalled if that herd is subsequently found to contain a CWD-positive animal.

V. Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD

FDA continues to consider materials from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD to be acceptable for use in NON-RUMINANT animal feeds in accordance with current agency regulations, 21 CFR 589.2000. Deer and elk not considered at high risk include: (1) deer and elk from areas not declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and (2) deer and elk that were not at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

Sunday, March 20, 2016

Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed ***UPDATED MARCH 2016*** Singeltary Submission

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM052506.pdf?source=govdelivery&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery


Singeltary comment;

https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=70082300


2003D-0186 Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed

EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Vol #: 1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Oct01/101501/101501.htm


CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE ZOONOSIS, ZOONOTIC 

“If CWD in humans is found to be contagious and transmissible among humans, as it is in cervids [57], the spread of the disease within humans might become endemic.”

PART 2. TPWD CHAPTER 65. DIVISION 1. CWD

31 TAC §§65.82, 65.85, 65.88

The Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission in a duly noticed meeting on May 25, 2023 adopted amendments to 31 TAC §§65.82, 65.85, and §65.88, concerning Disease Detection and Response, without changes to the proposed text as published in the April 21, 2023, issue of the Texas Register (48 TexReg 2048). The rules will not be republished.

Currently, there is scientific evidence to suggest that CWD has zoonotic potential; however, no confirmed cases of CWD have been found in humans.


17 DETECTION OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE PRIONS IN PROCESSED MEATS.

Rebeca Benavente1, Francisca Bravo1,2, Paulina Soto1,2, J. Hunter Reed3, Mitch Lockwood3, Rodrigo Morales1,2

1Department of Neurology, McGovern Medical School, University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Houston, USA. 2Universidad Bernardo O’Higgins, Santiago, Chile. 3Texas Parks and Wildlife, Austin, USA

Abstract

The zoonotic potential of chronic wasting disease (CWD) remains unknown. Currently, there are no known natural cases of CWD transmission to humans but increasing evidence suggests that the host range of CWD is not confined only to cervid species. Alarmingly, recent experimental evidence suggests that certain CWD isolates can induce disease in non-human primates. While the CDC strongly recommends determining CWD status in animals prior to consumption, this practice is voluntary. Consequently, it is plausible that a proportion of the cervid meat entering the human food chain may be contaminated with CWD. Of additional concern is that traditional diagnostic techniques used to detect CWD have relatively low sensitivity and are only approved for use in tissues other than those typically ingested by humans. In this study, we analyzed different processed meats derived from a pre-clinical, CWD-positive free-ranging elk. Products tested included filets, sausages, boneless steaks, burgers, ham steaks, seasoned chili meats, and spiced meats. CWD-prion presence in these products were assessed by PMCA using deer and elk substrates. Our results show positive prion detection in all products. To confirm the resilience of CWD-prions to traditional cooking methods, we grilled and boiled the meat products and evaluated them for any remnant PMCA seeding activity. Results confirmed the presence of CWD-prions in these meat products suggesting that infectious particles may still be available to people even after cooking. Our results strongly suggest ongoing human exposure to CWD-prions and raise significant concerns of zoonotic transmission through ingestion of CWD contaminated meat products.

***> Products tested included filets, sausages, boneless steaks, burgers, ham steaks, seasoned chili meats, and spiced meats.

***> CWD-prion presence in these products were assessed by PMCA using deer and elk substrates.

***> Our results show positive prion detection in all products.

***> Results confirmed the presence of CWD-prions in these meat products suggesting that infectious particles may still be available to people even after cooking.

***> Our results strongly suggest ongoing human exposure to CWD-prions and raise significant concerns of zoonotic transmission through ingestion of CWD contaminated meat products.

=====

9 Carrot plants as potential vectors for CWD transmission.

Paulina Soto1,2, Francisca Bravo-Risi1,2, Claudio Soto1, Rodrigo Morales1,2

1Department of Neurology, McGovern Medical School, University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Houston, USA. 2Universidad Bernardo O’Higgins, Santiago, Chile

***> We show that edible plant components can absorb prions from CWD-contaminated soils and transport them to their aerial parts.

***> Our results indicate that edible plants could participate as vectors of CWD transmission

=====

Transmission of prion infectivity from CWD-infected macaque tissues to rodent models demonstrates the zoonotic potential of chronic wasting disease.

Samia Hannaoui1,2, Ginny Cheng1,2, Wiebke Wemheuer3, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer3, Sabine Gilch1,2, Hermann Schatzl1,2 1University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada. 2Calgary Prion Research Unit, Calgary, Canada. 3Institute of Neuropathology, Medical Faculty, Saarland University, Homburg/Saar, Germany

***> Further passage to cervidized mice revealed transmission with a 100% attack rate.

***> Our findings demonstrate that macaques, considered the best model for the zoonotic potential of prions, were infected upon CWD challenge, including the oral one.

****> The disease manifested as atypical in macaques and initial transgenic mouse transmissions, but with infectivity present at all times, as unveiled in the bank vole model with an unusual tissue tropism.

***> Epidemiologic surveillance of prion disease among cervid hunters and people likely to have consumed venison contaminated with chronic wasting disease

=====


NOW, BE AWARE, OIE AND USDA HAVE NOW MADE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL BSE A LEGAL TRADING COMMODITY, WITH NO REPORTING OF SAID ATYPICAL CASES, EXCEPT FOR A VOLUNTARY NOTE ON ANNUAL REPORT...i don't make this stuff up...terry

cwd scrapie pigs oral routes

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***

*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <***

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.




Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.


CONFIDENTIAL

EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

LINE TO TAKE

3. If questions on pharmaceuticals are raised at the Press conference, the suggested line to take is as follows:-

"There are no medicinal products licensed for use on the market which make use of UK-derived porcine tissues with which any hypothetical “high risk" ‘might be associated. The results of the recent experimental work at the CSM will be carefully examined by the CSM‘s Working Group on spongiform encephalopathy at its next meeting.

DO Hagger RM 1533 MT Ext 3201


While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...


we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.


May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...


3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...


But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...



Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....


BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de


GAO-02-183 Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts February 26, 2002, A REVIEW 2024

Transmission of Cervid Prions to Humanized Mice Demonstrates the Zoonotic Potential of CWD 

Samia Hannaouia, Irina Zemlyankinaa, Sheng Chun Changa, Maria Immaculata Arifina, Vincent Béringueb, Debbie McKenziec, Hermann M. Schatzla, and Sabine Gilcha 

 Results: Here, we provide the strongest evidence supporting the zoonotic potential of CWD prions, and their possible phenotype in humans. Inoculation of mice expressing human PrPCwith deer CWD isolates (strains Wisc-1 and 116AG) resulted in atypical clinical manifestations in > 75% of the mice, with myoclonus as leading clinical sign. Most of tg650brain homogenates were positive for seeding activity in RT-QuIC. Clinical disease and presentation was transmissible to tg650 mice and bank voles. Intriguingly, protease-resistant PrP in the brain of tg650 mice resembled that found in a familial human prion disease and was transmissible upon passage. Abnormal PrP aggregates upon infection with Wisc-1 were detectable in thalamus, hypothalamus, and midbrain/pons regions. 

 Unprecedented in human prion disease, feces of CWD-inoculated tg650 mice harbored prion seeding activity and infectious prions, as shown by inoculation of bank voles and tg650 with fecal homogenates. 

 Conclusions: This is the first evidence that CWD can infect humans and cause disease with a distinctive clinical presentation, signature, and tropism, which might be transmissible between humans while current diagnostic assays might fail to detect it. These findings have major implications for public health and CWD-management. 

The finding that infectious PrPSc was shed in fecal material of CWD-infected humanized mice and induced clinical disease, different tropism, and typical three banding pattern-PrPres in bank voles that is transmissible upon second passage is highly concerning for public health. The fact that this biochemical signature in bank voles resembles that of the Wisc-1 original deer isolate and is different from that of bvWisc-1, in the migration profile and the glyco-form-ratio, is valid evidence that these results are not a product of contamination in our study. If CWD in humans is found to be contagious and transmissible among humans, as it is in cervids [57], the spread of the disease within humans might become endemic.


Transmission of cervid prions to humanized mice demonstrates the zoonotic potential of CWD

Acta Neuropathol 144, 767–784 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00401-022-02482-9

Published

22 August 2022


Transmission of cervid prions to humanized mice demonstrates the zoonotic potential of CWD

Samia Hannaoui1 · Irina Zemlyankina1 · Sheng Chun Chang1 · Maria Immaculata Arifn1 · Vincent Béringue2 · Debbie McKenzie3 · Hermann M. Schatzl1 · Sabine Gilch1

Received: 24 May 2022 / Revised: 5 August 2022 / Accepted: 7 August 2022

© The Author(s) 2022

Abstract

Prions cause infectious and fatal neurodegenerative diseases in mammals. Chronic wasting disease (CWD), a prion disease of cervids, spreads efficiently among wild and farmed animals. Potential transmission to humans of CWD is a growing concern due to its increasing prevalence. Here, we provide evidence for a zoonotic potential of CWD prions, and its probable signature using mice expressing human prion protein (PrP) as an infection model. Inoculation of these mice with deer CWD isolates resulted in atypical clinical manifestation with prion seeding activity and efficient transmissible infectivity in the brain and, remarkably, in feces, but without classical neuropathological or Western blot appearances of prion diseases. Intriguingly, the protease-resistant PrP in the brain resembled that found in a familial human prion disease and was transmissible upon second passage. Our results suggest that CWD might infect humans, although the transmission barrier is likely higher compared to zoonotic transmission of cattle prions. Notably, our data suggest a different clinical presentation, prion signature, and tissue tropism, which causes challenges for detection by current diagnostic assays. Furthermore, the presence of infectious prions in feces is concerning because if this occurs in humans, it is a source for human-to-human transmission. These findings have strong implications for public health and CWD management.

Keywords Chronic wasting disease · CWD · Zoonotic potential · Prion strains · Zoonotic prions

HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS STUDY

================================

Our results suggest that CWD might infect humans, although the transmission barrier is likely higher compared to zoonotic transmission of cattle prions. Notably, our data suggest a different clinical presentation, prion signature, and tissue tropism, which causes challenges for detection by current diagnostic assays. Furthermore, the presence of infectious prions in feces is concerning because if this occurs in humans, it is a source for human-to-human transmission. These findings have strong implications for public health and CWD management.

In this study, we evaluated the zoonotic potential of CWD using a transgenic mouse model overexpressing human M129-PrPC (tg650 [12]). We inoculated tg650 mice intracerebrally with two deer CWD isolates, Wisc-1 and 116AG [22, 23, 27, 29]. We demonstrate that this transgenic line was susceptible to infection with CWD prions and displayed a distinct leading clinical sign, an atypical PrPSc signature and unusual fecal shedding of infectious prions. Importantly, these prions generated by the human PrP transgenic mice were transmissible upon passage. Our results are the first evidence of a zoonotic risk of CWD when using one of the most common CWD strains, Wisc-1/CWD1 for infection. We demonstrated in a human transgenic mouse model that the species barrier for transmission of CWD to humans is not absolute. The fact that its signature was not typical raises the questions whether CWD would manifest in humans as a subclinical infection, whether it would arise through direct or indirect transmission including an intermediate host, or a silent to uncovered human-to-human transmission, and whether current detection techniques will be suffcient to unveil its presence.

Our findings strongly suggest that CWD should be regarded as an actual public health risk. Here, we use humanized mice to show that CWD prions can cross the species barrier to humans, and remarkably, infectious prions can be excreted in feces.

Our results indicate that if CWD crosses the species-barrier to humans, it is unlikely to resemble the most common forms of human prion diseases with respect to clinical signs, tissue tropism and PrPSc signature. For instance, PrPSc in variable protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr), a sporadic form of human prion disease, and in the genetic form Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome (GSS) is defined by an atypical PK-resistant PrPSc fragment that is non-glycosylated and truncated at both C- and N-termini, with a molecular weight between 6 and 8 kDa [24, 44–46]. These biochemical features are unique and distinctive from PrPSc (PrP27-30) found in most other human or animal prion disease. The atypical PrPSc signature detected in brain homogenate of tg650 mice #321 (1st passage) and #3063 (2nd passage), and the 7–8 kDa fragment (Figs. 2, 4) are very similar to that of GSS, both in terms of migration profile and the N-terminal cleavage site.

CWD in humans might remain subclinical but with PrPSc deposits in the brain with an unusual morphology that does not resemble the patterns usually seen in different prion diseases (e.g., mouse #328; Fig. 3), clinical with untraceable abnormal PrP (e.g., mouse #327) but still transmissible and uncovered upon subsequent passage (e.g., mouse #3063; Fig. 4), or prions have other reservoirs than the usual ones, hence the presence of infectivity in feces (e.g., mouse #327) suggesting a potential for human-to-human transmission and a real iatrogenic risk that might be unrecognizable.

suggesting a potential for human-to-human transmission and a real iatrogenic risk that might be unrecognizable.

=================================

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 


snip...see full text



Fortuitous generation of a zoonotic cervid prion strain 

Manuel Camacho, Xu Qi, Liuting Qing, Sydney Smith, Jieji Hu, Wanyun Tao, Ignazio Cali, Qingzhong Kong. Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, USA 

Aims: Whether CWD prions can infect humans remains unclear despite the very substantial scale and long history of human exposure of CWD in many states or provinces of USA and Canada. Multiple in vitro conversion experiments and in vivo animal studies indicate that the CWD-to-human transmission barrier is not unbreakable. A major long-term public health concern on CWD zoonosis is the emergence of highly zoonotic CWD strains. We aim to address the question of whether highly zoonotic CWD strains are possible. 

Materials and Methods: We inoculated several sCJD brain samples into cervidized transgenic mice (Tg12), which were intended as negative controls for bioassays of brain tissues from sCJD cases who had potentially been exposed to CWD. Some of the Tg12 mice became infected and their brain tissues were further examined by Western blot as well as serial passages in humanized or cervidized mice. 

Results: Passage of sCJDMM1 in transgenic mice expressing elk PrP (Tg12) resulted in a “cervidized” CJD strain that we termed CJDElkPrP. We observed 100% transmission of the original CJDElkPrP in transgenic mice expressing human PrP. We passaged CJDElkPrP two more times in the Tg12 mice. We found that such second and third passage CJDElkPrP prions retained 100% transmission rate in the humanized mice, despite that the natural elk CWD isolates and CJDElkPrP share the same elk PrP sequence. In contrast, we and others found zero or poor transmission of natural elk CWD isolates in humanized mice. 

Conclusions: Our data indicate that highly zoonotic cervid prion strains are not only possible but also can retain zoonotic potential after serial passages in cervids, suggesting a very significant and serious long-term risk of CWD zoonosis given that the broad and continuing spread of CWD prions will provide fertile grounds for the emergence of zoonotic CWD strains over time. 

Funded by: NIH Grant number: R01NS052319, R01NS088604, R01NS109532 

Acknowledgement: We want to thank the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center and Drs. Allen Jenny and Katherine O'Rourke for providing the sCJD samples and the CWD samples used in this study, respectively

"Our data indicate that highly zoonotic cervid prion strains are not only possible but also can retain zoonotic potential after serial passages in cervids, suggesting a very significant and serious long-term risk of CWD zoonosis given that the broad and continuing spread of CWD prions will provide fertile grounds for the emergence of zoonotic CWD strains over time."

PRION 2023 CONTINUED; 


A probable diagnostic marker for CWD infection in humans 

Xu Qi, Liuting Qing, Manuel Camacho, Ignazio Cali, Qingzhong Kong. Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, USA 

Aims: Multiple in vitro CWD-seeded human PrP conversion experiments and some animal model studies indicate that the species barrier for CWD to human transmission can be overcome, but whether CWD prion can infect humans in real life remains controversial. The very limited understanding on the likely features of CWD infection in humans and the lack of a reliable diagnostic marker for identification of acquired human CWD cases contribute to this uncertainty. We aim to stablish such a reliable diagnostic marker for CWD infections in humans should they occur. 

Materials and Methods: A couple of PrPSc-positive spleens were identified from humanized transgenic mice inoculated with either CWD or sCJDMM1. Prions in these spleens were compared by bioassays in cervidized or humanized transgenic mice. A couple of PrPSc-positive spleens from UK sCJDMM1 patients were also examined similarly as controls with no exposure to CWD. 

Results: We have detected two prion-positive spleens in humanized transgenic mice inoculated with some CWD isolates. Such experimentally generated splenic “humanized” CWD prions (termed eHuCWDsp) appear indistinguishable from prions in the brain of sCJDMM1 patients on Western blot. We compared eHuCWDsp with prions in the spleen from humanized mice infected with sCJDMM1 (termed sCJDMM1sp) by bioassays in cervidized or humanized transgenic mice. Significantly, we found that eHuCWDsp can efficiently infect not only the humanized mice but also cervidized transgenic mice, and cervidized mice infected by eHuCWDsp produced PrPSc and brain pathology that are practically identical to those of CWD-infected cervidized mice. In contrast, sCJDMM1sp, similar to prions from sCJDMM1 patient brains, is poorly transmissible in the cervidized mice. 

Conclusions: Our data demonstrate that high transmissibility with CWD features of splenic prions in cervidized transgenic mice is unique to acquired human CWD prions, and it may serve as a reliable marker to identify the first acquired human CWD cases. 

Funded by: NIH Grant number: R01NS052319, R01NS088604, R01NS109532 

Acknowledgement: We want to thank the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center and Drs. Allen Jenny and Katherine O'Rourke for providing the sCJD samples and the CWD samples used in this study, respectively.

=====end 

PRION 2023 CONTINUED; 


Prion 2023 Experimental Oronasal Inoculation of the Chronic Wasting Disease Agent into White Tailed Deer 

Author list: Sarah Zurbuchena,b , S. Jo Moorea,b , Jifeng Biana , Eric D. Cassmanna , and Justin J. Greenleea . a. Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, ARS, United States Department of Agriculture, Ames, IA, US b. Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, United States 

Aims: The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether white-tailed deer (WTD) are susceptible to inoculation of chronic wasting disease (CWD) via oronasal exposure. 

Materials and methods: Six male, neutered WTD were oronasally inoculated with brainstem material (10% w/v) from a CWD-positive wild-type WTD. The genotypes of five inoculated deer were Q95/G96 (wild-type). One inoculated deer was homozygous S at codon 96 (96SS). Cervidized (Tg12; M132 elk PrP) mice were inoculated with 1% w/v brainstem homogenate from either a 96GG WTD (n=10) or the 96SS WTD (n=10). 

Results: All deer developed characteristic clinical signs of CWD including weight loss, regurgitation, and ataxia. The 96SS individual had a prolonged disease course and incubation period compared to the other deer. Western blots of the brainstem on all deer yielded similar molecular profiles. All deer had widespread lymphoid distribution of PrPCWD and neuropathologic lesions associated with transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Both groups of mice had a 100% attack rate and developed clinical signs, including loss of body condition, ataxia, and loss of righting reflex. Mice inoculated with material from the 96SS deer had a significantly shorter incubation period than mice inoculated with material from 96GG deer (Welch two sample T-test, P<0.05). Serial dilutions of each inocula suggests that differences in incubation period were not due to a greater concentration of PrPCWD in the 96SS inoculum. Molecular profiles from western blot of brain homogenates from mice appeared similar regardless of inoculum and appear similar to those of deer used for inoculum. 

Conclusions: This study characterizes the lesions and clinical course of CWD in WTD inoculated in a similar manner to natural conditions. It supports previous findings that 96SS deer have a prolonged disease course. Further, it describes a first pass of inoculum from a 96SS deer in cervidized mice which shortened the incubation period. 

Funded by: This research was funded in its entirety by congressionally appropriated funds to the United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service. The funders of the work did not influence study design, data collection, analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. 

Acknowledgement: We thank Ami Frank and Kevin Hassall for their technical contributions to this project.

=====end 

PRION 2023 CONTINUED; 


The detection and decontamination of chronic wasting disease prions during venison processing

Marissa S. Milstein1,2, Marc D. Schwabenlander1,2, Sarah C. Gresch1,2, Manci Li1,2, Stuart Lichtenberg1,2, Rachel Shoemaker1,2, Gage R. Rowden1,2, Jason C. Bartz2,3 , Tiffany M. Wolf2,4, Peter A. Larsen1,2

Presenting author: Tiffany M. Wolf 1 Department of Veterinary and Biomedical Sciences, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA 2 Minnesota Center for Prion Research and Outreach, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA 3 Department of Medical Microbiology and Immunology, School of Medicine, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA 4 Department of Veterinary Population Medicine, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA

Aims: There is a growing concern that chronic wasting disease (CWD) prions in venison pose a risk to human health. CWD prions accumulate in infected deer tissues that commonly enter the human food chain through meat processing and consumption. The United States (US) Food and Drug Administration and US Department of Agriculture now formally consider CWD-positive venison unfit for human and animal consumption. Yet, the degree to which prion contamination occurs during routine venison processing is unknown. Here, we use environmental surface swab methods to: a) experimentally test meat processing equipment (i.e., stainless steel knives and polyethylene cutting boards) before and after processing CWD-positive venison and b) test the efficacy of five different disinfectant types (i.e., Dawn dish soap, Virkon-S, Briotech, 10% bleach, and 40% bleach) to determine prion decontamination efficacy.

Materials and Methods: We used a real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuIC) assay to determine CWD infection status of venison and to detect CWD prions in the swabs. We collected three swabs per surface and ran eight technical replicates on RT-QuIC.

Results: CWD prions were detected on all cutting boards (n= 3; replicates= 8/8, 8/8, 8/8 and knives (n= 3; replicates= 8/8, 8/8, 8/8) used in processing CWD-positive venison, but not on those used for CWD-negative venison. After processing CWD-positive venison, allowing the surfaces to dry, and washing the cutting board with Dawn dish soap, we detected CWD prions on the cutting board surface (n= 3; replicates= 8/8, 8/8, 8/8) but not on the knife (n= 3, replicates = 0/8, 0/8, 0/8). Similar patterns were observed with Briotech (cutting board: n= 3; replicates= 7/8, 1/8, 0/8; knife: n= 3; replicates = 0/8, 0/8, 0/8). We did not detect CWD prions on the knives or cutting boards after disinfecting with Virkon-S, 10% bleach, and 40% bleach.

Conclusions: These preliminary results suggest that Dawn dish soap and Briotech do not reliably decontaminate CWD prions from these surfaces. Our data suggest that Virkon-S and various bleach concentrations are more effective in reducing prion contamination of meat processing surfaces; however, surface type may also influence the ability of prions to adsorb to surfaces, preventing complete decontamination. Our results will directly inform best practices to prevent the introduction of CWD prions into the human food chain during venison processing.

Acknowledgement: Funding was provided by the Minnesota Environment and Natural Resources Trust Fund as recommended by the Legislative-Citizen Commission on Minnesota Resources (LCCMR), the Rapid Agriculture Response Fund (#95385/RR257), and the Michigan Department of Natural Resources.

Theme: Animal prion diseases

=====end

Prion 2023 Abstracts


8. Even though human TSE‐exposure risk through consumption of game from European cervids can be assumed to be minor, if at all existing, no final conclusion can be drawn due to the overall lack of scientific data. 

***> In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. 

The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids. It might be prudent considering appropriate measures to reduce such a risk, e.g. excluding tissues such as CNS and lymphoid tissues from the human food chain, which would greatly reduce any potential risk for consumers.. However, it is stressed that currently, no data regarding a risk of TSE infections from cervid products are available. 


COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Hansard Import restrictions on BSE beef Bellinger, Singeltary, FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Hansard Import restrictions on beef FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Proof Committee Hansard

RRA&T 2 Senate Friday, 5 February 2010

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

[9.03 am]

BELLINGER, Mr Brad, Chairman, Australian Beef Association

CARTER, Mr John Edward, Director, Australian Beef Association

CHAIR—Welcome. Would you like to make an opening statement?

Mr Bellinger—Thank you. The ABA stands by its submission, which we made on 14 Decemberlast year, that the decision made by the government to allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries is politically based, not science based. During this hearing we will bring forward compelling new evidence to back up this statement. When I returned to my property after the December hearing I received a note from an American citizen. I will read a small excerpt from the mail he sent me in order to reinforce the dangers of allowing the importation of beef from BSE affected countries. I have done a number of press releases on this topic, and this fellow has obviously picked my details up from the internet. His name is Terry Singeltary and he is from Bacliff, Texas. He states, and rightfully so:

You should be worried. Please let me explain. I’ve kept up with the mad cow saga for 12 years today, on December 14th 1997, some four months post voluntary and partial mad cow feed ban in the USA, I lost my mother to the Heinemann variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). I know this is just another phenotype of the infamous sporadic CJDs. Here in the USA, when USA sheep scrapie was transmitted to USA bovine, the agent was not UK BSE—it was a different strain. So why then would human TSE from USA cattle look like UK CJD from UK BSE? It would not.

So this accentuates that the science is inconclusive still on this devastating disease. He goes on to state:

The OIE—the International Organisation of Epizootics, the arm of the WTO— is a failed global agent that in my opinion is bought off via bogus regulations for global trade and industry reps. I have done this all these years for nothing but the truth. I am a consumer, I eat meat, but I do not have to sit idly by and see the ignorance and greed of it all while countless numbers of humans and animals are being exposed to the TSE agents. All the USA is interested in is trade, nothing else matters.

Even Dr Stanley Prusiner, who incidentally won the Nobel Health Prize in 1997 for his work on the prion—he invented the word ‘prion’, or it came from him—states:

The BSC policy was set up for one purpose only, trade—the illegal trading of all strains of TSE globally throughout North America, which is home to CBSC, IBSC and HBSC, many scrapie strains and two strains of CJD to date.

I would also like, while I have the opportunity, to explain the beef-off-the-shelves myth. At the first Senate hearing on 14 December, it was explained that the reason why they allowed BSC beef into Australia was the beef-off-the-shelves policy, whereby if we found a case of BSC in Australia they would have to recall all—

Senator HEFFERNAN—Which of course is total BS.

Mr Bellinger—Correct. This is written in the FSANZ document—Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Why isn’t this same policy in New Zealand? It is not—it is only in Australia. We are the only country in the world to have this idiotic policy. So we again call for the tabling of the WTO obligations paperwork. We do not believe that exists.

Mr Carter—We have an additional concern about human health. We are not scientists, but on 18 December, four days after the last hearing here, the BBC reported a new wave of deaths due to variant CJD linked to eating BSE infected beef could be underway. This is based on the work of Professor John Collinge of the National Prion Clinic, who reported that a 2009 death in Scotland was from a different genetic pool to that of the 166 deaths already reported in the UK. Those are all thought to share one gene, but Professor Collinge and his colleagues estimate that up to 350 people in this new group, represented by the person who died in Scotland, could get CJD. He thinks that CJD has moved into a new phase, and the incubation period is a long one. We tender the Australian Red Cross donor policy sheet, which bears out what Senator Back brought up last time, questioning the Chief Medical Officer, and we say that blood from people who were in the UK between 1980 and 1996 is not acceptable. That is the current ruling. We believe this now should be extended to anyone who has visited the UK, and this new evidence should ensure that Australia revisits the science of CJD.

CHAIR—Thank you, Mr Carter. Before we kick off, can I just remind colleagues that we are short of time today, so I ask that we do not traverse ground the we have previously covered and make sure that we stick to new information that is required. Mr Bellinger, when you started you referred to your view that this decision to allow the importation was politically based. I know you are going to go into this in the course of the next 20 minutes or so, but could you just give us a quick outline of what your definition of politically based is and why you think the decision was politically based?

Mr Bellinger—On the lowering of BSE standards: if you go back to 2006, for example, there were five categories for describing countries that had BSE and Australia was in the category for BSE free. Suddenly, by the time the United States got their third instance of BSE, through the influence of Robert Zoellick—who was the trade minister that signed the BSE corresponding side letter in 2004 and was George Bush’s appointment to the WTO—they suddenly changed the five categories to three categories and, instead of being BSE free, Australia became BSE negligible risk. At the time I put out a press release alerting the media to the dangers of this happening, and we are coming to the stage here when suddenly our government is saying, ‘Now let’s allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries.’ I believe that the WTO has been influenced by large multinational meat processors and retailers to change and allow the trading of BSE beef throughout the world.

CHAIR—Thanks, Mr Bellinger.

Mr Carter—Of course, the side letter that Minister Vaile signed was at the request of Mr Zoellick, who is now in the position that Mr Bellinger has explained.

Senator HEFFERNAN—I just want to put the committee on notice that, if we do not get through what we have got to get through today, I suggest we have another hearing, because this is the greatest ambush of Australia’s farmers of all time by a government. The evidence given at the last meeting was deadset lies. The proposition that this whole change of government policy was led by the industry is a deadset lie. While Simon Crean might want to change his mind because of the WTO and his lack of knowledge, the Australian beef industry, as you know, is under great challenge, not only from the currency but also from the undermining of our markets. This is a disgrace.

I will go to the meat-off-the-shelves proposition. By the way, there is no obligation to take meat off the shelves; it was something dreamt up by someone buried in the bureaucracy, who is probably taking notes down in the department now. There is absolutely no obligation but, if they wanted to stick to it, all they really had to do was do mandatory SRM removal. Now the renderers did not like that idea. It was going to cost money. Can you explain to us where you think the meat-off-the-shelves proposition came from?

Mr Bellinger—I think it was an ill-informed, misguided statement delivered from RMAC to the minister. They may have thought, by some weird dream, that by having this beef-off-the shelves policy it would somehow illustrate to the WTO that we cannot import beef from BSE affected countries—totally erroneous and totally stupid. Of course, if you look at the legislation on food recalls, it is handled by the states. I did an interview on 2NZ, a local radio station, 10 days ago in reply to Tony Burke’s statement on this beef-off-the-shelves policy, where he said that if a beast was found to have BSE in the Northern Territory then beef would have to be taken off the shelves in Tasmania—totally erroneous. It does not exist. It is the states who handle this. I am amazed that a minister could make this sort of statement.

Senator HEFFERNAN—You were talking about the next wave of possible human infection in the UK. It is a fact, actually—I have done some work on it. There are three genes that have been identified. One is very accepting: if you have that gene and you eat the meat, you get the consequences—mad cow disease. There are two genes that they have not worked out yet. One is more resistant than the other. Are you aware that there is a lot of science around that says, through this new understanding of the gene mutation, there could well be a new wave of mad cow disease in humans?

Mr Bellinger—I will hand you over to John Carter. He has done more research on this than me.

Mr Carter—It is Professor Collinge and the National Prion Clinic in the UK who have done this work. It is not as though it is some backyard person. I am certainly not a geneticist, but it appears to me, particularly from the work that Bob Steel has done, that these things are crossing barriers. To me, the science is not proven at all.

Senator HEFFERNAN—No. There seems to have been a change of government position in assessing the science, to risk analysis from a lesser proposition. Are you aware of when the government changed from the precautionary principle to risk analysis in terms of assessing these sorts of risk?

Mr Carter—To me, those are just words. In 1997 the UK government Lord Phillips inquiry stated that up to 136,000 people could lose their lives to CJD, and later the Blair government raised this to 250,000. Then, of course, when America gets BSE suddenly it is really no problem.

Senator HEFFERNAN—Look, this is just a trade issue. The government came in here.

Senator Sterle, I believe, will make some reflection upon your earlier remarks to say that this—

Senator STERLE—Absolutely, if you give me a chance. The clock is ticking.

Senator HEFFERNAN—Would you like to do it now?

Senator STERLE—Finish your question. No, because you will interrupt. So you have your run and then I will have my say.

Senator HEFFERNAN—The proposition was put to us last time that this was driven by the industry. I followed Simon Crean on 5AA the other day. He talked about ‘using the best principles’. He had idea what he was talking about, but they did say that this was driven by the industry—and the department accepted it, and I hope they are all listening down there, because they are a bunch of liars. They accepted the proposition—

Senator STERLE—Chair—

Senator O’BRIEN—Using this hearing to slander people in that way is completely unseemly.

Senator HEFFERNAN—Righto, I withdraw that. They overlooked the facts. We will correct the facts today, but this was driven by the industry, by demands from the industry, when in fact we now know from in an in-confidence answer to this committee there were 37 communications between the Canadian and US governments and the Australian government since November 2007 demanding that we allow their meat in here. Of course, the department of trade here— Simon Crean’s mob—said, ‘We’d better find a way,’ and this is the way they have done it. They have completely misled the Australian beef industry and I think it is a total disgrace. I might add also that, back when we knocked this on my head—

CHAIR—Do you have any questions, Senator Heffernan?

Senator HEFFERNAN—in 2005, I think it was, the then shadow health minister, Julia Gillard, was keen on maintaining the precautionary principle. We now seem to have gone from the precautionary principle, without any mention—by the way, this is all going to happen without coming to parliament—of risk analysis. I am going to deal with the risk analysis proposition when we get the guy that gave the so-called independent advice along. I will leave it at that.

Senator STERLE—I just have to clarify a few things, Mr Bellinger. You said that the OIE is an arm of the WTO. Do you want to clarify that? I am led to believe that they are not.

Mr Bellinger—I will explain it further. You have the World Trade Organisation, and then under that you have the World Health Organisation. The OIE, the organisation of international epizootics, then handles phytosanitary and animal health issues under that umbrella.

Senator STERLE—So they are not an arm of the WTO? I want to clarify it for the record.

Mr Bellinger—They are an arm—

Senator STERLE—Sorry to interrupt you. We had better clarify it, because there are people out there that are hanging on every word that is said in here so they can photocopy it and flick it around the country. So we had better get it very, very clear.

Mr Bellinger—They are.

Senator STERLE—They are?

Mr Bellinger—Yes.

Senator STERLE—You are saying they are an arm of the WTO?

Mr Bellinger—They are under the WTO umbrella.

Senator STERLE—Okay, but not an arm of the WTO.

Senator O’BRIEN—They are under the WTO umbrella—underneath and therefore controlled by. That is what your implication is.

Senator HEFFERNAN—OIE—

Senator STERLE—Hang on. Chair—

CHAIR—Senator Sterle has the call.

Senator STERLE—I just want to clarify: they are not an arm of the WTO?

Mr Bellinger—An arm or an umbrella—it is hard to define.

Senator HEFFERNAN—The OIE’s advice is provided by the WTO.

Senator STERLE—Senator Heffernan, you have had your turn.

CHAIR—Senator Heffernan, Senator Sterle has the call.

Senator STERLE—Thank you, Chair. Also, you have said Robert Zoellick is head of the WTO?

Mr Bellinger—The WTO, yes.

Senator STERLE—I am led to believe he is head of the World Bank.

Mr Bellinger—I stand corrected.

Senator STERLE—We will clarify that. You mentioned the interview you did on a local radio station about meat off the shelves. What this committee does know is that that is policy. A hundred and fifty-two countries are signed up to that policy that if there is an outbreak, regardless of where the outbreak is, all meat has to be taken off the shelves, and that is previous government policy.

Mr Bellinger—Excuse me, Senator Sterle. You are saying that 152 countries have this policy as well as Australia?

Senator STERLE—There are 152 under the WTO. If there is an outbreak, regardless of where the outbreak is, all the meat must come off the shelves.

Mr Bellinger—But there was no meat off the shelves in the United States or Japan when an outbreak occurred. Why wasn’t there?

Senator STERLE—Let us get back to the law. Quite clearly, 152 WTO members have the policy that if there is an outbreak, regardless of where that outbreak is, all meat must be taken off the shelves. Whether that has happened in America or not, this is the previous government’s policy.

Senator HEFFERNAN—No, it is not. That is garbage.

Mr Carter—There is no country in the world that has taken its meat off the shelves. Senator STERLE—Let us get it very clear. Regardless of whether they have or they have not, that is the protocol.

Senator HEFFERNAN—No, it is not.

Senator STERLE—It is. This is what we have been led to believe.

Mr Carter—But they are irrelevant protocols because they are not implementable.

Mr Bellinger—So you are saying that the United States and Japan have broken protocol?

Senator STERLE—No, I am not saying that. You are the ones who are saying they have not done it. I do not know. So do not put words in my mouth. I just want to address this very clearly. Under previous government policy, regardless of where the outbreak was—and fortunately we did not have it here—all meat had to come off the shelves.

Senator HEFFERNAN—That is not right.

Senator STERLE—I am not asking you, Senator Heffernan; I am asking the witnesses.

Mr Carter—I would like to ask you, Senator Sterle.

Senator STERLE—No, you get to answer the questions here.

Mr Carter—You said it was the policy—

snip...

CHAIR—That is okay. It has all been submitted to us, so we can go through and read the submission. But thank you very much for that.

Senator BACK—Dr Steel, thanks again for the work you have done. Can I take you to page 69 of our proceedings. It is a response dated 20 January to you from Dr Andy Carroll, and I think this really goes to the sense of the whole thing. You had written to him expressing the concerns you have raised here. His response says:

In regard to chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer and scrapie of sheep and goats, there is no evidence that these diseases can naturally infect cattle grazing on the same pastures as infected deer, sheep or goats. There is also no evidence that people can be infected by CWD or scrapie by consumption of meat … DAFF veterinarians working on transmissible spongiform encephalopathy issues are aware of the CWD research conducted by Dr. Elizabeth Williams—

and my colleague at the University of California. Are you satisfied that the integrity of animal health, beef health, in Australia and the integrity of human health is adequately answered and met? Are you happy now as a result of that paragraph?

Dr Steel—Definitely not. It is a bit like the radar people at Pearl Harbour thinking, ‘Oh, it’s the boys coming in,’ if you do not anticipate. There are three principles in science:

presupposition, evidence and logic, and I do not think this new policy has any of these qualities at all.

snip...


OIE, USDA, et al, and BSE TSE Prion December 18, 2007

the OIE is nothing more than a mouth piece for the industry, one that helped spread mad cow disease around the globe. it is the USDA and the OIE, and regulations there from, that helped spread mad cow disease, scrapie, and now cwd around the globe imo. please allow me to explain...

from the inside looking out ; 

Quote: Maybe familirise yourself with the OIE. The primary concern is animal health of the world they are the animal version of the WHO. It is a long way down from that ivory tower but here we go, until pressured by the USA representatives a country could not export animals for 6 years after finding a BSE/BASE positive animal so under the old rules the US would not be able to export anywhere in the world for another 4 1/2 years. Who got the risk levels system put in to allow some trade - your US representatives. You guys want to change rules - OK , but you do not get special rules that only apply to the US. As i have told you before Sand h I market all my own slaughter animals and you know that, so don't do the whole holier than thow act. 

With all due respect, it is obvious that you know little about the OIE and how it actually works. Having been to their offices in Paris and talked personally with the Head of the Animal Test Section, you would choke if you knew how many lobby groups attend that office daily. There is a steady stream of paid lobby groups that have one goal in life and that is to sway the Section Heads of each department within the OIE to suit the needs of different jurisdictions around the world, which curiously enough, also includes the USA and Canada. Anyone can go there and chat with them - providing they can provide valid cause to be let in. To say that the only goal of the OIE is animal health is actually only part of their function. They are more than that and my discussions with Dr. Diaz there has showed me that. But to blindly make a statement regarding what they do when you have no idea what they actually do is like eating the skin of the orange and not knowing what is actually under. 

Interestingly you state that the US Government applied pressure (to the OIE) I assume and that is a great example of the lobby groups doing their job. So, at the end of the day, one can safely assume that it is the pressure applied by certain influential lobby groups that will determine a likely outcome to an apparent OIE directive. Man alive, isn't it great to live in a democracy wherein the people get to make the choices and not just some "other" interested party or group - say like........Cargill or Tyson for example? 

So, one last question, question? 

Who wags the tail of that dog?? And for what reason other than one that is purely associated with trade and international agreements and greed? 

And you think it is so simply explainable. 

end

THE ABOVE WAS A QUOTE FROM BSETESTER Ronald Arnold Our company, BSE Prion Solutions Inc, owns the only USA Tested and Proven "Live Animal Infectious Prion Protein Urine Test" anywhere in the world that can identify the presence of PrPsc in as little as 1 ml of urine taken from a living animal.

Ron Arnold, of BSE Prion Solutions bse-tester Well-known member Joined Jul 1, 2005 Messages 517 Reaction score 0 Location Edmonton, Alberta, Canada







Volume 26, Number 6—June 2020 

Research Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice

Alba Marín-Moreno1, Alvina Huor1, Juan Carlos Espinosa, Jean Yves Douet, Patricia Aguilar-Calvo2, Naima Aron, Juan Píquer, Sévérine Lugan, Patricia Lorenzo, Cecile Tillier, Hervé Cassard, Olivier Andreoletti, and Juan María TorresComments to Author Author affiliations: Centro de Investigación en Sanidad Animal, Madrid, Spain (A. Marín-Moreno, J.C. Espinosa, P. Aguilar-Calvo, J. Píquer, P. Lorenzo, J.M. Torres); Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène–École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Toulouse, France (A. Huor, J.Y. Douet, N. Aron, S. Lugan, C. Tiller, H. Cassard, O. Andreoletti)

Abstract

Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is the only zoonotic prion disease described to date. Although the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE prions have been partially studied, an extensive analysis is still needed. We conducted a systematic study by inoculating atypical BSE isolates from different countries in Europe into transgenic mice overexpressing human prion protein (PrP): TgMet129, TgMet/Val129, and TgVal129. L-type BSE showed a higher zoonotic potential in TgMet129 mice than classical BSE, whereas Val129-PrP variant was a strong molecular protector against L-type BSE prions, even in heterozygosis. H-type BSE could not be transmitted to any of the mice. We also adapted 1 H- and 1 L-type BSE isolate to sheep-PrP transgenic mice and inoculated them into human-PrP transgenic mice. Atypical BSE prions showed a modification in their zoonotic ability after adaptation to sheep-PrP producing agents able to infect TgMet129 and TgVal129, bearing features that make them indistinguishable of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease prions.

Snip…

The transmission of atypical BSEs into sheep resulted in the emergence of prions similar to types 1 and 2 sCJD in terms of mean survival times, attack rates, PrPres profile, and PrPres deposition pattern in the brain of human-PrP transgenic mice. The similarities between the sheep-adapted atypical BSE prions propagated into our human-PrP transgenic mouse lines and sCJD prions could suggest a link between them. The well-established dogma that sCJD is a spontaneous disorder unrelated to animal prion disease has been questioned in a previous study given the resemblance of scrapie prions transmitted into human transgenic mouse models to sCJD strains (26); however, the data from that study do not unequivocally establish a causative link between exposure to sheep scrapie and the subsequent appearance of sCJD in humans, and the same could apply to our findings. An alternative explanation that cannot be ruled out is that, although being different strains, only a limited number of phenotypes could be generated for the human-PrP, indicating phenotypic convergence. Updates to old epidemiologic research is needed to reconsider all these results involving a possible infectious origin of sCJD. In any case, continuing the characterization of this newly emerged prion strain would be useful to finally discarding or refuting a link with sCJD prions.

Extrapolation of results from prion transmission studies based on transgenic mice should be done with caution, especially when human susceptibility to prions is analyzed. However, our results clearly indicate that atypical BSE adaptation to an ovine-PrP sequence could modify the prion agent to potentially infect humans, showing strain features indistinguishable from those of classic sCJD prions, even though they might or might not be different agents. The supposed sporadic nature of atypical BSE makes its transmission to sheep and later to humans unlikely. However, the expanding range of TSE agents displaying the capacity to transmit in human-PrP–expressing hosts warrants the continuation of the ban on meat and bone meal recycling and underscores the ongoing need for active surveillance.


“However, our results clearly indicate that atypical BSE adaptation to an ovine-PrP sequence could modify the prion agent to potentially infect humans, showing strain features indistinguishable from those of classic sCJD prions, even though they might or might not be different agents.”

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

Professor John Collinge on tackling prion diseases, sCJD accounts for around 1 in 5000 deaths worldwide

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2023 

Professor John Collinge on tackling prion diseases 

“The best-known human prion disease is sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), a rapidly progressive dementia which accounts for around 1 in 5000 deaths worldwide.”

There is accumulating evidence also for iatrogenic AD. Understanding prion biology, and in particular how propagation of prions leads to neurodegeneration, is therefore of central research importance in medicine.



MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2023 

Change in Epidemiology of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in the US, 2007-2020 


TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2023 

CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE TSE PRION DISEASE UPDATE USA DECEMBER 2023 


SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2023 

The role of environmental factors on sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease mortality: evidence from an age-period-cohort analysis


MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 202

Iatrogenic Alzheimer’s disease in recipients of cadaveric pituitary-derived growth hormone

''The clinical syndrome developed by these individuals can, therefore, be termed iatrogenic Alzheimer’s disease, and Alzheimer’s disease should now be recognized as a potentially transmissible disorder.''


Monday, January 29, 2024

iatrogenic Alzheimer’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease should now be recognized as a potentially transmissible disorder

Iatrogenic Alzheimer’s disease in recipients of cadaveric pituitary-derived growth hormone


2001 Singeltary on CJD

February 14, 2001

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr

Author Affiliations

JAMA. 2001;285(6):733-734. doi:10-1001/pubs.JAMA-ISSN-0098-7484-285-6-jlt0214 

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.




Terry S. Singeltary SR., Bacliff, Texas USA 77518



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