Transcript - Technical Briefing to Provide an Update on Investigation of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alberta
Date/Date: February 27, 2015 4:00 p.m.
Location/Endroit: Teleconference, Ottawa, Ontario
Principal(s)/Principaux: Dr. Martine Dubuc, Vice President – Science,
Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Delegate at the World Organization for
Animal Health Paul Mayers, Vice President - Policy and Programs, Canadian Food
Inspection Agency Dr. Harpreet Kochhar, Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada,
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Marco Valicenti, Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada
Subject/Sujet: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) holds a technical
briefing to provide an update on Investigation of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in Alberta.
Moderator:
Thank you all for joining us today for this technical briefing. My name is
Denis Schryburt. We have with us today representatives from the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.
Merci beaucoup à tous et à toutes d'être parmi nous aujourd'hui pour cette
séance d'information technique. Mon nom est Denis Schryburt, agent principal des
Relations avec les médias pour l'ACIA, et je serai le modérateur pour
aujourd'hui.
In the room today, from CFIA we have Paul Mayers, Vice President for Policy
and Program, for the CFIA, Dr. Martine Dubuc, vice-présidente de la direction
des Sciences et déléguée pour le Canada à l'Organisation mondiale de la santé
animale. And we also have Dr. Harpreet Kochhar, Chief Veterinary Officer for
Canada.
Thank you all for being here today. We will now begin today's technical
briefing with an update on the investigation into the BSE case in Alberta with a
statement from the CFIA. We will then open up the lines for questions and
answers.
J'aimerais maintenant céder la parole à Paul Mayers.
Paul Mayers:
Thank you very much. Good afternoon everyone. Thank you for calling in
today. We would like to provide an update on the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency's investigation into Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or BSE, in a cow
from Alberta.
I would like to remind you that no part of the animal's carcass entered the
human food or animal feed systems. Canada's suite of internationally recognized
safeguards effectively protects the safety of food and animal feed. There's no
risk to food safety.
Our in-depth investigation is continuing and includes identification of
animals who may have been exposed to the same feed. The Agency has identified
the birth cohort for this 2015 case. We're actively tracing these animals to
determine their location and status.
The World Organization for Animal Health, the OIE, guidance establishes the
birth cohorts as the animals born in the same year as the infected animal, along
with animals born in the year before and after the infected animal. The CFIA is
following this guidance.
Over the course of our investigation, we have confirmed that incidentally,
this 2015 case was born on the same farm as the previous BSE case detected in
2010 and born in 2004. Out of an abundance of caution, we are including in our
investigation animals that were born on this farm in the years between these two
cases and that may have been potentially exposed to the same feed.
Moving forward, our focus is on tracing and determining the status of these
animals. The investigation into potential sources of contamination of the feed
will continue. As you can see, the scope of the investigation is broad. As well,
the nature of this investigation is complex and requires us to be very thorough.
It will take time.
We will continue to provide regular updates as the investigation continues.
We continue to inform and reassure Canadians and our trading partners that
Canadian beef remains safe.
Thanks to Canada's BSE controls, which include the enhanced feed ban,
comprehensive surveillance programs and the removal and disposal of specified
risk material, BSE cases are extremely rare in Canada. This has been the first
case in four years. Canada continues to be officially recognized by the World
Organization for Animal Health as a controlled BSE risk country.
We were informed this morning that China has imposed temporary trade
restrictions on Canadian beef and beef products. We continue to work with our
trading partners to share information and respond to questions they may have. We
have and will continue to share information on the investigation with industry
trading partners and other stakeholders. The CFIA remains committed to
protecting animal health and takes BSE very seriously. All necessary resources
have been directed towards managing this situation and investigation.
In closing, I encourage you to visit our website at inspection.gc.ca for
details about this current investigation and more information about how Canada
takes action when responding to the disease. Thank you.
Denis Schryburt:
Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Mayers. Maintenant, la déclaration de
l'ACIA en français, Mme Dr. Dubuc.
Dre Martine Dubuc:
Bonjour et merci à vous tous d'être présents aujourd'hui. Nous souhaitons
vous présenter une mise à jour concernant l'enquête que l'Agence canadienne
d'inspection des aliments réalise sur le cas d'encéphalopathie spongiforme
bovine, ou ESB, chez une vache de l'Alberta.
Je tiens à vous rappeler qu'aucune partie de la carcasse de l'animal ne
s'est retrouvée dans la filière d'alimentation des humains ni celle des animaux.
Les mesures de protection du Canada, qui sont reconnues à l'échelle
internationale, protègent efficacement la salubrité des aliments et la salubrité
des aliments du bétail. Il n'y a aucun risque pour la salubrité des
aliments.
Nous poursuivons notre enquête approfondie qui comprend entre autres,
l'identification des aliments, des animaux qui auraient pu avoir consommé les
mêmes aliments. L'Agence a identifié la cohorte de naissance pour ce cas 2015.
Nous travaillons activement à retracer ces animaux pour déterminer leur
emplacement et leur statut.
Les lignes directrices de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale
établissent que la cohorte de naissance correspond aux animaux nés la même année
que l'animal infecté ainsi que les animaux nés une année avant et également les
ani-, les animaux nés une année après l'animal infecté. L'ACIA suit ces lignes
directrices actuellement dans son investigation.
Au cours de notre enquête, nous avons par ailleurs confirmé que la vache
infectée de ESB en 2015 est née sur la même ferme que le précédent animal
infecté d'ESB qui est né en 2004 et détecté en 2010. Par souci de prudence, nous
avons inclus dans notre enquête les animaux qui sont nés sur cette ferme au
cours des années séparant ces deux cas, qui auraient avoir pu consommé les mêmes
aliments.
Au cours des prochaines étapes, l'Agence poursuivra son investigation afin
de retracer et de déterminer le statut de ces animaux. L'enquête sur les sources
possibles de contamination des aliments du bétail ne poursuivra également. Comme
vous pouvez le constater, la portée de la présente enquête est vaste. Cette
enquête est très complexe et exige que nous fassions preuve de minutie. Cela
prendra du temps. Nous continuerons de fournir régulièrement des mises à jour au
fur et à mesure que l'enquête progressera.
Nous continuons d'informer et de rassurer les Canadiens et nos partenaires
commerciaux que le bœuf canadien est sain. Grâce aux mesures de contrôle mises
en place au Canada à l'égard de l'ESB qui comprennent notamment l'interdiction
renforcée frappant les aliments du bétail, le programme exhaustif de
surveillance ainsi que le retrait et l'élimination des matières à risque
spécifié, les cas d'ESB au Canada sont extrêmement rares.
Il s'agit du premier cas depuis quatre ans. Le canada continue d'être
reconnu officiellement par l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale comme
pays à risque maîtrisé à l'égard de l'ESB. Nous avons été informé ce matin que
la Chine a imposé des restrictions commerciales temporaires pour le bœuf et les
produits de bœuf canadiens. Nous continuons de collaborer avec nos partenaires
commerciaux en communiquant l'information et en répondant à leurs
questions.
Nous avons communiqué l'information sur l'enquête à l'industrie à nos
partenaires commerciaux et à d'autres intervenants et nous entendons continuer à
le faire. L'ACIA demeure résolue à protéger la santé animale et prend l'ESB très
au sérieux. Toutes les ressources nécessaires ont été affectées à la gestion de
cette situation et à l'enquête.
En terminant, je vous invite à consulter notre, site web à l'adresse
inspection.gc.ca pour de plus amples détails sur l'enquête en cours et sur la
façon dont le Canada intervient pour faire face à cette maladie. Nous vous
remercions de votre attention.
-30-
Review of the Evidence for the Occurrence of ‘BARB’ BSE Cases in
Cattle
General conclusions
Elimination of feed borne sources is now, as before, the key to elimination
of BSE. The incidence of the disease can be greatly reduced but not readily
eliminated in any country by adequate imposition of controls, particularly on
animal feed. As the level of incidence falls both in the UK and internationally,
the risks of contamination through feed, or indeed through any other source,
fall whether or not controls in the UK and abroad are further tightened. With
the current expertise in Defra and the VLA, GB is well placed to keep on top of
and promote developments. Recommendations: It is essential that appropriate,
risk based, controls and monitoring should be maintained on animals and feed
until no cases of BSE are found, and controls tightened up where feasible, both
in the UK and elsewhere that the UK can influence. In view of the very long
incubation period of BSE in some animals, long-continued vigilance is necessary.
It is not evident, however, that specific new measures are needed. Basically it
is necessary to ‘keep taking the medicine’. Nevertheless, in view of new
discoveries on the nature of the disease and the possibilities of new or changed
TSEs arising, relevant research capacity in GB should be maintained.
Appendices Appendix I.
Summary of feed control measures
In July 1988 the initial ban on use on materials of ruminant origin in
feedstuffs for ruminants was introduced. In September 1990, specified bovine
offals were banned in any animal fed. A ban was imposed on export of feed to EU
and in July 1991 worldwide. In November 1994 the ban was extended to feeding any
mammalian protein to ruminants. In the EU, all mammalian protein was banned in
animal feed, but restriction removed in March 1995 on e.g. milk and gelatin and
blood products. In April 1996 the feeding of meat and bone meal (MBM) to any
farm animal (including horses and farmed fish) was banned, in June a feed recall
scheme started to remove any such feed from merchants or farms, and from 1
August 1996 the reinforced ban was started, including the prohibition of MBM on
premises where livestock feeding stuffs were kept and disinfection of lorries
etc. where MBM had been produced or stored. (This is the Reinforced Ban).
Fishmeal, animal derived dicalcium phosphate and hydrolysed protein may be
fed to non-ruminant farmed livestock. Restrictions on feeding animal protein do
not apply to non-ruminant pets (e.g. dogs and cats) that are not farmed (e.g.
horses). The UK is largely self sufficient in production of pet foods, although
materials are imported.
Control in the UK to 2001 was mainly by feed sampling and testing, with
inspection of plants, vehicles and practices where positives were found, and
identification of potential points of cross-contamination. Since 2001 plant and
vehicles have been tested: of 2800 tests, 3 may have represented some risk to
ruminant feeds.
In October 2000 use of material from condemned animals was stopped in the
EU; and from December 2000 temporary, from May 2001, permanent harmonised
EU–wide controls for BSE and other TSEs were introduced, and in August 2001 a
ban was introduced on the feeding of processed animal protein to farm animals,
from when EU regulations can be considered effective. Feedstuffs entering Europe
from third countries should be tested for mammalian protein before movement in
Europe. Measures in other countries now in the EU have been introduced at
different times, and only standardised as of 2002 and when new members joined.
Appendix II. Summary of animal control measures
Those in charge of animals, including veterinary surgeons or others
responsible for examining or inspecting animals, must notify the Divisional
Veterinary Manager of any animal suspected of being affected with BSE. On
receipt of notification the DVM arranges an enquiry by a Veterinary officer
(VO). If a VO suspects BSE, the animal is restricted by notice. If a VO believes
the suspect animal is affected with BSE the animal is compulsorily slaughtered.
Diagnostic samples are removed from the carcase and the remainder incinerated.
These clinically diagnosed cases are termed as identified by passive
surveillance. From July 2001 active surveillance by EU approved rapid testing
methods on brain tissue post mortem has been introduced in all EU member states.
Cattle tested are: over 30 months and for human consumption (a limited number in
the UK); all fallen stock and all casualties over 24 months; all cattle born
after 31 July 1996 and aged over 42 months; and a random sample of 10000 OTMS
animals born before August 1996. All offspring and, introduced more recently,
all members of the farm–age (within 1 year) cohort of a BSE case are
compulsorily slaughtered and tested. There are also measures in relation to
human consumption.
Appendix III. Pattern of the epidemic from 1996 in Great Britain Total
number of BSE cases confirmed per year in GB since 1996 has been (Table 1a,
Defra February 2005 report), including BARBs (Table 6)
Slaughtered Other Total BARBs confirmed
1996 8013 3 8016 0 1997 4310 3 4313 0 1998 3179 1 3180 0 1999 2256 20 2276
0 2000 1311 44 1355 1 2001 781 332 1113 5 2002 445 594 1039 23 2003 173 374 547
41 2004 82 227 309 21
Appendix IV. Pattern of the epidemic from 2002 world wide BSE cases
world-wide for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, for countries (or regions) which
had cases in at least one of those years (Defra web page)
Year of detection Year of birth
2002 2003 2004 1995 1996 1997
GB 1039 547 309 1059 62 39 NI 98 63 34 123 28 5 Channel Isles 2 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium+Lux. 39 14 11 25 35 15 Denmark 2 2 1 7 2 1 France 239 137 54 355 95 39
Germany 106 54 65 83 141 42 Ireland 308 215 115 393 139 10 Italy 36 29 7 22 42
20 Netherlands 24 19 6 8 32 11 Portugal 86 133 92 84 70 58 Spain 127 167 137 83
100 126 Switzerland 24 21 3 40 12 15 Eastn Europe 13 11 23 4 3 2 Non Europe 3 6
6 2 5 1
2002 IN A PEMBROKESHIRE HERD BACKGROUND BSE was confirmed in a homebred
pedigree Holstein Friesian cow born on 3 October 2001. This case was identified
in the survey of emergency slaughtered Over Thirty Months Scheme (OTMS) animals
and came from a dairy herd in Pembrokeshire, South West Wales. The animal calved
in January 2004, was dried off in November 2004 and was due to calve again in
late January 2005. The animal was housed in early January 2005 when the owner
noticed that it was in poorer condition than the other dry cows. A few days
after housing the animal was found recumbent in the building with its hindlegs
splayed and only managed to rise with difficulty. The animal remained unsteady
on its hindlegs and the owner disposed of it as an emergency slaughtered OTMS
animal on 17 January 2005 aged 39 months and 14 days. Defra received the initial
positive BioRad ELISA test result for this case on 21 January 2005. The case was
confirmed on 1 March 2005 following a positive Western Blot result and detailed
further investigations. Thirty-nine cohort animals1 and one offspring animal
(born January 2004) were identified and effectively restricted within 24 hours
of suspicion of the index case. The cohort and offspring animals were
slaughtered following confirmation of the index case. Thirty-four cohorts were
slaughtered in an OTMS abattoir on 12 May 2005. The offspring animal and five of
the cohorts were slaughtered on farm. All the cohort animals were tested for
BSE. Two of the animals slaughtered in the OTMS abattoir tested positive on
BioRad ELISA. These homebred pedigree Holstein Friesian cows were born on 28
September 2001 and 1 May 2002, and were aged 43 and 36 months respectively at
slaughter. These cases were confirmed on 27 May 2005 following positive Hybrid
Western Blot (2001), OIE Western Blot (both), Immunohistochemistry (both) and
Histopathology (2002) results. Where possible, samples from the BioRad negative
cohorts were also subjected to further testing, all with negative results.
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (as at 29 October
2010)
Monday, September 12, 2011
BSE PRION Agriculture Animal Feed Question House of Lords Thursday, 8
September 2011
House of LordsThursday, 8 September 2011
Agriculture: Animal Feed Question 11.15 am Asked by Baroness Jenkin of
Kennington
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the scientific basis for
continuing the ban on feeding animal by-products and catering waste to pigs and
chickens.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (Lord Henley): My Lords, the basis for banning the
feeding of animal by-products and catering waste to
8 Sep 2011 : Column 386
pigs and chickens is to prevent the spread of serious animal diseases for
which these materials may be a vector. The European Commission is proposing to
lift the ban on feeding certain processed animal proteins to pigs and chickens
in the light of scientific advice that the ban is no longer justified. The
Government are considering their position.
Baroness Jenkin of Kennington: I thank my noble friend for his reply. Can
he confirm that if the EC relaxes the ban on non-ruminant ABP being fed to pigs
and chickens; and if, following the consultations he refers to, the Government
are satisfied by the scientific evidence that there are no public health risks,
they will then lift the ban in the UK?
Lord Henley: My Lords, obviously we want to take the scientific evidence
into account and consider it very carefully. We also want to take into account
likely consumer reaction because we want to take consumers along with us. If
that were the case, yes, we would be prepared to lift the ban.
Lord May of Oxford: My Lords, does the Minister agree that although there
is remaining uncertainty as to exactly the origins of the rogue prion that
caused BSE and how it hopped into cattle, the balance of opinion and evidence is
that it came from the unnatural practice of feeding animal by-products to
cattle? In the light of that, would it not be wise to continue the current
precautionary legislation?
Lord Henley: My Lords, as a very eminent scientist, the noble Lord is
right to draw the attention of the House to the scientific evidence. At this
stage there is no question of lifting the ban on feeding to cattle. We are
talking purely about non-ruminants, such as pigs and chickens, at this stage.
Obviously we will look at the evidence and at what the Food Standards Agency has
to say, and then make a decision.
Lord Grantchester: We must proceed only on a risk-based approach and, as
the Minister said, the other element to be considered is the acceptance by
consumers of food so produced. The supermarkets are the gateway to the consumer.
Can the Minister tell the House the attitude of supermarkets to reducing food
waste by this change of policy? What discussion has his department had with
supermarkets and the Food and Drink Federation?
Lord Henley: My Lords, we will continue to discuss these matters with the
supermarkets and others. Obviously, where it is appropriate, food waste can go
to feed animals-already some food waste can do so, when it has been
appropriately separated from meat and other such products. However, as I made
clear earlier, any loosening of what is happening will depend on scientific
evidence and consideration of these matters. I also think that it is important,
as the noble Lord makes clear, that we take opinion along with us on this
matter.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: My Lords, would the Minister accept
that traditionally fed pigs are very popular with the public in terms of the
flavour of pork, and so on? They certainly were until the change in their food.
Feeding pigs largely on soya
8 Sep 2011 : Column 387
has an unintended consequence, in that all the imports of soya are leading
to the further destruction of the rainforests. We really must make clear that
using our food waste as best we can to feed to pigs has important consequences
much further away in the world.
Lord Henley: My noble friend is right to point to further consequences of
feeding animals in this way, in terms of producing the amount of soya used.
Again, I stress to her, we should not make any changes unless the scientific
evidence assures us that that is right and proper.
Lord Whitty: My Lords, would the Minister accept that the Government and
the European authorities are right to proceed with caution on this front? I
speak both as the Minister who was allegedly in charge during the last stages of
food and mouth and as a former consumer champion. The noble Lord, Lord May, has
spoken about BSE and we still do not know how the foot and mouth virus entered
the chain. While some relaxation may be possible, I advise extreme
caution.
Lord Henley: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord was totally in
charge, and not just allegedly. As he puts it, we will proceed only if the
scientific evidence is right and proper.
Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, it is very important we realise that the
public perception is that the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in February
2001, which had such horrific consequences for the economy and everything else,
was the result of feeding animals to animals. Although there is a suggestion-or
at least the Minister has stated-that that will not happen with cattle, in the
minds of the Great British public it does not matter whether it is cattle, pigs
or poultry; they would still have this feeling. We must be awfully careful
before relaxing the ban.
Lord Henley: My Lords, the ban in 2001 that my noble friend refers to was
a ban on swill. We had already banned the use of processed animal protein as a
result of the BSE problems. I reiterate what I have said in answer to every
question: we will proceed with extreme caution and we will base any decisions,
as will the European Commission, on the scientific evidence available to
us.
ARCHIVE: BSE: Disease control & eradication - The feed ban
The aim of our BSE-related feed control policy is to ensure the continued
decline and eventual eradication of BSE in the UK. Effective controls on
livestock feed are the key to achieving this.
The rate of BSE cases in cattle being reported now is significantly lower
than in 1988, when the disease was first made notifiable, and the number of new
cases continues to decline yet further. The key factor behind this success has
been the very high level of compliance with BSE-related feed controls throughout
the feed manufacture, supply, and livestock industries. Industry quality
assurance schemes have considerably enhanced the level of compliance.
Experiments show that doses of infected tissue as low as 1 mg can infect a
calf so there is a need for everyone involved in the feed chain to maintain the
very high level of compliance seen to date.
Feed controls
In the UK, the original feed ban was introduced in 1988 to prevent
ruminant protein being fed to ruminants. In addition, it has been illegal to
feed ruminants with all forms of mammalian protein (with specific exceptions)
since November 1994 and to feed any farmed livestock, including fish and horses,
with mammalian meat and bone meal (mammalian MBM) since 04 April 1996.
EU-wide Feed Controls
Regulation (EC) No.999/2001 introduced EU controls to combat the spread of
BSE. The measures included a ban on the feeding of processed animal proteins to
animals which are kept, fattened or bred for the production of food. Some of
these measures have been amended in line with the European Commission’s TSE
Roadmap and further amendments are possible in the future. The Regulation is
administered by the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Regulations.
Feed controls - At a glance
snip...see full text ;
ARCHIVE: BSE: Disease control & eradication - the feed ban - born
after the July 1988 ban (BAB) cases
[back toThe feed ban]
The July 1988 ban on feeding ruminant proteins to ruminants (e.g. cattle,
sheep, goats and deer) in Great Britain, significantly reduced the risk of BSE
infection. There was a marked decrease in the number of confirmed BSE cases born
after the July 1988 ban (BAB cases) although the long incubation period delayed
the impact on BSE cases by approximately five years. Investigations of the
initial BAB cases indicated that the most likely source of infection in these
cases was the continued use of feed manufactured before the 1988 ban.
Reasons for BAB cases
By autumn 1994 the decline in the epidemic was occurring more slowly in
the north and east of England in which the proportion of pigs relative to cattle
was highest. At that time pig and poultry feed could legitimately contain
ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) and there was an increased risk of cross
contamination of cattle feed with MBM in these areas. Samples of cattle feed
taken in August 1994 were found to contain ruminant MBM, demonstrating that such
cross-contamination could occur. A 1994 case-control study looked at possible
causes of BSE in BAB animals concluding that a food borne source of infection
was the most likely explanation.
The continued presence of BSE infectivity in MBM suggested failings in the
Specified Risk Material (formerly Specified Bovine Offals (SBO)) controls. The
most likely source of this problem came from the practice of splitting bovine
skulls. Brain was disposed as SBO and the skull was rendered to MBM, but brain
tissue sometimes remained in the skull, allowing infectivity to enter MBM. Other
SBO may have been inadequately separated from non-SBO material, providing
another potential route of infection. Subsequent research has shown that some of
the rendering systems in use until December 1994 had little effect on BSE.
Prevention of Cross Contamination
In August 1995, the controls on the handling of SBO were strengthened
further to protect animal health. They required that the whole skull (except the
tongue) be disposed of as SBO and that rendering plants use dedicated lines for
processing SBO. In April 1996 the use of mammalian MBM was banned in all feed
for livestock, fish and equine animals. This was not as a result of fears of BSE
in non-ruminant species but to remove any possible risk of cross-contamination
of cattle rations with MBM in feed intended for other species. A Voluntary Feed
Recall Scheme, in June 1996, offered free collection and disposal of residual
stocks of feed. From 1 August 1996 it became an offence (except in very tightly
defined and controlled circumstances) to hold mammalian MBM on farms or in feed
mills and premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or
stored.
BSE: Disease Control & Eradication - The Feed Ban - Born After the
Reinforced Ban (BARB) Cases
1 August 1996 is regarded as the date the reinforced feed ban became
effective. BSE cases born after July 1996 are referred to as born after the
reinforced ban (BARB) cases.
Incidence
Details for cases in animals born after the reinforced feed ban of August
1996, that have been confirmed in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland, are
available on the Veterinary Laboratories Agency website (PDF 300 KB).
Reasons for BARB Cases
Animal Health carries out a detailed epidemiological investigation into
all BARB cases in Great Britain. One possible reason for BARB cases is the
contamination of cattle feed ingredients with mammalian MBM handled, stored and
transported outside the UK, prior to the 2001 EU-wide ban feeding of processed
animal protein (PAP) to all farmed animals. Newer Member States may not have
implemented full BSE controls until after January 2001.There is also evidence
from epidemiological investigations into BARB cases that some cases result from
the persistence of infection in feed stores.
In 2004, Professor William Hill FRS of the University of Edinburgh carried
out an independent review of BARB cases in the UK. Professor Hill concluded that
the UK controls in place to eliminate BSE in cattle were soundly based and
confirmed that the elimination of food-borne sources was key to the eradication
of BSE. He recommended that risk-based controls and monitoring should be
maintained on animals and feed.
The report is available (PDF 177 KB) and the Defra response is available
here (PDF 55KB).
Spontaneous occurrence (14-16) The evidence from the absence of BSE in
many countries and the surveillance schemes abroad indicates that most BARBs
cases cannot have arisen spontaneously, although the possibility cannot be
excluded that a very few of them did so. The possibility of a very low frequency
of spontaneous occurrence of BSE may be monitored from the output of
surveillance in cattle populations elsewhere.
snip...
Genetic variation in susceptibility (17-21) a) Previous statistical and
molecular genetic studies indicate there is little genetic variation of cattle
associated with susceptibility to BSE. b) Preliminary information from the GB
analysis and detailed information from the NI analyses of DNA sequence data on
BARBs cases and controls as yet show no clear associations, with no genotype
exclusively associated with BARBs cases whether acquired by infection or arising
spontaneously.
snip...
Feed borne infection (31-34) a) Recent unpublished experiments at the VLA
have shown that feeding exceptionally low doses (0.001g) of infected neural
tissue can cause BSE. b) The working hypothesis of Defra that the major cause of
BSE in BARBs cases has been through the ingestion of contaminated feed, most
likely by young animals, is strongly supported. Thus control of the disease
requires, as it has always required, completely eliminating the agent from the
cattle feed chain. c) Understanding causes of variation in infectivity are
important in terms of understanding the disease, but do not particularly impinge
on the control of BSE, where risks have to be avoided. R: Defra continues to
operate on the basis that BSE transmission via feed is the major route involved
in BARB cases.
snip...
General conclusions Elimination of feed borne sources seems to be now, as
before, the key to elimination of BSE. The incidence of the disease can be
greatly reduced but not readily eliminated in any country by adequate imposition
of controls, particularly on animal feed. As the level of incidence falls both
in the UK and internationally, the risks of contamination through cattle feed,
pet food, or indeed through any other source, fall whether or not controls in
the UK and abroad are further tightened. With the current expertise in Defra and
the VLA, GB is well placed to keep on top of and promote developments. R: It is
essential that appropriate, risk based, controls and monitoring should be
maintained on animals and feed until no cases of BSE are found, and controls
tightened up where feasible, both in the UK and elsewhere that the UK can
influence. In view of the very long incubation period of BSE in some animals,
long-continued vigilance is necessary. It is not evident, however, that specific
new measures are needed. Basically it is necessary to ‘keep taking the
medicine’. Nevertheless, in view of new discoveries on the nature of the disease
and the possibilities of new or changed TSEs arising, relevant research capacity
in GB should be maintained.
snip...
see full text ;
BSE SUMMARY OF PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE REPORTS IN GREAT BRITAIN
GENERAL STATISTICS ON BSE CASES IN GREAT BRITAIN
TSE EXOTIC SPECIES
Subject: Re: MAFF's views on the effects of pithing
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2000 13:16:25 –0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de References: 1
######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
Dear Lord Lucas and all,
> The Government has funded research which found evidence of >
contamination of jugular blood by fragments of brain tissue in one > out of
16 animals which were pithed following stunning.
not much of a research program, but since they found contamination of one
out of 16, this should merit further research ASAP.
> That research did not investigate whether any traces of brain tissue
> could be transported in the blood to the rest of the carcase.
as i said, not much of a study
> The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee reviewed the research
> findings and advised that there is no reason on the basis of current data
> to change UK practices of stunning and pithing during slaughter of
cattle.
[this would translate to, not enough human deaths yet, to change
practice...TSS]
this is unfortunate for U.K. public, and could further spread the agent.
did they research all the data?
why did SEAC refuse to look at the research put forth in the LANCET of
Sept. 1996 on Pithing by Tam Garland of Texas A.M.?
>From what i understand they refused the data because the research was
not done in the U.K.???
Who/Why would care, if the research proved that pithing could further
spread the agent? Which in fact, it showed a published color photo of 14.5 cm of
brain tissue in the LUNG. It had already gone through the heart. In their
unpublished work they found 16.5 cm of brain tissue in the LIVER which means it
blew through the heart and lungs to arrive in arterial circulation.
Their views...unfortunately for U.K.
Q.-- Research on the risks of contamination by stunning and slaughter
procedures?
A.-- A MAFF-funded team at Bristol University has been carrying out
research on the possibility that stunning and slaughter procedures may cause
cattle carcases to be contaminated by brain tissue. An article about this
research was published in the Veterinary Record on 16 Oct. 1999.
Q.-- What does this research show?
A.-- The researchers were looking for signs of brain tissue in the jugular
vein (the blood vessel draining the head) of cattle which had been stunned using
various different methods. They found brain tissue in jugular venous blood of
one animal which had been stunned by a method used in the UK. This was one of
sixteen animals which had been stunned using a penetrative captive bolt gun
followed by pithing. None of fifteen animals stunned by penetrative captive bolt
without subsequent pithing showed any sign of brain material in their
blood.
Q.-- What is the significance of this finding?
A.-- The research has found evidence that neural contamination of the blood
could result from stunning and pithing. If traces of brain tissue can be
transported via the blood stream to the edible parts of the carcase, there could
be implications for human health in relation to BSE.
Q.-- Does this research show that beef is unsafe?
A.-- No. The research did not demonstrate that meat can be contaminated by
traces of brain tissue in the blood. Before any brain fragments in venous blood
could get into the arterial system, they would have to pass through a network of
very fine blood vessels in the lungs. Only very small particles would in
principle be capable of doing so.
Q.-- What is SEAC's advice?
A.-- SEAC have advised that there is no reason on the basis of current data
to change the common UK practices of stunning and pithing during slaughter of
cattle.
Q.-- Why did SEAC take this view?
A.-- SEAC's view was that * the finding of brain tissue in the venous blood
in one of a group of sixteen cattle slaughtered by penetrating captive bolt
pistol and subsequent pithing provides insufficient data to give an accurate
assessment of the frequency of this occurrence;
* there are no data as to whether or not neural tissue reached the
arterial circulation in the single positive animal; * the very low number of
infected animals at the late stage of the incubation period entering the food
chain means that there is no need to alter current slaughter practices.
Q.-- What methods of stunning are used in the UK?
A.-- Animals are stunned to ensure immediate unconsciousness which lasts
until death by bleeding. Of abattoirs in the UK killing cattle for sale for
human consumption, about 80% currently use a penetrating captive bolt with
pithing and about 20% a penetrating captive bolt without pithing.
Q.-- What is pithing?
A.-- Pithing is the insertion of a rod into the brain through the hole made
by the captive bolt. It destroys brain tissue and speeds up brain death. Pithing
is carried out, before hoisting the animal, to reduce the involuntary kicking
actions of the stunned animal.
Q.-- Why is pithing used?
A.-- Pithing has benefits for both the safety of abattoir workers and
animal welfare as it reduces involuntary kicking by stunned animals and removes
any risk that a stunned animal may regain consciousness........
kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
Ralph Lucas wrote:
> > ######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
> > Lord Lucas asked Her Majesty's Government:
> > Whether the practice of "pithing" cattle at slaughter results in
the
> contamination of the carcass with brain material; and, if so, what is
the
> level of such contamination. (HL 1523)
> > The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food (Baroness
> Hayman): The Government has funded research which found evidence of
> contamination of jugular blood by fragments of brain tissue in one out
of 16
> animals which were pithed following stunning. That research did not
> investigate whether any traces of brain tissue could be transported in
the
> blood to the rest of the carcase. The results were published in the
> Veterinary Record of 16 October 1999. The Spongiform Encephalopathy
> Advisory Committee reviewed the research findings and advised that
there is
> no reason on the basis of current data to change UK practices of
stunning
> and pithing during slaughter of cattle.
> > ############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
############
2015
Veterinary Record 2015;176:159-160 doi:10.1136/vr.h784
Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President
CONCERN about the robustness of the surveillance network in England and
Wales was expressed by the BVA President, John Blackwell, in his speech to the
Association's annual London dinner last week.
Mr Blackwell said that, while the BVA understood the need for
rationalisation and efficiency, it was concerned that the surveillance system
that had been relied on in recent years was being dismantled without the
replacement being properly tested. If information coming from postmortem
examinations was not systematically and consistently fed into a central data
collection point, it would be ‘a lot harder to join the dots’ and to spot a
problem, something that was the ‘very foundation of a robust surveillance
system’.
‘If there is now a risk that we have a less responsive and accurate
diagnosis system, a system that is as yet not joined up and integrated, we leave
ourselves vulnerable, less able to spot new and emerging diseases and act
quickly to contain them’
As well as identifying known threats, a robust surveillance mechanism
needed to identify the unknowns: ‘If there is now a risk that we have a less
responsive and accurate diagnosis system, a system that is as yet not joined up
and integrated, we leave ourselves vulnerable, less able to spot new and
emerging diseases and act quickly to contain them,’ said Mr Blackwell. ‘This
risk is multiplied if the network of surveillance – that strategic ability to
horizon scan – is patchy. We fear this may now be the case. Soon after I
qualified back in 1985, BSE was effectively diagnosed because of our network of
surveillance laboratories. A network that allowed us to grasp and understand the
emerging threat and identify the unknown risk. Are we confident we have the
systems in place to spot the next emergent threat, the next …
> Could we spot the next BSE?
we have not spotted all the cases the first time around. with Nations like
the United States and Canada, organizations like the USDA, OIE, and WTO et al,
it was never about ‘spotting’ all the BSE TSE prion cases, it was more about how
not to find them. the triple BSE mad cow firewall, was and still is, nothing but
ink on paper. ...please see facts ;
COMMENT
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation
of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;
I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from
the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA
and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is
any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just
saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present
mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?
North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species
(excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and
or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented
evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine
spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just
not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid
CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type
BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to
date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical
Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different
strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow
case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC.
typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al),
and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical
Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid
populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk
assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to
trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day
December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats
the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries
throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated
to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the
OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion
disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type
disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about
money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating
disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure,
sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion
disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its
all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the
infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$
the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was
nothing but ink on paper.
for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and
that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE
GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all
TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk
assessments be made stronger than before.
lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to
America.
Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest
year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases
dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to
date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad
cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the
number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the
USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in
2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD
COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in
my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow
disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE
mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.
Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)
Country/Year
snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the
USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease.
...TSS
No documents available.
AttachmentsView All (1)
Empty
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation
of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
View Attachment:
Singeltary Submission to USDA 2014 BSE CJD TSE PRION
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation
of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular
characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases
from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE
contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also
suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
*** PLOS Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic
Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
PLOS Singeltary Comment ;
*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ?
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
2014
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice
overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may
result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical
similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype
at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and
another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].
snip...
Monday, December 1, 2014
Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A
Review December 1, 2014
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Identification of H-type BSE in Portugal
Thursday, December 25, 2014
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Romania Confirmed
Monday, May 5, 2014
Brazil BSE Mad Cow disease confirmed OIE 02/05/2014
Mad cow disease (No 193): In the latest exchanges of one of the
longest-running issues in the committee, Brazil complained about beef import
restrictions in China, South Africa and Japan even though mad cow disease
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE) was found in only one cow and did not
find its way into the food chain.
The EU repeated its concern that countries ban imports on BSE grounds on
products that are considered safe by the World Animal Health Organization (OIE),
and on products from whole countries instead of recognizing that regions within
them are disease-free. This time the EU said it is concerned about China’s
import ban, urged Rep. Korea and the US to speed up their efforts on allowing
imports, and praised Singapore for relaxing its restrictions.
Replying either to Brazil or the EU or both, China, South Africa, Japan
and Rep Korea said they were discussing the issue bilaterally and in some cases
seeking more information. China said there are many problems “undefined” in
science, and that it has no BSE cases and has to protect its livestock. Its laws
and regulations ban imports from countries that have BSE, China said.
Monday, October 21, 2013
WTO Mad cow disease (No 193)
Thursday, September 26, 2013
Brazil evaluate the implementation of health rules on animal by-products
and derived products SRM BST TSE PRION aka MAD COW DISEASE
Friday, December 07, 2012
ATYPICAL BSE BRAZIL 2010 FINALLY CONFIRMED OIE 2012
Wednesday, December 19, 2012
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Brazil
spontaneous atypical BSE ???
if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of
atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$
As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been
reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.
FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many
spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$
so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases
in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+
cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with
any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
Thursday, January 29, 2015
OIE REPORT Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Prion (atypical BSE type H),
Norway Information received on 29/01/2015
Thursday, October 02, 2014
[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine
Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December
4, 2013
TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD
COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were
wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on
paper $$$
full text ;
Friday, January 23, 2015
Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein sources
and relaxing the mad cow ban $
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution
of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05
Study of Atypical Bse
Sunday, December 28, 2014
Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFOIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE PRION
aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST
2014
Thursday, October 02, 2014
[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
Saturday, August 30, 2014
Maine Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified
Risk Materials SRM TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease
Friday, December 19, 2014
Rancho Alleged Cancerous Eyeball Case Going To Trial
Saturday, November 10, 2012
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk
Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK
MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
Friday, August 8, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
Saturday, April 5, 2008
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the
tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
Thursday, November 18, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92
BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS
Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent
application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas
represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA
provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various
injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation
revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a
computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the
service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was
placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in
restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports
to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska
cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska
ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle
including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow
Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections
of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about
feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for
laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to
the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation
by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE
inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his
reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he
submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year
term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in restitution.
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for
specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over
SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are
completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs
February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602)
525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD
COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of
Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail
fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel
Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease
relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without
that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at
risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their
continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm
Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government
funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004,
Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from
cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The
Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty
months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous
system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle.
Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per
obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle
Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow
disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the
sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm
Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that
Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted
Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or
caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in
order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified
corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the
extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have
jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its
place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to
effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect,
obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not
subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests
to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not
subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;
(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s
testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA
that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify,
internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats
was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from
cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to
fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads
prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds
carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud
convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for
the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence,
Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide
appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those
guidelines in determining a sentence.
Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The
investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE
NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
WE can only hope that this is a single incident. BUT i have my doubts. I
remember when the infamous TOKEN Purina Feed Mill in Texas was feeding up to 5.5
grams of potentially and probably tainted BANNED RUMINANT feed to cattle, and
the FDA was bragging at the time that the amount of potentially BANNED product
was so little and the cattle were so big ;
"It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in
origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no
evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the
feed were contaminated."
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a
cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. ... FDA's
investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into
"meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was
able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by
the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
WE now know all that was a lie. WE know that literally Thousands of TONS
of BANNED and most likely tainted product is still going out to commerce. WE
know now and we knew then that .005 to a gram was lethal. WE know that CWD
infected deer and elk, scrapie infected sheep, BSE and BASE infected cattle have
all been rendered and fed back to livestock (including cattle) for human and
animal consumption.
Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the
CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'',
and this was on March 15, 2006 ;
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National
Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an
expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question
was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one
year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that
initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected
seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector
general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before
2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr.
Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous
System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain
Thursday, November 28, 2013
Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch
Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows
seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our
children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high
risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they
did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a
recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked
the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse),
not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type
disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can
lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE
NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???
Saturday, September 21, 2013
Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry
Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH
RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ??? this recall was not for the welfare of the animals.
...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)
try this link ;
Sunday, November 13, 2011
*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer
livestock
Friday, January 30, 2015
*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
snip...
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that
some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type
Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME)
and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that
could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies
diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type
disease
what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the
public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.
why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping
everything the USDA inc says.
sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and
there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.
My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker
Becky Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.
with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you
Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the
Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am
seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years
and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or
what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other
meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how
many bodies is this market worth?
Saturday, January 17, 2015
*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed
with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Thursday, January 15, 2015
41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE
Prion: Case Report
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
NASDA BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE, PRION, Policy Statements updated with
amendments passed during the NASDA Annual Meeting Updated September 18, 2014
Sunday, December 28, 2014
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE AKA MAD DEER DISIEASE USDA
USAHA INC DECEMBER 28, 2014
*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC ***
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in
Texas in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European
the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed
investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to
European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The
specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear
largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where
other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.
Sunday, December 14, 2014
ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report
Sunday, February 08, 2015
FDA SCIENCE BOARD TO THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION BOVINE HEPARIN BSE
CJD TSE PRION Wednesday, June 4, 2014
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to
disease etiology?
Saturday, February 14, 2015
*** Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
*** Alberta Canada First case of chronic wasting disease found in farm elk
since 2002
UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD
OTHERS
BEEF AND VEAL
LIVE CATTLE
FATS
EMBRYOS
GELATIN ETC
SEMEN
MEAT
Wednesday, February 18, 2015
OIE Bovine spongiform encephalopathy ,Canada
Saturday, February 14, 2015
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in Alberta
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President
Friday, February 20, 2015
A BSE CANADIAN COW MAD COW UPDATE Transcript - Briefing (February 18, 2015)
Monday, February 23, 2015
20th BSE Case Raises New Concerns about Canada's Feeding Practices and
Voluntary Testing Program; Highlights Importance of COOL
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February
14, 2001 JAMA
snip...
layperson
mom dod 12/14/97 confirmed hvCJD, just made a promise to mom, never forget,
and never let them forget...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
TSS
