Sunday, February 2, 2014

The Presence of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in Skeletal Muscle of Cattle Infected with Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

NOTE Pathology

 

The Presence of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in Skeletal Muscle of Cattle Infected with Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

Hiroyuki OKADA1)*, Kohtaro MIYAZAWA1), Shigeo FUKUDA2), Yoshifumi IWAMARU1), Morikazu IMAMURA1), Kentaro MASUJIN1), Yuichi MATSUURA1), Takashi FUJII2), Kei FUJII2), Soichi KAGEYAMA2), Miyako YOSHIOKA1), Yuichi MURAYAMA1) and Takashi YOKOYAMA1)

 

1)National Institute of Animal Health, National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305–0856, Japan 2)Hokkaido Animal Research Center, Hokkaido Research Organization, Shintoku, Hokkaido 081–0038, Japan (Received 16 July 2013/Accepted 13 August 2013/Published online in J-STAGE 27 August 2013)

 

ABSTRACT. The aim of this study was to investigate the presence of disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) in the skeletal muscle of cattle infected with classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-BSE). The study was carried out systematically in 12 different muscle samples from 43 (3 field and 40 experimental) cases of C-BSE; however, muscle spindles were not available in many of these cases. Therefore, analysis became restricted to a total of 31 muscles in 23 cattle. Even after this restriction, low levels of PrPSc were detected in the muscle spindles of the masseter, intercostal, triceps brachii, psoas major, quadriceps femoris and semitendinosus muscles from 3 field and 6 experimental clinical-stage cases. The present data indicate that small amounts of PrPSc are detectable by immunohistochemistry in the skeletal muscles of animals terminally affected with C-BSE.

 

SNIP...

 

31. No muscle spindles were detected in the gluteus medius muscle, diaphragm or tongue. Even after this restriction, the global frequency of immunolabeled PrPSc detection was 9 (3 natural and 6 experimental) of 23 cases. Positive immunolabeling was detected in 16 of the 31 muscle samples containing spindles, including the masseter muscle (4/9; number of positive samples/number of detected samples), intercostal muscle (2/5), triceps brachii muscle (4/4), psoas major muscle (1/2), quadriceps femoris muscle (1/1) and semitendinosus muscle (3/3). In experimentally challenged animals, PrPSc detection was associated with clinical symptoms, but not with preclinical status. No positive spindles were observed in the 14 preclinical and 4 control animals. By WB analysis, a very weak signal for PrPSc was detected in 2 different muscle samples from naturally (masseter muscle from BSE/JP17) and experimentally (intercostal muscle from ID#5413) C-BSE-infected animals (Fig. 2). However, a detectable PrPSc signal was obtained from only 1 of 3 tissue pieces; adjacent locations were used for PrPSc immunohistochemistry within the same tissue in each case.

 

The results of this study indicate that low amounts of PrPSc are deposited in the muscle spindles of C-BSE-infected cattle. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first, or at least the most comprehensive, report on the localization of PrPSc by IHC in skeletal muscles of C-BSE affected cattle. Localization of PrPSc in the muscle spindles of skeletal muscles in the study was consistent with that of atypical BSE in cattle [8] and natural scrapie in sheep [1]. In addition, immunolabeled PrPSc localized at the terminal nerve endings of myofibrils has been reported in hamsters with scrapie and [16] in rodent and primate models with C-BSE and CJD, respectively [6, 9, 17].

 

PrPC is primarily expressed in neural tissues, but is also distributed in non-neural organs and tissues, such as the spleen, lymph node, heart, skeletal muscle, kidney, uterus, adrenal gland, intestine and mammary gland [7]. In muscle tissues, PrPC is located primarily at the neuromuscular junction [5]. Somatic motor neurons known as efferent nerve fibers arise from the ventral horn of the spinal cord and innervate skeletal muscle tissues at the neuromuscular junction via alpha motor neurons or intrafusal muscle fibers of the muscle spindles via gamma motor neurons. In addition, type Ia afferent sensory fibers connect to the muscle spindles. However, there are no precedents for a primary role for sensory neural pathways in the pathogenesis of BSE [10]. PrPSc accumulation in the peripheral nervous tissues may be attributed to a high degree of neurotropism in C-BSE [3, 10]. Our results indicate the centrifugal spread of the infectious agent from central nervous tissues through the somatic motor and/or sensory pathways to the muscle spindles of various muscle tissues during the clinical stage of the disease in both naturally occurring and experimentally-induced C-BSE animals.

 

Although we did not attempt a mouse bioassay to demonstrate infectivity in skeletal muscles, small amounts of PrPSc were detected in the skeletal muscles of C-BSE cattle in the clinical stage of the disease. The study suggests that it is important to investigate the presence of PrPSc in muscle tissues of C-BSE-affected cattle using immunohistochemical analysis.

 

This study was supported by Grants-in-Aid from the BSE and other Prion Disease Control Project of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan and from the TSE research of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan.

 

SNIP...

 

REFERENCES

 

KEY WORDS: BSE, muscle spindle, prion, skeletal muscle.

 

doi: 10.1292/jvms.13-0363; J. Vet. Med. Sci. 76(1): 103–107, 2014

 


 

Envt.07:

 

Pathological Prion Protein (PrPTSE) in Skeletal Muscles of Farmed and Free Ranging White-Tailed Deer Infected with Chronic Wasting Disease

 

Martin L. Daus,1,† Johanna Breyer,2 Katjs Wagenfuehr,1 Wiebke Wemheuer,2 Achim Thomzig,1 Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2 and Michael Beekes1 1Robert Koch Institut; P24 TSE; Berlin, Germany; 2Department of Neuropathology, Prion and Dementia Research Unit, University Medical Center Göttingen; Göttingen, Germany †Presenting author; Email: dausm@rki.de

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a contagious, rapidly spreading transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) occurring in cervids in North America. Despite efficient horizontal transmission of CWD among cervids natural transmission of the disease to other species has not yet been observed. Here, we report a direct biochemical demonstration of pathological prion protein PrPTSE and of PrPTSE-associated seeding activity in skeletal muscles of CWD-infected cervids. The presence of PrPTSE was detected by Western- and postfixed frozen tissue blotting, while the seeding activity of PrPTSE was revealed by protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA). The concentration of PrPTSE in skeletal muscles of CWD-infected WTD was estimated to be approximately 2000- to 10000-fold lower than in brain tissue. Tissue-blot-analyses revealed that PrPTSE was located in muscle- associated nerve fascicles but not, in detectable amounts, in myocytes. The presence and seeding activity of PrPTSE in skeletal muscle from CWD-infected cervids suggests prevention of such tissue in the human diet as a precautionary measure for food safety, pending on further clarification of whether CWD may be transmissible to humans.

 


 

Monday, August 26, 2013

 

***The Presence of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in Skeletal Muscle of Cattle Infected with Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 


 

 CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

 

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

 

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

 

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

 

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

 

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

 

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

 


 

 PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

 

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

 

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

 

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

 

Audit Report

 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II

 

and

 

Food Safety and Inspection Service

 

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

 

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

 

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

 


 

"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

 

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

 

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

 

USDA 2003

 

snip...see

 


 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER

 

2013 UPDATE

 

 OAI 2012-2013

 

OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.

 

 ATL-DO 1035703 Newberry Feed & Farm Ctr, Inc. 2431 Vincent St. Newberry SC 29108-0714 OPR DR, FL, FR, TH HP 9/9/2013 OAI Y

 

DET-DO 1824979 Hubbard Feeds, Inc. 135 Main, P.O. Box 156 Shipshewana IN 46565-0156 OPR DR, FL, OF DP 8/29/2013 OAI Y

 

ATL-DO 3001460882 Talley Farms Feed Mill Inc 6309 Talley Rd Stanfield NC 28163-7617 OPR FL, TH NP 7/17/2013 OAI N

 

NYK-DO 3010260624 Sherry Sammons 612 Stoner Trail Rd Fonda NY 12068-5007 OPR FR, OF NP 7/16/2013 OAI Y

 

DEN-DO 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO 81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N

 

CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL 61044-9605 OPR FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y

 

*** DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley CO 80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N

 

Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)

 


 

PLEASE NOTE, the VAI violations were so numerous, and unorganized in dates posted, as in numerical order, you will have to sift through them for yourselves. ...tss

 

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

 

*** Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 6/1/12 significant deviations from requirements in FDA regulations that are intended to reduce the risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) within the United States

 


 

 Thursday, June 6, 2013

 

BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013

 

Greetings,

 

since our fine federal friends have decided not to give out any more reports on the USA breaches of the feed ban and surveillance etc. for the BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease in the USDA livestock, I thought I might attempt it. I swear, I just don’t understand the logic of the SSS policy, and that includes all of it. I assure you, it would be much easier, and probably better for the FDA and the USDA INC., if they would simply put some kind of report out for Pete’s sake, instead of me doing it after I get mad, because I am going to put it all out there. the truth.

 

PLEASE BE ADVISED, any breach of any of the above classifications OAI, VAI, RTS, CAN lead to breaches into the feed BSE TSE prion protocols, and CAN lead to the eventual suspect tainted feed reaching livestock. please, if any USDA official out there disputes this, please explain then how they could not. paperwork errors can eventually lead to breaches of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban reaching livestock, or contamination and exposure there from, as well.

 

I would sure like to see the full reports of just these ;

 

 4018 CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL 61044-9605 OPR FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y

 

9367 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO 81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N

 

9446 DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley CO 80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N

 

9447 DEN-DO 3002857110 Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 13553 County Road 19 Fort Morgan CO 80701-7506 OPR RE HP 12/7/2011 OAI N

 

 see full list of the fda mad cow bse feed follies, toward the bottom, after a short brief update on the mad cow bse follies, and our good friend Lester Crawford that was at the FDA.

 

ALSO, I would kindly like to comment on this FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)4 format, for reporting these breaches of BSE TSE prion protocols, from the extensive mad cow feed ban warning letters the fda use to put out for each violations. simply put, this excel format sucks, and the FDA et al intentionally made it this difficult to follow the usda fda mad cow follies. this is an intentional format to make it as difficult as possible to follow these breaches of the mad cow TSE prion safety feed protocols. to have absolutely no chronological or numerical order, and to format such violations in a way that they are almost impossible to find, says a lot about just how far the FDA and our fine federal friends will go through to hide these continued violations of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, and any breaches of protocols there from. once again, the wolf guarding the henhouse $$$

 

 NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED

 

OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED

 

VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED

 

RTS = REFERRED TO STATE

 

Inspections conducted by State and FDA investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection, based upon whether objectionable conditions were documented. Based on the conditions found, inspection results are recorded in one of three classifications:

 

OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.

 

VAI (Voluntary Action Indicated) when inspectors find objectionable conditions or practices that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but warrant an advisory to inform the establishment that inspectors found conditions or practices that should be voluntarily corrected. VAI violations are typically technical violations of the 1997 BSE Feed Rule. These violations include minor recordkeeping lapses or conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.

 

NAI (No Action Indicated) when inspectors find no objectionable conditions or practices or, if they find objectionable conditions, those conditions are of a minor nature and do not justify further actions.

 


 

when sound science was bought off by junk science, in regards to the BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease, by the USDA, CFIA, WHO, OIE, et al. $$$

 

when the infamous, and fraudulently USDA, FSIS, APHIS, FDA, gold card was taken away that infamous day in December of 2003, all cards were off the table, it was time to change the science, and change they did. ...tss

 

snip. ...please see full text ;

 

Thursday, June 6, 2013

 

BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013

 


 

IN A NUT SHELL ;

 

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

 

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,

 


 

 Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

 Saturday, December 21, 2013

 

**** Complementary studies detecting classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy infectivity in jejunum, ileum and ileocaecal junction in incubating cattle ****

 


 

Saturday, December 15, 2012

 

*** Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: the effect of oral exposure dose on attack rate and incubation period in cattle -- an update 5 December 2012

 


 

***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model

 


 

***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle

 


 

***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

 


 

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

 


 

full text ; atypical L-type BASE BSE

 


 

However, a BSE expert said that consumption of infected material is the only known way that cattle get the disease under natural conditons.

 

*** “In view of what we know about BSE after almost 20 years experience, contaminated feed has been the source of the epidemic,” said Paul Brown, a scientist retired from the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke. BSE is not caused by a microbe. It is caused by the misfolding of the so-called “prion protein” that is a normal constituent of brain and other tissues. If a diseased version of the protein enters the brain somehow, it can slowly cause all the normal versions to become misfolded. It is possible the disease could arise spontaneously, though such an event has never been recorded, Brown said.

 


 

*** What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.” The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”

 


 

2012 ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE BASE CALIFORNIA ‘confirmed’ Saturday, August 4, 2012

 

*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012

 


 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

 

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 


 

Friday, January 17, 2014

 

*** Annual report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE EFSA, Question No EFSA-Q-2013-01004, approved on 11 December 2013

 


 

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

*** Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on paper $$$

 

full text ;

 


 

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

 

ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH

 


 

 Saturday, June 12, 2010

 

PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse

 


 

 Wednesday, July 28, 2010

 

re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010

 


 

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

 

*** Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 6/1/12 significant deviations from requirements in FDA regulations that are intended to reduce the risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) within the United States

 


 

Monday, March 8, 2010

 

UPDATE 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

 


 

Friday, September 4, 2009

 

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

 


 

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

 

re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

 


 

Friday, March 8, 2013

 

Dogs may have been used to make Petfood and animal feed

 


 

Monday, March 26, 2012

 

CANINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: A NEW FORM OF ANIMAL PRION DISEASE

 


 


 

FELINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY FSE

 


 


 


 

Saturday, November 2, 2013

 

APHIS Finalizes Bovine Import Regulations in Line with International Animal Health Standards while enhancing the spread of BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease around the Globe

 


 

Monday, March 19, 2012

 

Infectivity in Skeletal Muscle of Cattle with Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

PLoS One. 2012; 7(2): e31449.

 


 

Saturday, June 25, 2011

 

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

 

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

 


 

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

 

snip...

 

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

 


 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

snip...

 

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

snip...

 


 


 

see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;

 


 

Thursday, August 12, 2010

 

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

 

First threat

 

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

 

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

 

Second threat

 

snip...

 


 

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee

 

The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010

 

2.65 At its hearing on 14 May 2010, the committee heard evidence from Dr Alan Fahey who has recently submitted a thesis on the clinical neuropsychiatric, epidemiological and diagnostic features of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.48 Dr Fahey told the committee of his concerns regarding the lengthy incubation period for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the inadequacy of current tests and the limited nature of our current understanding of this group of diseases.49

 

2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50

 


 

Atypical BSE in Cattle

 

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE.

 

In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

 

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

 


 

When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

 

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

 


 

P.4.23

 

Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models

 

Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA

 

Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were largely undefined.

 

Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.

 

Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time.*** The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.

 

Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

 

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.

 


 

P26 TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS

 

Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1 1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA

 

Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown. We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C.*** The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.

 

III International Symposium on THE NEW PRION BIOLOGY: BASIC SCIENCE, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2 - 4 APRIL 2009, VENEZIA (ITALY)

 


 

I ask Professor Kong ;

 

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

 

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

 

Professor Kong reply ;

 

.....snip

 

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.''

 

Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

 

END...TSS

 

Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM

 

"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."

 

personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS

 

BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice.

 

The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

 

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.

 


 


 

 Tuesday, July 14, 2009 U.S.

 

Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book

 

Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

 

WHERE did we go wrong $$$

 


 

 LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow. This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$ ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

 


 


 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 


 

 her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).

 

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk JĂĽrgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009

 


 

 SEE FULL TEXT OF ALL THIS HERE ;

 

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

 


 

 Friday, December 23, 2011

 

Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model

 

Volume 18, Number 1—January 2012 Dispatch

 


 

 Friday, March 09, 2012

 

Experimental H-type and L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy in cattle: observation of two clinical syndromes and diagnostic challenges

 

Research article

 


 

Sunday, February 5, 2012

 

February 2012 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

 


 

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

 

Case-control study of cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy born after July 31, 1996 (BARB cases) in Great Britain Veterinary Record doi:10.1136/vr.100097

 


 

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

 

The epidemiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Republic of Ireland before and after the reinforced feed ban

 


 

Thursday, February 23, 2012

 

EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME

 


 

Thursday, February 16, 2012

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE

 

31 USA SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT OBAMA TO HELP SPREAD MAD COW DISEASE 2012

 


 

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

 

White House budget proposes cuts to ag programs including TSE PRION disease aka mad cow type disease

 


 

Saturday, July 23, 2011

 

CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE

 


 

Saturday, November 6, 2010

 

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU

 

Berne, 2010 TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

 


 

Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR>

 

Prion disease update 2010 (11) PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

 


 

P.9.21 Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

 

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

 

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

 

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.

 

Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis. Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

 


 

October 2009 O.11.3 Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle

 

Silvia Suardi1, Chiara Vimercati1, Fabio Moda1, Ruggerone Margherita1, Ilaria Campagnani1, Guerino Lombardi2, Daniela Gelmetti2, Martin H. Groschup3, Anne Buschmann3, Cristina Casalone4, Maria Caramelli4, Salvatore Monaco5, Gianluigi Zanusso5, Fabrizio Tagliavini1 1Carlo Besta" Neurological Institute,Italy; 2IZS Brescia, Italy; 33FLI Insel Riems, D, Germany; 4CEA-IZS Torino, Italy; 5University of Verona, Italy

 

Background: BASE is an atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy caused by a prion strain distinct from that of BSE. Upon experimental transmission to cattle, BASE induces a previously unrecognized disease phenotype marked by mental dullness and progressive atrophy of hind limb musculature. Whether affected muscles contain infectivity is unknown. This is a critical issue since the BASE strain is readily transmissible to a variety of hosts including primates, suggesting that humans may be susceptible.

 

Objectives: To investigate the distribution of infectivity in peripheral tissues of cattle experimentally infected with BASE. Methods: Groups of Tg mice expressing bovine PrP (Tgbov XV, n= 7-15/group) were inoculated both i.c. and i.p. with 10% homogenates of a variety of tissues including brain, spleen, cervical lymph node, kidney and skeletal muscle (m. longissimus dorsi) from cattle intracerebrally infected with BASE. No PrPres was detectable in the peripheral tissues used for inoculation either by immunohistochemistry or Western blot.

 

Results: Mice inoculated with BASE-brain homogenates showed clinical signs of disease with incubation and survival times of 175±15 and 207±12 days. Five out of seven mice challenged with skeletal muscle developed a similar neurological disorder, with incubation and survival times of 380±11 and 410±12 days. At present (700 days after inoculation) mice challenged with the other peripheral tissues are still healthy. The neuropathological phenotype and PrPres type of the affected mice inoculated either with brain or muscle were indistinguishable and matched those of Tgbov XV mice infected with natural BASE.

 

Discussion: Our data indicate that the skeletal muscle of cattle experimentally infected with BASE contains significant amount of infectivity, at variance with BSE-affected cattle, raising the issue of intraspecies transmission and the potential risk for humans. Experiments are in progress to assess the presence of infectivity in skeletal muscles of natural BASE.

 


 

 

 1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

 

*** Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

 

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

 

snip...

 

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

 

PMID: 6997404

 


 

 

WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

 

WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***

 


 

Sunday, October 13, 2013

 

*** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

 


 

 Thursday, January 2, 2014

 

*** CWD TSE Prion in cervids to hTGmice, Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease MM1 genotype, and iatrogenic CJD ???

 


 

 Friday, January 10, 2014

 

*** vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???

 


 

 Monday, January 13, 2014

 

*** Prions in Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy: An Update Pathogens 2013

 

Pathogens 2013, 2, 457-471; doi:10.3390/pathogens2030457

 


 

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

 

*** INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF CJD, VCJD AND OTHER HUMAN PRION DISEASES IN HEALTHCARE AND COMMUNITY SETTINGS Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr) January 15, 2014

 


 

Sunday, January 19, 2014

 

*** National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 as of January 8, 2014 ***

 


 

Thursday, January 23, 2014

 

Medical Devices Containing Materials Derived from Animal Sources (Except for In Vitro Diagnostic Devices) [Docket No. FDA–2013–D–1574]

 


 

 

 Saturday, February 01, 2014

 

vCJD With Extremely Low Lymphoreticular Deposition of Prion Protein MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE

 


 

 

 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; MRR http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/ url changed to http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; MRR

 


 

 

HAS BEEN CHANGED.

 

any link url with ;

 


 

 

will change too ;

 


 

 

 

1-14 of 14 2012

 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 9/3/12

 

JAPAN BANS DEER AND ELK MEAT AND ALLOWS SOME BEEF PRODUCTS, what about TSE prion concerns ?

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 1/5/12

 

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 10/15/10

 

U.S. Beef Talks May Progress as Japan Gathers Mad-Cow Disease Risk Data about U.S.A.

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 10/14/10

 

Netherlands reports 2nd BSE case this year 14 October

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 3/16/2010

 

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Hansard Import restrictions on beef FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010

 

atypical bse, AUSTRALIA, HANSARD, mad cow disease, SINGELTARY, SPORADIC CJD

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 12/3/09

 

FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT IN PORTUGAL FROM 11 TO 20 MAY 2009 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 11/23/09

 

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 6/23/09

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Inspection 2009 Slovenia and Bulgaria

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 5/26/09

 

OIE upgrades Japan's BSE status to "controlled risk"

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 5/21/09

 

THREE CATTLE FROM SAME HERD AS BSE-INFECTED COW HAVE ENTERED FOOD CHAIN most of the meat is likely to have been consumed

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 4/25/09

 

Prague BSE Confirmed in a Cow in the Region of Liberec in the Czech Republic

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 1/28/09

 

OIE amending the Annex to Decision 2007/453/EC establishing the BSE status of Member States or third countries or regions

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 6/23/08

 

BSE CASE CONFIRMED IN BRITISH COLUMBIA OTTAWA Monday, June 23, 2008 2:20 PM

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 6/12/08

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities APHIS-2006-0041

 


 

 

 

 

TSS

 

 

 

 

 

Monday, September 3, 2012

2012 JAPAN BANS DEER AND ELK MEAT AND ALLOWS SOME BEEF PRODUCTS, what about TSE prion concerns ?

JAPAN BANS DEER AND ELK MEAT AND ALLOWS SOME BEEF PRODUCTS ? really USDA okays some beef imports from Japan
 
 
 
August 27, 2012 By Julie Harker Leave a Comment
 
 
 
The USDA has cleared the way for whole cuts of boneless beef imports from Japan to resume, having determined that Japan is now free of foot-and-mouth disease. The U.S. halted beef exports from Japan to the United States in April 2010 while Japan managed its food-and-mouth outbreak.
A report on Farm.Com says the USDA also reviewed Japan’s food safety measures in light of concerns about radioactive contamination as a result of their nuclear crisis last year. The U.S. reviewed and approved of those measures. Wagyu beef, which is highly marbled, makes up the bulk of Japanese beef imported by the U.S.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Export Requirements for Japan
 



JA-224 (Aug 15, 2012)

Asterisks (*) indicate the most recent revision to these requirements. To search, click on your browser's "Edit" menu, then click on "Find (on this page)". Enter "*" in the "Find What" field, then click "Find" or "Find Next" until all asterisks have been identified.


Red Meat Export Requirements for Japan




Eligible/Ineligible Product


  1. Eligible Products - The following products are eligible to be exported to Japan as edible product:
    1. Beef and beef offal and veal and veal offal intended for export to Japan must be produced from animals slaughtered after 5:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time on July 27, 2006.

      Fresh/frozen beef and beef offal and veal and veal offal derived from animals 20 months of age or younger. Spinal cord and spinal column (excluding the transverse process of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, the wings of the sacrum, and the vertebrae of the tail) must be removed. Eligible beef and beef offal and veal and veal offal must be produced under an approved AMS Export Verification (EV) program for beef to Japan. Information about the EV program for Japan and a list of BEV approved establishments can be obtained from
      AMS' Web site.
snip...
B. Ineligible Meat Products
  1. Beef heads (hygienically removed tongues and cheek meat are eligible), processed beef products and veal products, ground beef and ground veal, and advanced meat recovery products containing beef or veal.
  2. Meat and meat products derived from sheep and goats.
  3. Coloring agents are not permitted in raw meat products.
  4. Bison, deer and elk meat.*


 


 

Alternative BSE Risk Assessment Methodology for Beef and Beef Offal Imported into Japan




Yasuhiro YOSHIKAWA1)*, Motohiro HORIUCHI2), Naotaka ISHIGURO3), Mutsuyo KADOHIRA4), Satoshi KAI5), Hidehiro MIZUSAWA6), Chisato NAGATA7), Takashi ONODERA8), Tetsutaro SATA9), Toshiyuki TSUTSUI10), Masahito YAMADA11) and Shigeki YAMAMOTO12)




1)School of Veterinary Medicine, Kitasato University, 23–35–1 Higashi, Towada, Aomori 034–8628, Japan


2)Laboratory of Veterinary Hygiene, Department of Applied Veterinary Sciences, Graduate School of Veterinary Medicine, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido 060–0818, Japan


3)Laboratory of Food and Environmental Hygiene, Department of Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Applied Biological Sciences, Gifu University, Gifu 501–1193, Japan


4)Department of Life Science and Agriculture, Obihiro University of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine, Obihiro, Hokkaido 080–8555, Japan


5)Faculty of Business, Marketing and Distribution, Nakamura Gakuen University, Fukuoka, Fukuoka 814–0198, Japan


6)Department of Neurology and Neurological Science, Tokyo Medical and Dental University, Yushima, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113–8619, Japan


7)Department of Epidemiology & Preventive Medicine, Graduate School of Medicine, Gifu University, Gifu 501–1193, Japan


8)Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 1–1–1 Yayoi, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113–8657, Japan


9)Department of Pathology, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Toyama, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162–8640, Japan


10)Epidemiological Research Team, National Institute of Animal Health, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305–0856, Japan


11)Department of Neurology and Neurobiology of Aging, Graduate School of Medical Science, Kanazawa University, Kanazawa 920–8640, Japan


12)Division of Biomedical Food Research, National Institute of Health, Yoga, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 158–8501, Japan


(Received 11 September 2010/Accepted 31 October 2011/Published online in J-STAGE 14 November 2011)




Abstract.





The Food Safety Commission (FSC) of Japan, established in July 2003, has its own initiative to conduct risk assessments on food stuffs known as “self-tasking assessment”. Within this framework, the FSC decided to conduct a risk assessment of beef and beef offal imported into Japan from countries with no previous BSE reports; thus, a methodology was formed to suit to this purpose. This methodology was partly based on the previous assessments of Japanese domestic beef and beef imported from U.S.A./Canada, but some modifications were made. Other organizations’ assessment methods, such as those used for BSE status assessment in live cattle by the OIE and EFSA’s GBR, were also consulted. In this review, the authors introduce this alternative methodology, which reflects (1) the risk of live cattle in the assessed country including temporal risks of BSE invasion and domestic propagation, with the assessment results verified by surveillance data, and (2) the risk of beef and beef offal consisting of cumulative BSE risk by types of slaughtering and meat production processes implemented and the status of mechanically recovered meat production. Other possible influencing factors such as atypical BSE cases were also reviewed. The key characteristic of the current assessment is a combination of the time-sequential risk level of live cattle and qualitative risk level of meat production at present in an assessed country.





KEY WORDS: beef, BSE, importation, prion diseases, risk assessment.




*Correspondence to: Yoshikawa, Y., School of Veterinary Medicine, Kitasato University, 23–35–1 Higashi, Towada, Aomori 034–8628, Japan. e-mail: ayyoshi@mail.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp or yyoshikawa@cis.ac.jp Authors’ notes: The authors, except for the first author, are listed alphabetically. This article is based on the discussion at a Prion Expert Committee meeting. ©2012 The Japanese Society of Veterinary Science




doi: 10.1292/jvms.10-0393; J. Vet. Med. Sci. 74(8): 959–968, 2012




More than 20 years have passed since BSE was officially recognized in the U.K. Now, there is prominent evidence showing the efficacy of a real feed ban and the abolishment of using meat and bone meal (MBM) derived from mammals in feeds for mammals. The total number of BSEpositive cases in the world last year was less than that of one day when the BSE outbreak was at its peak in the U.K. from 1992 through 1993. However, the U.K. continued to spread the sources of BSE pathogens, such as live cattle and animal feeds, to two dozen countries, resulting in a cumulative number of more than 220 variant CJD patients in the world [9].





Currently, Japan imports beef and beef offal from the U.S.A. and Canada, two countries that have previously experienced BSE cases and for which the Food Safety Commission (FSC) in Japan has already assessed the BSE risks of their beef and beef offal. Besides these two countries, Japan also imports beef and beef offal from other countries where no BSE cases have been reported so far. However, some of these countries were categorized as Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) category III by the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA). According to EFSA’s definition, countries are designated as GBR category III either because they are estimated to have a reasonably high possibility of having BSE cases that have not been detected or because they have had a few confirmed cases of BSE. Among exporters to Japan, there are also countries that have simply not been assessed by EFSA’s GBR.




Japanese risk managers presently request importers of beef and beef offal from the above countries to submit official health certificates confirming that the cattle are of healthy origin and also ask that they refrain from importing specified risk materials (SRM). Although the health certificates are confirmed at quarantine stations, there are currently no measures to clarify the exclusion of SRM among beef products imported. There is also uncertainty over potential risks of imported beef and beef offal due to insufficient availability of data related to BSE prevalence and anti-BSE countermeasures in the above-mentioned countries.




The FSC in Japan conducts risk assessments at the request of risk managers, or alternatively, it can also conduct assessments on its own initiative, termed “self-tasking assessment”. The process of hazard selection for self-tasking assessment is as follows. The Expert Committee for Planning collects information and screens the possible assessment subjects based on the degree of public concern in Japan, based on demands for information collection either due to increasing necessity for developing hazards or based on items that are heavily requested for assessment. Selected subjects are then discussed for potential assessment at the Commission’s opinion exchange meetings, and finally, the FSC officially adopts the hazards of choice to be the next subject of selftasking assessment.





Risk assessment of beef and beef offal imported into Japan was among the most requested items during public meetings and other occasions hosted by the FSC. Behind these requests, there seemed to be public concern over uncertainty about BSE risks in beef and beef products imported from countries other than the U.S.A. and Canada. With this situation, the FSC decided to conduct “risk assessment of beef and beef offal imported into Japan” as its self-tasking assessment.





The current assessment conducted by the Prion Expert Committee (PEC) of the FSC in Japan is based on the following concepts: (1) presently, the worldwide BSE prevalence is in the trend of decline; (2) this risk assessment is essentially different from the rest of the BSE-related risk assessments previously conducted by the FSC, in that the assessed countries are only those that have not previously reported BSE cases; (3) previous risk assessments of beef and beef products from the U.S.A. and Canada were conducted by comparing their risks with that of Japanese beef and beef products so that the assessment was based on the relativity; and (4) it was foreseen to be based on the data submitted by each assessed country on a voluntary basis. Subsequently, assuming that there may be certain limitations concerning data availability and submission, the PEC decided to largely conduct this assessment on a qualitative basis but to strive to make it as quantitative as possible.





It was with this background that the PEC firstly developed an alternative assessment method suited to the current situation and then carried out BSE risk assessment for imported beef and beef offal according to this method. In this review, the authors describe the structure and logic of this assessment method. A sample assessment result is provided at the end of this article to enhance readers’ understanding.





PRINCIPLES OF THE CURRENT RISK ASSESSMENT





The methodology for the current risk assessment was developed based on the previously used models for risk assessments of Japanese domestic beef and for US/Canadian beef imported into Japan [5, 6]. OIE’s risk assessment criteria for BSE status and the EFSA GBR method were also referred to [8, 11]. The PEC for the current assessment aimed to deliver the overall conclusion as a science-based comprehensive assessment defined by time periods and based on a combination of the following risk aspects: ...





snip...




Recently, there have been a few cases of irregular forms of BSE (atypical BSE) reported apart from classical BSE in Europe, Japan and the U.S.A. These reports of atypical BSE indicated variation in molecular sizes of abnormal prion proteins (PrPSc) among cases, and eventually two major sizes of proteins were designated as the H and L types. Most of the atypical BSE cases were found in aged cattle over 8 years old, but a remarkable exception exists in Japan, where a steer only 23 months old was reported to have been infected with atypical BSE (the 8th BSE case in Japan). When this exception was excluded, the detection ages of atypical BSE cases ranged from 6.3 to 18 years old. The average detection ages for the H and L types were 11.8 and 11.6 years old, respectively [3].





To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there have been about 40 cases of atypical BSE reported worldwide, yet the OIE does not require distinction between classical and atypical BSE cases in member countries for their reports, while the EFSA only recently referred to case reporting by classical/atypical recognition in its 2009 scientific opinion. These situations seem to further obscure the clear number of atypical BSE cases occurring in the world.





The origin of atypical BSE has not yet been determined. According to EFSA’s scientific opinion published in 2008, all the cases of atypical BSE were reported with birth dates before the real feed ban in January 2001 in Europe. Therefore, the possibility of these atypical cases being attributed to contaminated feeds, just as in classical BSE, cannot be completely denied. On the other hand, data of atypical BSE cases (both the H and L types) in France did not show any reasonable correlation between birth year and frequency of occurrence, as was indicated in classical BSE cases, thus raising the possible interpretation of atypical BSE being sporadic isolated cases of prion disease [3].





Based on the data accumulated in France, the frequencies of atypical BSE cases per 1 million tested adult cattle were estimated to be 0.41 and 0.35 cases for the H and L types, respectively (1.9 and 1.7 cases for the H and L-types, respectively, when limiting the sampling to tested cattle over 8 years old). In Japan, a total of 10 million cattle including fallen stock and slaughtered cattle were tested for BSE, and the results showed no positive cases of the H type and 2 positive cases (case 8, a 23-month-old steer; case 24, a 169-month-old Japanese black cow) of the L type of atypical BSE. These data indicate that Japan has prevalence frequencies of 0 and 0.2 cases of the H and L types of atypical BSE per 1 million cattle including tested fallen stock and slaughtered cattle (zero and approximately 1.5 cases of the H and L types respectively, when limiting the sampling to tested slaughtered cattle over 8 years old).





Atypical BSE of both the H and L types was confirmed to be transmissible by intracerebral inoculation in transgenic mice expressing alleles of bovine or ovine PrP genes and of inbred mice. However, for transgenic mice expressing human prion protein, the L type but not the H type could be transmitted according to the previously published reports (recently, it was reported that H type also transmissible to the humanized transgenic mice). There have also been reports of glycosylation pattern transformation from L-type BASE3 PrPSc-like type to more of the classical BSE PrPSc type. This phenomenon was observed during passage using inbred and transgenic TgVR2 mice. As for the atypical cases of BSE confirmed in Japan, the 24th case of BSE was determined to have had the atypical L type at the detection age of 169 months old, and its sample was successfully transmitted to transgenic mice expressing bovine prion protein. However, transmission of a sample from the other case of atypical L-type BSE confirmed in Japan (the 8th case; detected at the age of 23-month-old) was reported to be unsuccessful in transgenic mice expressing bovine prion protein. The reason for this inconsistency is not clear at this time, although the possible presence of a limitation in the amount of prion protein accumulated in the subject’s brain sample or that the inoculated volume was too low to reach the detection limit cannot be excluded.





A recent report has shown that the atypical L type of BSE has a higher degree of potential for pathogenicity than that its classical counterpart because incubation periods are shorter in atypical BSE transmitted to transgenic mice expressing human prion protein, suggesting that atypical BSE possibly has a higher degree of pathogenicity when compared to its classical counterpart [7].





In contrast to classical BSE, the systemic distribution of abnormal prion protein in atypical BSE cases is barely known. Therefore, it is unclear whether the brainstem is truly the optimal part for sampling and testing in H/L type detection. Likewise, information regarding the infectivity distribution of atypical BSE is scarce in bovine peripheral tissues and body fluid. All together, the lack of essential data hinders, to a certain extent, evaluation of the relative risk-reducing effects of various SRM removal measures for cattle.





Based on the currently available data concerning the potential risks for humans of atypical BSE and prevalence of atypical BSE, it may be too extreme to deny the risk of MRM, especially in MRM derived from aged cattle. However, the degree of influence of the presence of atypical BSE on our concept of the MRM risk will be limited to a low level under the circumstances with presently available knowledge and our discussion. In the meantime, one must also be reminded of the fact that only a limited amount of data is currently available concerning atypical BSE. A proper amount of dis cretion should be used when interpreting these data to avoid unnecessary confusion. Further research and accumulation of data will bring additional insight into the mechanism, pathogenicity and transmission potential of atypical BSE, for which further assessment may become necessary in the future.




To gain the final result of this assessment, the periodic BSE risk status of a country (the sum of invasive BSE risk and domestic stability) and efficacy of present BSE riskreducing measures at meat processing lines were combined and used as an indicator of comprehensive likelihood of BSE prion contamination in beef and beef offal imported into Japan. Surveillance data were used to verify reliability of the assessment. Finally, a summary of each country was expressed in schematic figures (an example is shown in Fig. 4). In Fig. 4, a model country’s invasive risk was ranked as high (from 1986–2005) but was reduced to the middle level from 2006 onwards. The efficacy of feed ban (domestic stability) was unstable during 1986–1989 but improved to the middle level (1990–1996), to the stable level (1997–2000) and then to the very stable level (2001-until now). Current risk reduction efficacy at meat processing lines, determined by factors such as the definition of SRM, compulsory removal of SRM by law, and HACCP/SSOP procedures were good and verified and were therefore rated as ◎. BSE testing at slaughterhouse (>30 months), proper slaughtering procedures such as avoidance of air stunning and pithing were verified as ◎. All together, the overall risk reduction was extremely effective.





The final assessment for this model country was as follows: the domestic BSE exposure/propagation risk was low, and risk reduction at meat processing lines was extremely effective; therefore, the risk of BSE contamination of beef and beef offal imported from this assessed country was considered to be negligible.





RISK ASSESSMENT OF BEEF AND BEEF OFFAL IMPORTED INTO JAPAN









Tuesday, July 17, 2012


O.I.E. BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE PRION DISEASE Final Report of the 80th General Session, 20 - 25 May 2012








----- Original Message -----


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


To: wahis_devt@oie.int


Cc: m.zampaglione@oie.int ; oie@oie.int ; rma-mrr@tbs-sct.gc.ca ; B.Vallat@oie.int


Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2007 2:31 PM


Subject: TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES in the USA and OIE reporting of it ???


Greetings again OIE,


I am deeply concerned that the OIE has completely given up on the surveillance and eradication of TSE around the Globe. I am disappointed, and IF the OIE gives favorable ratings for the USA TSE rating with the new BSE/BASE MRR policy, I will then have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...


1st and foremost question,


IF THE OIE gives favorable ratings for USA BSE/BASE/TSE, by what means will it be justified (scientific, not political) ??? ;


Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 9:12 PM


Subject: BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 COMMENT SUBMISSION


January 28, 2007


Greetings APHIS,


I would kindly like to submit the following to ;


snip...


THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.


MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???


go figure. ...




Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518




Comment Submitted Comment Receipt


Thank you. Your comment on Document ID: APHIS-2006-0041-0001 has been sent. Comment Tracking Number: APHIS-2006-0041-DRAFT-0028


Attachments: C:\My Music\My Documents\APHIS-2006-0041_January 28.doc


If you wish to retain a copy of the receipt, use the following link to print a copy for your files.








snip...end







IN SHORT, AND IN A NUT SHELL ;


(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)


11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,









Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93


Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST August 24, 2005


Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION



Greetings APHIS ET AL,


My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;


PROPOSED RULES


Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:


Whole cuts of boneless beef from- Japan...


snip... see full text ;












word file










Thursday, August 12, 2010


Seven main threats for the future linked to prions


First threat


The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...







EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story


This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;


Monday, October 10, 2011


EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story


snip...


EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.


snip...












see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;







2010-2011


When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.


This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.









Saturday, May 26, 2012


Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?


SNIP...


What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”


The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”


“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi State.


In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said


The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.


SNIP...






==============================================



Saturday, August 4, 2012


Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012






=============================================





SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE INVESTIGATION JULY 2012


Summary Report BSE 2012


Executive Summary







Saturday, August 4, 2012


Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE Epidemiological Investigation







WHO WILL FOLLOW THE CHILDREN FOR CJD SYMPTOMS (aka mad cow disease) FOR THE NEXT 50 YEARS ???




Saturday, May 2, 2009


U.S. GOVERNMENT SUES WESTLAND/HALLMARK MEAT OVER USDA CERTIFIED DEADSTOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM






OUR SCHOOL CHILDREN ALL ACROSS THE USA WERE FED THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE FOR 4 YEARS I.E. DEAD STOCK DOWNER CATTLE VIA THE USDA AND THE NSLP.


WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5+ DECADES ???


DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???


you can check and see here ;












the article in question was an opinion article _written_ by Dr. Richard Raymond former Undersecretary for Food Safety, U.S. Department of Agriculture (2005-2008), and published on Bill Marlers Food Safety News feed.













Sunday, August 26, 2012


Detection of PrPSc in peripheral tissues of clinically affected cattle after oral challenge with BSE






in the url that follows, I have posted


SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.


then


MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until 2007, when they ceased posting them.


then,


MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.




Friday, May 18, 2012


Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012






2011 Monday, September 26, 2011


L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD






Tuesday, June 26, 2012


Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada, Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012


type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the rise in Canada and the USA






Monday, July 23, 2012


The National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center July 2012






2012




***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...






MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...


***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model






***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle






***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.






***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.






The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSEinfected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission.


In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.






Sunday, August 26, 2012


Detection of PrPSc in peripheral tissues of clinically affected cattle after oral challenge with BSE






Monday, September 3, 2012


Sale of misbranded and/or non-inspected meat and meat products to Omaha Public Schools indicted






Response to Public Comments


on the


Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005


INTRODUCTION


The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Risk_Assessments/index.asp). Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:






Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.


October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024






Sunday, February 14, 2010


[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)






Owens, Julie


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]


Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments


Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006


Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;












03-025IFA


03-025IFA-2


Terry S. Singeltary


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]


Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 6:17 PM


To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov


Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle


Greetings FSIS,


I would kindly like to submit the following to [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle












U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001












TSS