Thursday, December 17, 2020

THE MAD COW BSE TSE PRION THAT STOLE CHRISTMAS DECEMBER 2003, WHAT REALLY HAPPENED, A REVIEW 2020

THE MAD COW BSE TSE PRION THAT STOLE CHRISTMAS DECEMBER 2003, WHAT REALLY HAPPENED, A REVIEW 2020

USDA MAD COW BSE TESTING 48 HOUR TURNAROUND TURNED INTO 7 MONTHS FINALLY CONFIRMED AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS A REVIEW DECEMBER 2020

On December 23, 2003, the landscape of the beef industry in the United States changed forever. Any individual with ties to the beef cattle industry has heard of "the cow that stole Christmas." This phrase refers to the first animal in the United States identified as infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)...

1985

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. 

snip... 

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle... 

-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: RE: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS 
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2005 09:19:49 +0100 
From: "Adriano Aguzzi" 
T o: "'Terry S. Singeltary Sr.'"

Dear Mr. Singeltary

I sympathize with your wish to have the most sensitive assay implemented. However, the situation is not as simple as one might think. In the case of homogeneously distributed agent, biochemical detection of PrPSc is indeed likely to be more sensitive than immunohistochemistry. In the case of variegated, punctate distribution of the agent, morphological methods may indeed be an asset.

There are also issues of feasibility. In my laboratory, we routinely run phosphotungstic acid precipitation followed by Western blotting. However, this is an extraordinarily cumbersome procedure. The sensitivity is increased vastly, but the amount of work needed is also amazing. There is no way I could see our own procedure implemented for mass screening of millions of cows - unless one would draft a veritable army of laboratory technicians.

For all these reasons, while I see all your points, I feel unable to offer a strong public opinion in favor or against any specific methods. The final decision needs to take into account a variety of complex factors, and that is why I believe that it is best left to a panel of experts rather than to a public discussion.

Best regards Adriano Aguzzi

____________________________

Prof. Adriano Aguzzi (MD PhD hc FRCP FRCPath) Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zürich Schmelzbergstrasse 12, CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland Tel. ++41-1-255 2107 Tel. (direct line): 2869 Fax: ++41-1-255 4402, cellular: +41-79-320 1516 http://www.unizh.ch/pathol/neuropathologie/

-----Original Message----- 
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder@wt.net] ;
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 20:18 
Subject: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS

Greetings again Professor Aguzzi,

A kind greetings from Texas. I hope you do not mind, but I must ask you several questions that will put you in the hot seat. Someone with credibility must come forward, such as yourself and speak out about the fact of the non scientific approach that USDA et al has take after the first diagnosis of BSE in the USA. This being, the refusal to use Western Blot on any suspicious or inconclusive BSE/TSE test. IHC is like a brain biopsy on trying to diagnose a CJD case. IF you take the sample from a part of the brain that is not that tainted, you will not get a reading. WB is much more sensitive, especially now with the Phospohtugstic acid precipitation step. IF Prusiners CDI was validated, who knows, that might even be more sensitive. Bottom line, we need you to come forward and state publicly ''the facts'' about USDA et al decision not to use WB on not only questionable samples, but on ALL samples. would you be willing to comment on this, to me or someone from the media (under the understanding it will be for the public)? I have several questions for you??? This is very very important in terms of human health (i.e. that nov. pos. pos. incl. neg cow).

P.S. there is one other top TSE scientist that has come forward and said what the USDA et al did with that cow was ''not logical''. (this will not be published for another 3 or 4 weeks). ONE other TOP TSE scientist saying the same thing would be much better for the public to hear and understand. anyway, does not hurt to ask, and i hope you come through here for us. I know this is a very loaded question, but times a wasting, and human health is at risk here...

thank you, with kindest regards,

I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

I would like to add to the first paragraph of Adriano Aguzzis comments. We have seen cases in Europe, where a positive result obtained with our Western blot rapid test(Prionics-Check WESTERN)could not be confirmed with IHC, but with the OIE-Western blot procedure, and we have also seen cases where the result could be confirmed by IHC but not by OIE-Western blot. As Adrino Aguzzi pointed out both IHC and OIE-Western have their limitations, but when combined and when performed well they pick up BSE reliably. In case of doubt, i.e. if a rapid test comes out consistently positive but an initial attempt of confirmation with IHC (or OIE-Western) fails, we recommend to routinely do a second test with the respective alternative method. This is the procedure most national reference centers, which are responsible for final confirmation of BSE cases, are following. Regards Markus Moser Prionics

-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT) 
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:53:47 -0500 
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys

1. What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?

The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad test. If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted with the Western blot test.

2. How long has this been the case?

Its a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot test become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic acid precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped develop) is extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is extremely reliable with high-signal test results. However, it had to be made more sensitive for low-signal (samples with low density of malformed prions) samples. It has been made more sensitive.

Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not standardized; depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the technician involved in the test, one can get conflicting results.

3. Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy and objectivity?

Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we have shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more sensitive and its results are reproducible. IHC relies on localization. If you have a weak signal case, you may get lucky and test a spot with a high concentration of prions. But the opposite it true too; you can miss an infection by testing a sample with low concentrations. Western blot is much better for low signal situations.

4. The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent testing. In the case this November, which it announced was negative, it instead used the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is this good science?

Its not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings, you do another test. I can only advise, its managements duty at USDA to make the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the rapid test and the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another test.

5. We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE. Or BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot detect the variant. Is this true?

Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one here in France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The distribution in the brain is very different than we see with BSE, it looks very different. The IHC test will come back negative.

This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence. We do not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic infection. Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it existed if we werent running systematic testing in the EU.

BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due to low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the food chain, and was given time to amplify. By the time it was identified, even good cooking couldnt eliminate it.

I cant stress enough that systematic testing is necessary. Withdrawing all positives from the food chain is the best way to break the cycle.

What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk is that several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000 head of cattle and has three positives. That would indicate that there are probably undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the disease is allowed to amplify. You have to maintain testing.

When people choose to protect their economic interests over public health, it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through Europe. They always deny; its not OUR problem, it is our neighbors problem. And then a single case is discovered and the public reacts. The economic results are devastating. It would be better to just assume BSE is present and use systematic testing as protection. That way, the public is reassured that it is not entering the food supply.

By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to test every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In Europe, three times as many cases of BSE have been caught by systematic testing as by clinical testing (of clearly sick animals). In 2004, eight clinical cases were discovered, 29 were discovered at rendering plants, and 17 at slaughter. We should be using these tests as a weapon to protect the public and to give them assurance that the food supply is being protected.

6. USDAs list of specified risk materials excludes some products, like blood and bone meal, that are banned in the EU and UK. Is our feed supply safe?

With SRMs, where do you stop? Tests have found prions in meat, nerves travel through meat, and so on. The main infectivity is in the brain and the spinal cord. A blood and bone meal ban in animal feed is not really necessary, because except in cases of highly infective animals, it is unlikely that they are dangerous in themselves. If you combine systematic testing and targeted SRM removal, the brain and the spinal column in cattle over 30 months, you can have a compromise that is both safer and less costly than expanded feed bans.

Certainly, you can stop the spread of BSE with a total ban on offal. But it has to be a total ban. It cant be given to sheep or swine or poultry. It would be very expensive and virtually impossible to accomplish. You can have farmers using the wrong feed or transportation errors.

Systematic testing makes far more sense. I think of it as a thermometer. It not only allows us to catch the disease, it also allows us to monitor its progress. We can watch the levels of infectivity and if they start going up instead of down, we can take measures.

To an extent, our environment is contaminated. About 10 percent of wild animals test positive for TSEs. If you recycle these agents, they can evolve and get more dangerous. This is probably what happened with BSE. It wasnt very dangerous until it evolved to the disease we know today.

People complain that testing is very expensive. It is much more expensive to kill and test whole herds.

7. In your opinion, is infected feed the sole method of transmission of BSE, apart from the very rare maternal transmission?

Feed is the main problem. However, we are seeing some other possibilities, including through fat and greases. Calves are fed milk extracts, with the cream removed. To make it nutritious, they are using fat and grease from cattle.

(FOLLOW QUESTION: Would that allow BSE to develop into an infective level in cattle younger than 30 months, assuming they might be getting infected at a younger age?)

8. You were involved in a study that tested two primates who were fed infected brain tissue. One eventually died of TSE; the other survived. The press reported that the main finding was that it would take something on the order of 1.5 kilograms of infected matter to create an infection, but that seems to be an oversimplification. Could you explain it further?

The findings suggest that as little as five grams is enough to infect. The 1.5 kilo figure is the amount of infected tissue that would have to be ingested from an animal that would be below the threshold of infection, and would test negative. In other words, even though a younger animal may be developing the disease, it would take a considerable amount of tissue to transmit the disease.

An animal could be just below the testing level, and not be particularly dangerous. But that is why you have to keep testing. Once it reaches the threshold, it can become highly infective.

9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less than 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by comparison, kills thousands every year. Overall, how do you rate the threat from BSE?

The overall risk is not particularly high. Over two million infected animals went into the food chain in Europe, 400,000 of them before the SRMs, the brains and spinal column, were removed from the carcass. Less than 200 died, and less than 4,000 are at risk of developing the disease. What we know now is that one particle is not going to kill you. There has to be condensation of the prions to be truly dangerous.

This is not a sterile world. But the danger is that now that the crisis appears to be over, attention will turn elsewhere and that will allow the disease to amplify again. Just as we stopped paying attention to AIDS when medication seemed to control it, then were surprised when a new and more infectious and aggressive strain appeared, we could be surprised by a more serious strain of BSE. That is why I support systematic testing for the long term. The object is to keep levels of BSE low, and to recognize the danger if it suddenly pops back up. ...END

TSS


-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED 
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 16:12:06 -0600 
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED

The US plans to measure the incidence of mad cow disease in its cattle with a test that its own officials have said gives too many false positives. Some experts fear the choice reflects an official desire to downplay the impact of the first positive BSE tests that emerge, when they turn out not to be confirmed.

Last week the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) approved two tests, including one made by the Californian firm BioRad, for screening up to 300,000 cattle for BSE, starting in July. No more tests will be licensed for months. Announcing the testing plan, chief veterinary officer Ron DeHaven cautioned that "there will be positive results", many of them false.

BioRad's antibody-based test for the prion protein that causes BSE has given numerous false positives in Belgium and Germany. And in Japan only 8 of 113 cattle that repeatedly tested positive with BioRad were confirmed by slower tests that do not give false positives.

The USDA even wrote last May that "it is well known" that tests like BioRad's give false positives. It states that other kinds of quick tests are more suitable for testing for very low levels of BSE, which are expected in the US.

The second quick test approved by the USDA, made by Maine-based IDEXX, could also in theory give false positives. It remains unclear how reliable it is, because there has been little practical experience with the test so far. It is not yet approved for use in Europe, where the vast majority of BSE tests are done.

Debora MacKenzie, Brussels correspondent, New Scientist. tel +32-2-245-0412 fax +32-2-245-0552 mobile +32-49-754-0444


===================== 

Greetings,

odd that the USDA et al approves two US-OWNED tests that are _known_ to give false positives, when they know other rapid TSE test are much more reliable. IT's like they purposely do not want to find any TSE in the USA bovine, so they pick the worst test available. The USDA own experts think BioRad is not suitable for supposedly BSE/TSE free and low incidence areas, so why did they choose this test and or the IDEXX, which i dont think has even been submitted to the EU for evaluation and has no commercial experiance to my knowledge. You could almost get the feeling they are deliberately skipping over Prionics for the least supperior TSE rapid test. I believe the Canadians finally did choose prionics. maybe paul or marcus might comment? seems if North America is going to be a consolidated BEEF trading market amongst themselves and expect to export there tainted products everywhere, they could at least come up with the same TSE rapid Test. how can one use a less reliable test and the other use a more reliable test, and it all be the same? i know there is a word Dehaven used, but it slips my mind now, (consolidated markets) that's not it, but you get the just of my thoughts, i think;-)...TSS


-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED 
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 00:53:39 +0100 
From: Moser Markus 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Regarding your question about Canada's BSE-test choice for their official BSE surveillance, I can confirm that they chose the Prionics-Check Western rapid test. Regards Markus

CONTINUED

-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED 
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 01:11:04 +0100 
From: Roland Heynkes 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Dear Terry,

odd that the USDA et al approves two US-OWNED tests that are _known_ to give false positives, when they know other rapid TSE test are much more reliable.

the BioRad-test seems to be the most sensitive rapid BSE test and it is clear that you "get" false positive results when you try to confirm its results with a less sensitive method like immune histochemistry. Poorly trained technicians of course may produce some false positives with the BioRad-test, but immune histochemistry produces many false negatives especially in the hands of not very experienced people. Generally the false negative and not the much fewer false positive results are the problem of all actually available BSE tests.

It is therefore not so easy to say, if the BioRad-test produced a false positive or if the confirming test produced a false negative result and which of them is more reliable. I for sure would not eat the meat of a cow which was seemingly false positive tested with the BioRad-test.

IT's like they purposely do not want to find any TSE in the USA bovine, so they pick the worst test available.

The BioRad-test is definitively not the worst test available (have a look on the EU results) and when a government does not want to get positive results, it uses immune histochemistry instead.

The USDA own experts think BioRad is not suitable for supposedly BSE/TSE free and low incidence areas, so why did they choose this test and or the IDEXX, which i dont think has even been submitted to the EU for evaluation and has no commercial experiance to my knowledge.

Are you sure that USDA has experts for BSE testing?

You could almost get the feeling they are deliberately skipping over Prionics for the least supperior TSE rapid test. I believe the Canadians finally did choose prionics. maybe paul or marcus might comment?

The Prionics western blot test is also a good rapid test which of course does not produce false positive results. In addition this test allows to see new variants of BSE, which would not be seen with the BioRad. But at least in Europe its positive results become confirmed by the OIE Western blot exactly as the BioRad results. Because of this control step the BioRad test cannot produce significantly more problems.

seems if North America is going to be a consolidated BEEF trading market amongst themselves and expect to export there tainted products everywhere, they could at least come up with the same TSE rapid Test. how can one use a less reliable test and the other use a more reliable test, and it all be the same? i know there is a word Dehaven used, but it slips my mind now, (consolidated markets) that's not it, but you get the just of my thoughts, i think;-)...TSS

Not the minor differences between the rapid tests are the problem, but the much to low testing numbers and the prefered IHC-testing in the USA. In Germany we test every month as many as the USA is going to test per year (mostly with BioRad) - and we have only 13 million cattle.

kind regards

Roland


-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED 
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 02:51:09 +0100 
From: Moser Markus 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Dear Roland Immunohistochemistry, correctly executed, is the gold standard, together with the OIE Western blotting method. It allows detection of infection even in cases where prion aggregates can only be detected in few individual cells. It is certainly not less sensitive than either Bio-Rad or Prionics. In fact, the abundant data on all three methods indicate equal diagnostic sensitivity (if sampling is done appropriate: note that immunohistochemistry has to be conducted on different tissue samples, since the tissue has to be formalin fixed). In case a BSE case obtained with a rapid test cannot be confirmed in a first approach with one of the gold standard methods, the second method will be used. I agree, that the sensitivity of immunohistochemistry can be negatively influenced e.g. by only looking at a limited number of slides or by not carefully examining the slides for prion aggregates. However, if a rapid test is not confirmed by immunohistochemistry due to a sloppy analysis, it will still show up in the OIE Western blot. Nevertheless, it is of course possible, that a true positive result cannot be confirmed e.g. if only the tissue sample used for the initial testing contained prion aggregates, which is theoretically possible, since the aggregates are not evenly distributed in the tissue. This is why it is not formally possible to disproof with 100% certainty an initial positive diagnosis (and you are right: it's certainly wise to rather not eat any suspicious animals). Nevertheless, false positives cannot in general be attributed to faulty confirmatory tests, but to the fact that the ELISA method simply produces a certain rate of false positives, which is why we offer rapid BSE tests on both platforms, the ELISA and the Western technology. And we make it clear to our customers, that when choosing the Prionics-Check LIA (the ELISA based test) coping with occasional false positive results will be inevitable. The LIA is therefore mostly used in European countries, with well established levels of BSE, while the Prionics-Check Western is also used in BSE-free countries (where a maximum positive predictive value is important to support the conclusion of low frequency or absence of BSE, which would otherwise be difficult for the reason you indicated and I mentioned above, i.e. due to the reason that it is hard to formally disprove an initial diagnosis with absolute certainty). Regards, Markus

-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: Re: ''INCONCLUSIVE'' IS NEGATIVE or so they claim...OFFICIAL REPORT 
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2005 16:59:27 -0600 
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ##################### --------

Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? 
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 21:07:51 -0600 
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
To: Carla Everett 

ok, thank you Carla. i hate rumors and 'inconclusive' announcements. kind regards, terry Carla Everett wrote:

> our computer department was working on a place holder we could post

> USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be

> announced tonight

> by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA

> announcement

> when we hear something.

> > > At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:

> >> why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?

>> >> Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:

>> November 22: Press Release title here

>> >> star image More BSE information

>> >> >> >> terry

>> >> Carla Everett wrote: no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...

>>> no confirmation on location of animal.

I still want my Texas mad cows confirmed BY WB! TSS

-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? 
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 21:07:51 -0600 
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
To: Carla Everett 

ok, thank you Carla. i hate rumors and 'inconclusive' announcements.

kind regards, terry

Carla Everett wrote:

our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something.

At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:

why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: November 22: Press Release title here star image More BSE information

terry

Carla Everett wrote:

no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test... no confirmation on location of animal.

I still want my Texas mad cows confirmed BY WB!

TSS





48 HOUR BSE TEST TURN AROUND TURNS INTO ALMOST A YEAR, from Nov. 2004 when Texas TAHC first announced BSE postive, then took it back, and then almost one year later, Nov. 2005, a final BSE positive confirmation was announced, after only scientist around the globe, and literally an act of Congress took place by the Honorable Fong order the sample retested. ...Thank YOU!



ONE YEAR LATER, finally confirmed $$$

Release No. 0233.05 Contact: USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623

Printable version Email this page

TRANSCRIPT OF MEDIA CONFERENCE WITH REMARKS MADE BY AGRICULTURE SECRETARY MIKE JOHANNS, DR. JOHN CLIFFORD, CHIEF VETERINARY OFFICER, ANIMAL PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, AND DR. DANNY MATTHEWS, TSE PROGRAM MANAGER, VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY, WEYBRIDGE, ENGLAND - WASHINGTON D.C. - JUNE 24, 2005

SNIP...

"So let me start first with the test results. As you are aware, last November we had an inconclusive report from a rapid screening test. USDA then conducted two IHC confirmatory tests, and both came out negative. A few weeks ago an additional confirmatory test was conducted, and that test is referred to as the Western blot test.

"On June 10 I learned that test was reactive and shared those results at that time.

"We now have the test results from the lab in Weybridge, England, as well as the results from additional testing in our own lab, and again I am here today to share those results with you.

"The results confirm the presence of BSE in this animal, an animal that was blocked from entering the food supply thanks to the firewalls that are in place. It is critically important to note that this animal was identified as a high risk animal. A sample was taken, and the carcass was incinerated.



Tuesday, July 14, 2009

U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

WHERE did we go wrong $$$


TSS





 2004, highly suspect stumbling and staggering mad cow reported, however, NO TESTING DONE, ON ORDERS FROM AUSTIN $

 May 4, 2004

 Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms

 On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

 FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

 FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

 Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison)...


USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system (CNS)

According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NHIS) Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2 The memorandum notes that "it is essential that brain specimens be collected from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance of BSE."

The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5

May 13,2004

Page 2

snip...

The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5

This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of whether this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between the number of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows actually tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:


USDA did not test possible mad cows

By Steve Mitchell

United Press International

Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM

WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.



"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

TEXAS 2ND MAD COW THAT WAS COVERED UP, AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, AND CALLS FROM TSE PRION SCIENTIST AROUND THE GLOBE, THIS 2ND MAD COW IN TEXAS WAS CONFIRMED

THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP

JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED

OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7 MONTHS LATER

TEXAS MAD COW

THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;

During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.


Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.

snip...

Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.

Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.

Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.

Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.


Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half


Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Washington, D.C. 20250 January 25, 2006 REPLY TO ATTN OF: 50601-10-KC TO: W. Ron DeHaven Administrator Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Barbara Masters Administrator Food Safety and Inspection Service ATTN: William J. Hudnall Deputy Administrator Marketing Regulatory Program Business Services William C. Smith Assistant Administrator Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review FROM: Robert W. Young /s/ Assistant Inspector General for Audit SUBJECT: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III This report presents the results of our audit of the enhanced BSE surveillance program and controls over specified risk materials and advanced meat recovery products. Your written response to the official draft report, dated January 20, 2006, is included as exhibit G with excerpts of the response and the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) position incorporated into the Findings and Recommendations section of the report, where applicable. We accept the management decisions for all recommendations. Please follow your agency’s internal procedures in forwarding documentation for final action to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). We are providing a separate memorandum to the agencies and OCFO that provides specific information on the actions to be completed to achieve final action. We appreciate your timely response and the cooperation and assistance provided to our staff during the audit USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC/ Page i

Executive Summary

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Results in Brief This report evaluates elements of the interlocking safeguards in place to protect United States (U.S.) beef from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, widely known as BSE or "mad cow disease." Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), has led a multi-agency effort to monitor and prevent BSE from entering the food supply. After discovering a BSE-positive cow in December 2003, APHIS expanded its BSE surveillance program. To further protect the food supply, USDA banned materials identified as being at risk of carrying BSE (specified risk materials (SRM)), such as central nervous system tissue. As part of this effort, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) required beef slaughter and processing facilities to incorporate controls for handling such materials into their operational plans. Onsite FSIS inspectors also inspect cattle for clinical signs in order to prevent diseased animals from being slaughtered for human consumption. To evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguards, we assessed APHIS’ implementation of the expanded surveillance program, as well as FSIS’ controls to prevent banned SRMs from entering the food supply.

In June 2004, APHIS implemented its expanded surveillance program; participation by industry in this surveillance program is voluntary. As of May 2005, over 350,000 animals were sampled and tested for BSE. To date, two animals tested positive for BSE; one tested positive after implementation of the expanded surveillance program.

USDA made significant efforts to implement the expanded BSE surveillance program. Much needed to be done in a short period of time to establish the necessary processes, controls, infrastructure, and networks to assist in this effort. In addition, extensive outreach and coordination was undertaken with other Federal, State, and local entities, private industry, and laboratory and veterinary networks. This report provides an assessment as to the progress USDA made in expanding its surveillance effort and the effectiveness of its controls and processes. This report also discusses the limitations of its program and data in assessing the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd.

snip...

40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive.

41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004.

42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue.

43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope.

44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue.

SNIP...

PLEASE SEE FLAMING EVIDENCE THAT THE USDA ET AL COVERED UP MAD COW DISEASE IN TEXAS ;

PAGE 43;

Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls

snip...

FULL TEXT 130 PAGES


Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS.

Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.

This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:


Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006

Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;


Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.

October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024


Sunday, February 14, 2010

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)


Thursday, April 9, 2009

Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed Thursday, April 09, 2009

Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed


Greetings FDA et al,

I kindly wish to comment on the following ;

[Docket No. FDA-2002-N-0031] (formerly Docket No. 2002N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46

[Federal Register: April 9, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 67)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 16160-16161] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ap09-18]


Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)


FULL TEXT OF GOA REPORT BELOW (takes a while to load)

2. Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts. GAO-02-183, January 25.


8 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease

Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."


Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

snip...

There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box , Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx

Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST

In Reply to:

Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results

posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:

Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected. just pondering... TSS

*** 2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006 ***


WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 2020 

***> BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5


WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 2020 

***> Idiopathic Brainstem Neuronal Chromatolysis IBNC BSE TSE Prion a Review 2020


THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015 

Former Ag Secretary Ann Veneman talks women in agriculture and we talk mad cow disease USDA and what really happened


THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2012 

EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME


2020 DECEMBER

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2020 

Biden's pick Tom Vilsack Failed Terribly on Mad Cow BSE TSE Prion, why put him back as top Agriculture pick? 


Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion End of Year Report

CJD FOUNDATION VIRTUAL CONFERENCE CJD Foundation Research Grant Recipient Reports Panel 2 Nov 3, 2020

zoonotic potential of PMCA-adapted CWD PrP 96SS inoculum


4 different CWD strains, and these 4 strains have different potential to induce any folding of the human prion protein. 


***> PIGS, WILD BOAR, CWD <***

***> POPULATIONS OF WILD BOARS IN THE UNITED STATES INCREASING SUPSTANTUALLY AND IN MANY AREAS WE CAN SEE  A HIGH DENSITY OF WILD BOARS AND HIGH INCIDENT OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE

HYPOTHOSIS AND SPECIFIC AIMS

HYPOTHOSIS 

BSE, SCRAPIE, AND CWD, EXPOSED DOMESTIC PIGS ACCUMULATE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES AND STRAINS OF PRIONS IN PERIPHERAL TISSUES, EACH ONE OF THEM WITH PARTICULAR ZOONOTIC POTENTIALS


Final Report – CJD Foundation Grant Program A. 

Project Title: Systematic evaluation of the zoonotic potential of different CWD isolates. Principal Investigator: Rodrigo Morales, PhD.


Systematic evaluation of the zoonotic potential of different CWD isolates. Rodrigo Morales, PhD Assistant Professor Protein Misfolding Disorders lab Mitchell Center for Alzheimer’s disease and Related Brain Disorders Department of Neurology University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Washington DC. July 14th, 2018

Conclusions and Future Directions • We have developed a highly sensitive and specific CWD-PMCA platform to be used as a diagnostic tool. • Current PMCA set up allow us to mimic relevant prion inter-species transmission events. • Polymorphic changes at position 96 of the prion protein apparently alter strain properties and, consequently, the zoonotic potential of CWD isolates. • Inter-species and inter-polymorphic PrPC → PrPSc conversions further increase the spectrum of CWD isolates possibly present in nature. • CWD prions generated in 96SS PrPC substrate apparently have greater inter-species transmission potentials. • Future experiments will explore the zoonotic potential of CWD prions along different adaptation scenarios, including inter-species and inter-polymorphic.



Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease 

Author item MOORE, SARAH - Orise Fellow item Kunkle, Robert item KONDRU, NAVEEN - Iowa State University item MANNE, SIREESHA - Iowa State University item SMITH, JODI - Iowa State University item KANTHASAMY, ANUMANTHA - Iowa State University item WEST GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University item Greenlee, Justin Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 3/15/2017 Publication Date: N/A Citation: N/A Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: Aims: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally-occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of cervids. We previously demonstrated that disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) can be detected in the brain and retina from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent. In that study, neurological signs consistent with prion disease were observed only in one pig: an intracranially challenged pig that was euthanized at 64 months post-challenge. The purpose of this study was to use an antigen-capture immunoassay (EIA) and real-time quaking-induced conversion (QuIC) to determine whether PrPSc is present in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the CWD agent. 

Methods: At two months of age, crossbred pigs were challenged by the intracranial route (n=20), oral route (n=19), or were left unchallenged (n=9). At approximately 6 months of age, the time at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled (<6 month challenge groups). The remaining pigs (>6 month challenge groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post challenge (mpc). The retropharyngeal lymph node (RPLN) was screened for the presence of PrPSc by EIA and immunohistochemistry (IHC). The RPLN, palatine tonsil, and mesenteric lymph node (MLN) from 6-7 pigs per challenge group were also tested using EIA and QuIC. 

Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.



Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP 

Author item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item Kokemuller, Robyn item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University item BALKEMA-BUSCHMANN, ANNE - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item GROSCHUP, MARTIN - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item Greenlee, Justin Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 5/10/2018 Publication Date: 5/22/2018 Citation: Moore, S.J., Kokemuller, R.D., West-Greenlee, M.H., Balkema-Buschmann, A., Groschup, M.H., Greenlee, J.J. 2018. The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP. Prion 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, May 22-25, 2018. Paper No. WA15, page 44.

Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: We have previously shown that the chronic wasting disease (CWD) agent from white-tailed deer can be transmitted to domestic pigs via intracranial or oral inoculation although with low attack rates and restricted PrPSc accumulation. The objective of this study was to assess the potential for cross-species transmission of pig-passaged CWD using bioassay in transgenic mice. Transgenic mice expressing human (Tg40), bovine (TgBovXV) or porcine (Tg002) PRNP were inoculated intracranially with 1% brain homogenate from a pig that had been intracranially inoculated with a pool of CWD from white-tailed deer. This pig developed neurological clinical signs, was euthanized at 64 months post-inoculation, and PrPSc was detected in the brain. Mice were monitored daily for clinical signs of disease until the end of the study. Mice were considered positive if PrPSc was detected in the brain using an enzyme immunoassay (EIA). In transgenic mice expressing porcine prion protein the average incubation period was 167 days post-inoculation (dpi) and 3/27 mice were EIA positive (attack rate = 11%). All 3 mice were found dead and clinical signs were not noted prior to death. One transgenic mouse expressing bovine prion protein was euthanized due to excessive scratching at 617 dpi and 2 mice culled at the end of the study at 700 dpi were EIA positive resulting in an overall attack rate of 3/16 (19%). None of the transgenic mice expressing human prion protein that died or were euthanized up to 769 dpi were EIA positive and at study end point at 800 dpi 2 mice had positive EIA results (overall attack rate = 2/20 = 10%). The EIA optical density (OD) readings for all positive mice were at the lower end of the reference range (positive mice range, OD = 0.266-0.438; test positive reference range, OD = 0.250-4.000). To the authors’ knowledge, cervid-derived CWD isolates have not been successfully transmitted to transgenic mice expressing human prion protein. The successful transmission of pig-passaged CWD to Tg40 mice reported here suggests that passage of the CWD agent through pigs results in a change of the transmission characteristics which reduces the transmission barrier of Tg40 mice to the CWD agent. If this biological behavior is recapitulated in the original host species, passage of the CWD agent through pigs could potentially lead to increased pathogenicity of the CWD agent in humans.


cwd scrapie pigs oral routes 

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 2020 

***> Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Cervid State by State and Global Update November 2020


MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2020 

***> REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION

see updated concerns with atypical BSE from feed and zoonosis...terry


Monday, November 30, 2020 

Tunisia has become the second country after Algeria to detect a case of CPD within a year


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2020 

The European Union summary report on surveillance for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in 2019 First published 17 November 2020


WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2020 

EFSA Annual report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE 2020 Singeltary Submission


WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2020

EFSA Evaluation of public and animal health risks in case of a delayed post-mortem inspection in ungulates EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) ADOPTED: 21 October 2020

i wonder if a 7 month delay on a suspect BSE case in Texas is too long, on a 48 hour turnaround, asking for a friend???


I URGE EVERYONE TO READ IN FULL, THE OIE REPORT 2019 ABOUT ATYPICAL BSE TSE PRION, SRMs, SBOs, and feed...tss

''Experts could not rule out other causes due to the difficulty of investigating individual cases. Some constraints are the long incubation period of the disease and the lack of detailed information available from farms at the time of the trace-back investigation.''

Scientists investigate origin of isolated BSE cases 

The European response to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) after the crisis of the 1980s has significantly reduced prevalence of the disease in cattle. However, isolated cases are still being reported in the EU and for this reason the European Commission asked EFSA to investigate their origin.

The key measure for controlling BSE in the EU is a ban on the use of animal proteins in livestock feed. This is because BSE can be transmitted to cattle through contaminated feed, mainly in the first year of life.

Sixty cases of classical BSE have been reported in cattle born after the EU ban was enforced in 2001. None of these animals entered the food chain. Classical BSE is the type of BSE transmissible to humans. The Commission asked EFSA to determine if these cases were caused by contaminated feed or whether they occurred spontaneously, i.e. without an apparent cause.

EFSA experts concluded that contaminated feed is the most likely source of infection. This is because the infectious agent that causes BSE has the ability to remain active for many years. Cattle may have been exposed to contaminated feed because the BSE infectious agent was present where feed was stored or handled. A second possibility is that contaminated feed ingredients may have been imported from non-EU countries.

Experts could not rule out other causes due to the difficulty of investigating individual cases. Some constraints are the long incubation period of the disease and the lack of detailed information available from farms at the time of the trace-back investigation.

EFSA experts made a series of recommendations to maintain and strengthen the EU monitoring and reporting system, and to evaluate new scientific data that become available.

The European response to BSE

The coordinated European response to BSE has succeeded in reducing the prevalence of the disease. Between 2005 and 2015 about 73,000,000 cattle were tested for BSE in the EU, out of which 60 born after the ban tested positive for classical BSE. The number of affected animals rises to 1,259 if cattle born before the ban are included. The number of classical BSE cases has dropped significantly in the EU over time, from 554 cases reported in 2005 to just two in 2015 (both animals born after the ban). Moreover the EU food safety system is designed to prevent the entry of BSE-contaminated meat into the food chain.


THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 

Veterinary Biologics Guideline 3.32E: Guideline for minimising the risk of introducing transmissible spongiform encephalopathy prions and other infectious agents through veterinary biologics


U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


snip...

[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.

[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]

[host Richard] could you repeat the question?

[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.

[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary

[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?

[not sure whom speaking] NO

snip...see full archive and more of this;


P.9.21 Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle. Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.

Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. * It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss




PLOS ONE Journal 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;


IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***


MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2020 

***> REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION

see updated concerns with atypical BSE from feed and zoonosis...terry


TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2020 

ISO's Updated 22442 Animal Tissue Standards — What Changed? TSE Prion!


WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019 

Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures USDA HERE'S YOUR SIGN!


WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2020 

EFSA Annual report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE 2020 Singeltary Submission


2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

PLEASE NOTE;

2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author: ‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).

In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.


SUNDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2020 

Bovine adapted transmissible mink encephalopathy is similar to L-BSE after passage through sheep with the VRQ/VRQ genotype but not VRQ/ARQ 


THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2020 

The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/ Nor98 scrapie


FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23, 2020 

Scrapie TSE Prion Zoonosis Zoonotic, what if?


THURSDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2020 

Exposure Risk of Chronic Wasting Disease in Humans 


USDA FDA MAD COW FEED BAN THAT NEVER WAS, A REVIEW 2020

mad cow feed in commerce USA, post mad cow feed ban 1997!

10 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT 

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing. 

REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI 

___________________________________ 

PRODUCT 

Custom dairy premix products: 

MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, 

HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, 

LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, 

HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, 

TATARKA, 

M CUST PROT Meal, 

SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, 

LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, 

DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, 

WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, 

WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, 

JENKS, 

J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, 

COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, 

GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), 

TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, 

ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, 

BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, 

BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, 

V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, 

VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, 

SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, 

Recall # V-025-2007 

CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified. 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. 

Firm initiated recall is complete. 

REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. 

DISTRIBUTION ID and NV 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007 


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________ 

PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim’s" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6

CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

125 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and FL 

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6

CODE

All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

27,694,240 lbs

DISTRIBUTION

MI 

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6

CODE

None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

?????

DISTRIBUTION

KY

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


=====

PRODUCT 

Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

CODE

No code or lot number.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Mars Petcare US, Clinton, OK, by telephone on May 21, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Product may have contained prohibited materials without cautionary statement on the label.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

208,820 pounds

DISTRIBUTION

TX

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 26, 2009

###


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST 

PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 

CODE None 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? 

DISTRIBUTION KY 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

### 


MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II 
______________________________ 

PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; 

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; 

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; 

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 

CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons 

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###


Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006 

Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration

New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006

WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06

FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

Sincerely,

/S

Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District 


PLEASE NOTE, THE FDA URLS FOR OLD WARNING LETTERS ARE OBSOLETE AND DO NOT WORK IN MOST CASES. I LOOKED UP THE OLD ONE ABOVE AND FOUND IT, BUT HAVE NOT DONE THAT FOR THE OTHERS TO FOLLOW. THE DATA IS VALID THOUGH! 

Subject: MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE USA 2006 RECALL UPDATE 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[log in to unmask]> 

Reply-To: SAFETY <[log in to unmask]> 

Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2006 14:10:37 -0500 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS 

IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV 

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons 

DISTRIBUTION AL

______________________________

snip...


 Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS 

Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II

______________________________

snip...

______________________________

PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 

CODE None 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT 

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; 

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; 

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; 

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; 

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; 

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; 

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###


 Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS

Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST 

PRODUCT 

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; 

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; 

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; 

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; 

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; 

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; 

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; 

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; 

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; 

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; 

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; 

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 

CODE 

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


 MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT 

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; 

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; 

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; 

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 

CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###


Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 07/27/05 08/01/05 X X On 7/27/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

snip...

MONTEBELLO MEAT PROCESSING, INC 19075 M19075 P MANATI, PR 08/01/05 08/18/05 X X X 09/26/05 On 8/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (7/01/05 to 9/30/05)

snip...

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 09/01/05 09/20/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action

21562 M

concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli X X X Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 08/08/05 08/16/05 X X X On 8/8/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

FIVE STAR PACK INC. 08725 M08725 P GOLDEN CITY, MO 09/01/05 09/09/05 X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 07/28/05 08/08/05 08/17/05 08/19/05 X X On 8/17/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 07/28/05 08/01/05 X X On 7/28/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 07/26/05 07/29/05 X X On 7/26/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 09/21/05 X X On 9/21/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31792 M31792 P WAUKON, IA 09/06/05 09/12/05 X X X On 9/6/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 07/01/05 07/28/05 X X X On 7/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

08/04/05

08/19/05

On 8/4/05,

an enforcement action 01046 M01046 P concerning Bovine Spongiform KANSAS CITY, MO X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

THE MEAT SHOP 08/18/05 09/06/05

09/09/05

On 9/6/05, a suspension action 31561 M concerning Bovine SpongiformBENSON, VT Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. XX X X X

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, 07/27/05 07/29/05

On 7/27/05, a suspension action INC concerning Bovine Spongiform31647 M31647 P Encephalopathy and Specified Risk X X

LEWISTON, UT Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 07/25/05 08/01/05

On 7/25/05, a suspension action 20594 M20594 Pconcerning Bovine Spongiform

GRANTSVILLE, UT X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

52 pages


Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress FY 2007 - 2nd Half

Two Texas Companies Sentenced and Fined for Misbranding Meat Products In April 2007, two closely held and related Texas companies pled guilty in Federal court and were sentenced to 12 months of probation and ordered to pay $10,250 in fines for misbranding meat products. One of the companies sold adulterated meat products to a retail store in New Mexico. Additionally, portions of the invoices failed to properly and consistently identify the meat products as being from cattle more than 30 months old at time of slaughter. This information is required to be disclosed because of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease") concerns. No adulterated meat reached consumers.


***> Wednesday, January 23, 2019 

***> CFIA SFCR Guidance on Specified risk material (SRM) came into force on January 15, 2019 <***


In the USA, USDA et al sometimes serves SRM’s up as appetizers or horderves.

Thursday, November 28, 2013

Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows


seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse), not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???

Saturday, September 21, 2013

Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT


DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???

this recall was not for the welfare of the animals. ...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)


try this link ;


Sunday, November 13, 2011
 
*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock
 
 
Wednesday, March 2, 2016
 
RANCHO He did not know that they were placing healthy cow heads next to suspect carcasses BSE TSE Prion
 
 
Sunday, June 14, 2015
 
Larry’s Custom Meats Inc. Recalls Beef Tongue Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials BSE TSE Prion
 
 
Thursday, June 12, 2014
 
Missouri Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials 4,012 pounds of fresh beef products because the dorsal root ganglia may not have been completely removed
 
 
Saturday, November 10, 2012
 
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
 
 
Saturday, July 23, 2011
 
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
 
 
Sunday, October 18, 2009
 
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
 
 
Thursday, October 15, 2009
 
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
 
 
Thursday, June 26, 2008
 
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
 
 
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
 
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
 
 
Friday, August 8, 2008
 
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
 
 
Saturday, April 5, 2008
 
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
 
 
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
 
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
 
 
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
 
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
 
 
Friday, October 15, 2010
 
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
 
 
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
 

 Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009


 Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009


Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$



*** PLEASE SEE THIS URGENT UPDATE ON CWD AND FEED ANIMAL PROTEIN ***

Sunday, March 20, 2016

Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed ***UPDATED MARCH 2016*** Singeltary Submission


SEE MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS AFER MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS ;


Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0764 for Animal Feed Regulatory Program Standards Singeltary Comment Submission


16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997 2013 

Sunday, December 15, 2013 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE 


Tuesday, December 23, 2014 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION 


17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997 

Monday, October 26, 2015 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE October 2015 


TUESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2017 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE 2016 to 2017 BSE TSE PRION


TUESDAY, JULY 18, 2017 

USDA announces Alabama case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Alabama


2012 ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE TSE PRION CALIFORNIA ‘confirmed’ Saturday, August 4, 2012

*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012


SEE MORE;

Tuesday, September 10, 2019

FSIS [Docket No. FSIS–2019–0021] Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials Singeltary Submission


THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017 

USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2019 

***> USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection Aug 29, 2018 A Review of Science 2019 <***


MONDAY, JANUARY 09, 2017 

Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle 

CDC Volume 23, Number 2—February 2017 

*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.

*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.


TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 2018 

USDA finds BSE infection in Florida cow 08/28/18 6:43 PM


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018 

USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection USDA 08/29/2018 10:00 AM EDT


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Atypical BSE Confirmed Florida Update USA August 28, 2018


H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: 


clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation


H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation
 
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES
 
Title: H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation
 
Authors
 
item Moore, Sarah - item West Greenlee, Mary - item Smith, Jodi item Nicholson, Eric item Vrentas, Catherine item Greenlee, Justin
 
Submitted to: Prion
 
Publication Type: Abstract Only
 
Publication Acceptance Date: August 12, 2015
 
Publication Date: May 25, 2015
 
Citation: Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H., Smith, J., Nicholson, E., Vrentas, C., Greenlee, J. 2015. H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation. Prion 2015. p. S5.
 
Technical Abstract: In 2006 an H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) case was reported in an animal with an unusual polymorphism (E211K) in the prion protein gene. Although the prevalence of this polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele are predisposed to rapid onset of H-type BSE when exposed. The purpose of this study was to investigate the phenotype of this BSE strain in wild-type (E211E) and E211K heterozygous cattle. One calf carrying the wild-type allele and one E211K calf were inoculated intracranially with H-type BSE brain homogenate from the US 2006 case that also carried one K211 allelle. In addition, one wild-type calf and one E211K calf were inoculated intracranially with brain homogenate from a US 2003 classical BSE case. All animals succumbed to clinical disease. Survival times for E211K H-type BSE inoculated catttle (10 and 18 months) were shorter than the classical BSE inoculated cattle (both 26 months). Significant changes in retinal function were observed in H-type BSE challenged cattle only. Animals challenged with the same inoculum showed similar severity and neuroanatomical distribution of vacuolation and disease-associated prion protein deposition in the brain, though differences in neuropathology were observed between E211K H-type BSE and classical BSE inoculated animals. Western blot results for brain tissue from challenged animals were consistent with the inoculum strains. This study demonstrates that the phenotype of E211K H-type BSE remains stable when transmitted to cattle without the E211K polymorphism, and exhibits a number of features that differ from classical BSE in both wild-type and E211K cattle.
 
 
*** All animals succumbed to clinical disease. Survival times for E211K H-type BSE inoculated catttle (10 and 18 months) were shorter than the classical BSE inoculated cattle (both 26 months). ***
 
-------- Original Message --------
 
Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD
 
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43 -0000
 
From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" e.asante@ic.ac.uk
 
 
Dear Terry,
 
I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am a Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the paper. I have attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention.
 
Thank you for your interest in the paper.
 
In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, ***yes. As you will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate phenotype to type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. It is too early to be able to claim any further sub-classification in respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky Rimmer's version. It will take further studies, which are on-going, to establish if there are sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. The main point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new variant CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc.
 
I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I can be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. Best wishes..
 
Emmanuel Asante
 
< >
 
____________________________________
 
Dr. Emmanuel A Asante MRC Prion Unit & Neurogenetics Dept. Imperial College School of Medicine (St. Mary's) Norfolk Place, LONDON W2 1PG Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 3794 Fax: +44 (0)20 7706 3272 email: e.asante@ic.ac..uk (until 9/12/02) New e-mail: e.asante@prion.ucl.ac.uk (active from now)
 
_________end...TSS___________________
 
 
***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. ***
 
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. ***
 
P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification
 
Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan
 
To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA).
 
Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.
 
Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, ***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
 
================
 
 


THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017 

USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200


LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow. 

This new prionopathy in humans? 

the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......

wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, 

WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? 

there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$ 

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama 

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. 

This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. 

This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. 

We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation. 



Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). 

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail:maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009


LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow. 

This new prionopathy in humans? 

the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......

wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, 

WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? 

there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$ 

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama 

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. 

This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. 

This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. 

We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation. 



Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009


Thursday, July 24, 2014 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations 


Thursday, July 24, 2014 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations 


Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY 

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


MONDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2020 

Experimental oral transmission of chronic wasting disease to sika deer (Cervus nippon)


cwd scrapie pigs oral routes 

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




Friday, December 14, 2012 

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012 

snip..... 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law. Animals considered at high risk for CWD include: 

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and 

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal. 

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants. 

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. 

It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011. 

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB. 

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products. 

snip..... 

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison. snip..... The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008). 

snip..... 

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion. snip..... In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates. 

snip..... 

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents. 

snip..... 


***> READ THIS VERY, VERY, CAREFULLY, AUGUST 1997 MAD COW FEED BAN WAS A SHAM, AS I HAVE STATED SINCE 1997! 3 FAILSAFES THE FDA ET AL PREACHED AS IF IT WERE THE GOSPEL, IN TERMS OF MAD COW BSE DISEASE IN USA, AND WHY IT IS/WAS/NOT A PROBLEM FOR THE USA, and those are; 

BSE TESTING (failed terribly and proven to be a sham) 

BSE SURVEILLANCE (failed terribly and proven to be a sham) 

BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS (another colossal failure, and proven to be a sham) 

these are facts folks. trump et al just admitted it with the feed ban. 

see; 

FDA Reports on VFD Compliance 

John Maday 

August 30, 2019 09:46 AM VFD-Form 007 (640x427) 

Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach. ( John Maday ) Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary. On August 29, FDA released its first report on inspection and compliance activities. The report, titled “Summary Assessment of Veterinary Feed Directive Compliance Activities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2016 – 2018,” is available online.


SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019 

***> FDA Reports on VFD Compliance 


THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, 2020 

***> Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year? <***


MONDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2020 

Experimental oral transmission of chronic wasting disease to sika deer (Cervus nippon)


***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.

https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). 

Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 

=============== 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 

=============== 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 

============== 

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf 

***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

Taylor & Francis

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20

Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

snip...

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

PMID: 6997404


Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6


Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).

Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).



Wednesday, February 16, 2011

IN CONFIDENCE

SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

IN CONFIDENCE


> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people.
key word here is ‘reported’. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can’t, and it’s as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it’s being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. …terry
*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion aka mad deer disease zoonosis
We hypothesize that:
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and
(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.
ZOONOTIC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE
Prion 2017 Conference
First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress Stefanie Czub1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Christiane Stahl-Hennig3, Michael Beekes4, Hermann Schaetzl5 and Dirk Motzkus6 1 
University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Canadian Food Inspection Agency; 2Universitatsklinikum des Saarlandes und Medizinische Fakultat der Universitat des Saarlandes; 3 Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen; 4 Robert-Koch-Institut Berlin; 5 University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; 6 presently: Boehringer Ingelheim Veterinary Research Center; previously: Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen 
This is a progress report of a project which started in 2009. 21 cynomolgus macaques were challenged with characterized CWD material from white-tailed deer (WTD) or elk by intracerebral (ic), oral, and skin exposure routes. Additional blood transfusion experiments are supposed to assess the CWD contamination risk of human blood product. Challenge materials originated from symptomatic cervids for ic, skin scarification and partially per oral routes (WTD brain). Challenge material for feeding of muscle derived from preclinical WTD and from preclinical macaques for blood transfusion experiments. We have confirmed that the CWD challenge material contained at least two different CWD agents (brain material) as well as CWD prions in muscle-associated nerves. 
Here we present first data on a group of animals either challenged ic with steel wires or per orally and sacrificed with incubation times ranging from 4.5 to 6.9 years at postmortem. Three animals displayed signs of mild clinical disease, including anxiety, apathy, ataxia and/or tremor. In four animals wasting was observed, two of those had confirmed diabetes. All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals. Protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuiC) and PET-blot assays to further substantiate these findings are on the way, as well as bioassays in bank voles and transgenic mice. 
At present, a total of 10 animals are sacrificed and read-outs are ongoing. Preclinical incubation of the remaining macaques covers a range from 6.4 to 7.10 years. Based on the species barrier and an incubation time of > 5 years for BSE in macaques and about 10 years for scrapie in macaques, we expected an onset of clinical disease beyond 6 years post inoculation. 
PRION 2017 DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS 
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge).
To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years.
After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate.
The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD..
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
Prion Conference 2018
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA..
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD
states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio..
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017,
AND
included 104 patients. SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%),
AND
THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
snip…
see more on Prion 2017 Macaque study from Prion 2017 Conference and other updated science on cwd tse prion zoonosis below…terry
Prion 2018 Conference
8. Even though human TSE‐exposure risk through consumption of game from European cervids can be assumed to be minor, if at all existing, no final conclusion can be drawn due to the overall lack of scientific data. In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids. It might be prudent considering appropriate measures to reduce such a risk, e.g. excluding tissues such as CNS and lymphoid tissues from the human food chain, which would greatly reduce any potential risk for consumers. However, it is stressed that currently, no data regarding a risk of TSE infections from cervid products are available.
International Conference on Emerging Diseases, Outbreaks & Case Studies & 16th Annual Meeting on Influenza March 28-29, 2018 | Orlando, USA
Qingzhong Kong
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, USA
Zoonotic potential of chronic wasting disease prions from cervids
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease in cervids (mule deer, white-tailed deer, American elk, moose, and reindeer). It has become an epidemic in North America, and it has been detected in the Europe (Norway) since 2016. The widespread CWD and popular hunting and consumption of cervid meat and other products raise serious public health concerns, but questions remain on human susceptibility to CWD prions, especially on the potential difference in zoonotic potential among the various CWD prion strains. We have been working to address this critical question for well over a decade. We used CWD samples from various cervid species to inoculate transgenic mice expressing human or elk prion protein (PrP). We found infectious prions in the spleen or brain in a small fraction of CWD-inoculated transgenic mice expressing human PrP, indicating that humans are not completely resistant to CWD prions; this finding has significant ramifications on the public health impact of CWD prions. The influence of cervid PrP polymorphisms, the prion strain dependence of CWD-to-human transmission barrier, and the characterization of experimental human CWD prions will be discussed.
Speaker Biography Qingzhong Kong has completed his PhD from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Post-doctoral studies at Yale University. He is currently an Associate Professor of Pathology, Neurology and Regenerative Medicine. He has published over 50 original research papers in reputable journals (including Science Translational Medicine, JCI, PNAS and Cell Reports) and has been serving as an Editorial Board Member on seven scientific journals. He has multiple research interests, including public health risks of animal prions (CWD of cervids and atypical BSE of cattle), animal modeling of human prion diseases, mechanisms of prion replication and pathogenesis, etiology of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) in humans, normal cellular PrP in the biology and pathology of multiple brain and peripheral diseases, proteins responsible for the α-cleavage of cellular PrP, as well as gene therapy and DNA vaccination.
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2019 

Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion and THE FEAST 2003 CDC an updated review of the science 2019


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 04, 2014 

Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes 2005–2011

Authors, though, acknowledged the study was limited in geography and sample size and so it couldn't draw a conclusion about the risk to humans. They recommended more study. Dr. Ermias Belay was the report's principal author but he said New York and Oneida County officials are following the proper course by not launching a study. "There's really nothing to monitor presently. No one's sick," Belay said, noting the disease's incubation period in deer and elk is measured in years. "


Transmission Studies

Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases {the following was written but with a single line marked through it ''first passage (by this route)}....TSS

resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret.

snip.... 


Prion Infectivity in Fat of Deer with Chronic Wasting Disease▿ 

Brent Race#, Kimberly Meade-White#, Richard Race and Bruce Chesebro* + Author Affiliations

In mice, prion infectivity was recently detected in fat. Since ruminant fat is consumed by humans and fed to animals, we determined infectivity titers in fat from two CWD-infected deer. Deer fat devoid of muscle contained low levels of CWD infectivity and might be a risk factor for prion infection of other species. 


Prions in Skeletal Muscles of Deer with Chronic Wasting Disease 

Here bioassays in transgenic mice expressing cervid prion protein revealed the presence of infectious prions in skeletal muscles of CWD-infected deer, demonstrating that humans consuming or handling meat from CWD-infected deer are at risk to prion exposure. 


*** now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal communications years ago, and then the latest on the zoonotic potential from CWD to humans from the TOKYO PRION 2016 CONFERENCE.

see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does this mean there IS casual evidence ???? “Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans”

From: TSS 

Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???

Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST

From: "Belay, Ermias"

To: Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"

Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM

Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

Dear Sir/Madam,

In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD.. That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.

Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

-----Original Message-----

From: Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM


Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM .......snip........end..............TSS

Thursday, April 03, 2008

A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41 A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease Sigurdson CJ.

snip...

*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,

snip... full text ; 


*** I urge everyone to watch this video closely...terry 

*** you can see video here and interview with Jeff's Mom, and scientist telling you to test everything and potential risk factors for humans ***


*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies. 


> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people. 

sporadic, spontaneous CJD, 85%+ of all human TSE, just not just happen. never in scientific literature has this been proven.

if one looks up the word sporadic or spontaneous at pubmed, you will get a laundry list of disease that are classified in such a way;



key word here is 'reported'. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can't, and it's as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it's being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. ...terry 

*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***

*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).*** 



FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2019 

Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids: Implications for Prion Transmission to Humans and Other Animal Species


TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2020 

***> 2004 European Commission Chronic wasting disease AND TISSUES THAT MIGHT CARRY A RISK FOR HUMAN FOOD AND ANIMAL FEED CHAINS REPORT UPDATED 2020


CWD TSE PRION AND ZOONOTIC, ZOONOSIS, POTENTIAL

Subject: Re: DEER SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY SURVEY & HOUND STUDY 

Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 23:12:22 +0100 

From: Steve Dealler 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Organization: Netscape Online member 

To: BSE-L@ References: <3daf5023 .4080804="" wt.net="">

Dear Terry,

An excellent piece of review as this literature is desparately difficult to get back from Government sites.

What happened with the deer was that an association between deer meat eating and sporadic CJD was found in about 1993. The evidence was not great but did not disappear after several years of asking CJD cases what they had eaten. I think that the work into deer disease largely stopped because it was not helpful to the UK industry...and no specific cases were reported. Well, if you dont look adequately like they are in USA currenly then you wont find any!

Steve Dealler =============== 


Stephen Dealler is a consultant medical microbiologist  deal@airtime.co.uk 

BSE Inquiry Steve Dealler

Management In Confidence

BSE: Private Submission of Bovine Brain Dealler

snip...see full text;

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019

***> MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019


***> In conclusion, sensory symptoms and loss of reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome can be explained by neuropathological changes in the spinal cord. We conclude that the sensory symptoms and loss of lower limb reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome is due to pathology in the caudal spinal cord. <***

***> The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.<*** 

***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***

***> All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals.<*** 

***> In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II) <***


WHAT IF???

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 01, 2020 

Sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease sCJD and Human TSE Prion Annual Report December 14, 2020 


Wednesday, December 16, 2020 

Expanding spectrum of prion diseases Prusiner et al


Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA, 77518, Galveston Bay...on the bottom! <flounder9@verizon.net>