Wednesday, February 28, 2024

Draft guidance on Mechanically Separated Meat (MSM) for the consultation 2024

Draft guidance on Mechanically Separated Meat (MSM) for the consultation 2024

Draft guidance on mechanically separated meat (MSM): Introduction

This guidance will explain how the definition of Mechanically Separated Meat (MSM) in Annex I, point 1.14 of assimilated Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 in Northern Ireland should be applied.

Last updated: 28 February 2024 View as PDF(Opens in a new window)


We are consulting on this draft guidance. See Consultation on the mechanically separated meat (MSM) guidance for details.

Assimilated Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 (Opens in a new window) in GB / Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 (Opens in a new window) in Northern Ireland (NI) (together ‘the Regulations’) lay down specific hygiene rules for Food Business Operators ( FBO s) in relation to food of animal origin. The specific hygiene requirements that must be applied to the preparation and handling of products of animal origin depend on the nature of the product as defined under the Regulations. Establishments manufacturing and/or handling products subject to requirements under Annex III to the Regulations must be approved for the manufacture and/or handling of products that they wish to place on the market unless a relevant exemption applies.
A product must be correctly classified to ensure that its preparation and handling meet the requirements of food law for that product. Product classifications are set out in the definitions provided in Annex I to the Regulations. 

The Courts have delivered judgments (together ‘the Judgments’) that clarify how the definition of MSM in Annex I to the Regulations should be interpreted and applied. There have been no changes to the Regulations as a result of the Judgments; no legislative requirements regarding MSM have been added, amended or removed.

This guidance provides advice and clarification on implications of the Judgments. It supersedes the 2012 Guidance on the Moratorium regarding the production and use of desinewed meat (‘DSM’) in the UK, which was officially withdrawn on 14 November 2022.

It remains prohibited to use bones or bone-in cuts of bovine, ovine and caprine animals for the production of MSM, under Annex V of assimilated Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 (Opens in a new window) in GB / Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 (Opens in a new window) in NI, laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs).

Intended audience


This guidance is intended for:

  • FBO s currently using, or intending to use, mechanical meat separation equipment in their production processes (for example, Baader, SEPAmatic, Marel and other food processing machines). 

  • FBO s using, or intending to use, MSM as an ingredient.

  • FBO s producing or using, or intending to produce or use, an ingredient for which clarity is required as to its classification i.e., whether it is MSM.

  • FBO s that place MSM products and/or meat preparations products on the England, Wales and NI markets and exporters.

  • While this guidance is primarily intended to support  FBO s to achieve compliance with the regulatory requirements, it may be used by Local Authorities,  FSA  Operational and  DAERA  staff to support official controls and provide consistency of the regulatory approach. 

Purpose of the guidance


The Court Judgments clarified how the definition of MSM in Annex I to the Regulations is to be interpreted and applied. This guidance supports  FBO s in determining whether a product is MSM to ensure their compliance in line with regulatory requirements.

Further general information on MSM and assistance in understanding implications for  FBO s can be found in Annex A: MSM Q&A.

Legal status of the guidance


Assimilated EU Law is identified in this guidance using the following format: assimilated Regulation (EC) No xxx/xxxx. In NI, EU law continues to apply for most food law and feed hygiene and safety law and is identified in this guidance using the following format: Regulation (EC) No xxx/xxxx. 

This guidance document has been produced to provide: 

  • Guidance on the legal requirements of the Regulations in so far as they concern the production, handling and labelling of MSM. 

  • Guidance on the TSE measures concerning MSM under Article 9 and Annex V (paragraph 5) of assimilated Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 in GB and Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 in NI.

  • Guidance on the microbiological criteria for foodstuffs in assimilated Regulation (EC) No 2073/2005 in GB and Regulation (EC) No 2073/2005 in NI, in so far as they concern the production of MSM.

It is the responsibility of the  FBO  to comply with food law. This guidance document cannot cover every situation and you may need to consider the relevant legislation to understand how it applies in your circumstances.  FBO s may wish to seek advice from their competent authority; an  FSA -appointed Official Veterinarian (OV), for  FSA -approved establishments; or local food safety team, for Local Authority-approved or -registered establishments. 

Review

We undertake regular reviews to ensure guidance remains relevant. The next scheduled review date for this guidance is [TBC]. 

Contact us

We welcome feedback on this guidance, including reports of broken links or out of date content, and will consider all feedback in the next review. Please provide any feedback to meathygiene@food.gov.uk.



Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Changes to legislation:

There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Help about Changes to Legislation

  1. Introductory Text

  2. CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

    1. Article 1.Scope

    2. Article 2.Separation of live animals and of products of animal origin

    3. Article 3.Definitions

    4. Article 4.Safeguard measures

  3. CHAPTER II DETERMINATION OF BSE STATUS

    1. Article 5.Classification

  4. CHAPTER III PREVENTION OF TSE

    1. Article 6.Monitoring system

    2. Article 6a. Breeding Programmes 

    3. Article 7.Prohibitions concerning animal feeding

    4. Article 8.Specified risk material

    5. Article 9.Products of animal origin derived from or containing ruminant material

    6. Article 10.Education programmes

  5. CHAPTER IV CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF TSEs

    1. Article 11.Notification

    2. Article 12.Measures with respect to suspect animals

    3. Article 13.Measures following confirmation of the presence of a TSE

    4. Article 14.Contingency plan

  6. CHAPTER V PLACING ON THE MARKET AND EXPORT

    1. Article 15.Live animals, their semen, embryos and ova

    2. Article 16.Placing on the market of products of animal origin

    3. Article 17.Health certificates

    4. Article 18.Supplementation of health certificates

  7. CHAPTER VI REFERENCE LABORATORIES, SAMPLING, TESTING AND CONTROLS

    1. Article 19. Reference laboratories 

    2. Article 20.Sampling and laboratory methods

    3. Article 21. Community controls 

  8. CHAPTER VII TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

    1. Article 22.Transitional measures concerning specified risk material

    2. Article 23.Amendment of the Annexes

    3. Article 23a.The appropriate authority may by regulations amend the following non-essential...

    4. Article 24. Regulations

    5. Article 24a.Decisions to be adopted in accordance with one of the...

    6. Article 25.Consultation of the scientific committees

    7. Article 26.Entry into force

  9. Signature

    1. Expand +

      ANNEX I

       SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS 

    2. Expand +

      ANNEX II

       DETERMINATION OF BSE STATUS 

    3. Expand +

      ANNEX III

       MONITORING SYSTEM 

    4. Expand +

      ANNEX IV

       ANIMAL FEEDING 

    5. Expand +

      ANNEX V

       SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL 

    6. Expand +

      ANNEX VI

      PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN DERIVED FROM OR CONTAINING RUMINANT MATERIAL, AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 9(1)

    7. Expand +

      ANNEX VII

       CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES 

    8. Expand +

      ANNEX VIII

      PLACING ON THE MARKET AND EXPORT

    9. Expand +

      ANNEX IX

      IMPORTATION INTO GREAT BRITAIN OF LIVE ANIMALS, EMBRYOS, OVA AND PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN

    10. Expand +

      ANNEX X

      REFERENCE LABORATORIES, SAMPLING AND LABORATORY ANALYSIS METHODS

    11. Expand +

      ANNEX XI

       TRANSITIONAL MEASURES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 22 AND 23






DFA 14 Consideration of the Risk from Mechanically Recovered Meat (MRM) in 1989

Draft Factual Accounts 9 July 1999


DFA 14 – CONSIDERATION OF THE RISK FROM MECHANICALLY RECOVERED MEAT (MRM) IN 1989-1990 UPDATE 20 JANUARY 2000


BSE Inquiry

DFA 14 Consideration of the Risk from Mechanically Recovered Meat (MRM) in 1989-1990


DFA 15 Monitoring and Enforcement of the SBO Specified Bovine Offal Regulations




Saturday, July 23, 2011

CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE


Experts say it is likely that bits of spinal cord - the part of a cow most likely to be contaminated with BSE - could be found in mechanically recovered meat.


Horror of the BSE school dinner risk

by SEAN POULTER, Daily Mail

Large quantities of 'BSE risk' meat sludge found its way into school lunches for up to 15 years.

Some 75,000 tons of mechanically recovered meat (MRM), blasted from the bones of cattle with water jets, was used in economy foods, a study reveals.

A further 150,000 tons of meat from heads, including cheeks and lips, which was later banned as a risk, was used, often in schools and hospitals.

The scandal was exposed yesterday in a report by the Food Standards Agency, which shed new light on the risk to human health of BSE.

The findings horrified families who lost loved ones to CJD, the human form of BSE. Lester Firkins, chairman of the Human BSE Foundation, a charity set up by victims' families, said: 'The fact that this stuff was getting into school dinners is repulsive.

'The average age of those people who have died is 27. We are left wondering whether school dinners was the common factor.

'No sensible parent would knowingly have allowed their children to eat that sort of food.

'You assume that what children are given at school is better than you'd get at a fast-food restaurant. That wasn't the case.

'The schools and other authorities should have made checks about the quality of the food they were using. Even today we do not know exactly what ends up on our plates.'

Mr Firkins lost his son Ellis, a 25-year-old teacher, to CJD last year.

The FSA says that MRM was being fed to humans at the rate of 5,000 tons a year from 1980 to 1995, which covered the years that BSE was rife in cattle.

Head meat was routinely included in economy foods at the rate of 10,000 tons a year for the same period.

Assuming it was used at a rate of around 15 per cent of the contents, the MRM alone could equate to 4.5billion burgers over 15 years.

The study shows that in the late 1980s, every part of the carcass was used in food production.

Frozen brains were exported to France while 'rectums were cleaned and salted and exported to Germany for sausages'.

The FSA suggests that 40 per cent of MRM went into cheap mince, another 40 per cent into economy burgers and the rest to other uses such as pies, sausages and patés.

Some of the MRM, although it is likely to have been a small quantity, may even have been included in processed baby food and beef stock cubes.

The mince and burgers would have been eaten in schools or available as economy lines from supermarkets. Many of the burgers were sold at fairs and football matches.

As much as 50 per cent of cheap mince was made up from head meat, which was used heavily in schools and hospitals.

The report points out: 'Institutional buyers, such as schools and hospitals... put constant pressure on suppliers to reduce prices.

'There were only so many ways this could be achieved - one of which was using bovine MRM. In addition, head meat would have been a standard ingredient.'

The report comes in spite of what appeared to be a concerted attempt by the processing industry to keep details secret.

A year ago, the Government's BSE expert committee, SEAC, complained that manufacturers had stalled and blocked all attempts to get information on the use of MRM.

Eventually it asked the FSA to launch an inquiry, which involved face-to-face meetings with industry executives, many now retired.

While all the MRM and head meat carried a theoretical risk, only about 10 per cent would have come from older animals, those most likely to carry infection.

SEAC chairman, Professor Peter Smith, said last night: 'This study goes a long way to confirm what we suspected. A lot of individuals will have been exposed to this meat.'

The findings will be studied by scientists at the CJD suveillance unit in Edinburgh and the use of beef 'head meat' will be further explored. It is banned in Britain and Portugal but is still used in other EU states.

Read more: 



J Cancer Epidemiol Prev. 2002;7(2):59-70.

UK dietary exposure to BSE in beef mechanically recovered meat: by birth cohort and gender.

Cooper JD, Bird SM.

Source

MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge, UK.

Abstract

BACKGROUND:

Meat recovered mechanically from bovine vertebral columns for use in burgers, sausages and other meat products may have been contaminated with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) from recovered spinal cord and dorsal root ganglia (DRG). We quantified UK exposure to BSE in beef mechanically recovered meat (MRM) by birth cohort (born pre-1940, in 1940-1969, post-1969), gender and calendar period (1980-1989, 1990-1996) because information on any two of BSE exposure intensity, vCJD incubation period and the new cases of vCJD tells us about the third.

METHODS:

Synthesis of evidence on BSE epidemiology, MRM production, infectivity in spinal cord and DRG, and UK dietary consumption.

FINDINGS:

Production of beef MRM peaked at 5000 tonnes in 1987, was nil in 1989 but recovered to 2000 tonnes in 1995 when it ceased altogether; reportedly 90% was used in burgers. Mean weight of spinal cord recovered per carcass was 3.3 g (95% credible interval 0.24-12.02 g) before the specified bovine offal (SBO) legislation and 1.5 g (0.02-8.30 g) after the legislation; whereas recovered weight of DRG (as infectious as spinal cord) was 27 g. Recovery of spinal cord from 1-year pre-clinical bovines peaked in 1988 at 238 g and of DRG in 1993 at 4250 g (medians). Median infectivity (5th and 95th percentiles) consumed in beef MRM was 33 250 (30 550-35 950), 65 600 (60 250-71 050) and 14 350 (13 150-15 600) bovine oral (Bo) ID50 units for the post-1969, 1940-1969 and pre-1940 birth cohorts in 1980-1989; and 44 250 (41 300-47 350), 39 600 (37 100-42,400) and 8750 (8100-9350) Bo ID50 units in 1990-1996. Males consumed almost 58% of infectivity in both periods. If the worst-case level of infectivity pertained, exposure, instead of halving in 1990-1996, would be sustained at around its 1980-1989 level for the two older birth cohorts and would have doubled in 1990-1996 for the post-1969 birth cohort.

INTERPRETATION:

SBO legislation in 1989 contributed only a 6% reduction in the infectivity in beef MRM. Salient sensitivity issues are highlighted.


Comment:

Para 72 and following sections

Mechanically recovered meat: Should you not suggest more urgent action over mechanically recovered meat, given that this seems to be the route of infection for vCJD?

It is all very well to have the 1995 controls in the UK, but are they 100 per cent effective? How can a consumer know if a product contains MRM from another country, where there may be either no, or very ineffective, controls?

Having read your report and the BSE Inquiry report, I suggest there is doubt about whether MRM can be safely eaten. It is very hard to be sure exactly what is in MRM and whether it is safe. Given this, your advice should surely be to advise consumers not to eat products which may contain MRM but to stick to cuts of meat which are clearly identifiable. It is often children who eat these MRM products.

I don`t know if there is the possibility to reply to these questions. I tried speaking to someone in your press office but he just quoted the report at me, which I can read very well for myself.ct contains MRM from another country, where there may be either no, or very ineffective, controls?

Having read your report and the BSE Inquiry report, I suggest there is doubt about whether MRM can be safely eaten. It is very hard to be sure exactly what is in MRM and whether it is safe. Given this, your advice should surely be to advise consumers not to eat products which may contain MRM but to stick to cuts of meat which are clearly identifiable. It is often children who eat these MRM products.

I don`t know if there is the possibility to reply to these questions. I tried speaking to someone in your press office but he just quoted the report at me, which I can read very well for myself.


PLEASE NOTE IN REFERENCE TO THE LATEST LONG TERM USDA DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM CASE STUDY FOR VCJD IN CHILDREN UK AND USA

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (Variant) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (Prion Diseases) Description Since 1996, strong evidence has accumulated for a causal relationship between ongoing outbreaks, primarily in Europe, of a disease in cattle called bovine spongiform encephalopathy BSE, or mad cow disease and a disease in humans called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Both disorders, which are caused by an unconventional transmissible agent, are invariably fatal brain diseases with incubation periods typically measured in years (1). Transmission of the BSE agent to humans, leading to vCJD, is believed to occur via ingestion of cattle products contaminated with the BSE agent; the specific foods associated with this transmission are unknown. However, a recently published case-control study involving 132 vCJD cases in the United Kingdom (UK) showed evidence of an increased risk for vCJD associated with the frequency of consuming beef products likely to contain mechanically recovered meat and head meat (such as burgers, meat pies, and sausages) (2). Bioassays and molecular tests have enabled identification of what World Health Organization consultants have classified a high-infectivity and lower infectivity tissues of cattle with BSE (3). The high-infectivity tissues include the brain, spinal cord, retina, optic nerve, and dorsal root and trigeminal ganglia, suggesting that these tissues can pose a relatively high risk of transmission. The lower infectivity tissues include peripheral nerves (e.g., sciatic and facial nerves), tonsils, nictitating membrane (third eye lid), distal ileum, bone marrow, and possibly thigh muscle. The latter tissue from one cow with BSE transmitted disease to highly BSE-sensitive transgenic mice at a rate indicative of trace levels of infectivity.


MECHANICALLY RECOVERED MEAT MRM





Wednesday, October 30, 2013

SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL (SRM) CONTROL VERIFICATION TASK FSIS NOTICE 70-13 10/30/13


USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse), not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???

Saturday, September 21, 2013

Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT


DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ??? this recall was not for the welfare of the animals. ...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/pdf/Hallmark-Westland_byState.pdf

try this link ;


or this link;


Sunday, November 13, 2011

*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock


-------- Original Message --------

Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease

Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us

Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

snip...

There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx


Monday, December 5, 2022

Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials DOCKET NUMBER Docket No. FSIS-2022-0027 Singeltary Submission



FRIDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2023

The Mad Cow That Stole Christmas, 20 Years Later


Wednesday, May 24, 2023 

***> WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, United States of America Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Immediate notification




***> USA 50 State Emergency BSE Conference Call 2001 <***


Monday, November 13, 2023

Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) Singeltary Another Request for Update 2023


Price of TSE Prion Poker goes up substantially, all you cattle ranchers and such, better pay close attention here...terry

Transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent from elk to cattle after oronasal exposure

Justin Greenlee, Jifeng Bian, Zoe Lambert, Alexis Frese, and Eric Cassmann Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, USDA-ARS, Ames, IA, USA 

Aims: The purpose of this study was to determine the susceptibility of cattle to chronic wasting disease agent from elk. 

Materials and Methods: Initial studies were conducted in bovinized mice using inoculum derived from elk with various genotypes at codon 132 (MM, LM, LL). Based upon attack rates, inoculum (10% w/v brain homogenate) from an LM132 elk was selected for transmission studies in cattle. At approximately 2 weeks of age, one wild type steer (EE211) and one steer with the E211K polymorphism (EK211) were fed 1 mL of brain homogenate in a quart of milk replacer while another 1 mL was instilled intranasally. The cattle were examined daily for clinical signs for the duration of the experiment. One steer is still under observation at 71 months post-inoculation (mpi). 

Results: Inoculum derived from MM132 elk resulted in similar attack rates and incubation periods in mice expressing wild type or K211 bovine PRNP, 35% at 531 days post inoculation (dpi) and 27% at 448 dpi, respectively. Inoculum from LM132 elk had a slightly higher attack rates in mice: 45% (693 dpi) in wild type cattle PRNP and 33% (468) in K211 mice. Inoculum from LL132 elk resulted in the highest attack rate in wild type bovinized mice (53% at 625 dpi), but no K211 mice were affected at >700 days. At approximately 70 mpi, the EK211 genotype steer developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease, depression, low head carriage, hypersalivation, and ataxia, and was necropsied. Enzyme immunoassay (IDEXX) was positive in brainstem (OD=4.00, but non-detect in retropharyngeal lymph nodes and palatine tonsil. Immunoreactivity was largely limited to the brainstem, midbrain, and cervical spinal cord with a pattern that was primarily glia-associated. 

Conclusions: Cattle with the E211K polymorphism are susceptible to the CWD agent after oronasal exposure of 0.2 g of infectious material. 

"Cattle with the E211K polymorphism are susceptible to the CWD agent after oronasal exposure of 0.2 g of infectious material."

=====end

Strain characterization of chronic wasting disease in bovine-PrP transgenic mice 

Conclusions: Altogether, these results exhibit the diversity of CWD strains present in the panel of CWD isolates and the ability of at least some CWD isolates to infect bovine species. Cattle being one of the most important farming species, this ability represents a potential threat to both animal and human health, and consequently deserves further study. 

"Altogether, these results exhibit the diversity of CWD strains present in the panel of CWD isolates and the ability of at least some CWD isolates to infect bovine species. Cattle being one of the most important farming species, this ability represents a potential threat to both animal and human health, and consequently deserves further study."

=====end


How in the hell do you make a complete recall of 27,694,240 lbs of feed that was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein, in one state, Michigan, 2006? Wonder how much was fed out?

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II ______________________________


PRODUCT


a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;


b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,
net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;


c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;


d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,
Recall # V-103-6;


e) "Big Jim’s" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,
Recall # V-104-6;


f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,
Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;


g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,
Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;


h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete
Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,
Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-107-6;


i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying
Chickens, Recall # 108-6;


j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;


k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED,
net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;


l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-111-6;


m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-112-6


CODE 
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
 Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006.

FDA initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


125 tons


DISTRIBUTION


AL and FL 
______________________________


PRODUCT


Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6 
CODE
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006.

Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


27,694,240 lbs


DISTRIBUTION


MI 
______________________________


PRODUCT


Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6


CODE
 None


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON


Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


???


DISTRIBUTION


KY

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 

P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media: 301-827-6242 Broadcast Media: 301-827-3434 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.


SATURDAY, MAY 20, 2023 

***> Tennessee State Veterinarian Alerts Cattle Owners to Disease Detection Mad Cow atypical L-Type BSE



MAY 19, 2023


2 weeks before the announcement of this recent mad cow case in the USA, i submitted this to the APHIS et al;

***> APPRX. 2 weeks before the recent mad cow case was confirmed in the USA, in Tennessee, atypical L-Type BSE, I submitted this to the APHIS et al;

Document APHIS-2023-0027-0001 BSE Singeltary Comment Submission May 2, 2023

''said 'burden' cost, will be a heavy burden to bear, if we fail with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion disease, that is why this information collection is so critical''...



spontaneous??? big outbreak of spontaneous mad cow disease evidently, around the same time, strange;

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 08, 2023 

Ireland Atypical BSE confirmed November 3 2023 


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2023 

Ireland Atypical BSE case, 3 progeny of case cow to be culled 


SUNDAY, JULY 16, 2023 

Switzerland Atypical BSE detected in a cow in the canton of St. Gallen 


WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type

Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type

Switzerland - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy - Immediate notification



Monday, March 20, 2023 

WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT United Kingdom Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical H-Type 




BRAZIL BSE START DATE 2023/01/18

BRAZIL BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/22

BRAZIL BSE END DATE 2023/03/03



SPAIN BSE START DATE 2023/01/21

SPAIN BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/03

SPAIN BSE END DATE 2023/02/06



NETHERLANDS BSE START DATE 2023/02/01

NETHERLANDS BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/01

NETHERLANDS BSE END DATE 2023/03/13



PLEASE NOTE, USDA ET AL ONLY TESTING <25k CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE, woefully inadequate, yet USDA just documented a case Atypical L-Type BSE, the most virulent strain to date...

Monday, May 22, 2023 

***> BSE TSE Prion MAD COW TESTING IN THE USA COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES? 


NOW, BE AWARE, OIE AND USDA HAVE NOW MADE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL BSE A LEGAL TRADING COMMODITY, WITH NO REPORTING OF SAID ATYPICAL CASES, EXCEPT FOR A VOLUNTARY NOTE ON ANNUAL REPORT...i don't make this stuff up...terry

cwd scrapie pigs oral routes 

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.


CONFIDENTIAL

EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

LINE TO TAKE

3. If questions on pharmaceuticals are raised at the Press conference, the suggested line to take is as follows:- 

 "There are no medicinal products licensed for use on the market which make use of UK-derived porcine tissues with which any hypothetical “high risk" ‘might be associated. The results of the recent experimental work at the CSM will be carefully examined by the CSM‘s Working Group on spongiform encephalopathy at its next meeting.

DO Hagger RM 1533 MT Ext 3201


While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...


we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.


May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...


3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...


But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...


Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....


Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.


***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.


***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.



O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

============== 

PRION 2015 CONFERENCE


PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 1933-690X 

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 


Tuesday, December 16, 2014 

Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions 

Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications 

Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 

Abstract 

Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. 

***The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance


why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $ 5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis. 

snip... R. BRADLEY 


1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8 

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC. 

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation. 

snip... 

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. PMID: 6997404


Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias" Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously. snip... 76/10.12/4.6 


Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4. 

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis) 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC. Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0 

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis) 

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland 

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).






Detection of classical BSE prions in asymptomatic cows after inoculation with atypical/Nor98 scrapie

* Marina Betancor, Belén Marín, Alicia Otero, Carlos Hedman, Antonio Romero, Tomás Barrio, Eloisa Sevilla, Jean-Yves Douet, Alvina Huor, Juan José Badiola, Olivier Andréoletti & Rosa Bolea  * Veterinary Research volume 54, Article number: 89 (2023) 
 Abstract

The emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) prions from atypical scrapie has been recently observed upon experimental transmission to rodent and swine models. This study aimed to assess whether the inoculation of atypical scrapie could induce BSE-like disease in cattle. Four calves were intracerebrally challenged with atypical scrapie. Animals were euthanized without clinical signs of prion disease and tested negative for PrPSc accumulation by immunohistochemistry and western blotting. However, an emergence of BSE-like prion seeding activity was detected during in vitro propagation of brain samples from the inoculated animals. These findings suggest that atypical scrapie may represent a potential source of BSE infection in cattle.

Snip…

Further in vivo experiments challenging different mouse lines have been started in order to confirm the infectivity of the PMCA products obtained in this study. However, in conclusion, our findings show that the propagation of atypical scrapie in cattle leads to the emergence of BSE-like seeding activity. This is a concerning issue with far-reaching implications for public health and food safety. The possibility of interspecies transmission of prion diseases and the emergence of new prion strains highlight the critical need for continued surveillance and monitoring of these diseases in both animal and human populations. Early detection of prion diseases is crucial, and highly sensitive detection techniques such as PMCA can play an important role in this regard.


Cattle with the EK211 PRNP polymorphism are susceptible to the H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent from either E211K or wild type donors after oronasal inoculation

Justin J. Greenleea, Eric D. Cassmanna, S. Jo Moorea,b, and M. Heather West Greenleec

aVirus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, ARS, United States Department of Agriculture, Ames, IA, USA; bOak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN, US; cDepartment of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, US

Aims: In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (H-BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure.

Material and Methods: Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with the H-BSE agent from either the US 2004 case (wild type donor; n = 3) or from the US 2006 case with the E211K polymorphism (n = 4). Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. When signs were noted, animals were euthanized and necropsied. Cattle were confirmed positive for abnormal BSE prions by enzyme immunoassay (EIA; Idexx HerdChek BSE Ag Test), anti-PrP immunohistochemistry (IHC) on brainstem, and microscopic examination for vacuolation.

Results: Three-out-of-four (75%) calves with the EK211 genotype developed clinical signs of H-BSE including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and were euthanized. Two of the positive EK211 steers received H-BSE US 2004 inoculum (Incubation Period (IP): 59.3 and 72.3 months) while the other positive steer received the E211K H-BSE inoculum (IP: 49.7 months). EIA confirmed that abundant misfolded protein (O.D. 2.57–4.0) in the brainstem, and IHC demonstrated PrPScthroughout the brain. All wild type recipient cattle and a single EK211 steer remained asymptomatic for the duration of the experiment (approximately 7 years post-inoculation) and no abnormal prion protein was detected in these cattle by EIA.

Conclusions: This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. Cattle with the EK211 genotype are oronasally susceptible to small doses of the H-BSE agent from either EK211 or EE211 (wild type) donors. Wild-type EE211 cattle remained asymptomatic for the duration of the experiment with this small dose (0.1 g) of inoculum. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.

Funded by: US Department of Agriculture


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2023

EFSA TSE Report 2022 First published 28 November 2023 The European Union summary report on surveillance for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in 2022


THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2023 

Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Cervid Update By State December 2023 (Long Version) 


(Short Version) 


FRIDAY, DECEMBER 08, 2023 

TEXAS CWD TSE PRION DIRE CONSEQUENCES ARE HERE! 


TUESDAY, JANUARY 16, 2024

CIDRAP launches international effort to prepare for possible chronic wasting disease spillover


Professor John Collinge on tackling prion diseases, sCJD accounts for around 1 in 5000 deaths worldwide

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2023 

Professor John Collinge on tackling prion diseases 

“The best-known human prion disease is sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), a rapidly progressive dementia which accounts for around 1 in 5000 deaths worldwide.”

There is accumulating evidence also for iatrogenic AD. Understanding prion biology, and in particular how propagation of prions leads to neurodegeneration, is therefore of central research importance in medicine.



MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2023 

Change in Epidemiology of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in the US, 2007-2020 


TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2023 

CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE TSE PRION DISEASE UPDATE USA DECEMBER 2023 


SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2023 

The role of environmental factors on sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease mortality: evidence from an age-period-cohort analysis


22 years ago;

2001 Singeltary on CJD

February 14, 2001

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr

Author Affiliations

JAMA. 2001;285(6):733-734. doi:10-1001/pubs.JAMA-ISSN-0098-7484-285-6-jlt0214 

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.



Terry S. Singeltary Sr.